Opinion of the Court 100 C. Cls. made on the job. In view of this, and since plaintiff on this particular job was acting both as his own superintendent and engineer, we think his services were reasonably worth not less than $750.00 a month. It is agreed that the other overhead costs were $4.95 a day. This makes a total daily cost of superintendence and overhead of $29.95. We have found that the defendant is responsible for the damages suffered by plaintiff for 238 days of delay caused by the defendant. At $29.95 a day for the cost of superintendence and job overhead he was damaged on this account in the total sum of $7,128.10. He is entitled to recover this amount. (2) Equipment rentals.-Plaintiff claims damages for the time certain of his equipment remained idle on account of defendant's delays. This equipment was a Rex mixer, a Chevrolet coupe, a saw rig, a derrick crab, 10,000 square feet of floor pans, small tools, and office furniture. He assumes that all this equipment was idle for the entire period of the delays, but there is no proof of this. The work was not at a complete standstill for all this time and some of this equipment may have been used for a part of the time. The proof tends to show that the job could have been completed 238 days earlier than it was except for defendant's delays, and if so, the equipment could have been used on other jobs or rented much earlier than it was. But, whether or not all this equipment was needed on this job until the end of the contract, or how much longer it was necessary on this job than it would have been had there been no delays, the proof does not show. The actual damage must be proven more definitely than has been done in this case. Cf. Eastern Contracting Co. v. United States, No. 44226, C. Cls. decided October 5, 1942. However, the defendant's delays have been many and long and inexcusable, and it is beyond doubt plaintiff has been greatly damaged thereby, and in part by the loss of use of this equipment. This was plaintiff's first contract; formerly he had worked as superintendent for other contractors. When he entered upon the work he had enough money saved up to pay his operating costs and to discount his bills. The purchase price 15 Opinion of the Court of his equipment was payable in installments, but on account of defendant's repeated delays he could not keep up his payments and lost his equipment, for which he had paid $4,405.25 (exclusive of the office furniture). According to plaintiff's figures the depreciation, upkeep, and interest on the investment in this equipment (exclusive of the office furniture) during the original contract time would have been $3,096.00. If this be deducted from the cost of the equipment, plaintiff would have suffered a loss of $1,309.25; but we think plaintiff's figure on the depreciation, etc., is high. We think $1,905.25 is more accurate. Deducting this from the cost of the equipment would result in a loss of $2,500.00. Under the peculiar facts of this case we think plaintiff should recover on this account the sum of $2,500.00. (3) Increased price of materials.-As a result of the adoption of the Codes of Fair Competition under the National Industrial Recovery Act in the early part of 1934 the cost of building materials substantially increased over 1933 prices. Since plaintiff's contract had to be largely performed thereafter on account of defendant's delays, plaintiff's material costs were increased by $644.64. He is entitled to recover this amount. (4) Loss of discounts for prompt payment of bills.—At the beginning of the job plaintiff discounted his bills for materials, and would have had sufficient funds to do so throughout the job except for the delays, but these delays so depleted his resources by delaying him in securing progress payments from the defendant that he was unable to continue to discount his bills, and he lost in this way $302.30. This he is entitled to recover. (5) Extra cost of doing certain work.-On account of the delays, making it impossible for plaintiff to do his work in an orderly manner, he was put to extra expense of doing certain work in the amount of $1,907.05. He is entitled to recover this amount. (6) Additional travel expense.-The commissioner found that the plaintiff was required to spend about $576.00 on travel expense to Clarksburg, West Virginia, and Washington, D. C., in efforts to prevent or minimize further delays. Opinion of the Court 100 C. Cls. The defendant takes no exception thereto. He is entitled to recover this item. (7) Extra cost due to inefficiency of labor.-The commissioner has found that plaintiff's proof is not sufficient to support this item. We agree. (8) Loss on insurance policy.-On account of defendant's delays and the consequent depletion of plaintiff's financial resources he was compelled to surrender life insurance policy in order to realize thereon its cash value. He claims a loss on the surrender of this policy as an element of his damage, but in our opinion he sustained no loss thereon. Plaintiff no doubt did not wish to surrender this policy when he did, but was forced to do so by defendant's delays, but he suffered no monetary loss on this account. He received its full cash value. (9) Extra cost of subcontracts.-We have held, supra, that plaintiff is not entitled to recover on account of this item. (10) Claim for extra photographs.