It is evident that they were residents of the southern states seeking their way home.

April 25th, 1863, the district court ordered an examination and inventory of the cargo to be made. The report of the commissioners disclosed that a very large portion of the cargo was found to be particularly adapted to army use; that a large number of cases contained Blucher boots, which are known as army shoes; a number of others contained cavalry boots, and were so labeled; that 192 bales of the cargo consisted of gray blankets adapted to the use of an army, and believed to be such as are used in the United States Army; ninety-five casks contained horse-shoes of a large size, suitable for cavalry service, and unfit for Mexican horses; thirty six cases contained artillery harness in sets for four horses, with two riding saddles attached to each set. There were also two hydraulic presses in pieces, adapted for cotton, and a considerable portion of the cargo consisted of an assorted lot of drugs; quinine, calomel, morphine and chloroform. There were also large quantities of iron, steel, shovels, spades, blacksmiths' bellows, anvils, nails, leather, rope and tin. The invoices also show negro brogans, and blue military cloth and serge.

This report shows that the cargo consisted of 4,477 packages, of which 2,744 contained articles manufactured for army and navy use, and which, if designed for delivery in an enemy's port, or for enemy's use, are contraband of war. It appears that the Peterhoff sailed under an arrangement to proceed to the Rio Grande with a cargo suitable to the then existing market of that region, and to return with a cargo of cotton. She carried out a cargo, ostensibly to Matamoras, but which was to have been delivered at the mouth of the Rio Grande for the market of Texas, and she was to receive in exchange, therefor, a cargo of cotton. from Texas. A package of papers was thrown overboard by Harris; a second package was burned by Duffey, and a third package was handed by the captain to Webber for concealment, which Webber, after the capture, returned to the captain. Among the papers found on the Peterhoff is a copy of a policy of insurance, on the hull and machinery of the vessel, for this voyage, in which the assurers assume the peril inter alia of men-of-war, enemy's takings at sea, arrests, etc., of what nation soever, and it contains this clause: "Warranted free from capture, seizure, detention, and all consequences of hostilities."

The case further appears in the opinion. Messrs. Henry Stanbery, Atty. Gen., and Titian J. Coffey and J. H. Ashton, for the United States:

Samuel J. Redgate, claimant of a large part of the cargo, admits in his first answer, that he is a citizen of the United States. In his affidavit, he states that he was a citizen of Texas when she was annexed to the United States, and

No authority can be needed on these facts to stamp him with a hostile character, notwithstanding his alleged personal loyalty.

All that part of the cargo owned by him was, therefore, lawful prize of war.

In his claim he alleged himself to be owner, agent, and consignee of cargo to the value of $375,000, or thereabouts.

As to this cargo, the court knows only Redgate, and if restitution be made, it must be made to him. But Redgate is an enemy, and by well settled law, restitution cannot be made to an enemy, since he has no persona standi in judicio. Therefore, restitution cannot be made at all, and the decree as to that part of the cargo claimed by him must stand.

Halleck, ch. 31, § 23, p. 772; 3 Phil. Int. Law, § 461; The Falcon, 6 Rob. 199.

The legal effect of the consignment of these goods to Redgate, into whose actual possession they were delivered at the time of shipment, was to vest the title in him, and so make them lawful prize, no matter by whom they were shipped. The De Bilboa, 2 Rob. 133.

The foregoing remarks apply to all goods consigned in the name of Robert Bowden. He made no claim, and, if represented at all, is represented by Redgate. He came to New York with the prize vessel, and was examined in preparatorio; so that ignorance or absence from the country does not excuse his failure to make claims and test oaths.

The Adeline, 9 Cranch, 244.

The destination of the Peterhoff and her cargo was not Matamoras, but the enemy country. The Peterhoff, when captured, was pursuing a voyage, laden with a cargo not intended to be disposed of, or even delivered at Matamoras, as its port of destination, but intended to be delivered and sold in the state of Texas, and this was the sole and exclusive purpose of the voyage.

The said cargo was largely contraband of war, consisting of articles, all of which were specially, and some of which were exclusively, suited to enemy use, and destined to an enemy use, and destined to an enemy port for such enemy use.

