Concurring Opinion: Harlan, J.

reasonable tolls. But the legislature, by the sixth section of the act of 1852, agreed that the directors might levy and collect such reasonable rates as they should, from time to time, establish by their by-laws. The introduction into that section of the special clause relating to rates, after and in connection with the general clause conferring power to make by-laws, rules and regulations, in reference to the affairs, business and interest of the company, not inconsistent with the laws of the State, was entirely unnecessary, and is meaningless, if not intended to assure those who put their means into the proposed road, that, as to the tolls to be levied and collected, they should be established by the directors within the limit of reasonableness, and not left to the uncontrolled discretion of the legislature. In other words, the company has-putting aside the general law of 1849-a contract with the State that it may, by its directors, establish, levy, and collect reasonable tolls. The court holds, erroneously, as I think, that no contract, in any view of the case, arises out of the act of 1852, and that, consistently with its provisions, the judiciary cannot inquire whether the rates established by the board of directors are or are not reasonable. Although the rates fixed by the legislature may be shown to be ruinously low, the judiciary cannot, according to the decision of the court, protect the company in the exercise of the power granted to it of establishing, levying, and collecting reasonable tolls.

I am of opinion that if the act of 1852 is to be regarded either alone or as superseding the law of 1849, it constitutes a contract between the State and the company, whereby the latter acquired an exemption from absolute legislative control as to rates, and secured, beyond the power of the legislature to withdraw, the right, through its directors, from time to time, within the limit of reasonableness, to establish rates of toll for the transportation of persons and property. If this be so, it results that all controversies involving rights under this contract must be adjusted, as in all other cases of contract, in the courts according to the established principles of law, and are not determinable by, or wholly dependent upon, the will of one of the parties. The company, or any one acting by its authority,

Counsel for Parties.

has the right to submit to the courts the question whether rates prescribed by any subsequent act of the legislature will give that reasonable compensation which the State agreed, in the act of 1852, might be exacted by the company under by-laws established by its board of directors.

The act of 1852 does not, I think, supersede the provisions of the general law of 1849 upon the subject of rates. But since the company (if we look alone to the act of 1852) has failed to show that the rates fixed in the act of 1871 are unreasonable, and since if the thirty-second section of the act of 1849 is still in force it does not appear that those rates would reduce the company's profits below the amount to which, by that section, they could be restricted by subsequent legislation, I concur in affirming the judgment.

FIELD, J.-I concur in the judgment in this case solely on the ground that no proof was made that the rate prescribed by the legislature was unreasonable. Under previous decisions of the court the legislative rate is to be taken as presumptively reasonable.

I do not give any weight to Munn v. Illinois. My objec tions to the decision in that case were expressed at the time it was rendered, and they have been strengthened by subsequent reflection. Besides, that case does not relate to corporations or to common carriers.

MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD did not sit in this case.

ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY v. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.

IN ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.

Decided May 7th, 1883.

Mr. John A. Campbell and Mr. John N. Jewett for plaintiff

in error.

Mr. James McCartney, Attorney-General of Illinois, Mr.

Opinion of the Court.

James K. Edsall, and Mr. John B. Hawley for defendant in

error.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. The case follows in all respects Ruggles v. Illinois, ante. This case, like that of Ruggles v. Illinois, just decided. presents the question whether the State of Illinois has entered into a contract with a railroad corporation not to exercise the legislative power to regulate charges for the carriage of persons and property upon the railroad of the corporation. It is not necessary in this case, any more than it was in the other, to inquire whether the power of legislative regulation, in this particular, is one that can be bargained away, because here, as there, we are of opinion that no such thing was intended. The provision of the charter of the Illinois Central Railroad Company relied on, as showing a contract, is almost identical with that of the Central Military Tract Company considered in the Ruggles case, and in the following words:

"SEC. 8. The said company shall have power to make, ordain, and establish all such by-laws, rules and regulations as may be deemed expedient and necessary to fulfil the purposes and carry into effect the provisions of this act, and for the well ordering, regulating, and securing the affairs, business, and interests of the company; Provided, That the same be not repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States or of this State, or repugnant to this act. The board of directors shall have power to establish such rates of toll for the conveyance of persons and property upon the same as they shall from time to time by their by-laws direct and determine, and to levy and collect the same for the use of said company. The transportation of persons and property, the width of track, the construction of wheels, the form and size of cars, the weight of loads, and the other matters and things respecting the use of said road and the conveyance of passengers and property, shall be in conformity to such rules and regulations as said board of directors shall from time to time determine. Nothing in this act contained shall authorize said corporation to make a location of their track within any city without the consent of common council of said city."

