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100 C. Cls.

CONTRACTS-Continued.

85 C. Cls. 603; Plato v. United States, 86 C. Cls.
665; United States v. Rice and Burton, Receivers,
317 U. S. 61. Id.

VIII. Where defendant had the right to make changes
in the contract, plaintiff is not entitled to re-
cover damages for delay caused by changes
made by defendant. United States v. Rice and
Burton, Receivers, 317 U. S. 61. Id.

IX. Where contractor failed to request an extension
of 27 days on account of delays in supplying
details and drawings at the time he requested
an extension of 24 days on another account,
which extension of 24 days was granted, con-
tractor thereby waived his claim to the 27 days'
delay. Id.

X. Failure of contractor to notify the contracting
officer of delays at the time of their occurrence,
as required by the contract, precludes recovery
under the Supreme Court's decision in Plumley
v. United States, 226 U. S. 545. Id.

XI. A requirement that notice of delay be given as a
condition precedent to the maintenance of a
suit against the United States in no way im-
pinges upon the jurisdiction conferred on the
Court of Claims by Congress. Id.

XII. Where the cause of delay is within the knowledge
of the contracting officer, notice is not neces-
sary. Id.

XIII. Where with the contractor's consent, building
was occupied by the Government before final
inspection, and where contractor did not notify
the contracting officer that he was being dam-
aged by such delay in making final inspection;
plaintiff is not entitled to recover. Id.
XIV. Actual damages must be definitely proven.
Eastern Contracting Company v. United States,
97 C. Cls. 341. Id.

XV. Where contractor was delayed by defendant's
representations in determining the depth of
footings required, for which delay no extension
was granted; and where contractor was unable
to give his personal supervision by reasons of
circumstances for which defendant was respon-
sible, resulting in delay of completion; assess-
ment of liquidated damages was unreasonable
and arbitrary, and plaintiff is entitled to
recover. Id.

100 C. Cls.

CONTRACTS-Continued.

XVI. Where the contract drawings specified a tin roof,
which contractor installed, under the super-
vision of the construction engineer, after a
sample of the tin had been submitted to the
supervising architect and approved by him;
and where later upon a report of a travelling
inspector the supervising architect reversed his
previous interpretation of the plans and speci-
fications and required contractor to remove the
tin roof and replace it with copper, which the
contractor did under protest; plaintiff is en-
titled to recover. Id.

XVII. The interpretation of the plans and specifications
by the contracting officer is final and conclusive
under the provisions of the Standard Govern-
ment Construction Contract, but there is
nothing in the contract or specifications that
gives the contracting officer the right to reverse
his ruling after the work has been done in accord-
ance with the original instructions of the con-
tracting officer. Id.

XVIII. Where Invitation for Bids and Specifications put
contractor on notice to investigate the condi-
tions existing in the river bed to be dredged,
and where defendant gave plaintiff such in-
formation as it had, there was no misrepre-
sentation of conditions by the defendant.
Huffman Construction Co., 80.

XIX. It is a prerequisite to plaintiff's right to an
equitable adjustment under Article 4 of stand-
ard Government contract that it appear that
conditions at the site were materially different
from those shown on the drawings or indicated
in the specifications. Id.

XX. In determining whether or not conditions at site
of work were different from those shown on the
drawings or indicated by the specifications, the
findings of fact of the contracting officer as to
the conditions actually encountered are final
and conclusive if not arbitrary or grossly
erroneous. Id.

XXI. Where specifications stated materials to be re-
moved were believed to be sand and clay "with
some hardpan and boulders" and where the
hardpan actually removed was 11 percent of
the total materials removed, conditions actually
encountered did not materially differ from those

100 C. Cls.

CONTRACTS-Continued.

indicated by the specifications; on the other
hand, if the hardpan actually removed had been
as much as that claimed by plaintiff, to wit,
50 percent, the conditions actually encountered
would have materially differed from those
indicated by the specifications. Id.

XXII. Where specifications provided for payment of cost
of removing shoals occurring after previous
dredging, but provided for the removal of mis-
placed materials at the expense of the con-
tractor, and the contracting officer found that
the materials removed were materials misplaced,
and not shoals, his decision is final and conclu-
sive, unless arbitrary or grossly erroneous. Id.
XXIII. Contracting officer's decision on contractor's claim
for remission of liquidated damages for delay,
which decision was affirmed by the head of the
department, was conclusive in the absence of
proof that such decision was arbitrary or er-
roneous. Id.

