Opinion of Field, J., concurring. follow any lawful employment without other restraint than such as equally affects all other persons. Before this amendment and the thirteenth amendment were adopted, the States had supreme authority over all these matters, and the National government, except in a few particulars, could afford no protection to the individual against arbitrary and oppressive legislation. After the civil war had closed, the same authority was asserted, and, in the States recently in insurrection, was exercised to the oppression of the freedmen; and towards citizens of the North seeking residence there, or citizens resident there who had maintained their loyalty during the war for nationality, a feeling of jealousy and dislike existed which could not fail soon to find expression in discriminating and hostile legislation. It was to prevent the possibility of such legislation in future, and its enforcement where already adopted, that the fourteenth amendment was directed. It grew out of the feeling that a union which had been maintained by such costly sacrifices was, after all, worthless if a citizen could not be protected in all his fundamental rights everywhere— North and South, East and West-throughout the limits of the Republic. The amendment was not, as held in the opinion of the majority, primarily intended to confer citizenship on the negro race. It had a much broader purpose; it was intended to justify legislation, extending the protec tion of the National government over the common rights of all citizens of the United States, and thus obviate objections to the legislation adopted for the protection of the emancipated race. It was intended to make it possible for all persons, which necessarily included those of every race and color, to live in peace and security wherever the jurisdiction of the nation reached. It, therefore, recognized, if it did not create, a National citizenship, and made all persons citizens except those who preferred to remain under the protection of a foreign government; and declared that their privileges and immunities, which embrace the fundamental rights belonging to citizens of all free governments, should not be abridged by any State. This National citi Syllabus. zenship is primary, aud not secondary. It clothes its possessor, or would do so if not shorn of its efficiency by construction, with the right, when his privileges and immunities are invaded by partial and discriminating legislation, to appeal from his State to his Nation, and gives him the assurance that, for his protection, he can invoke the whole power of the government. This case was considered by the court in connection with the Slaughter-House Cases, although its decision has been so long delayed. I have felt, therefore, called upon to point out the distinction between this case and those cases, and as there has been some apparent misapprehension of the views of the dissenting judges, to restate the grounds of their dis sent. I concur in the judgment in this case. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. SYKES v. CHADWICK. A woman's right of dower being a valuable right which she cannot be compelled to resign, and which the law protects very carefully from her husband's control, her release of it is a good consideration for a promise to pay money to her separate use. Accordingly, where a husband and another, owning a piece of land in the District of Columbia, which they wanted to sell, applied to the wife (all parties being residents of the District) to release her dewer, which she did in consideration of the husband and the other executing to her directly a joint promissory note for a sum of money; Held: 1st. That in virtue of the act of 10th April, 1869 (14 Stat. at Large, 45), regulating the rights of property of married women in the District of Columbia, by which it is enacted, "that the right of a married woman to any property belonging to her at the time of marriage, or acquired during mar. riage, in any other way than by gift or conveyance from her husband, shall be as absolute as if she were a feme sole, and not subject to the disposal of her husband or liable for his debts; and that she may convey or bequeath the same as if she were unmarried; also, that any married woman may contract and sue and be sued in her own name in all matters having relation to her sole and separate property in the same manner as if she were unmarried:" And in virtue of the further act, to amend the law of the District of Columbia in rela Statement of the case. tion to judicial proceedings therein, of February 22d, 1857 (14 Id. 405), by the twentieth section of which it is enacted "that where money is pay. able by two or more persons jointly or severally, one action may be sustained and judgment recovered against all or any of said parties by whom the money is payable, at the option of the plaintiff," she could sue the joint obligor of her husband at law. 2d. That though by the laws of the District as construed, the wife might, in fact, under the special circumstances of the case, really have had no right of dower, still if her release was deemed requisite