-Plaintiff claims the cost of taking photographs to sustain his claim for expenses incurred for erecting an exterior masonry scaffold and for removing and rebuilding the boiler pit. This is an expense of prosecuting his claim. Such expense is not an element of damage for which recovery may be had. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES DEDUCTED The contract time was extended by the contracting officer until September 7, 1934. The building was occupied by the defendant on October 1, 1934. Liquidated damages were assessed for the 24 days between the expiration of the contract time and the occupation of the building in the amount of $720.00. This amount the plaintiff seeks to recover. The contracting officer found that the completion of the building had been delayed this length of time due to the failure of the plaintiff to give the work his personal supervision or to have on the job a competent foreman or superintendent. The Secretary of the Treasury approved the findings of the contracting officer on February 12, 1935. The commissioner has found that the work could have been completed 24 days earlier had the work been given adequate 15 Opinion of the Court supervision, but he also found that the plaintiff, who was his own superintendent, was unable to give the work the necessary supervision on account of the defendant's previous delays, which necessitated his absence from the work in an effort to establish new lines of credit and to locate his subcontractors and induce them to go on with the work. This is not denied by the defendant. As we stated above, plaintiff's resources were adequate for him to have completed the job and to have discounted his bills had he not been delayed by the defendant. We have also found that the subcontractors were reluctant to go on with the work because of the increased costs resulting from the enactment of the National Industrial Recovery Act and the adoption after the original completion date of the contract of Codes of Fair Competition. Plaintiff, therefore, was prevented from giving the work adequate supervision by the acts of the defendant in delaying the completion of the job. Had an extension of time been granted for the 18 days during which the work was suspended while defendant's representatives were making up their minds to what depth they wanted the footings lowered, the completion date would have been September 25, 1934. There is no conceivable reason why this extension should not have been granted. It was a delay caused in part by latent subsurface conditions, and in part by the failure of defendant's representatives to act promptly. The plaintiff was in no possible way responsible therefor. Under articles 4 and 9 he was clearly entitled to an extension of these 18 days. Had this extension been granted, the defendant's occupation of the building would have been only five or six days after the completion date. The assessment of liquidated damages under all these circumstances was altogether unreasonable and must be set aside as arbitrary. The plaintiff is entitled to recover $720.00 on account of liquidated damages deducted. CLAIM FOR COST OF REMOVING AND INSTALLING ROOF Plaintiff's last claim is for the cost of removing a tin roof and installing a copper one. The contract drawings specified a tin roof over the load Opinion of the Court 100 C. Cls. ing platform. In the middle of the drawing showing this roof there was written in large capital letters the words "TIN ROOF." The specifications said nothing about the kind of roofing for this loading platform, although they did provide for the kind of roofing for other portions of the building. Prior to installing the roof the plaintiff sent a sample of the tin he proposed to use for this purpose to the supervising architect for approval. It was returned approved. Plaintiff then proceeded to install the tin roof. This was done under the supervision of the construction engineer, and at the end of the month plaintiff was paid for the roof. About a month later a traveling inspector from the supervising architect's office told plaintiff that this roof should have been of copper instead of tin, because the specifications provided that "all exterior sheet metal work shall be of copper." Plaintiff protested. The construction engineer wrote the supervising architect for instructions. The supervising architect then reversed his former interpretation of the plans and specifications and held that a copper roof was required, and required plaintiff to remove the tin roof and replace it with copper. This plaintiff did under protest and at a cost of $319.44. The drawings and specifications, properly interpreted, plainly call for a tin roof. The provision in the specifications that "all exterior sheet metal work shall be of copper" is a general provision. The provision in the drawings calling for a “tin roof" is a specific provision relating to this particular exterior sheet metal. Anybody reading the specifications and looking at the drawings would of necessity come to the conclusion that it was intended that this roof should be of tin. The supervising architect was of this opinion when plaintiff presented to him the sample of the tin he proposed to use for this roof. The defendant says, however, that the interpretation of the plans and specifications by the contracting officer is made final and conclusive. So it is. But the contracting officer at first interpreted them to call for a tin roof. There is nothing in the contract or the specifications that gives him the right to reverse his ruling after the work has been done and to require plaintiff to tear out work already done in |