Sec. 197. Partial loss. The measure of damages in case of a partial loss is the amount necessarily incurred in repairing the vessel and in restoring it to a condition as good as it was before the collision, with interest on the amount so expended, together with the damages incurred by reason of the loss of the services of the vessel from the time of its disability until again restored to a seaworthy condition, together with such disbursements and expenses as directly result from the collision and are incurred on behalf of the

injured ship in restoring it to the condition in which it was prior to the injury inflicted. Ordinarily the damages that may be allowed for injuries cannot exceed the value of the ship at the time of collision. To recover more, where the vessel has been repaired instead of abandoned, special circumstances must be shown that the excess occurred notwithstanding the exercise of good faith and ordinary prudence in making the repairs.1

Restitution for the loss sustained and no more is the rule for determining the amount of damages in case of partial loss.2

For damages sustained by the vessel alone, the rule does not permit of a recovery beyond the amount of the full value of the vessel at the time of the collision, except as above stated. To the cost of the repairs, however, may be added such reasonable charges as are necessary to ascertain whether the vessel is a total loss or not, and such expenses as are incurred in removing the wreck, where this must be done. Courts require the injured party to show clearly that such special circumstances exist as justify the allowance of an excess over its valuation at the time of the collision, and that the utmost good faith and prudence have been exercised in incurring such additional expenses.

Sec. 198. Repairs. As before stated, the effort of admiralty courts is to restore the injured party to the condition in which he was prior to the injury, and the measure of

1 Halderman v. Beckwith, 4 McLean, 286; Williamson v. Barrett, 13 How. 101; The Narragansett, 1 Blatch. 211, 217; The Catherine v. Dickinson, 17 How. 170; The Rhode Island, Olc. 505; The Minnie, 26 Fed. R. 860; The Mary Eveline, 14 Blatch. 497; Seabrook v. Raft of Ties, 40 Fed. R. 596; The Fanny Tuthill, 17 Fed. R. 87.

2 The Venus, 17 Fed. R. 925.

The Venus, 17 Fed. R. 925.

Where a vessel was sunk in water so shallow that it could be raised and repaired for much less than the value of the ship at the time of collision, it was held that recovery could only be had for the cost of raising and for necessary repairs. The Thomas P. Way, 28 Fed. R. 526.

his damages for injury to the ship is the cost of restoring the vessel to as good a condition as it was at the time of the injury. The owner must, however, promptly take such steps as are necessary to restore the vessel. He may not dispose of it as it lies without effort to restore it, when repairs can be made, and sue for the difference between its value at the time of the collision and the amount so received.1

In making repairs to an injured vessel reference is always had to the usual and most economic method of making them, taking into consideration the object to be attained — the restoration of the vessel to its former condition; and where it is shown that unusual and needless expense is incurred in making such repairs, no recovery can be had beyond the fair value of the cost of making them. While indemnity only for the loss sustained is the rule of compensation, where the actual cost of repairs is relied upon as the proof of the amount of damage, it is necessary that the repairs be made within a reasonable time after the injury is received. Where the injured party has been unreasonably dilatory, and the repairs for that reason are unusually expensive, or where intervening voyages increasing the injuries already received have been made, the court will make a reasonable deduction for such increased damages.3

Where the wrong-doer takes the injured vessel into his

1 The Catherine v. Dickinson, 17 How. 170; The Cambridge, 2 Low. 21; O'Neil v. The J. M. North, 37 Fed. R. 270.

Where a vessel was damaged by reason of the unsafe condition of the bottom of a pier, it was held the measure of damage was the cost of repairing, and not the difference between the value of the vessel before injury and her value afterwards. Union Ice Co. v. Crowell, 55 Fed. R. 87.

Where repairs were so imprudently made that their cost amounted to more than the value of the vessel after they were made, the court only allowed libelant for demurrage during the time necessary to ascertain the cost of repairs and the cost of such examination. A Scow Without a Name, 8 Ben. 181.

