ALBERT C. GOODRICH and George C. remove obstructions from its river and harbor," and that such case is decisive of the present action. It will be seen, therefore, that the case made by that declaration proceeds upon an absolute obligation on the part of the city to remove all obstructions growing out of the power conferred and the ordinances establishing the proper officers, and providing the needful means for the exercise of that power, and that the ground of action proceeds only and wholly upon the omission of the city to exercise the power in the given case. Now, giving to this decision its whole legal APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United effect, it does not touch the case made by this States for the Northern District of Illinois. The present appellants filed their libel in the district court of the United States for the northern district of Illinois against the city of Chicago in personam. They alleged that they were the owners of the steamboat Huron; that said steamboat was duly enrolled and licensed and employed in navigating the lakes; that, on March 27, 1857, said steamboat, while leaving the port of Chicago, ran against a sunken wreck at or near the mouth of the Chicago river, and inside of the north pier, and was sunk; that this accident was in consequence of the negligence of the city, and that the city was responsible for the damage to the libelants, and that the action was without fault on the part of the steamboat. The respondent answered and alleged substantially: 1. Want of jurisdiction in the district court. 2. That the city was not liable on the facts of the case, nor was it under any legal obligation to remove said sunken vessel. 3. That the accident occurred through the carelessness and unskilful conduct of the Huron, her master and crew. 4. A former judgment on demurrer to the declaration in an action on the case between the same parties in the supreme court of Illinois, as a bar to this action. The district court held that the court had jurisdiction and rendered a final decree in favor of the libelant. The respondent appealed to the circuit court, and that court reversed the decree of the district court, and ordered that the libel be dismissed, with costs. From this last decree the libelants have appealed to this court. The case further appears in the opinion. Messrs. Stephen A. Goodwin and Edwin C. Larned, for appellants: An objection to the libelant's case is found in the article of the respondent's answer, which sets forth that the libelants are barred from maintaining the libel by reason of a judgment rendered by the supreme court of Illinois at the April term, 1858, against the libelants and in favor of the respondent, upon a demurrer to a declaration filed in the circuit court of Cook county at its October term, 1857, which declaration is averred to have been for the same causes of action which are set forth in the libel. His Honor, Judge Davis, who gave the opinion on appeal, cites the opinion of the supreme court in Goodrich v. Chicago, 20 Ill. 445, and holds that "such decision is an authoritative adjudication, denying that there is an obligation imposed by law on the city of Chicago to libel. It simply decides that a case will not lie against the city for mere omission to act-for the mere nonassumption of the power conferred over the harbor by the charter, by neglecting to undertake to remove a particular obstruction. The question of liability in all cases where the city had elected to act under the power and entered upon and assumed the work, would, therefore, remain an open question, uncontrolled, and unembarrassed by that decision, and this court would be left at perfect liberty to decide such a case in conformity with their own views of the law and the facts. Such duty of removal becomes obligatory and imperative, not from the mere force alone of the provisions of the charter conferring the power and the means, but from these and the superadded action of the city in neglecting to exercise and act under such powers by entering upon and undertaking the work. While a judgment on demurrer is admitted to be as valid as any other judgment, it is equally undeniable, that it is a bar only to the precise case made by the pleadings, and is no bar to a new suit setting up another and different case. The principles applicable to such judgment are fully set forth in the opinion of the supreme court in Gilman v. Rives, 10 Pet. 301; Smalley v. Edey, 19 Ill. 211; 1 Chit. Pl. 198; Pars. Mar. L. 210, citing "The Ann and Mary,” 2 W. Rob. 190. Mr. S. A. Irvin, for appellee: Without local legislation, the city cannot be held liable. Its liability is predicated on a duty imposed, not by the common law of the sea, but by local statutes, and its neglect to perform or discharge that duty. The cause of action, therefore, as against the city, was created by the statutes of Illinois, and without them, admiralty would have no jurisdiction. Ferry Co. v. Beers, 20 How. 402, 15 L. ed. 964; Orleans v. Phoebus, 11 Pet. 183; The St. Lawrence, 1 Black, 527, 17 L. ed. 183; P. W. & B. R. R. Co. v. Steam Towboat Co. 23 How. 209, 16 L. ed. 433. Is the judgment of the state court between the same parties, for precisely the same case of action, a bar to the maintenance of this suit in admiralty? The liability of the city, in admiralty is and must be predicated on the ground that the injury received by the Huron was, or was in the nature of, a marine tort. The question then arises whether the jurisdiction of courts of admiralty in such cases is exclusive or concurrent. That it is concurrent, is established both by this court and the courts of several of the, was in the state courts. The liability of the states in numerous cases, of which I cite the city is based on its nonfeasance in both courts, following: and the supreme court of Illinois, at its April term, 1858, expressly decides the very identical questions raised in the case at bar against the appellants. Ingraham v. Dawson, 20 How. 486, 15 L. ed. 984; Taylor v. Carryl, 20 How. 583-598, 15 L. ed. 1028;, Maguire v. Card, 21 How. 248, 16 L. ed. 118; The Globe, 2 Blatchf. 