you, so far as, in my most anxious judgment, I consistently can. But you must act. Yours, very truly, Major-General MOCLELLAN. ABRAHAM LINCOLN. In this letter the President only echoed the impatience and eagerness of the whole country. The most careful inquiries which General Wool, in command at Fortress Monroe, had been able to make, satisfied him that Yorktown was not held by any considerable force, and subsequent disclosures have made it quite certain that this force was so utterly inadequate to the defence of the position, that a prompt movement upon it would have caused its immediate surrender, and enabled our army to advance at once upon Richmond. General McClellan decided, however, to approach it by a regular siege; and it was not until this design had become apparent, that the rebel Government began to re-enforce Magruder.* He * The following extract from the official report of Major-General Magruder, .dated May 3d, 1862, and published by order of the Confederate Congress, is conelusive as to the real strength of the force which General McClellan had in front of him at Yorktown: HEADQUARTERS, DepartmenT OF THE PENINSULA, General 8. CoOPER, A. and I. G. C. 8. A. : * I had prepared, as my real line of defence, positions in advance at Harwood's and Young's Mills. Both flanks of this line were defended by boggy and difficult streams and swamps. In my opinion, this advanced line, with its flank defences, might have been held by twenty thousand troops. Finding my forces too weak to attempt the defence of this line, I was compelled to prepare to receive the enemy on a second line on Warwick River. This line was incomplete in its preparations. Keeping then only small bodies of troops at Harwood's and Young's Mills, and on Ship Point, I distributed my remaining forces along the Warwick line, embracing a front from Yorktown to Minor's farm of twelve miles, and from the latter place to Mulberry Island Point one and a half miles. I was compelled to place In Gloucester Point, Yorktown, aud Mulberry Island, fixed garrisons, amounting to six thousand men, my whole force being eleven thousand, so that it will be seen that the balance of the line, embracing a length of thirteen miles, was defended by about five thousand men. After the reconnoissances in great force from Fortress Monroe and Newport News, the enemy, on the 8d of April, advanced and took possession of Harwood's Mill. He advanced in two heavy columns, one along the old York road, and the other along the Warwick road, and on the 5th of April appeared simultaneously along the whole part of our line from Minor's farm to Yorktown. I have no accurate data upon which to base an exact statement of his force; but from various continued his applications to the Government for more troops, more cannon, more transportation-all which were sent forward to him as rapidly as possible, being taken mainly from McDowell's corps. On the 14th of April, General Franklin, detached from that corps, reported to General McClellan, near Yorktown, but his troops remained on board the transports. A month was spent in this way, the President urging action in the most earnest manner, and the commanding general delaying from day to day his reiterated promises to commence operations immediately. At last, on the morning of the 4th of May, it was discovered that the rebels had been busy for a day or two in evacuating Yorktown, and that the last of their columns had left that place, all their supply trains laving been previously removed on the day and night preceding. General McClellan, in announcing this event to the Government, added that "no time would be lost" in the pursuit, and that he should "push the enemy to the wall." General Stoneman, with a column of cavalry, was at once sent forward to overtake the retreating enemy, which he succeeded in doing on the same day, and was repulsed. On the 5th, the forces ordered forward by General McClellan came up, and found a very strong rear-guard of the rebels strongly fortified, about two miles east of Williamsburg, and prepared to dispute the advance of the pursuing troops. It had been known sources of information I was satisfied that I had before me the enemy's Army of the Potomac, under the command of General McClellan, with the exception of the two corps d'armés of Banks and McDowell respectively-forming an aggregate number certainly of not less than one bundred thousand, since ascertained to have ben one hundred and twenty thousand men. On every portion of my lines he attacked us with a furious cannonading and musketry, which was responded to with effect by our batteries and troops of the line. His skirmishers also were well thrown forward on this and the succeeding day, and energetically felt our whole line, but were everywhere repulsed by the steadiness of our troops. Thus, with five thousand men, exclusive of the garrisons, we stopped and held in check over one hundred thousand of the enemy. Every preparation was made in anticipation of another attack by the enemy. The men slept in the trenches and under arms, but, to my utter surprise, he permitted day after day to elapse without an assault. In a few days the object of his delay was apparent. In every direction in front of our lines, through the intervening woods and along the open fields, earthworks began to appear. Through the energetic action of the Government re-enforcemonts began to pour in, and each hour the army of the Peninsula grew stronger and stronger, until anxiety passed from my mind as to the result of an attack upon us. * J. BANKHEAD Magruder, Major-General. from the beginning that a very formidable line of forts had been erected here, and it ought to have been equally well known by the commanding general that the retreating enemy would avail himself of them to delay the pursuit. General McClellan, however, had evidently anticipated no resistance. He remained at his head-quarters, two miles in the rear of Yorktown, until summoned by special messenger in the afternoon of the 5th, who announced