Syllabus.

What was said in the other case as to the construction of section six of that charter is applicable to this, and, referring to the opinion in that case for the reasons,

We affirm this judgment.

FIELD, J.--I concur in the judgment in this case for the reason expressed for my concurrence in the decision of Neal Ruggles v. The People of the State of Illinois.

HARLAN, J.-For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Ruggles v. People of Illinois, I dissent from the opinion of the court, but concur in affirming the judgment.

MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD took no part in the decision of this

case.

HAWLEY v. FAIRBANKS and Others.

IN ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.

Decided May 7th, 1883.

Appeal-Conflict of Law—Injunction—Jurisdiction-Mandamus-Municipal Bonds-Municipal Corporations--Statutes.

An act of the State of Illinois authorizing subscriptions by municipalities to the stock of a railroad company required the town clerks to transmit to county clerks transcripts of votes authorizing subscriptions, and the amount voted and the rate of interest to be paid, and after issue of bonds, certificates of the amount of bonds issued, the rate of interest thereon, and the number of each bond. It also required the county clerk, after the execu tion and delivery of the bonds, to annually compute and assess upon the township enough to pay the accruing interest and cost of collection, and a fund for redemption. A subsequent statute authorized holders of such bonds to register them with the State auditor of public accounts, and made it the duty of the auditor to estimate the amount of assessment necessary to meet the interest, &c., and to inform the county clerk: Held, That the object of each act was to provide a mode for information to reach the county clerk as to the amount of money necessary to be raised for these purposes, and that certified copies of judgments recovered in the Circuit Court of the United States by such bondholders upon their bonds lodged with the county clerk, had the same force and effect as information derived

Opinion of the Court.

in the modes provided by law, and made it the duty of the clerk to proceed with the computation and assessment of the tax.

Where a State court enjoined a municipal officer from enforcing a tax to pay a municipal obligation, and subsequently to the Injunction a judgment for payment of the interest which it was agreed should be made by the assessment and collection of the tax was recovered in a circuit court of the United States, the injunction cannot stand in the way of the enforcement of the tax by the circuit court, to carry its judgment into execution. When distinct causes of action are united in one suit for convenience, and to save expense, and the sum at issue in some of the causes is insufficient to give jurisdiction, and in others is sufficient to give it, those cases in which it is insufficient will be dismissed for want of jurisdiction, and those in which it is sufficient will be retained for adjudication.

Petition for mandamus to a county clerk, to compel the assessment of a tax to pay judgments recovered upon municipal bonds issued to pay subscriptions to stock in a railroad corporation.

Mr. James K. Edsall and Mr. John B. Hawley for plaintiff in error.

Mr. George A. Sanders for Fairbanks, defendant in error. Mr. T. C. Mather for Skinner, Thomas and Wetmore, defendants in error.

Mr. Thomas S. McClelland for all defendants in error.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. On the 5th of April, 1872, the town of Amboy, Lee County, Illinois, issued a series of bonds in payment of a subscription voted by the voters of the town to the capital stock of the Chicago & Rock River Railroad Company. Both the subscription and bonds were authorized by the charter of the railroad company, approved March 24th, 1869.

Sections 12 and 13 of this charter, which alone need be considered, are as follows:

"§ 12. It shall be the duty of the clerk of any such city, town or township, in which a vote shall be given in favor of subscription, within ten days thereafter, to transmit to the county clerk of their counties a transcript or statement of the vote given, and the amount so voted to be subscribed, and the rate of interest to be paid: Provided, That when elections shall be held and bonds