the general admiralty law of this country, it is nevertheless statute law, and is to be interpreted as such. Its efficacy depends upon the statute and not upon any inherent force of the maritime law, this being operative in the United States only so far as it is adopted by the laws, usages and customs of the country.1 It has repeatedly been held that the adoption of the rule was not an attempt to enlarge the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts, but was the enactment of a law which the courts were qualified to enforce and which congress had the constitutional right to enact.2 The first section of the act relates to liability arising from loss or damage by fire. The second section relates to liability for loss or damage to precious metals and other articles named, this section having been somewhat modified by the act of congress of February 28, 1871.3 The third section of the act is the one above quoted in full, and has never been altered or amended. The scope of the act has been enlarged, both by the decisions and rules of the courts as well as by subsequent acts of congress, until now the terms of the act, and the exemptions from liability afforded by it, are applicable to all sorts and conditions of vessels and water-craft, whether engaged in the navigation of the external or internal waters of the country, regardless of the nationality of the owner. The object of the law was to encourage ship-building, and to relieve owners from the common-law liability imposed upon them, placing them upon an equal footing with foreign competitors in the carrying trade in so far as their general liability is concerned.5 1 The Scotland, 15 Otto, 24; The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558. 2 Providence & N. Y. S. S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U. S. 578; Long Island North Shore Passenger Transp. Co., 5 Fed. R. 599; The Garden City, 26 Fed. R. 766. 316 U. S. Stat. at L. 458; U. S. Rev. Stat., sec. 4281. 4U. S. R. S., secs. 4281-4289; Act June 26, 1884, 23 U. S. Stat. at L. 57; Act June 19, 1886, 24 U. S. Stat. at L. 81; The Propeller Niagara, 21 How. 26. 5 Moore v. The American Transp. Co., 24 How. 1. On the 13th of February, 1893, congress passed an act1 entitled "An act relating to navigation of vessels, bills of lading, and to certain obligations, duties and rights in connection with the carriage of property." The act appears to have been drawn without a very clear idea of the object sought to be remedied, the language of the third section, taken by itself, being broad enough to annul substantially all liability and responsibility of carriers by sea. It is hardly supposable that congress intended to enact a law so radical and wide-sweeping in its effect as the language of the act would imply if literally construed. So far the adjudications limit it to the objects expressed in the title, and hold that it does not limit or modify the owner's liability for the negligent navigation of his ship.2 Sec. 213. What courts have jurisdiction.— The act of 1851 makes no reference as to what court may be resorted to for the relief provided by it, except that "the parties, or any of them, may take appropriate proceedings in any court for the purpose of apportioning the sum," etc. The substance of the act being in the nature of an admiralty proceeding, the supreme court, in the case of Norwich Co. v. Wright, held that it was within the admiralty jurisdiction of the district courts to administer the provisions of the act; and to facilitate this the court prescribed a system of rules regulating the procedure on the part of suitors seeking to avail themselves of the benefit of the act. The right of the court to prescribe such rules as were necessary to carry into effect the acts of congress and the general maritime law has never been questioned. The act being declaratory of the maritime law, and these courts vested with exclusive au 127 U. S. Stat. at L. 445. 2 The Guild Hall, 58 Fed. R. 797; The Concord, 58 Fed. R. 913; The Viola, 59 Fed. R. 913; 60 Fed. R. 296; The Berkshire, 59 Fed. R. 1007. 313 Wall. 104; National Steamship Co. v. Dyer, 1 Sup. Ct. R. 58. 4 Admiralty Rules 54 to 58; The Benefactor. 103 U. S. 244; Ex parte Slayton, 105 U. S. 452. 5 The Mary Lord, 31 Fed. R. 416. 6 The Scotland, 105 U. S. 28; Ex parte Phoenix Ins. Co., 118 U. S. 610. thority to take cognizance of this class of cases, it was early held that the district courts were well qualified to administer the provisions of the act, and have jurisdiction over the subject-matter, and power to enforce its provisions;1 in pursuance of which it may enjoin the prosecution of any suit at law wherein the personal liability of the owner is sought to be enforced. It has been a question of much uncertainty whether the act is to be limited to the liability arising under those cases cognizable in admiralty courts exclusively, or whether the act is broader in its scope than the mere limitation of a liability for acts strictly maritime in their nature. Were the authority of the court to administer the provisions of the law derived from the maritime law alone, there would be little doubt but that the admiralty courts alone could, under the constitution, administer its provisions. But the source of the law is not the general maritime law; it is statutory in its nature, and may be broader in scope than the general maritime law, so far as anything