JURISDICTION-Continued.
VIII. If the Act of February 27, 1909, conferring certain
jurisdiction on the courts of the Canal Zone, can
be construed to confer on such courts jurisdic-
tion to render judgment against the United
States, it is held that it was not intended that
such jurisdiction should be exclusive of the
general jurisdiction conferred on the Court of
Claims of suits against the sovereign. Id.
JUST COMPENSATION.
See Indian Claims I.
KLEIN CASE DECISION.
See Special Jurisdictional Act Invalid V, VI.
LABOR FROM RELIEF ROLLS.
Laches is defined as neglect to do a thing at the proper time.
Kawneer Company, 523.
See also Pay and Allowances VII.
LAND GRANT ROUTES.
See Transportation of Government Property I, II, V.
LIABILITY OF GOVERNMENT.
See Contracts VI, XV.
LIEN ON FUTURE BANK EARNINGS.
See Taxes XV, XVI.
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES.
I. Under the provisions of article 9 of the Standard
Government Construction Contract, on the
question of the assessment of liquidated dam-
ages the findings of the contracting officer as to
the facts and extent of delay are final and con-
clusive, subject to appeal to the head of the
department, but on the question whether or not
the defendant had caused a delay for which it
might be held liable for damages, the contracting
officer's findings of fact are not final and con-
clusive. Langevin, 15.
II. Where contractor was delayed by defendant's
representations in determining the depth of
footings required, for which delay no extension
was granted; and where contractor was unable
to give his personal supervision by reasons of
circumstances for which defendant was respon-
sible, resulting in delay of completion; assess-
ment of liquidated damages was unreasonable
and arbitrary, and plaintiff is entitled to recover.
Id.
See also Contracts XXIII.
MAIL CONTRACT.
See Contracts XLVII, XLVIII.
MISREPRESENTATION.
See Contracts III, XVIII, XXVII, XXVIII.
NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL
I. Where contract was exempt from the provisions of the
National Industrial Recovery Administration Act
and the President's Reemployment agreement
and Code of Fair Competition, but in response to
pressure brought to bear on contractor to in-
crease wages and shorten hours as prescribed in
the President's Reemployment Agreement, con-
tractor did increase wages and shorten hours;
it is held that such increase of wages and shorten-
ing of hours were the direct result of the enact-
ment of the National Industrial Recovery Ad-
ministration Act and plaintiff is entitled to
recover under the provisions of the Act of 1934
(U. S. Code, Title 41, Section 28) Huffman
Construction Co., 80.
II. Upon the stipulated facts and under the provi-
sions of the Acts of June 16, 1934, and June 25,
1938 (U. S. Code, Title 41, Sections 28-33),
claims filed by Kawneer Company under the
Act of 1934, individually and as successor of the
Coleman Bronze Company, for the increased
costs incurred under the subcontracts made by
the two companies were valid under the 1934
Act and sufficient to give the Court of Claims
jurisdiction to hear and determine said claims
under the Act of June 25, 1938. Kawneer
Company et al., 523.
III. Where a corporation, through a merger and con-
solidation, on February 28, 1934, acquired,
in exchange for stock, all the property and assets
of its wholly-owned subsidiary and assumed all
its liabilities, including certain contracts which
the subsidiary had partly performed; and where
the parent corporation completed the contracts;
the right of the parent-successor corporation to
present a claim under the Act of June 16, 1934,
for increased costs incurred as the result of the
enactment of the National Industrial Recovery
Act, under the contracts of the subsidiary prior
and subsequent to February 28, 1934, was not
barred under Section 3477 of the Revised Sta-
tutes under the rule announced and applied in
NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION
Seaboard Air Line Railway v. United States, 256
U. S. 655, and Kingan & Company v. United
States, 71 C. Cls. 19. Id.
IV. The 1934 Act gave completing sureties the right
to make claims and receive payments thereon,
and it was not intended to deny such right to
successors through merger and consolidation.
Id.
V. The legislative history of the 1934 and 1938 Acts
indicates that Congress intended that the pro-
viso of Section 1 of the 1938 Act should receive
a liberal rather than a technical construction
so as to accomplish the equitable purposes
intended by said Acts. Id.
VI. The 1938 Act enlarged the period during which
increased costs incurred under the N. I. R. A.
Act could be recovered, and for this enlarged
period recovery can be had even if no claim for
any period was presented under the 1934 Act.
Id.