Therefore, the ship and cargo were taken on a voyage having its terminus a quo at London, and its terminus ad quem in the enemy country, on a blockaded coast; and even if, at the time of capture, a purpose existed to tranship the cargo from the mouth of the Rio Grande to Matamoras, for conveyance thence to the enemy country, that purpose did not break the continuity of the voyage to the blockaded enemy country.

Halleck, Int. L. ch. 21, § 11, p. 504; 1 Kent, Com. 81; The Maria, 5 Rob. 365; The William, 5 Rob. 385; The Thomyris, Edw. Adm. 17; The Minerva, 3 Rob. 229; The Richmond, 5 Rob. 325; The Commercen, 1 Wheat. 382; Jecker v. Montgomery, 18 How. 110, 115, 15 L. ed. 311; The Nancy, 3 Rob. 122; The Isabella Thompson. 3 Wall. 155 (ante, 55); The Bermuda, 3 Wall. 514 (ante, 200).

The ship and cargo were liable to capture as

prize of war, from the moment of starting for the purpose of entering an enemy and blockaded port, or of delivering the cargo within the enemy country, and having been captured while that purpose yet existed, they were good prize. The Columbia, 1 Rob. 154; The Vrow Johanna, 2 Rob. 109; The Neptunus, 2 Rob. 115; Medeiros v. Hill, 8 Bing. 231; Yeaton v. Fry, 5 Cranch, 335; The Imina, 3 Rob. 167; The Trende Sostre, 6 Rob. 390, note; The Admiral, 3 Wall. 603 (ante, 58).

The part of the cargo not contraband of war was good prize, not only for the reason embraced in the foregoing propositions, viz., that it was captured on a voyage to a blockaded country, but for the further reason that it was owned by the owners of the contraband part.

Halleck, Int. L. ch. 24, § 6, p. 573, and authorities cited; 3 Phillim. Int. L. § 277; 2 Wildman, Int. L. 215; The Sarah Christina, 1 Rob. 237.

The vessel was also good prize because, when captured, she was engaged in the sole and exclusive business of transporting a cargo destined for the blockaded and enemy country, as far as the mouth of the Rio Grande, for the express purpose of securing its delivery into that country, either by direct transhipment on lighters to the Texan coast, or by transhipment through Matamoras and thence across the river into Texas.

The Neutralitet, 3 Rob. 296; The Franklin, 3 Rob. 217; The Ranger, 6 Rob. 126; The Baltic, 1 Action, 25; The Jonge Margaretha, 1 Rob. 189; The Mercurius, 1 Rob. 288 and note; The Jonge Tobias, 1 Rob. 329; The Neptunus, 3 Rob. 108; The Eenrom, 2 Rob. 1; The Edward, 4 Rob. 68; The Oster Risoer, 4 Rob. 200; The Carolina, 4 Rob. 260; The Richmond, 5 Rob. 325; The Charlotte, 5 Rob. 275; The Ringende Jacob, 1 Rob. 89; Carrington v. Mer. Ins. Co. 8 Pet. 520.

The blockade of the mouth of the Rio Grande made all neutral ocean bound commerce with Matamoras, in articles of a contraband nature, unlawful.

The blockade of the mouth of the Rio Grande and of the port of Brownsville, on the Texas side of that river, involved of necessity the prohibition, whilst the blockade lasted, of even neutral, ocean-borne commerce, with the port of Matamoras on the Mexican side of that river, in all articles of a contraband character.

This proposition rests on the principle that the belligerent has a right to make his blockade absolutely effective, and even neutral rights, otherwise sacred, must, for the time, yield to that belligerent right.

The Neutralitet, 6 Rob. 35; The Zelden Rust, 6 Rob. 94; The Maria, 6 Rob. 201, 204.

ported into Mexico for trade there, might be again sold, and so come to the use of the belligerent, would have no effect upon the question. It is trade with the belligerent, in contraband, that subjects to capture. Trade between neutrals in contraband of war is perfectly legitimate, although they know or believe that eventually the contraband may be sold to the belligerent.

