85 C. Cls. 603; Plato v. United States, 86 C. Cls. 665; United States v. Rice and Burton, Receivers, 317 U. S. 61. Id.
VIII. Where defendant had the right to make changes in the contract, plaintiff is not entitled to re- cover damages for delay caused by changes made by defendant. United States v. Rice and Burton, Receivers, 317 U. S. 61. Id.
IX. Where contractor failed to request an extension of 27 days on account of delays in supplying details and drawings at the time he requested an extension of 24 days on another account, which extension of 24 days was granted, con- tractor thereby waived his claim to the 27 days' delay. Id.
X. Failure of contractor to notify the contracting officer of delays at the time of their occurrence, as required by the contract, precludes recovery under the Supreme Court's decision in Plumley v. United States, 226 U. S. 545. Id.
XI. A requirement that notice of delay be given as a condition precedent to the maintenance of a suit against the United States in no way im- pinges upon the jurisdiction conferred on the Court of Claims by Congress. Id.
XII. Where the cause of delay is within the knowledge of the contracting officer, notice is not neces- sary. Id.
XIII. Where with the contractor's consent, building was occupied by the Government before final inspection, and where contractor did not notify the contracting officer that he was being dam- aged by such delay in making final inspection; plaintiff is not entitled to recover. Id. XIV. Actual damages must be definitely proven. Eastern Contracting Company v. United States, 97 C. Cls. 341. Id.
XV. Where contractor was delayed by defendant's representations in determining the depth of footings required, for which delay no extension was granted; and where contractor was unable to give his personal supervision by reasons of circumstances for which defendant was respon- sible, resulting in delay of completion; assess- ment of liquidated damages was unreasonable and arbitrary, and plaintiff is entitled to recover. Id.
XVI. Where the contract drawings specified a tin roof, which contractor installed, under the super- vision of the construction engineer, after a sample of the tin had been submitted to the supervising architect and approved by him; and where later upon a report of a travelling inspector the supervising architect reversed his previous interpretation of the plans and speci- fications and required contractor to remove the tin roof and replace it with copper, which the contractor did under protest; plaintiff is en- titled to recover. Id.
XVII. The interpretation of the plans and specifications by the contracting officer is final and conclusive under the provisions of the Standard Govern- ment Construction Contract, but there is nothing in the contract or specifications that gives the contracting officer the right to reverse his ruling after the work has been done in accord- ance with the original instructions of the con- tracting officer. Id.
XVIII. Where Invitation for Bids and Specifications put contractor on notice to investigate the condi- tions existing in the river bed to be dredged, and where defendant gave plaintiff such in- formation as it had, there was no misrepre- sentation of conditions by the defendant. Huffman Construction Co., 80.
XIX. It is a prerequisite to plaintiff's right to an equitable adjustment under Article 4 of stand- ard Government contract that it appear that conditions at the site were materially different from those shown on the drawings or indicated in the specifications. Id.
XX. In determining whether or not conditions at site of work were different from those shown on the drawings or indicated by the specifications, the findings of fact of the contracting officer as to the conditions actually encountered are final and conclusive if not arbitrary or grossly erroneous. Id.
XXI. Where specifications stated materials to be re- moved were believed to be sand and clay "with some hardpan and boulders" and where the hardpan actually removed was 11 percent of the total materials removed, conditions actually encountered did not materially differ from those
indicated by the specifications; on the other hand, if the hardpan actually removed had been as much as that claimed by plaintiff, to wit, 50 percent, the conditions actually encountered would have materially differed from those indicated by the specifications. Id.
XXII. Where specifications provided for payment of cost of removing shoals occurring after previous dredging, but provided for the removal of mis- placed materials at the expense of the con- tractor, and the contracting officer found that the materials removed were materials misplaced, and not shoals, his decision is final and conclu- sive, unless arbitrary or grossly erroneous. Id. XXIII. Contracting officer's decision on contractor's claim for remission of liquidated damages for delay, which decision was affirmed by the head of the department, was conclusive in the absence of proof that such decision was arbitrary or er- roneous. Id.
