CHAP. V.

That fome Intelligible Objects, viz. of the immaterial Kind, are feen or underflood immediately, or by themselves ; with an occafional Argument for the exiftence of a God, and fome devotional Reflections upon the beatifick Vifion.

H

1. Aving taken a view of the feveral forts of intelligible Objects, as far as was requifite to the purpose of our Theory; let us now, in the next place, proceed to confider more definitely the precife manner, according to which we may with the greatest appearance of Reafon, fuppofe them to be understood by us. In order to which it is to be remarked, that there are two ways, and but two that can poffibly be conceiv'd of understanding things, viz. either by themselves, per autopsσiav

Tegyμal, as I may fay, the things themselves being immediately prefent to the Mind that is fuppofed to behold them, or by their Reprefentatives or Ideas. Which diftinction St. Auftin (whofe comprehenfive Capacity few things could efcape) takes notice of, and expreffes by per Præfentiam, and per Imagines, when he tells us, that his Memory was full of innumerable things, either by their Images, as of

Confef. lib. 10. Cap. 17.

all Bodies, or by their Prefence, as of the Arts, &c. Ecce in Memoria mea Campis & Antris & Cavernis innumerabilibus, atq; innumerabiliter plenis innumerabilium rerum generibus, five per Imagines, ficut Omnium Corporum, five per Prafentiam, ficut Artium, &c. So then according to this Metaphyfical Father, there are two ways of things being in the Mind, and confequently of being understood, either by themselves, or by their Ideas. Now it feems reasonable to think that fome of them are understood by themfelvés, that is, I mean (to be as diftinct as is poffible in expreffing what I would have diftinaly apprehended) that in the Perception of fome things the immediate Object of our Thought are the very things themselves.

2. As first of all, to begin at home, Those things that are in the Mind, as our Thoughts, whether they are pure Intellections, or Imaginations,or Senfations, or Defires, Affections, Inclinations, or whatever they be; these things, I conceive, are immediately perceiv'd by themfelves, and that because they are in the Mind, and so most intimate to it, and indeed more intimate than any Ideas can be. There is therefore no need of any Ideas in the Perception of these things, befides that it is not very conceivable how Ideas fhould be able to reprefent them. But not to infift upon this, fince it is not yet apparent what those Ideas are which are the Objects of our Thoughts, it may fuffice

for

for the prefent, that there is here no need or Occafion of them. For tho' the Soul turns her dark fide, as I may fay, to her felf, as having no clear view of her own Effence, that dear Self, whereof fhe is fo blindly fond, yet fhe can reflect upon her own Actings, and upon her own Senfations, and need not go out of her felf, for the Perception of any of thefe, because they are in her felf. How ignorant foever fhe may be of her felf, or of things that are without her, fhe cannot but be confcious of what paffes within, of what he does, or of what the feels done to her, of Thoughts and Sentiments, tho' as not having an Ideal view of her felf, fhe may not be able to know, per haps, what that Modification of her Effence is wherein this or that Sentiment does confift.

3. Now as to the things that are without the Mind, no fooner do we ftep out of our felves, but we launch out into a vaft Sea of intelligible Objects, where we fee no Shore, and can found no bottom. These are either Spiritual, or Corporeal, Intellectual, or Senfible. As for thofe of them which are Spiritual and Intellectual, as great a Friend as I am to Ideas, and of as much importance as I think them to be, not only to Humane Understanding, but even to the Sciences themfelves, yet I find it most reasonable, if not neceffary, to hold, That fome of these things are by themselves immediately Intelligible, and alfo fo understood by us, that they are not feen by any intelligible Species, or

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Idea

Confef. Lib. 10.

Cap. 10.

Part II. Idea reprefenting them to our Minds, but that the very things themselves, by a Real Prefence, as I may fay, are the immediate Objects of our Perception, whenever we have any Perception of them. In Memoria recondimus non Imagines earum fed ipfas, as St. Auftin fpeaks. 4. In the Head of thefe Self-intelligible Objects let us with all Reverence place the Great and ever Bleffed God, who is the best and most perfective Object of our Understandings, whose Vifion is in every degree Beatifick, and whom to know fully is Eternal Life, and that because he is known by Himself. Indeed we commonly talk of the Idea of God, and of our having an Idea of him; and a Philofopher of great Name, tho' in my poor Opinion not fo great as he deferves, has offer'd a Demonftration of his existence from his Idea. And 'tis true indeed we may be faid in a loofer and more popular Senfe, to have an Idea of God, as that means only on Objective Conception of him at large, or fo much of his infinite Nature, or Effence, as we can rightly conceive. But then when 'tis faid we have an Idea of God, the Term Idea, as I conceive with Submiffion to better Judgments, muft not be here taken as when applied to created Beings; as suppose when I fay I have an Idea of a Man, or of a Horse, because then 'twou'd import that as fuch Creatures are understood by something, that is di

ftinct from them, and we are faid to perceive them, in as much as we perceive what is intelligibly reprefentative of them, fo in like manner that God is alfo understood by fomething that is really diftinct from him, fomething that is not God, and that we perceive his Divine Effence no otherwife than as we perceive that which Ideally represents it, which I can by no means admit. God as he is the most Intelligible Object, fo is he Intelligible in the most perfect manner,and as he understands all things immediately in himself, fo alfo is he immediately Intelligible by himself, and 'tis by himself as the immediate Object of our Thought, that we perceive all that we do, or fhall ever perceive of him. For which Opinion, as novel or ftrange as it may appear to those who have been ufed to another way of Thinking, or of Speaking in Divine Matters, I feem not to want most convincing Reasons.

5. In the first place, let it be confider'd what was but now laft hinted. God is the most Intelligible Object, as being the greatest Reality. So far I reafon with Aquinas, and have the Warrant of his Authority both for my Satisfaction, and for my Protection. Cum unumquodq; fit Cognofcibile fecundum quod eft in actu, Deus qui eft Actus Purus, Art. 1. abfq; omni permixtione Potentia,

Part. 10. Quæft. 12.

quantum in fe, Maxime Cognofcibilis eft. Well, but then upon this ground I further argue, If God as being a pure Act be the most Intelligible

Object