The Bermuda, 3 Wall. 514, 551 (ante, 200, 205); Halleck, Int. L. 570, 575, 576; The Commercen, 1 Wheat. 382; Wheat. Int. L. 568; The Ocean, 3 Rob. 297; The Jonge Pieter, 4 Rob. 83, 89; Treaty with Great Britain, 1794, art. 18, 8 Stat. at L. 125.

It is, if possible, still clearer, that trade with the belligerent by neutrals was entirely lawful and did not subject to either detention or capture.

Accordingly, were it not for the blockade, it would have been perfectly lawful for a neutral to ship any merchandise, not contraband of war, either to Charleston or Mobile. The Bermuda, supra.

To make trade between the North and South unlawful, it was necessary to pass a statute so declaring it. Congress never sought to infringe the law of nations in respect to the trade between neutrals and the seceded states.

See act of July 13th, 1861, 12 Stat. at L. 257; Proclamation, app. p. 5.

The mouth of the Rio Grande was not blockaded.

We at times had cruisers there, but they did not claim to blockade a river which was one half Mexican: while, on the other hand, vessels almost daily cleared from Northern ports, with the acquiescence of the government, for the port of Matamoras, situate within the river and about forty miles from the gulf. From the port of New York alone, nearly sixty vessels cleared for Matamoras in the eight months that preceded the trial of this case in July, 1863; a period that includes the date of the capture of the Peterhoff.

Frau Ilsabe, 4 C. Rob. 64.

It is impossible to doubt that the destination of the Peterhoff was the mouth of the Rio Grande.

Whether or not the Peterhoff carried goods which were contraband of war, was not at all material, unless the trade was to the enemy; but it will be well to inquire how well grounded are the allegations, that she had on board many articles and large quantities of goods which came within this designation.

1. What is contraband by the law of nations, as recognized and insisted by the government of the United States, appears by reference to the Treaty with Great Britain of 1784, art. 18.

See 8 Stat. at L. 125; Mr. Pickering, Sec. of State, to Mr. Pinckney at Paris, June 12, 1797;

Messrs. Lorenzo Sherwood, William Marvin, and Augustus F. Smith, for claimant: Trade with Mexico by neutrals was legal during the late war, whether in articles of contraband of war or not. No power existed in the government of the United States, nor is any now pretended, to restrict such trade.

The mere fact that contraband of war im

ering, Sec. of State, to Mr. Monroe, Minister at Paris, September 12, 1795, Am. St. Papers, 596, 597; Mr. Pickering to Messrs. Pinckney, Marshall, and Gerry, ministers to the French Republic, July 15, 1797; 2 Am. St. Papers, 153, 154; Messrs. Pinckney, Marshall, and Gerry to the French Ministers, January 27, 1798; Am. St. Papers, 169, 174, 175; 1 Kent, 138, 139, and note, b.

If it were proved that any contraband on

other, even for the purpose of improving the navigation.

The mouth of the Rio Grande was, therefore, for half its width, within Mexican territory, and, for the purposes of navigation, was, altogether as much Mexican as American. It is clear, therefore, that nothing short of an express declaration by the Executive would warrant us in ascribing to the government an intention to blockade such a river in time of peace between the two Republics.

It is supposed that such a declaration is contained in the President's Proclamation of February 18th, 1864, 13 U. S. Stat. 740, which recites as matter of fact that the port of Brownsville had been blockaded, and declares the relaxation of the blockade. The argument is that Brownsville is situated on the Texan bank of the Rio Grande, opposite Matamoras; and that the recital in the proclamation that Brownsville had been blockaded must, therefore, be regarded as equivalent to an assertion that the mouth of the river was included in the blockade of the coast. It would be difficult to avoid this inference if Brownsville could only be blockaded by the blockade of the river. But that town may be blockaded also by the blockade of the harbor of Brazos Santiago and the Boca Chica, which were, without question, in52*] cluded in the blockade *of the coast. Indeed, until within a year prior to the proclamation, the port of entry for the district was not Brownsville, but Point Isabel on that harbor; and, in the usual course, merchandise intended for Brownsville was entered at Point Isabel, and taken by a short land conveyance to its destination.

We know of no judicial precedent for extending a blockade by construction. But there are precedents of great authority the other way. We will cite one.

