INDEX

ABANDONMENT OF DEBTOR'S PROPERTY BY TRUSTEE. See
Bankruptcy Act.

AIDERS AND ABETTORS AS SUBJECT TO DEATH PENALTY. See
Constitutional Law, II.

AID TO FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN. See Constitu-
tional Law, X.

ALL WRITS ACT. See Witnesses.

ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS' PERMIT AUTHORITY. See Clean
Water Act.

ARTICLE III JUDGES. See Constitutional Law, IV, 4.
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. See Constitutional Law, VIII.
BANK HOLDING COMPANY ACT OF 1956. See also Judgments.

Definition of "banks"-Federal Reserve Board regulation.-Federal Re-
serve Board exceeded its statutory authority in adopting a regulation that
defined "banks" in a manner contrary to §2(c) of Act, which defines a
"bank" as any institution that "accepts [demand] deposits" and makes
"commercial loans." Board of Governors, FRS v. Dimension Financial
Corp., p. 361.

BANKRUPTCY ACT.

Trustee's abandonment of debtor's property-State health or safety
laws-Pre-emption. - A bankruptcy trustee, acting pursuant to § 554(a) of
Act, may not abandon debtor's property in contravention of state public
health or safety laws, such as New Jersey and New York laws under which
debtor waste oil processor had been ordered to clean up certain contami-
nated processing sites that its trustee sought to abandon; § 554(a) does not
pre-empt all state and local laws. Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey
Dept. of Environmental Protection, p. 494.

CALIFORNIA. See Indians.

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. See Constitutional Law, II.

CIGARETTE EXCISE TAXES. See Indians.

CITATIONS FOR EMPLOYERS' VIOLATIONS OF SAFETY STAND-
ARDS. See Occupational Safety and Health Act.

CITY ELECTIONS. See Stays.

CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1871. See Constitutional Law, IV, 5, 6.
CLEAN WATER ACT.

Army Corps of Engineers-Permit authority-"Freshwater wet-
lands."-Army Corps of Engineers reasonably interpreted Act as requir-
ing that permits be obtained from Corps before discharging dredged or fill
materials onto "freshwater wetlands" adjacent to "waters of United
States," and a narrow reading of Corps' regulatory jurisdiction was not
necessary to avoid a "taking" problem under Fifth Amendment. United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., p. 121.

COLLEGES. See Constitutional Law, IV, 1.

"COMMERCIAL LOANS" BY BANKS. See Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956.

CONFESSIONS.

Corpus.

See Constitutional Law, VII; VIII, 1; Habeas

CONFRONTATION CLAUSE. See Constitutional Law, I.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See also Clean Water Act; Prisons and
Prisoners.

I. Confrontation of Witnesses.

State's expert witness-Inability to recall basis for opinion. - Where, at
respondent's murder trial resulting in his conviction, (1) State's expert
witness testified that in his opinion a hair, which was similar to victim's
hair and was found on murder weapon, had been forcibly removed, (2) ex-
pert testified on both direct examination and cross-examination that he
could not recall what method he had used in reaching his "forcible removal"
conclusion, (3) defense's expert witness testified that State's expert had
previously informed him of method used, and (4) defense's expert then
challenged premise of such method, admission of opinion of State's expert
did not violate respondent's rights under Confrontation Clause of Sixth
Amendment despite expert's inability to recall basis for his opinion. Dela-
ware v. Fensterer, p. 15.

II. Cruel and Unusual Punishment.

Death penalty-Aiders and abettors. - Either jury or state court may
make factual findings necessary to enforce Eighth Amendment rule that
death sentence may not be imposed on one who aids and abets a felony dur-
ing which a murder is committed but does not himself kill, attempt to kill,
or intend that a killing occur or that lethal force be used; where necessary
findings were not made in state-court proceedings, federal court, in habeas

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Continued.

corpus proceeding, should take steps to require State's judicial system to
make such findings in first instance. Cabana v. Bullock, p. 376.

III. Double Jeopardy.

1. Conviction of multiple counts-Resentencing.-Where (1) after re-
spondent was convicted in a Pennsylvania court of multiple counts of theft
and forgery, he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment on one theft
count and probation on one forgery count, and sentence was suspended on
remaining counts, and (2) appellate court held that statute of limitations
barred prosecution of several theft counts, including that on which re-
spondent had been sentenced, Pennsylvania Supreme Court erred in hold-
ing that, on remand, resentencing on remaining counts was barred by Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause. Pennsylvania v. Goldhammer, p. 28.

2. Kidnaping and murder-Separate prosecutions in two States.-
Where, in connection with his wife's kidnaping and murder, petitioner
pleaded guilty to murder in a prosecution in Georgia, where body was
found, and he was subsequently convicted of murder during a kidnaping in
a prosecution in Alabama, where kidnaping occurred, under dual sover-
eignty doctrine Alabama prosecution was not barred by Double Jeopardy
Clause. Heath v. Alabama, p. 82.

IV. Due Process.

1. Enrollment in university program-Student's dismissal upon failing
examination.-Where (1) respondent, after completing 4 years of a 6-year
medical program at University of Michigan, was dismissed from University
when he failed a test required for qualifying for final 2 years, and (2) after
unsuccessfully seeking readmission and an opportunity to retake examina-
tion, respondent brought federal-court action alleging a right to retake
examination on ground that his dismissal was arbitrary and capricious in
violation of his due process rights, record supported finding that there was
no violation of respondent's due process rights, even assuming that he had
a property right in continued enrollment. Regents of University of Michi-
gan v. Ewing, p. 214.

