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taxes, and ties.
public means of transportation, such as telegraph lines, cables, railways, and boats belonging to the state may be appropriated to his use, but unless in case of military necessity they are not to be destroyed. All churches and buildings devoted to religious worship and to the arts and sciences, all schoolhouses, are, so far as possible, to be protected, and all destruction or intentional defacement of such places, of historical monuments or archives, or of works of science or art, is prohibited, save when required by urgent military necessity.
Private property, whether belonging to individuals or corporations, is to be respected, and can be confiscated only for cause. Means of transportation, such as telegraph lines and cables, railways and boats, may, although they belong to private individuals or corporations, be seized by the military occupant, but unless destroyed under mili
tary necessity are not to be retained. Contributions, While it is held to be the right of the conqueror to levy
contributions upon the enemy in their seaports, towns, or provinces which may be in his military possession by conquest and to apply the proceeds to defray the expenses of the war, this right is to be exercised within such limitations that it may not savor of confiscation. As the result of military occupation the taxes and duties payable by the inhabitants to the former government become payable to the military occupant, unless he sees fit to substitute for them other rates or modes of contribution to the expenses of the government. The moneys so collected are to be used for the purpose of paying the expenses of government under the military occupation, such as the salaries of the judges and the police, and for the payment of the expenses
Private property taken for the use of the army is to be paid for when possible in cash at a fair valuation, and when payment in cash is not possible, receipts are to be
given. Occupied ports All ports and places in Cuba which may be in the actual
possession of our land and naval forces will be opened to the commerce of all neutral nations, as well as our own, in articles not contraband of war upon payment of the prescribed rates of duty which may be in force at the time of the importation.
WILLIAM McKINLEY. By order of the Secretary of War:
H. C. CORBIN,
of the army
RIGHT OF MILITARY AUTHORITIES TO IMPOSE TARIFF
UPON IMPORTS DURING MILITARY OCCUPATION.
Attorney-General J. W. Griggs (Opinions Attorney-General, vol. 22, p. 562) says, August 10, 1899:
According to the well-settled principles of public law relating to territory held by conquest, and according to the adjudication of the Supreme Court of the United States in Cross v. Harrison, the military authorities in possession, in the absence of legislation by Congress, may make such rules or regulations and impose such duties upon merchandise imported into the conquered territory as they may, in their judgment and discretion deem wise and prudent.
As to THE ASSUMPTION OF CONSULAR FUNCTIONS BY
NAVAL OFFICERS IN TERRITORY HELD BY MILITARY
The following letter explains the opinion of the Department of State in matters of this kind :
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 3, 1898. The Honorable The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.
SIR: I am advised by the Secretary of War, upon information received from Major General J. F. Wade, U. S. V., President of the United States Commission for the Evacuation of the Island of Cuba, that the senior officer commanding a United States naval vessel in the harbor of Habana has, in virtue of an existing statute or regulation, assumed the functions of United States Consul in and for the port of Habana.
It is presumed that the statute referred to is Sec. 1433, Title 15, Chap. 2, of the U. S. laws relating to Navy and Marine Corps (p. 297).
During the suspension of relations between the govern-Case at Habana ments of the United States and Spain, consequent upon a state of war, and still continuing notwithstanding the stipulated suspension of hostilities between them, all direct diplomatic and consular representation of the United States in places and ports within Spanish control is necessarily suspended. During such suspension resort has been
had to the usual privilege, recognized by international law, of placing the interests of American citizens in the respective ports and places under the care of the respective British diplomatic or consular representative whose good offices in this relation have been recognized and admitted by the government and authorities of Spain. The acting Consul-General of Great Britain at Habana, Mr. Lucien J. Jerome, is so acting at the present time and will continue to do so until, by the final evacuation, the control of that port shall pass for the time being into the hands of the military authorities of the United States, when, of course, there would be no further occasion for a consular representative there.