The Frau Ilsabe, 4 C. Rob. 63, and her cargo were captured in 1799 for breach of the British blockade of Holland. The voyage was from Hamburg to Antwerp and, of course, in its latter part, up the Scheldt. Condemnation of the cargo was asked on the ground that the Scheldt was blockaded by the blockade of Holland. But Sir W. Scott said: "Antwerp is certainly no part of Holland, and, with respect to the Scheldt, it is not within the Dutch territory, but rather a coterminous river, dividing Holland from the adjacent country." This case is the more remarkable inasmuch as Antwerp is on the right bank of the river, as is also the whole territory of Holland; and, though no part of that country was part of Flanders, then equally with Holland combined with France in a war with Great Britain. "It was just as lawful," as Sir W. Scott observed, "to blockade the ports of Flanders as those of Holland," and the Scheldt might have been included in the blockade, but he would not hold it necessarily included in the absence of an express declaration.

This case seems to be in point.

It is impossible to say, therefore, in the absence of an express declaration to that effect, that it was the intention of the government to blockade the mouth of the Rio Grande. And we are the less inclined to say it, because we are not aware of any instance in which a belligerent has attempted to blockade the mouth

of a river or harbor occupied on one side by neutrals, or in which such a blockade has been recognized as valid by any court administering the law of nations.

The only case which lends even appar. [*53 ent countenance to such a doctrine, is that of The Maria, 6 C. Rob. 201, adjudged by Sir W. Scott in 1805. The cargo in litigation had been conveyed from Bremen, through the Weser to Varel, near the mouth of the Jahde, and there transhipped for America. The mouth of the Weser was then blockaded, and Sir W. Scott held that the commerce of Bremen, though neutral, could not be carried on through the Weser. This, he admitted, was a great inconvenience to the neutral city, which had no other outlet to the sea; but it was an incident of her situation and of war. It happened in that case that a relaxation of the blockade in favor of Bremen warranted restitution. Otherwise, there can be no doubt that the cargo would have been reluctantly condemned.

But it is an error to suppose this case an authority for an American blockade of the Rio Grande, affecting the commerce of Matamoras. Counsel were mistaken in the supposition that only one bank of the Weser was occupied by the French, and that Bremen was on the other. Both banks were in fact so held, and the blockade was warranted by the hostile possession of both. The case would be in point had both banks of the Rio Grande been in rebel occupation.

Still less applicable to the present litigation is the case of The Zelden Rust, 6 C. Rob. 93, cited at the bar. That was not a case of violation of blockade at all. It was a question of contraband, depending on destination. The Zelden Rust, a neutral vessel, entered the bay or river De Betancos, on one side of which was Ferrol, and on the other Corunna. Counsel argued on the supposition that Ferrol was a belligerent and Corunna a neutral port, whereas both were belligerent; and the cargo was condemned on the ground of actual or probable destination to Ferrol, which was a port of naval equipment; though nominally destined to Corunna, also a port of naval equipment, thought not to the same extent as Ferrol. There was no blockade of the bay or river or of either town.

It is unnecessary to examine other cases referred to by *counsel. It is sufficient [*54 to say that none of them support the doctrine that a belligerent can blockade the mouth of a river occupied on one bank by neutrals with complete rights of navigation.

We have no hesitation, therefore in holding that the mouth of the Rio Grande was not included in the blockade of the ports of the rebel States, and that neutral commerce with Matamoras, except in contraband, was entirely free.

If we had any doubt upon the subject, it would be removed by the fact that it was the known and constant practice of the govern ment to grant clearances for Matamoras from New York, on condition of giving bond that no supplies should be furnished to the rebelsa condition necessarily municipal in its nature, and inapplicable to any clearance for a foreign port. These clearances are incompatible with the existence of the supposed blockade.

We come next to the question whether an ul

terior destination to the rebel region, which we now assume as proved, affected the cargo of the Peterhoff with liability to condemnation. We mean the neutral cargo; reserving for the present the question of contraband, and questions arising upon citizenship or nationality of shippers.

were condemned *upon evidence that they [*56 did not in fact belong to neutrals, but to British merchants, engaged in unlawful trade with the enemy; but the principle just stated was explicitly affirmed.

The question now is whether the same consequence will attend an ulterior destination to a belligerent country by inland conveyance. And upon this question the authorities seem quite clear.