2. Exercise of Miranda right to remain silent-Prosecutor's use as evi-
dence of sanity.-Where (1) respondent, after receiving Miranda warn-
ings, exercised his right to remain silent at police interrogations following.
his arrest on state charges, (2) he later pleaded not guilty by reason of
insanity but was convicted, and (3) in closing argument, prosecutor, over
defense counsel's objection, reviewed officer's testimony as to respondent's
refusals to answer questions without first consulting an attorney, and sug-
gested that such refusals demonstrated a degree of comprehension that
was inconsistent with insanity claim, prosecutor's use of respondent's
silence as evidence of sanity violated Due Process Clause. Wainwright
v. Greenfield, p. 284.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Continued.

3. Failure to declare goods to Customs-Remission of forfeiture.-
Where (1) Customs seized respondent's car, purchased out of country,
when he failed to report it upon entering country, (2) rather than waiting
to challenge seizure in a judicial forfeiture action that Government might
institute, he elected to petition for administrative remission of forfeiture of
car, and (3) Customs did not respond to petition, or set penalty, until 36
days later, such delay did not deprive him of property without due process.
United States v. Von Neumann, p. 242.

4. Federal court of appeals' rule-Waiver of appellate review. -Due
Process Clause of Fifth Amendment, Article III of Constitution, and Fed-
eral Magistrates Act are not violated by a federal court of appeals' rule con-
ditioning appeal, when taken from a district court judgment that adopts a
magistrate's recommendation, upon timely filing of objections to magis-
trate's report with district court identifying issues on which further review
is desired, at least when rule incorporates notice to litigants and an oppor-
tunity to seek an extension of time for filing objections; such a rule is a
valid exercise of court's supervisory power. Thomas v. Arn, p. 140.

5. Injury to jail inmate-Official's negligence. -Due Process Clause is
not implicated by a state official's negligent act causing unintended loss of
or injury to life, liberty, or property; thus, a jail inmate could not recover
damages in an action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against a sheriff's deputy for
injuries allegedly sustained when inmate slipped on a pillow negligently
left on a jail stairway by deputy. Daniels v. Williams, p. 327.

6. Injury to prison inmate-Officials' negligence. -Due process protec-
tions, whether procedural or substantive, are not triggered by prison offi-
cials' lack of due care; thus, petitioner state prison inmate could not recover
damages for personal injuries in an action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against
prison officials for negligently failing to protect him from attack by a fellow
inmate after he had notified officials of threatened attack.
Cannon, p. 344.

Davidson v.

7. State's expert witness-Inability to recall basis for opinion.—Where,
at respondent's murder trial resulting in his conviction, (1) State's expert
witness testified that in his opinion a hair, which was similar to victim's
hair and was found on murder weapon, had been forcibly removed, (2) ex-
pert testified on both direct examination and cross-examination that he
could not recall what method he had used in reaching his "forcible removal"
conclusion, (3) defense's expert witness testified that State's expert had
previously informed him of method used, and (4) defense's expert then
challenged premise of such method, prosecution's foreknowledge that its
expert would be unable to give basis for his opinion did not impose an
obligation on it, as a matter of due process, to refrain from introducing
expert's testimony. Delaware v. Fensterer, p. 15.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Continued.

V. Equal Protection of the Laws.

Grand jury selection-Racial discrimination. -Where (1) state trial
court refused to quash respondent's indictment for alleged systematic
exclusion of blacks from grand jury that indicted him, (2) he was convicted
of first-degree murder, and (3) after unsuccessfully pursuing state-court
relief for next 16 years, he obtained federal habeas corpus relief on basis
of his equal protection challenge to grand jury, requirement of exhaustion
of state remedies was satisfied even though District Court required parties
to present supplemental evidence, where such evidence did not funda-
mentally alter claim already considered by state courts; rule requiring re-
versal of conviction was reaffirmed as against contentions that error was
harmless and that conviction after a fair trial purged any taint attributable
to grand jury process. Vasquez v. Hillery, p. 254.

VI. Freedom of Religion.

Visually handicapped persons-Aid to student at Christian college-Va-
lidity of state statute.-Extension of aid, under Washington statute for
vocational rehabilitation assistance to visually handicapped persons, to fi-
nance petitioner's training at a private Christian college to become a pas-
tor, missionary, or youth director, would not advance religion in violation
of Establishment Clause. Witters v. Washington Dept. of Services for
Blind, p. 481.

VII. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination.

Confessions-Voluntariness. —Admission of petitioner's confession-on
theory that, even assuming his arrest was illegal, voluntariness of confes-
sion was test of admissibility, and he did not claim that confession was not
voluntary-was improper; a finding of voluntariness of a confession for
Fifth Amendment purposes is not by itself sufficient to purge taint of an
illegal arrest, but is merely a threshold requirement for Fourth Amend-
ment analysis. Lanier v. South Carolina, p. 25.

VIII. Right to Counsel.

1. Accused's incriminating statements-Informant's use of body wire
transmitter. -Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated by admis-
sion at trial of incriminating statements made by respondent, who had re-
tained counsel, to his codefendant after indictment and at a meeting of the
two to plan defense strategy, where, unknown to respondent, codefendant
was cooperating with police and wore a body wire transmitter to record
meeting. Maine v. Moulton, p. 159.

2. Effectiveness of assistance-Plea-bargaining.-In federal habeas cor-
pus proceedings alleging that petitioner's plea-bargained guilty plea in a
state murder and theft prosecution was involuntary because of ineffective
assistance of counsel who misinformed him that he would be eligible for