vision which extends the judicial power of the United States to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and which authorizes congress "to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying it into execution," as well as upon the provision authorizing congress to regulate commerce between the states and foreign countries. The subject of the act is one of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and, so far as maritime torts are concerned, it is applicable to all such vessels, and over all waters subject to the general admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts, irrespective of the question as to whether the vessel is engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.1

In cases where the act does not constitute a maritime tort, the doctrine laid down in The Vessel-owners' Towing Co. is doubtless true,- that the vessel must be engaged in interstate or foreign commerce to enable the owners to avail themselves of the act limiting their liability where the tort is not of a maritime nature.

The provisions of this act do not apply to vessels navigating waters wholly within a state which are not navigable waters of the United States, the commerce on such waters not being within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, and not within the constitutional provision giving congress power to regulate commerce between the states. The act can only apply to those vessels which are engaged in foreign or interstate commerce, or upon waters over which admiralty has jurisdiction.3

It is not necessary that the vessel should be registered to entitle the owner to the provisions of the act.

1 The Katie, 40 Fed. R. 480; In re Petition of Long Island, etc. Transp. Co., 5 Fed. R. 599; Providence, etc. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U. S. 589; The Garden City, 26 Fed. R. 766; The Hazel Kirke, 25 Fed. R. 601; United States v. Burlington, etc. Ferry Co., 21 Fed. R. 331.

226 Fed. R. 169.

3 Moore v. American Transp. Co.,

24 How. 1; In re Long Island North Shore Passenger Transp. Co., 5 Fed. R. 599; The Vessel-owners' Towing Co., 26 Fed. R. 169; Lord v. Goodall, etc. Steamship Co., 4 Saw. 292; The Katie, 40 Fed. R. 480.

4 Wallace v. Providence & Stonington S. S. Co., 14 Fed. R. 56.

The statute has been held not to extend to the owners of pleasure crafts, but is confined to the owners of vessels engaged in commerce.1

Sec. 225. Foreign vessels and owners.- In administering justice admiralty courts usually determine the rights and liabilities of the parties according to the law of the forum. Where the parties seeking redress are both subjects of the same foreign power, or where they belong to different countries having the same law, the law of the flag being shown, the court will apply it; but where the foreign law is not shown, or where the laws of the litigants are not the same, the law of the forum prevails, and the courts apply the general maritime law as administered in this country.2

Where collisions occur on the high seas between foreign vessels where the law of no particular country prevails, the law of the forum will be applied unless it is shown that the laws of the flags are the same and different from the law

The Mamie, 5 Fed. R. 813. Where a steam-vessel was wrecked and abandoned to the insurers, and the vessel was taken in tow by a wrecking-master, but sank while in his charge and one of the crew was drowned, it was held that the steamer was still a "vessel" at the time of sinking, within the meaning of the limited liability act. Craig v. Continental Ins. Co., 141 U. S. 638.

The exemption from liability of arrest given to the owners of canalboats under section 4251 of the United States Revised Statutes extends only to those actually engaged in navigating canals, and does not include vessels built for that purpose but not engaged in that form of navigation. The Wm. L. Norman, 49 Fed. R. 285.

A scow-platform, used as an adjunct to a wharf which was mainly stationary and seldom moved, though capable of being moved by towing from place to place, having no motive power of its own, was held not a vessel within the meaning of the act. Ruddiman v. A Scow-Platform, 38 Fed. R. 158.

A barge, without motive power, used for excursion purposes about the harbor of New York and waters adjacent, was held to be within the provisions of the act, and might be surrendered under the act without the surrender of the tug by which it was towed. In re Myers Excursion & Navigation Co., 57 Fed. R. 240.

2 The Scotland, 105 U. S. 24; The State of Virginia, 60 Fed. R. 1018.

of the forum, when they will prevail if shown. The limited liability act is general in its terms, extending to all owners alike without distinction, and forms a part of the general admiralty law of this country, to be administered by our courts as any other part of our admiralty system is administered, although its efficacy as a rule depends upon the statute rather than upon any inherent force of the general maritime law, as that particular feature had never been adopted by our courts prior to the passage of the act.1 By navigating American waters a foreign ship subjects itself to the laws of this country, if bound to or from a port of this country; and when sued in the courts of the United States, or when appealing to them for protection, it must submit to the laws as administered here, and is entitled to all the relief our laws afford, subject to the limitations before stated.2 As between foreign and American ships on the high seas or elsewhere, when resorting to our courts, the limited liability of the owners will be applied to each alike. While it is true that the force of a statute cannot be extraterritorial, the limitation of liability has always been a rule of the general maritime law, although never adopted in this country until the passage of the limited liability act, when it became a part of our system of maritime jurisprudence, to be administered to the same extent and by the same methods that all other general maritime laws are administered; and the courts apply the rule regardless of the source whence their authority is derived, as well when it operates in favor of foreign owners as when it operates against them. It is well settled that American courts apply the general rule of limited liability, permitting the owner to surrender his vessel and freight and be exempt from further responsibility, regardless of the residence or nationality of the suitor.*

1 The Lotta wanna, 21 Wall. 558; Lewiston v. Oceanic Steam Nav. Co., 17 Alb. L. J. 285; In re Leonard, 14 Fed. R. 53; Thomassen v. Whitwell, 9 Ben. 403, 458.