During the blockade of Holland in 1799, goods belonging to Prussian subjects were shipped from Edam, near Amsterdam, by inland navigation to Emden, in Hanover, for transhipment to London. Prussia and Hanover were neutral. The goods were captured on the voyage from Emden, and the cause, The Stert, 4 C. Rob. 65, came before the British court of 55*] Admiralty in *1801. It was held that the blockade did not affect the trade of Holland carried on with neutrals by means of inland navigation. "It was," said Sir William Scott, "a mere maritime blockade effected by force operating only at sea." He admitted that such trade would defeat, partially at least, the object of the blockade, namely: to cripple the trade of Holland, but observed: "If that is the consequence, all that can be said is that it is an unavoidable consequence. It must be imputed to the nature of the thing which will not admit a remedy of this species. The court cannot on that ground take upon itself to say that a legal blockade exists where no actual blockade can be applied. . . It must be presumed that this was foreseen by the blockading state, which, nevertheless, thought proper to impose it to the extent to which it was practicable."

The same principle governed the decision in the case of The Ocean, 3 C. Rob. 297, made also in 1801. At the time of her voyage, Amsterdam was blockaded, but the blockade had not been extended to the other ports of Holland. Her cargo consisted partly or wholly of goods ordered by American merchants from Amsterdam, and sent thence by inland conveyance to Rotterdam, and there shipped to America. It was held that the conveyance from Amsterdam to Rotterdam, being inland, was not affected by the blockade, and the goods, which had been captured, were restored.

These were cases of trade from a blockaded to a neutral country, by means of inland navigation, to a neutral port or a port not blockaded. The same principle was applied to trade from a neutral to a blockaded country by inland conveyance from the neutral port of primary destination to the blockaded port of ulterior destination in the case of The Jonge Pieter, 4 C. Rob. 79 adjudged in 1801. Goods belonging to neutrals going from London to Emden, with ulterior destination by land or an interior canal navigation to Amsterdam, were held not liable to seizure for violation of the blockade of that port. The particular goods in that instance

ton, in Texas, or from Brownsville or Galveston to Matamoras, was affected by the blockade of the Texan coast.

And the general doctrines of international law lead irresistibly to the same conclusion. We know of but two exceptions to the rule of free trade by neutrals with belligerents: the first is that there must be no violation of blockade or siege; and the second, that there must be no conveyance of contraband to either belligerent. And the question we are now considering is, "Was the cargo of the Peterhoff within the first of these exceptions?" We have seen that Matamoras was not and could not be blockaded, and it is manifest that there was not and could not be any blockade of the Texan bank of the Rio Grande, as against the trade of Matamoras. No blockading vessel was in the river; nor could any such vessel ascend the river, unless supported by a competent military force on land.

The doctrine of The Bermuda Case, supposed by counsel to have an important application to that before us, has, in reality, no application at all. There is an obvious and broad line of distinction between the cases. The Bermuda and her cargo were condemned because engaged in a voyage ostensibly for a neutral, but in reality, either directly or by substitution of another vessel, for a blockaded port. The Peterhoff was destined for a neutral port with no ulterior destination for the ship, or none by sea for the cargo to any blockaded place. In the case of The Bermuda, the cargo destined primarily for Nassau could not reach its ulterior destination without violating the blockade of the rebel ports; in the case before us the cargo, destined primarily for Matamoras, *could reach an ulterior destination in [*57 Texas without violating any blockade at all.

We must say, therefore, that trade between London and Matamoras, even with intent to supply, from Matamoras, goods to Texas, violated no blockade, and cannot be declared unlawful.

Trade with a neutral port in immediate proximity to the territory of one belligerent, is certainly very inconvenient to the other. Such trade with unrestricted inland commerce between such a port and the enemy's territory, impairs, undoubtedly, and very seriously impairs, the value of a blockade of the enemy's coast. But in cases such as that now in judg ment, we administer the public law of nations, and are not at liberty to inquire what is for the particular advantage or disadvantage of our own or another country. We must follow the lights of reason and the lessons of the masters of international jurisprudence.

The remedy for inconveniences of the sort just mentioned is with the political department of the government. In the particular instance