in the act indicates. The supreme court have not yet decided the question whether district courts alone have power to act, or whether the relief granted must be confined to cases strictly maritime in their nature. The nearest approach to a decision of the question is in Ex parte Phoenix Ins. Co.,3 where the court held that it was impossible, by the form of proceeding then invoked by the owner in the case at bar, to afford relief proceeding as an admiralty court. All the court pretended to decide was that the district courts of the United States, proceeding as admiralty courts, have no jurisdiction for the limitation of liability, where they would not have cognizance in admiralty originally of the cause of action involved. The court say: "In this case our decision against the jurisdiction of the district court is made without deciding whether or not 1 Norwich Co. v. Wright, 13 Wall. 104; The Providence, etc. S. S. Co., 6 Ben. 124; Providence & N. Y. S. S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U. S. 578; Black v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 39 2 Long Island North Shore Passenger Transp. Co., 5 Fed. R. 599. 3118 U. S. 610, 618. the statutory limitation of liability extends to the damages sustained by the fire in question, so as to be enforceable in an appropriate court of competent jurisdiction." In the case of Elwell v. Geibei et al.' Mr. Justice Wallace of the circuit court for the southern district of New York held that the circuit courts of the United States have no original jurisdiction by bill in equity or otherwise to enforce proceedings for limitation of the ship-owner's liability; that the statute created a new right, and by implication prescribed that it should be enforced in the district courts, and the remedy is confined to the jurisdiction provided by the statute which gives the right. In The Mary Lord' the same conclusion was reached. Jurisdiction depends upon the determination of the question as to Sec. 214. What acts limitation of liability may be asked for. If the exemption from liability is to be confined strictly to maritime offenses, then undoubtedly the admiralty courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction; but if the act is broader in its scope and is to be so construed as to include losses of whatsoever nature, regardless of the inquiry as to whether they fall within the category of maritime losses or offenses, no real reason can be urged why any court having jurisdiction of the cause of action and the parties should not so administer the law as to afford the relief intended to be given by the act. In the case of The Goodrich Transportation Company against Gagnon, Mr. Justice Harlan, with much care, discusses the question and concludes that the losses with respect to which congress designed the act to apply are those maritime losses over which admiralty courts have jurisdiction; and where the loss or injury arises under such circumstances that an admiralty court has no jurisdiction to enforce a liability, or to afford relief under the general admiralty jurisdiction, no limitation of liability can be invoked. While the weight of the learned judge's argu 133 Fed. R. 71. 231 Fed. R. 416. 336 Fed. R. 123. ment is admitted, and while we hesitate to criticise the opinion of so eminent an authority, the author is constrained to believe the act is broader in its scope than the court was disposed to concede in the case referred to. In construing the statute the manifest intention of congress in framing the act ought to be of paramount weight in determining its scope. The terms of the act are as broad as language can express them. It provides that "for any loss, damage or injury by collision, or for any act, matter or thing lost, damage or forfeiture done or occasioned, or incurred without the privity or knowledge of the owner, the owner shall only be liable to the extent of the value of his interest in the vessel and freight pending." So that unless there is some constitutional reason why the act is not applicable to other than maritime causes of action, it would seem that no substantial reason can be urged why it should not be as comprehensive in its application as its language indicates. It is urged that the act is but declaratory of the ancient maritime law, and that no act of congress can add to or detract from the jurisdiction conferred by the constitution; that the act is cognizable in admiralty only, because it deals with a subject of a maritime nature, and admiralty courts are more convenient than any other to enforce its provisions and better adapted to do so. It is doubtless true as a general proposition that congress cannot enlarge or decrease the jurisdiction of admiralty courts. It must be borne in mind, however, that the power of admiralty courts to act at all in this matter is by virtue of the statute, without which they are helpless, the ancient rule of admiralty limiting the owner's liability, having never been adopted into the laws of this country prior to the adoption of the statute; so that in exercising jurisdiction at all under the act, the courts act upon conferred jurisdiction. There is manifestly as much propriety in the federal courts assuming jurisdiction and applying the relief prescribed by the statute, not as admiralty courts but as law courts, in cases where the act complained of does not come within the cognizance of admiralty, as |