In view of the fact that adequate provision exists for consular representation of the United States at Habana during the current interval and in view, also, of the further circumstances that the same technical continuance of a state of war which would prevent the titular consulargeneral of the United States at Habana from returning to his post, would prevent the substitution of a new consular representative whose power to act would depend upon recognition by the local authorities and whose functions are, by the statute above referred to, limited to mariners of the United States, I have the honor to request that proper instructions be given to the naval officer in the premises. I have the honor to be, Sir, Your obedient servant,
CERTAIN CONCLUSIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
In the following letter addressed to the Secretary of the Navy the Secretary of State discusses the question of insurgent blockade and formulates certain conclusions. The correspondence in full may be found in International Law Situations, Naval War College, 1902, pp. 79–83, embodied in a somewhat full discussion of the subject.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D. C., November 15, 1902. The HONORABLE
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. Sır: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the letter of the Acting Secretary of the Navy (346855 B), under date of November 12, inclosing copy of a letter from the president of the Naval War College containing certain suggestions respecting interference with commerce by insurgent vessels, and requesting my comments thereon.
While as a rule this Department is reluctant to express, of record, general opinions or comments upon questions of a more or less academic character, the papers you submit to me, and particularly the statement prepared by Professor Wilson and submitted to Captain F. E. Chadwick, may justify some general observations.
Cases involving assertion of the rights of insurgent Insu “ blockade” are necessarily exceptional, to be considered ceptional. . as governed by exigent circumstances rather than by doctrine.
In dealing with concrete cases arising within the official How dealt cognizance of the Department of State and embracing points of international law like those presented in Mr. Wilson's memorandum, this Department endeavors to interpret the consensus of international law authorities with due regard to the precise significance of the term “block
zent blockade is ex
Blockade of enemy ports is, in its strict sense, conceived Blockade; to be a definite act of internationally responsible sovereign ing, and meas
ures marking its in the exercise of a right of belligerency. Its exercise exercise. involves the successive stages of, first, proclamation by a sovereign state of the purpose to enforce a blockade from an announced date. Such proclamation is entitled to respect by other sovereigns conditionally on the blockade proving effective. Second, warning of vessels approaching the blockaded port under circumstances preventing their having previous actual or presumptive knowledge of the international proclamation of blockade. Third, seizure of a vessel attempting to run the blockade. Fourth, adjudication of the question of good prize by a competent court of admiralty of the blockading sovereign.
Insurgent “blockade,” on the other hand, is exceptional, being a function of hostility alone, and the right it involves is that of closure of avenues by which aid may reach the enemy.
In the case of an unrecognized insurgent, the foregoing conditions do not join. An insurgent power is not a sovereign maintaining equal relations with other sovereigns, so that an insurgent proclamation of blockade does not rest on the same footing as one issued by a recognized sovereign power. The seizure of a vessel attempting to
run an insurgent blockade is not generally followed by Insurgent admiralty proceedings for condemnation as good prize, admiralty courts and if such proceedings were nominally resorted to a denational respect. cree of the condemning court would lack the title to that
international respect which is due from sovereign states to the judicial act of a sovereign. The judicial power being a coordinate branch of government, recognition of the government itself is a condition precedent to the recognition of the competency of its courts and the acceptance of
their judgments as internationally valid. Recognition of
To found a general right of insurgent blockade upon the one or a few pow. recognition of belligerency of an insurgent by one or a
right of insurgent block' few foreign powers would introduce an element of uncer
tainty. The scale on which hostilities are conducted by the insurgents must be considered. In point of fact, the insurgents may be in a physical position to make war against the titular authority as effectively as one sovereign could against another. Belligerency is a more or less notorious fact of which another government, whose commercial interests are affected by its existence, may take cognizance by proclaiming neutrality toward the contending parties, but such action does not of itself alter the relations of other governments which have not taken cognizance of the existence of hostilities. Recognition of insurgent belligerency could merely imply the acquiescence by the recognizing government in the insurgent seizure of shipping flying the flag of the recognizing state. It could certainly not create a right on the part of the insurgents to seize the shipping of a state which has not recognized their belligerency.
It seems important to discriminate between the claim of a belligerent to exercise quasi sovereign rights in accordance with the tenets of international law and the conduct of hostilities by an insurgent against the titular government.
The formal right of the sovereign extends to acts on the high seas; insur high seas, while an insurgent's right to cripple his enemy essentially do- by any usual hostile means is essentially domestic within
the territory of the titular sovereign whose authority is
Sovereign rights extend to