VII. The claims presented by plaintiff were sufficient
under the 1934 and 1938 Acts; and it is accord-
ingly held that under the provisions of Sections
3 and 4 of the Act of June 16, 1934, proper and
sufficient claims were presented to give the
Court of Claims jurisdiction of the claim made
in the instant suit under the provisions of
Section 1 of the Act of June 25, 1938, and that
the Kawneer Company is entitled to recover
the amount stipulated as the increased labor
costs, both direct and indirect, incurred as a
result of the National Industrial Recovery Ad-
ministration Act in the performance of sub-
contracts made by the Kawneer Company and
the Coleman Bronze Company. Id.
VIII. Where, under the 1934 Act, the Comptroller
General received, considered and passed upon
a claim which showed on its face that it was
filed more than 6 months after the prime con-
tract had been completed; it is held that the
Comptroller General, in effect, extended the
time for presentation of the claim, and in any
event, having authority so to extend the time,
by considering and deciding the claim he waived
any objection to late filing thereof which might
be urged in the Court of Claims. See Thomp
NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION
son v. United States, 91 C. Cls. 166; Callahan
Construction Company v. United States, 91 C.
Cls. 538. Id.
IX. Under the express terms of Section 4 of the 1934
Act the Comptroller General was given abso-
lute discretion, where he considered there was
a good cause for late presentation, to consider
and decide a claim filed more than six months
after the completion of the contract. Id.
X. What constituted good cause was solely for the
Comptroller General to decide. Id.
XI. The 1938 Act provides that judgments, if any,
under the Act shall be allowed "upon a fair and
equitable basis," notwithstanding the bars or
defenses of any alleged laches or any provisions
of the 1934 Act.
XII. Laches is defined as neglect to do a thing at the
proper time.
XIII. Where under Section 4 of the 1934 Act the Comp-
troller General did not hold that a claim could
not "be considered or allowed" because pre-
sented late without good cause, the defense of
late presentation can not be made in the Court
of Claims under Section 3 of the 1938 Act. Id.
XIV. In order to recover under the Act of June 25, 1938,
it must be shown that the loss sustained by
contractor was the direct result of the enactment
of the National Industrial Recovery Adminis-
tration Act. See McCloskey & Company v.
United States, 98 C. Cls. 90, and Dravo Corpora-
tion v. United States, 93 C. Cls. 734. Weenink
and Sons, 543.
XV. In the instant case the immediate cause of the
plaintiff's extra labor costs was the inefficiency
of its employees, under the "stagger system" of
employment adopted on the recommendation
of a Joint Labor Committee, representing roof-
ing contractors and a local union of roofers,
with the purpose of spreading employment in
conformity with the purposes of the National
Industrial Recovery Administration Act but
not a direct result of the enactment thereof.
XVI. It is held that the evidence submitted by plaintiff
is not sufficient to establish that the increased
costs for lumber used in the manufacture of
articles covered by plaintiff's contracts with
NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION
defendant were the result of the enactment of
the National Industrial Recovery Administration
Act, and accordingly plaintiff is not entitled to
recover therefor. See Steel Products Engineering
Company v. United States, 90 C. Cls. 513, 518.
XVII. Where, in order to maintain wage-rate differentials
among its employees, as required by Section
4 (a) of the National Industrial Recovery Ad-
ministration Act and Paragraphs 6, 7, and 8 of
the President's Reemployment Agreement,
plaintiff made increases in the wages of its
employees receiving more than 40 cents per
hour; it is held that such increases were justified
under the statute and agreement and plaintiff is
accordingly entitled to recover. Id.
XVIII. Upon the proof showing that plaintiff made wage
increases to meet the minimum wage provisions
of the President's Reemployment Agreement; it
it held that such increases were the direct result
of the enactment of the National Industrial
Recovery Administration Act and plaintiff is
entitled to recover.
XIX. Under the jurisdictional act of June 25, 1938,
recovery for increased labor costs is conditioned
on the incurring of such costs as the result of
the enactment of the National Industrial Recov-
ery Administration Act rather than on strict
compliance with the code for the industry
involved. Erwin Cotton Mills, 559.
NET ESTATE FOR TAX PURPOSES.
I. The estate tax statute makes the estate of a dece-
dent a separate and distinct taxable entity and
deals with it as such; the estate is the taxpayer
and the statute requires the taxpayer to pay a
tax upon the net value of the property which
the estate receives as a transfer by death, after
deducting the amount of bona fide debts and
claims which are allowed by the laws of the
jurisdiction under which the estate is adminis-
tered. Schiffman et al., 248.
II. The net estate, for estate tax purposes, consists of
such property as the estate, under applicable
local laws and the terms of the will, if any, is
entitled to keep and distribute to the heirs,
legatees or trustees. Id.
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