to him that our troops had encountered the enemy strongly posted, that a bloody battle was in progress, and that his presence on the field was imperatively required. Replying to the messenger that he had supposed our troops in front "could attend to that little matter," General McClellan left his head-quarters at about half-past two, P. M., and reached the field at five. General Hooker, General Heintzelman, and General Sumner had been fighting under enormous difficulties, and with heavy losses, during all the early part of the day; and just as the commanding general arrived, General Kearney had re-enforced General Hooker, and General Hancock had executed a brilliant flank movement, which turned the fortunes of the day, and left our forces in possession of the field. General McClellan does not seem to have understood that this affair was simply an attempt of the rebel rearguard to cover the retreat of the main force, and that when it had delayed the pursuit it had accomplished its whole purpose. He countermanded an order for the advance of two divisions, and ordered them back to Yorktown; and in a dispatch sent to the War Department the same night, he treats the battle as an engagement with the whole rebel army. "I find," he says, General Joe Johnston in front of me in strong force, probably greater, a good deal, than my own." He again complains of the inferiority of his command, says he will do all he can 66 with the force at his disposal," and that he should "run the risk of at least holding them in check here (at Williamsburg) while he resumed the original plan"-which was to send Franklin to West Point by water. But the direct pursuit of the retreating rebel army was abandoned-owing, as the General said, to the bad state of the roads, which rendered it impracticable. Some five days were spent at Williamsburg, which enabled the rebels, notwithstanding the "state of the roads," to withdraw their whole force across the Chickahominy, and establish themselves within the fortifications in front of Richmond. On the morning of the 7th, General Franklin landed at West Point, but too late to intercept the main body of the retreating army; he was met by a strong rear-guard, with whom he had a sharp but fruitless engagement. The York River had been selected as the base of operations, in preference to the James, because it was in a better position to effect a junction with any troops that might move from Washington on the Fredericksburg line;"* and arrangements were made to procure supplies for the army by that route. On the 9th, Norfolk was evacuated by the rebels, all the troops withdrawing in safety to Richmond; and the city, on the next day, was occupied by General Wool. On the 11th, the formidable steamer Merrimack, which had held our whole naval force at Fortress Monroe completely in check, was blown up by the rebels themselves, and our vessels attempted to reopen the navigation of the James River, but were repulsed by a heavy battery at Drury's Bluff, eight miles below Richmond. After waiting for several days for the roads to improve, the main body of the army was put in motion on the road towards Richmond, which was about forty miles from Williamsburg; and, on the 16th, head-quarters were established at White House, at the point where the Richmond Railroad crosses the Pamunkey, an affluent of the York River-the main body of the army lying along the south bank of the Chickahominy, a swampy stream, behind which the rebel army had intrenched itself for the defence of Richmond. General McClellan began again to prepare for fighting * See General McClellan's testimony-Report of Committee on Conduct of the War, vol. i., p. 431. the "decisive battle" which he had been predicting ever since the rebels withdrew from Manassas, but which they had so far succeeded in avoiding. A good deal of his atmaking out a case of tention, however, was devoted to neglect against the Government. On the 10th of May, when he had advanced but three miles beyond Williamsburg, he sent a long dispatch to the War Department, reiterating his conviction that the rebels were about to dispute his advance with their whole force, and asking for "every man" the Government could send him. If not re-enforced, he said he should probably be "obliged to fight nearly double his numbers strongly intrenched." Ten days previously the official returns showed that he had one hundred and sixty thousand men under his command. On the 14th, he telegraphed the President, reiterating his fears that he was to be met by overwhelming numbers, saying that he could not bring more than eighty thousand men into the field, and again asking for "every man" that the War Department could send him. Even if more troops should not be needed for military purposes, he thought a great display of imposing force in the capital of the rebel government would have the best moral effect. To these repeated demands the President, through the Secretary of War, on the 18th of May, made the following reply : WASHINGTON, May 18—2 P. M. GENERAL:-Your dispatch to the President, asking re-enforcements, has been received and carefully considered. The President is not willing to uncover the Capital entirely; and it is believed that even if this were prudent, it would require more time to effect a junction between your army and that of the Rappahannock by the way of the Potomac and York River, than by a land march. In order, therefore, to increase the strength of the attack upon Richmond at the earliest moment, General McDowell has been ordered to march upon that city by the shortest route. He is ordered, keeping himself always in position, to save the Capital from all possible attack, so to operate as to put his left wing in communication with your right wing, and you are instructed to co-operate so as to establish this communication as soon as possible by extending your right wing to the north of Richmond. It is believed that this communication can be safely established either north or south of the Pamunkey River. |