XXIV. Where contract was exempt from the provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Administra- tion Act and the President's Reemployment Agreement and Code of Fair Competition, but in response to pressure brought to bear on con- tractor to increase wages and shorten hours as prescribed in the President's Reemployment Agreement, contractor did increase wages and shorten hours; it is held that such increase of wages and shortening of hours were the direct result of the enactment of the National In- dustrial Recovery Administration Act and plaintiff is entitled to recover under the provi- sions of the Act of 1934 (U. S. Code, Title 41, Section 28). Id.
XXV. Following the decision in Seeds & Derham v. United States, 92 C. Cls. 97, it is held that plain- tiff is not entitled to recover where, under the terms of the contract, labor was taken from the relief rolls, and where the proof shows that the labor so obtained was average relief-roll labor, and there is no showing that any rules and regu- lations were enforced which the contractor did not know about in advance, or that the labor was of a quality below that which the contractor had a right to expect. Frazier-Davis Construction Company, 120.
XXVI. Judgment on the basis of quantum meruit can not be allowed where there is a valid contract be- tween the parties. Id.
XXVII. Where the Government in the invitation for bids or in specifications makes a misrepresentation of material fact or conceals material facts and information known to it but not available to or known to the bidder, damages by way of excess costs may under the implied terms of the contract be recovered in a suit on the contract. Id.
XXVIII. In the instant case it is held there was no mis- representation by defendant of any fact which it was under a legal duty to disclose to bidders, or of any fact known to it and unknown and unavailable to bidders; and the proof does not show fraud, duress, accident or such mistake as would justify the application of equitable principles under the equitable jurisdiction con- ferred upon the Court of Claims by Section 145 of the Judicial Code. (U. S. Code, Title 28, Section 250.)
XXIX. Where under the provisions of the contract the decisions of the contracting officer upon the facts, when affirmed by the head of the department, were final; and where such findings are not shown to have been arbitrary or grossly er- roneous; it is held that plaintiff is not entitled to recover. Id.
XXX. Where Government building, constructed under contract by the plaintiff, was occupied by the Government on September 21, 1933, and on that date the work was complete except for certain defects, which were corrected to the satisfac- tion of the Government in the fall of 1935; and where final voucher was submitted on July 20, 1936, and paid shortly thereafter; suit filed on April 5, 1941, was not barred by the statute of limitation. (U. S. Code, Title 28, Section 26.) B-W. Construction Co., 227. XXXI. Under the decisions in Pink v. United States, 85 C. Cls. 121, and Austin Engineering Co. v. United States, 88 C. Cls. 559, the statute of limitation did not begin to run until the work was completed and final vo che was presented. Id.
XXXII. Where the contracting officer admitted there had been a slowing up of the work on Government building but stated he did not have knowledge as to the cause of the delay in completion, such statement was not a finding that defendant was responsible therefor.
XXXIII. Where in connection with the contract for the construction of a Government building, plain- tiff, contractor, submitted a proposal as to cost of certain additions which the contracting officer acknowledged were extra work, which work was performed; and where the contracting of- ficer rejected the claim for payment for such extra work solely on the ground that payment could not be made under Section 320 of the Economy Act of June 30, 1932 (47 Stat. 382, 412); and where it is not denied that plaintiff was entitled under the contract to the additional compensation claimed; it is held that the con- tracting officer's rejection of plaintiff's claim, on the grounds stated, was not an interpreta- tion of the drawings or specifications but a con- struction of the statute, as to which neither the contracting officer nor the head of the depart- ment was the final arbiter. Id.
XXXIV. Whether Section 320 of the Economy Act barred plaintiff from receiving additional compensation for admittedly extra work was neither a ques- tion of fact nor a dispute "arising under this contract"; and the decision of the contracting officer thereon is not binding on the contract- ing parties nor on the court. Id.
XXXV. Where plaintiff, contractor, appealed from adverse decision of the contracting officer to the head of the department, who considered plaintiff's appeal, sustained its contention and reversed the decision of the superintendent of construc- tion and contracting officer, and directed plain- tiff to submit its claim for extra costs on the regular Government voucher form, supported by a statement of facts, through the office of the superintendent of construction and the con- tracting officer; and where plaintiff, in accord- ance with the decision of the head of the depart- ment, submitted its voucher as directed, sup- ported by extended findings of fact by the super-
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