In contrast to the moral gain of the visit of the Deutschland was the generally unfavorable impression created by the visit at the same time of the U53. Quite unexpectedly I received the news that a German submarine had arrived at Newport, the captain of which had reported himself to the American commandant and had handed him a letter addressed to me. The letter attracted a good deal of attention in the Press, but it actually contained nothing further than the introduction of the captain. The episode of the U53 was, from a political point of view, most undesirable and of no military value. When, moreover, a few days later the news arrived that the U53 had sunk several ships off the American coast-always, it is true, according to international law-the incident assumed a fairly serious aspect. Meanwhile I travelled direct to Shadow Lawn, the President's beautiful summer residence on the New Jersey coast, to hand to Mr. Wilson a letter from the Emperor. The President had appealed to the Heads of all the combatant States to urge them to permit relief to starving Poland, as had been done for Belgium. As was to be expected, the Entente rejected the proposal while the Central Powers agreed to it. The Emperor's approval was contained in the letter which I brought to Mr. Wilson.

The President took this opportunity to speak to me very seriously on the cruise of the U53, and urged me to see to it that this incident was not repeated. Otherwise he could not be responsible for public feeling in the United States, which might again become very bitter. The affair was very disagreeable to me personally, because I was building hopes on Mr. Wilson's mediation and because I feared that the cruise of the U53 would be interpreted as an attempt on our part to put difficulties in the way of the President's re-election. It might be assumed that his Republican opponents would say that

Germany could now do what she liked, as Mr. Wilson had never adopted energetic measures.

On the subject of this conversation with Mr. Wilson I sent the following telegram to the foreign office:

TELEGRAM IN CIPHER

"Washington, 11th October, 1916.

"I had a conversation with Mr. Wilson on the occasion of handing over the Emperor's autograph letter with regard to Polish relief. The President is anxious to carry the matter further and asked me how this could best be done. I replied that the difficulties lay exclusively on the English side.

"The cruiser warfare undertaken by our submarines off the American coast is naturally regarded by Mr. Wilson with anxiety, because all his hopes of re-election are based exclusively on the fact that according to the opinion held over here he has kept the United States out of the war and in spite of that has put an end to our so-called illegal attacks on American lives. His whole position falls to pieces if American lives are lost now, or if indignation is aroused by a submarine campaign off the American coast. So far this has not occurred. The exploit of U53 is even hailed as a sporting achievement. This view will, however, be changed if the incident is repeated. For this reason Wilson spoke plainly about a continuance of the submarine campaign off the American coast. He regarded as particularly serious the fact that two neutral ships were sunk, as well as a Canadian passenger vessel making for the United States. He said that such incidents could not be understood by the American public."

To this telegram I received from the Imperial Chancellor the following reply:

TELEGRAM IN CIPHER

"Berlin, 4th October, 1916. "England entirely responsible for difficulties with regard to Polish relief. For Your Excellency's exclusive information it is not intended to continue submarine campaign off American coast. Final decision as to activity of U53 not possible until she returns. Our concessions to America are being strictly observed and will be until explicitly revoked.

"BETHMANN-HOLLWEG."

CHAPTER X

AMERICAN MEDIATION

Ar midsummer, 1916, the political lull desired by Colonel House actually set in. The Colonel betook himself to one of the beautiful lakes of New Hampshire, in the far north of the United States, where in the ordinary way I could only reach him by letter or telegram. How secret we kept our communications is shown by the fact that, according to agreement, I wrote and telegraphed to Colonel House under the pseudonym "Martin." This caution proved to be fully justified, as the inquiry by the Senate Committee has shown that the letters from the Embassy were frequently opened by agents of the Entente propaganda, whether with or without the connivance of the American secret police I will not definitely say. I have already had occasion to mention this question in connection with the robbing of Mr. Albert. There are in the secret police of all countries men of doubtful honor. It might be taken as certain that there were such men in the pay of the Entente agents.

Soon after the settlement of the Sussex incident-on 27th May-Mr. Wilson made public, for the first time, his plan for the League of Nations. This idea was to constitute the foundation-stone of his mediation and fulfil all the hopes of the American pacifists for a compulsory court of arbitration in international disputes and general disarmament. Before the war many shrewd men in the United States thought that the arbitration system

initiated by the American Government would exclude the possibility of great wars. The outbreak of the World War showed that this was an illusion, and the question arose what precautions could be taken to prevent a recurrence of the world catastrophe. Mr. Wilson was one of the first in whom the idea matured that the scheme, hitherto regarded as utopian, of a league binding all civilized nations to a peaceful settlement of their disputes was capable of being made a practical proposition if backed, as a means of compulsion, by a commercial boycott, similar to that which the Entente, in contravention of international law, employed with such terrible results against Germany.

The most important sentences of the speech which the President addressed to the American peace league ran as follows:

"When the invitation for me to be here to-night came to me, I was glad to accept,-not because it offered me. an opportunity to discuss the programme of the League, -that you will, I am sure, not expect of me,--but because the desire of the whole world now turns eagerly towards the hope of peace, and there is just reason why we should take our part in counsel upon this great theme.

"With its causes and its objects we are not concerned. The obscure fountains from which its stupendous flood has burst forth we are not interested to search for or explore.

"And the lesson which the shock of being taken by surprise in a matter so deeply vital to all the nations of the world has made poignantly clear is, that the peace of the world must henceforth depend upon a new and more wholesome diplomacy. Only when the great nations of the world have reached some sort of agreement as to what they hold to be fundamental to their common in