XXIV. Where contract was exempt from the provisions of
the National Industrial Recovery Administra-
tion Act and the President's Reemployment
Agreement and Code of Fair Competition, but
in response to pressure brought to bear on con-
tractor to increase wages and shorten hours as
prescribed in the President's Reemployment
Agreement, contractor did increase wages and
shorten hours; it is held that such increase of
wages and shortening of hours were the direct
result of the enactment of the National In-
dustrial Recovery Administration Act and
plaintiff is entitled to recover under the provi-
sions of the Act of 1934 (U. S. Code, Title 41,
Section 28). Id.

XXV. Following the decision in Seeds & Derham v.
United States, 92 C. Cls. 97, it is held that plain-
tiff is not entitled to recover where, under the
terms of the contract, labor was taken from the
relief rolls, and where the proof shows that the
labor so obtained was average relief-roll labor,
and there is no showing that any rules and regu-
lations were enforced which the contractor did
not know about in advance, or that the labor was
of a quality below that which the contractor had
a right to expect. Frazier-Davis Construction
Company, 120.

100 C. Cls.

CONTRACTS-Continued.

XXVI. Judgment on the basis of quantum meruit can not
be allowed where there is a valid contract be-
tween the parties. Id.

XXVII. Where the Government in the invitation for bids
or in specifications makes a misrepresentation of
material fact or conceals material facts and
information known to it but not available to or
known to the bidder, damages by way of excess
costs may under the implied terms of the
contract be recovered in a suit on the contract.
Id.

XXVIII. In the instant case it is held there was no mis-
representation by defendant of any fact which
it was under a legal duty to disclose to bidders,
or of any fact known to it and unknown and
unavailable to bidders; and the proof does not
show fraud, duress, accident or such mistake as
would justify the application of equitable
principles under the equitable jurisdiction con-
ferred upon the Court of Claims by Section 145
of the Judicial Code. (U. S. Code, Title 28,
Section 250.)

Id.

XXIX. Where under the provisions of the contract the
decisions of the contracting officer upon the facts,
when affirmed by the head of the department,
were final; and where such findings are not
shown to have been arbitrary or grossly er-
roneous; it is held that plaintiff is not entitled to
recover. Id.

XXX. Where Government building, constructed under
contract by the plaintiff, was occupied by the
Government on September 21, 1933, and on that
date the work was complete except for certain
defects, which were corrected to the satisfac-
tion of the Government in the fall of 1935;
and where final voucher was submitted on
July 20, 1936, and paid shortly thereafter;
suit filed on April 5, 1941, was not barred by
the statute of limitation. (U. S. Code, Title 28,
Section 26.) B-W. Construction Co., 227.
XXXI. Under the decisions in Pink v. United States, 85
C. Cls. 121, and Austin Engineering Co. v.
United States, 88 C. Cls. 559, the statute of
limitation did not begin to run until the work
was completed and final vo che was presented.
Id.

574432-44-vol. 100- -39

100 C. Cls.

CONTRACTS-Continued.

XXXII. Where the contracting officer admitted there had
been a slowing up of the work on Government
building but stated he did not have knowledge
as to the cause of the delay in completion, such
statement was not a finding that defendant
was responsible therefor.

Id.

XXXIII. Where in connection with the contract for the
construction of a Government building, plain-
tiff, contractor, submitted a proposal as to cost
of certain additions which the contracting officer
acknowledged were extra work, which work
was performed; and where the contracting of-
ficer rejected the claim for payment for such
extra work solely on the ground that payment
could not be made under Section 320 of the
Economy Act of June 30, 1932 (47 Stat. 382,
412); and where it is not denied that plaintiff
was entitled under the contract to the additional
compensation claimed; it is held that the con-
tracting officer's rejection of plaintiff's claim,
on the grounds stated, was not an interpreta-
tion of the drawings or specifications but a con-
struction of the statute, as to which neither the
contracting officer nor the head of the depart-
ment was the final arbiter. Id.

XXXIV. Whether Section 320 of the Economy Act barred
plaintiff from receiving additional compensation
for admittedly extra work was neither a ques-
tion of fact nor a dispute "arising under this
contract"; and the decision of the contracting
officer thereon is not binding on the contract-
ing parties nor on the court. Id.

XXXV. Where plaintiff, contractor, appealed from adverse
decision of the contracting officer to the head
of the department, who considered plaintiff's
appeal, sustained its contention and reversed
the decision of the superintendent of construc-
tion and contracting officer, and directed plain-
tiff to submit its claim for extra costs on the
regular Government voucher form, supported
by a statement of facts, through the office of
the superintendent of construction and the con-
tracting officer; and where plaintiff, in accord-
ance with the decision of the head of the depart-
ment, submitted its voucher as directed, sup-
ported by extended findings of fact by the super-

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