Sec. 170. Collision with wharves and docks.- The owners of a vessel are liable to the dock-owner for damages arising by reason of negligent mooring, although the case may not be triable in an admiralty court, and is not, if the dock is a permanent fixture, attached to the earth; but where the landing place is a floating wharf or wharf-float, admiralty jurisdiction extends over it. Conversely, the owner or occupant of a dock is liable in damages to a person who, by invitation, makes use of it, for injuries caused by any defect in the dock, negligently permitted by the owner or occupant, the vessel using ordinary care to protect itself. While the owner or occupant of the dock is not an insurer of the safety of vessels moored there, he is bound to use reasonable care to keep his dock in moored to a pier of a bridge out of the usual channel, which might have been avoided by careful navigation. Baltimore, etc. R. R. Co. v. W. Transp. Co., 32 Ohio St. 116. A schooner was proceeding up the Chicago river in tow of a tug going at moderate speed. Approaching a bridge, the usual signal for passing was given by the tug, and the bridge-tender rang the usual bell, indicating that the bridge was about to be opened. The machinery to the bridge not responding to the effort to open it, the bridge-tender, instead of warning the tug to hold back, attempted to repair the machinery, by which delay the tow collided with the bridge. Held, that the bridge was alone at fault; that although the ringing of the bell was a warning to foot-passengers, yet the tug might well consider it a signal of permission to continue. Manistee Lumber Co. v. City of Chicago, 44 Fed. R. 87. In the case of The Arkansas, 17 Fed. R. 383, the court attempts to draw a distinction between torts arising from the collision of boats with structures lawfully placed in the navigable bed of a river, and those resulting from collision with structures along the shore, holding that over the former admiralty has jurisdiction. The weight of authority, however, does not sustain this view. A bridge company owning a draw-bridge across a navigable stream was held not responsible for a collision occurring between a schooner and a bridge, when the vessel in passing through sheered from its course and struck the bridge. Even though the bridge was so defective in construction as to amount to an obstruction of navigation, when this fact did not contribute to the collision the owner was not at fault. The John C. Sweeney, 55 Fed. R. 536. such a condition as to be used in safety by vessels invited to enter.1 Sec. 171. Collisions with obstructions to navigation.Vessels on the navigable waters of the United States have no such exclusive right of use that they may wholly disregard the right of occupancy or use by others. Navigable waterways must always be so used that the greatest good and the least inconvenience will result. Even where the occupancy of a navigable channel is illegal, it affords no justification for wilful injury nor for injuries that might with reasonable care be avoided.2 535. 1 The John A. Berkman, 6 Fed. R. of piles in dredging, not known or suspected by the owner of the slip, neither he nor the charterer of the vessel was liable for resulting damages sustained by the ship. Where a schooner came in collision with a wharf-boat by reason of dragging its anchor during a severe gale, the vessel was held not in fault for refraining from putting to sea when the approach of the storm was observed, it appearing that everything was done that prudence and good seamanship would suggest. It was held to be a case of inevitable accident. Stearns v. Hooper, 20 Pac. R. 734. In The Henry Clark v. O'Brien, 65 Fed. R. 815, where a vessel going out of harbor, and out of her course, was injured by striking a pier, the owner of the pier was held not liable although the pier was an unlawful obstruction, the vessel being at fault for attempting to start in the then state of wind and tide, and at fault for not anchoring when it became apparent that it could not get to sea. 2 In Hogan v. Brockie, 11 Fed. R. 745, it was held that where an injury was inflicted on a vessel by reason of a previous displacement It was held to be negligence on the part of the owner of a canal charging tolls to leave sunken piles or other obstructions in position where they were liable to interfere with navigation, and inflict injury, without providing sufficient danger signals. Pajewski v. Carondelet Canal Co., 11 Fed. R. 313. A vessel has no right to obstruct the channel of a navigable stream by stretching a line across it; and in doing so it will be liable for the resulting damages. McCord v. The Tiber, 6 Biss. 409. No one has the right to obstruct navigable waters unless acting under special authority to do so, and then only in such manner as to do the slightest amount of inconvenience. Where the littoral owner of a navigable stream erects projections from his shore into the navigable portion of the stream, he is liable for damages done to pass ing vessels, in the absence of special authority to do so. Atlee v. Packet Co., 21 Wall. 389. Where the channel of a stream is lawfully used, the user is chargeable with negligence in its use, if done in such a manner as to unnecessarily obstruct navigation. Where the screw of a propeller became entangled in a telegraph cable laid under navigable waters, it was held that the owner was bound to lay it in such a manner as not to cause an obstruction, and was liable for laying it in such a manner that it became entangled in the wheel. Stephens, etc. Transp. Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 8 Ben. 502. Where, under state authority, a pipe was laid across the bed of a navigable stream, allowing it to rest on the bed of the stream instead of burying it underground, the owner was held liable for damages to a vessel injured by reason of it. Onslaer v. Pennsylvania Co., 31 Fed. R. 354. Where the owner of a sunken vessel in a navigable stream or channel neglected to raise her, he cannot recover for damages done by a vessel running upon her and doing injury. The Atlee, 12 Fed. R. 734. CHAPTER XII. NEGLIGENCE IN GENERAL. Sec. 172. Lookouts.- While the international rules make no provision for lookouts, there is no rule of navigation more strictly enforced against all classes of vessels, regardless of size or condition, than the one requiring competent persons to be stationed in situations where there is an unobstructed opportunity to observe the movements of approaching vessels and the presence of pending danger.1 A competent and vigilant lookout, stationed in the forward part of a vessel under way, in a position best adapted to observe the presence of an approaching or overtaking vessel, is a measure so indispensable that admiralty courts have at all times been pronounced in their disapproval of its non-observance, and have not hesitated to impose damages for remissness in this most important particular.? Approaching vessels have the right to assume that the other is being navigated in compliance with the rules and customs of the sea, and that it is provided with proper and watchful lookouts both by day and night.3 Where there is any known impediment under which the ship is laboring there is an added necessity for vigilance. 1 The Marion, 56 Fed. R. 271. 2 St. John v. Paine, 10 How. 557. 3 Irons v. The Coe F. Young, 49 Fed. R. 167; The New Orleans, 106 U. S. 13; The Columbia, 9 Ben. 254; McCormick v. The Gladys, 35 Fed. R. 160. 110. this duty and has no special privilege exempting it that other vessels do not enjoy. The Manhassett, 34 Fed. R. 408. A schooner that was towed through a narrow passage where the wheelman's view was ob 4 The Agnes Manning, 44 Fed. R. structed was held at fault for not keeping a lookout posted. The Raritan, 32 Fed. R. 847. The necessity of a lookout properly stationed on a steamer navigating a harbor at night is imperative, and a ferry-boat is not exempt from In the case of The Lynn, 21 Fed. R. 815, it was held that where a collision was brought about by a Sec. 173. Sufficiency of lookout. The law imposes upon a ship the duty of employing only competent persons to act as lookouts; and where there is a failure to select persons of suitable age, intelligence, experience and physical qualifications, the ship and owners are responsible, where such neglect contributes to the collision.1 A proper lookout means not merely some one on deck who can see approaching danger if his attention is directed to it, but some one in a favorable position to observe, whose especial and sole business it is to watch and see that the vessel has an unobstructed course; and who is in such direct communication with the helmsman and officers in command, that prompt report may be made of the presence of danger of any sort.2 It has been repeatedly held that the master of a vessel is not a proper lookout. Having the general care of the ship, he cannot give that entire and undivided attention to the duties of a lookout required of one in that important position. It may well be said that public policy forbids the master of a vessel, to whose judgment and care the lives and property of multitudes of people are intrusted, to be distracted from the general supervision of the ship by the lack of watchfulness and care on The Pottsville, 12 Fed. R. 631; In this case a steamship, navigating at the rate of four miles an hour in a rough sea and dense fog, in one of the most frequented parts of the Atlantic, had placed a boy of sixteen years of age, who had been upon the water but a few weeks, as lookout. Held, that he was insufficient, and that the ship was liable for failing to select a competent person. That a vessel has an incompetent lookout is not a fault if his incompetency does not contribute to the disaster. Chapin v. The Hattie Ross, Fed. Cas. No. 2598. See, also, The Young America, 1 Brown, Adm. 549; The Victor, 1 Brown, Adm. 449; Shirley v. The Richmond, 2 Woods, 58; The Atlas, 4 Ben. 27; The Pennsylvania, 9 Blatch. 451; The Empire State, 2 Biss. 216. 2 The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443. |