368 Opinion of the Court section 1086 provide for an action to recover money paid on a false claim. The only remedy given the Government by this section is the forfeiture of the claim, and in consequence the relief of the Government from liability therefor. After payment there is no claim to be forfeited. It may be the Congress might have provided for a suit against a claimant who had been paid on a false claim, if it had thought of it, but it has not done so. Although it is not necessary to show a pecuniary loss to defeat a fraudulent claim, it is necessary to do so where a claim has been paid and an action is brought to recover the amount paid. In such case recovery can be had only to the extent of the pecuniary loss sustained. Charles v. United States, 19 C. Cls. 316, does not hold otherwise. There a pecuniary loss was sustained and the offset was allowed to the extent of it. The demurrer to defendant's amended plea will be sustained and the plea dismissed. Proof will be taken only on the allegations of plaintiffs' petition. It is so ordered. MADDEN, Judge; LITTLETON, Judge; and WHALEY, Chief Justice, concur. JONES, Judge, took no part in the decision of this case. On plaintiff's motion for judgment, to which the defendant appended a statement to the effect that it "has no objection to the entry of judgment for plaintiffs in the amount of $1,286.28 other than defendant's set-off", and it appearing that on December 6, 1943, the court sustained the plaintiffs' demurrer to the defendant's amended Plea of Set-off, and dismissed said Plea; and it further appearing that on January 26, 1944, a stipulation was filed, signed by the parties, in which it was agreed that "during the months from November 1941 through August 1942 plaintiffs sold and delivered to defendant, pursuant to purchase orders duly authorized and entered into by representatives of defendant, certain fruits and vegetables for an aggregate purchase price of $1,727.74, of which sum defendant has paid plaintiffs the Opinion of the Court 100 C. Cls. sum of $437.66 and defendant was allowed by plaintiffs a credit of $3.80 for returned merchandise," and that "defendant has not paid the balance of said sum, to-wit, $1,286.28"; and it further appearing that on January 28, 1944, the commissioner of the court to whom the case was referred filed a memorandum report in which it was recommended that judgment be entered in favor of plaintiffs in the amount of $1,286.28, it was ordered February 7, 1944, that plaintiffs' motion for judgment be allowed, and judgment was entered for plaintiffs in the said sum of $1,286.28. ADOLF H. LANDLEY v. THE UNITED STATES [No. 45860. Decided December 6, 1943] On Demurrer Reward for information to Government.-Information gratuitously furnished by plaintiff to certain agencies of the Government does not come within the provisions of any of the statutes providing rewards, and plaintiff's petition does not state a cause of action. Same; no contract for services.-There was no contract, expressed or implied, made by any Government agency with the plaintiff for any service he may have rendered. Mr. Adolf H. Landley pro se. Mr. Percy M. Cox, with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney General Francis M. Shea, for the defendant. The facts sufficiently appear from the opinion of the court. WHALEY, Chief Justice, delivered the opinion of the court. This case comes to the court on a demurrer to the petition. Stricken of its surplus verbiage the petition alleges that the plaintiff, acting as a cobroker selling foreclosed mortgaged realty in the City of New York, discovered that numerous mutual savings banks, incorporated under State laws, had been indulging in what he considered certain malpractices in loaning money upon property fictitiously mortgaged; that the depositors of such banks were not adequately protected because the banks were not insured 372 Opinion of the Court under Federal laws; that since 1933 he had been attempting to stop these malpractices through the State agencies having jurisdiction of such banks but without success; that he took the matter up with the Federal Government and wrote to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and offered suggestions and a plan for the correction of the evils; that he had objected to the Federal Deposit Insurance granting insurance to these companies but three of them had been insured (and in the amendment to the petition plaintiff alleged all other Mutual Savings Banks in the State of New York had been insured); and that he had been informed in effect by the Federal agencies named that his information and observations were very interesting but "unfortunately no statute could be found giving the Federal Government jurisdiction over State banking." The plaintiff claims that a fair and reasonable value of the information so furnished by him to the Federal Government is the sum of one hundred thousand dollars for which judgment is prayed. Attached to the petition are four exhibits which are supposed to support plaintiff's claim for remuneration. The Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission replied to plaintiff's letter stating that the Commission had no authority to take any action. The Treasury Department acknowledged receipt of plaintiff's letter and enclosure and stated that it would receive careful consideration in connection with their study of the problem. The Comptroller of Currency simply acknowledged receipt of the letter. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation replied that "this corporation is without authority to require that [sic] all mutual savings become insured. As you know all such banks are State chartered institutions. Their affiliation with a Federal agency, consequently, must be voluntary. Insurance of deposits by this Corporation continues to be available to all mutual savings banks." From the above it will be seen that there has been no Opinion of the Court 100 C. Cls. contract, expressed or implied, made with the plaintiff for any service he may have rendered. Such services were purely gratuitous and were voluntarily made. From the allegations in the petition we are unable to see that they were of any value. Certainly no promise was made by any Federal agency to pay plaintiff for his efforts. Plaintiff's efforts were directed to the improvement of the banking situation in the State of New York and had nothing to do whatsoever with the Federal banking system. Plaintiff labored under the impression, and states in his petition, that he should be treated in the same way as others are treated under statutes covering rewards for information furnished. Plaintiff cites Title 5, Par. 416 of the United States Code which deals solely with rewards for useful suggestions of certain employees of the Navy Department; Title 8, Par. 139, 140, covering reward for informers of labor violationsthe transportation and soliciting of transportation or migration of contract laborers from one State to another; Title 50, Par. 58, which covers rewards for useful suggestions of employees of the War Department; and Title 19, Par. 1619, which refers to rewards for information of violations of the Custom Laws. We know of no law which would justify an award to plaintiff for whatever service he may have rendered and certainly there has been no contract entered into by any Federal agency and plaintiff. Plaintiff's acts were purely voluntary and such as any good citizen might do in order to protect his Government from assumed violations or bad practices of its agencies. We are of the opinion that no cause of action has been stated and the demurrer is therefore sustained and the petition dismissed. It is so ordered. MADDEN, Judge; WHITAKER, Judge; and LITTLETON, Judge, concur. JONES, Judge, took no part in the decision of this case. Syllabus ALLEN POPE v. THE UNITED STATES [No. 45704. Decided January 3, 1944]* On the Proofs Special Jurisdictional Act directing judgment of Court of Claims invalid.-1. Where a case has already been litigated to a final judgment in the Court of Claims, under the court's general jurisdiction; and where the right to seek a review of that judgment in the Supreme Court, also granted by a statute of general application, has already been exercised and such review denied by the Supreme Court; and where the amount of the judgment awarded by the Court of Claims to the plaintiff had been paid to him; it is held that a special act of Congress under which the plaintiff seeks to obtain a second, and more favorable, judgment from a court which has already heard, determined and rendered final judgment in the same litigation is invalid and not binding on the Court of Claims. Same.-2. The special act (56 Stat. 1122) not only purports to confer upon plaintiff the unusual privilege of litigating the same case a second time in a court which once finally decided it, and of applying a second time for a review in the Supreme Court of the United States, which also had once considered plaintiff's petition and denied such a review; but the special act also purports to decide the questions of law which were in the case upon its former trial, and to decide also all questions of fact except certain simple commutations which the Court of Claims is directed by the act to make, according to the formula specified in the special act. Same; construction of statutes.-3. It is generally recognized that a court should make every proper effort to give to an act of Congress a construction which keeps the act clear of serious constitutional questions. Same; language of special act mandatory.-4. The language of section 2 of the Special Act under consideration is plain and is, in the court's opinion, mandatory as to how the case must be decided, if the court should take the jurisdiction which the act purports to confer. Same; decision in Klein case controlling.-5. The decision in United States v. Klein, (13 Wall. 128) is controlling in the instant case, the grounds of decision in the Klein case being the attempted encroachment by one of the three independent branches of the Government upon another branch. Same.-6. Everything which the Supreme Court said in the Klein case, where the suit was pending on appeal in the Supreme Court when *Plaintiff's petition for writ of certiorari pending. |