to secure the sale of the property, such release was a good consideration for the promise to pay her money. ERROR to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, the case being thus: James Sykes and H. A. Chadwick (the latter a married man, his wife being Eleanor Chadwick), owning a piece of real estate in the city of Washington, and wishing to borrow money on it, conveyed it by deed of trust-that is to say, mortgaged it-to Hyde to secure a sum which he lent thern; Mrs. Chadwick joining in the mortgage, and her acknowledgment of the same being taken separately and apart from her husband, in the way prescribed by the laws of the District in order to pass the estate of a feme covert. Desiring afterwards to sell the same property (the mortgage being still unpaid), Sykes and Chadwick requested Mrs. Chadwick to join them in a deed to the purchaser for the purpose of releasing her right of dower. She did so; and, in consideration therefor, they gave her a note in this form: $5000.] WASHINGTON, October 15th, 1869. Six months after date, we promise to pay to the order Eleanor Chadwick five thousand dollars, value reccived. JAMES SYKES, H. A. CHADWICK. At the time when this note was thus given, there prevailed in the District an act of Congress, passed April 10th, 1869,* in these words: *16 Stat. at Large, 45. Argument against the wife's right. An Act regulating the Rights of Property of Married Women in the District of Columbia. SEC. 1. The right of any married woman to any property, personal or real, belonging to her at the time of her marriage, or acquired during marriage in any other way than by gift or conveyance from her husband, shall be as absolute as if she were feme sole, and shall not be subject to the disposal of her husband, nor liable for his debts; but such married woman may convey, devise, and bequeath the same, or any interest therein, in the same manner and with like effect as if she were unmarried. SEC. 2. Any married woman may contract and sue and be sued, in her own name, in all matters having relation to her sole and separate property, in the same manner as if she were unmarried; but neither her husband, nor his property, shall be bound by any such contract, nor liable for any recovery against her in any such suit; but judgment may be enforced by execution against her sole and separate property, as if she were sole. Also another act, of February 22d, 1867,* in these words: An Act to amend the law of the District of Columbia in relation to Judicial Proceedings therein. SEC. 20. Where money is payable by two or more persons jointly or severally, as by joint obligors, covenantors, makers, drawers, or indorsers, one action may be sustained and judgment recovered against all or any of said parties, by whom the money is payable, at the option of the plaintiff. In this state of facts and of statutes, the note to Mrs. Chadwick not being paid, she brought suit upon it against Sykes alone, at law, in the court below, a court having jurisdiction both in equity and at common law. The court below sustained the suit; and from its judg ment in the matter this writ of error was taken. Messrs. W. F. Mattingly and R. T. Merrick, for the plaintiff in error: 1st. There was no consideration for the note. The deed of * 14 Stat. at Large, 405. Opinion of the court. trust to Hyde, executed previously to the deed of sale (or mortgage), in connection with which the note was given, passed Mrs. Chadwick's right of dower, and in the District, where the ancient rule of the English law, inherited by the District from the colonial law of Maryland, prevails, a widow has no dower in an equity of redemption.* It will not do to allege that her mere execution of the deed was a sufficient consideration for the note. 2d. Even if she had a right of dower in the real estate, it was not her sole and separate property within the meaning of the law. The right of dower is not an estate in lands.† If the contrary view is held to be law, then every married woman, whose husband happens to own real estate, has a sole and separate property, with reference to which she may contract. 3d. The note was a joint note, and being void as to her husband, one of the makers, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover.‡ 4th. This case, in no view of it, comes within the letter or spirit of the acts of Congress. Mrs. Chadwick has no separate property, and therefore could not make any contract as to it. The note itself could not be her separate estate, under the law, for the note is merely the evidence. of the contract, which she was incapable of making. Moreover, it is void, as already said. Messrs. A. G. Riddle, C. M. Hawley, and F. Miller, contra. Mr. Justice BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court. The question is whether the note on which this suit is brought against Sykes is valid, as against the defendant, so as to sustain the present action. In aid of the plaintiff's case certain acts of Congress relating to the District of Columbia have been referred to. First, an act regulating the *Stelle v. Carroll, 12 Peters, 201. † Jackson v. Vanderheyden, 17 Johnson, 167. |