3 The Russia, 4 Ben. 572; The Henry M. Clark, 22 Fed. R. 752; The Thomas P. Way, 28 Fed. R.

2 The J. T. Easton, 24 Fed. R. 95; 526; Clarke v. The Fashion, 2 Wall. The Venus, 17 Fed. R. 925.

Jr. 339.

possession to repair, he will be required to show that it is in as good condition as before; and where the repairs are imperfectly made, the wrong-doer is liable for such further amount as may be necessary to place it in the condition it was in before the accident.1

Where the vessel on the whole is worth as much as it was before the injury, no allowance for depreciation should be made unless such depreciation is clearly shown, and the difference in value must be substantial and real. Mere conjecture that the vessel is not as valuable as before, or that some damage may appear in the future, not apparent at the time, is too vague and uncertain for allowance.2

The owner is entitled to recover as damages whatever sum is found necessary to restore the vessel to the same degree of efficiency and usefulness it was before the injury, irrespective of the fact that, in making the repairs, new and more valuable material is used than was in the vessel at the time of receiving the injury.3

The actual cost of repairs, rather than the estimated cost, is the true measure of damages; and where the actual cost is less than the estimated value, allowance can be made only for the amount actually expended. The sum for which repairs are actually contracted, although prima facie evidence of the cost, is not conclusive, and any excess of the contract price, if shown, is properly chargeable against the offending party. In estimating the cost of repairs it is proper to add to their cost the damages suffered by the dis

1 The Uncle Abe, 9 Ben. 502.

2 Petty v. Merrell, 9 Blatch. 447; Coffin v. The Osceola, 34 Fed. R. 921.

In Sawyer v. Oakman, 7 Blatch. 290, it was held that when repairs made rendered the vessel as good as before, the fact that the general market price of the vessel was less than before, such depreciation not being due to the character of the re

pairs, did not entitle the owner to recover for such general depreciation where the repairs restored it perfectly to its former condition.

87.

3 The Fannie Tuthill, 17 Fed. R.

4 The City of Chester, 34 Fed. R. 429.

5 The Fannie Tuthill, 17 Fed. R. 87; The North Star, 44 Fed. R. 492; The Alaska, 44 Fed. R. 498.

abled vessel in consequence of the condition in which it is left by the wrong-doer. The expense of putting the vessel in condition that repairs may be made is a proper item of expense, and may include the expense incurred in raising, cleaning and pumping out the injured ship. The expense

of taking it from the place of collision to a suitable place for repairs, and such other expenses as are actually and necessarily incurred in putting the vessel in condition for repairs, are proper items of expense. Where the owner incurs expense in raising the injured vessel, or in investigating its condition to ascertain the extent of the injury, such expense may be recovered in addition to the actual repairs made, and in addition to the total loss, if repairs cannot be made, as it is the duty of the owner to ascertain, when possible, the extent of the injuries before declaring it a total loss; and where it is necessary to raise it to determine whether it can be repaired or not, the expense of doing so is properly chargeable against the wrong-doer, even though it turns out that the vessel is not worth repairing, and even though such added expense amounts to more than the full value of the ship when repaired, or more than its full value at the time of the collision. In the absence of fraud, such

1 Halderman v. Beckwith, 4 McLean, 286; Barrett v. Williams, 4 McLean, 589; The Havilah, 50 Fed. R. 331; The Morning Star, 4 Biss. 62; The Narragansett, 1 Blatch. 211; The Seabrooke v. Raft R. R. Ties, 40 Fed. R. 596; The Mary Eveline, 14 Blatch. 497; Fitch v. Livingstone, 4 Sandf. 492; The America, 11 Blatch. 485; Williamson v. Barrett, 13 How. 101; The Nebraska, 3 Ben. 261.

In the case of The Benjamin F. Hunt, Jr., 34 Fed. R. 816, a vessel received such injuries that it could not proceed with the voyage, and, being unable to navigate without

assistance, hired a tug to tow it to the home port. Held, that the towing charges were proper items of expense chargeable against the offending vessel, there being no evidence of bad faith on the part of the master in going to the home port rather than stopping at the nearest port for temporary repairs.

2 The America, 11 Blatch. 485; The Mary Eveline, 14 Blatch. 497.

3 The Nebraska, 3 Ben. 261; The Chauncey M. Depew, 59 Fed. R. 791; Mason v. Rhinelander, 8 Ben. 163.

4 The Bristol, 10 Blatch. 537.