3

2 The John Bramall, 10 Ben. 495; The Scotland, 105 U. S. 24.

3 In re Leonard, 14 Fed. R. 53. The Scotland, 105 U. S. 24; Churchill v. The British America,

2

Sec. 226. Losses by personal injuries and death. The act affords exemption from losses for injuries to persons 1 and for death resulting therefrom. Where the owner has taken appropriate proceedings to obtain the benefit of the act, such proceedings are a bar to the maintenance of a separate action for such injuries.3

The lim

Sec. 227. Limitation of losses on contracts. itation of liability afforded by the statute as it now is, is not confined to liability arising from the torts of the ship, but includes all liability arising from the contracts of the master and to all debts and liabilities incurred by the ship, where there is no privity to such contracts on the part of the owner. Except as to seamen's wages, the creditor's redress in all cases is limited to the value of the ship and pending freight, and the owner's liability measured by his interest therein. The owner is not relieved from liability upon his own personal contracts or such as he adopts as his contracts by ratification.

5

9 Ben. 516; Dyer v. National Steam Nav. Co., 118 U. S. 507; In re Petition of The Long Island North Shore Passenger and Freight Co., 5 Fed. R. 599; The John Bramall, 10 Ben. 495.

The Epsilon, 6 Ben. 378; The Amsterdam, 23 Fed. R. 112; The City of Columbus, 22 Fed. R. 460; The Marine City, 6 Fed. R. 413.

2 Craig v. Continental Ins. Co., 141 U. S. 638; In re Long Island Transp. Co., 5 Fed. R. 599; The Epsilon, 6 Ben. 378.

4 The Giles Loring, 48 Fed. R. 463; In re Garrett, 141 U. S. 12; Miller v. O'Brien, 35 Fed. R. 779; The Amos D. Carver, 35 Fed. R. 665; Whitcomb v. Emerson, 50 Fed. R. 128.

5 Laverty v. Claussen, 40 Fed. R. 542; McPhail v. Williams, 41 Fed. R. 61; The Amos D. Carver, 35 Fed. R. 665.

In Re Liverpool & Great Western S. S. Co., 3 Fed. R. 168, it was held that the act does not apply to relieve the owner from a claim for

3 Butlier v. Boston & S. S. S. Co., freight advanced but not earned 130 U. S. 527.

The act of February 28, 1871, providing for the better security of life on board of steam-vessels. does not supersede or displace the provisions of the act of 1851. Id.

by the ship.

6 Gokey v. Fort, 44 Fed. R. 364.

In The Giles Loring, 48 Fed. R. 463, it was held that the limited liability of the owner extended to an unjustifiable sale of cargo by

Sec. 228. Freight. The owner of a ship seeking to limit his liability is required not only to surrender the vessel or stipulate for its value, but also to surrender or stipulate for the amount of freight earned.

For the purpose of measuring the owner's liability, the value of the ship and freight at the end of the voyage upon which the loss occurs is the standard of measurement, whether the voyage is stopped by reason of disaster or is continued after collision occurs; but ordinarily no freight is earned until the port of destination is reached, and where no freight is earned, there is no liability therefor on the part of the owner. As Judge Nelson, in The Abbie C. Stubbs, says, "when a ship-owner sends his ship to sea, so far as his liability for collisions and other losses happening through the fault of those in charge of her, and without his privity or knowledge, is concerned, he puts at risk only his ship, the expense of navigating her, and the freight she may earn on the voyage. His responsibility is limited to the capital embarked in the adventure, and the profit he may gain from it in the form of freight or its equivalent. If the ship is sunk or destroyed, and no freight earned, his whole responsibility is at an end. If either or both are saved, in whole or in part, to that extent his liability remains; the words 'her freight then pending,' as used in section 4283, must at least include freight earned at the end of the voyage, for cargo on board at the time of the collision. Any deduction from the freight in the nature of an apportionment is therefore disallowed." But where the con

the master on the coast of Africa after the vessel was condemned as unseaworthy.

In Laverty v. Claussen, 40 Fed. R. 542, it was held that where a carrier contracts to insure a cargo he cannot claim the benefit of the limited liability act, its provisions not exempting him from his direct personal contracts.

1 Place v. Norwich & N. Y. Trans. Co., 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1150.

228 Fed. R. 719.

3 See, also, Thomassen v. Whitwell, 12 Fed. R. 891.

In Sumner et al. v. Caswell, 20 Fed. R. 249, Judge Brown, of the southern district of New York, held that the statute not only requires the surrender of the ship,