428; Percival v. Hickey, 18 Johns. 257. The jurisdiction being concurrent, then the adjudication in the state court is conclusive, the parties and the cause of action being the same. The authorities on this point are numerous, and the attention of the court is only called to the following: Hopkins v. Lee, 6 Wheat. 109, 113; Smith v. McIver, 9 Wheat. 535; Bank of U. S. v. Beverly, 1 How. 134; W. Bridge Co. v. Stewart, 3 How. 413; Kitchen v. Campbell, 3 Wils. 308. Nor does it make any difference, should the defeated party resort to a different writ or remedy. He cannot agitate a settled controversy by modifying the form of his action. Hitchin v. Campbell, 2 W. Bl. 831; Cist v. Zeigler, 16 Serg. & R. 285; Darlington v. Gray, 5 Whart. 499; Souter v. Baymore, 7 Pa. 417. Nor will a court of equity review the decision of a court of law, even though it has concurrent jurisdiction. Abrams v. Camp, 3 Scam. 291; Thompson v. Berry, 3 Johns. Ch. 389; Bartholomew v. Yaw, 9 Paige, 166; Hempstead v. Watkins, 1 Eng. 317; Marine Ins. Co. v. Hodgson, 6 Cranch, 206; Brown v. Wann, 10 Pet. 504. Nor is the doctrine of res judicata confined or limited to cases where the party and the subject-matter are the same in the second or subsequent action. Goodrich v. Chicago, 20 Ill. 445. Mr. Justice Swayne delivered the opinion of the court: This is an appeal in admiralty from a decree of the circuit court of the United States for the northern district of Illinois. In the view which we have taken of the case, it will be necessary to consider but a single point. The appellants filed their libel to recover damages for the sinking of the steamer Huron, in the Chicago river, near its mouth. The casualty was caused by the steamer running against a sunken wreck. The libel alleges that it was the duty of the city to have it removed, and that it was guilty of negligence in not having done so. It alleges further, that the city entered upon the work of removal, but abandoned it before the result was accomplished. Among the defenses set up by the answer of the respondent was, that of a final judgment in the supreme court of Illinois, upon a general demurrer to a declaration in an action at law by the appellants against the respondent for the same cause of action. The court below sustained the defense, and to be stated-dismissed the libel. upon this ground- and another not necessary The record of the action at law is found among the proofs in this case. Upon a careful examination of the declaration and of [*574 the libel, we are constrained to say, there is no such difference in the cases which they respec The correct rule being, that whenever the point or question in issue has been once litigated and determined by a judgment or decree of a competent court, it is a bar to all subsetively make as can take this case out of the operation of the principles of res adjudicata. quent suits involving the same point or ques- Bendernagle v. Cocks, 19 Wend. 208; Duchess of Kingston's Case, and the notes. tion. Doty v. Brown, 4 N. Y. 73; Gardner v. Buckbee, 3 Cow. 120; Burt v. Stenburgh, 4 Cow. 559; Bochaud v. Dias, 3 Den. 238; Outram v. Morewood, 3 East, 346; Kelheffer v. Herr, 17 Serg. & R. 319. Nor is the rule confined to cases where issues are joined and verdicts obtained on the merits. Where the questions raised on the demurrer go to the very cause of the action, the judgment or decree of the court thereon is just as much a bar to any subsequnt action as a judgment or a verdict or a decree on a final verdict, or a decree on a final hearing. Story, Eq. Jur. § 456; City Bank v. Walden, 1 La. Ann. 46. It is also held in the following cases, that a judgment or a general demurrer to a declaration is a judgment on the merits, and is conclusive in a subsequent suit where the parties and the cause of action are the same. Perkins v. Moore, 16 Ala. 17; Robinson v. Whatever the result might be here, if this obstacle were out of the way, we have no choice but to apply the law in this as in other cases. The decree below is affirmed, with costs THE UNITED STATES, Piff. in Err., v. MOSES MACDONALD et al. (See S. C. 5 Wall. 647-660.) Compensation of collectors. A collector of the customs is entitled to retain as compensation not exceeding $2.000 per annum from his receipts, as storage for the custody and safe keeping of imported merchandise, entered for warehousing, under the acts of Congress upon that subject, and stored in bonded warehouses. [No. 89.] Argued Jan. 14, 1867. Decided Feb. 4, 1867. Howard, 5 Cal. 428; Bouchaud v. Dias, 3 Den: IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United 243; Ferrer's Case, 6 Co. 7; Hitchen v. Campbell, 2 W. Bl. 833; Ferrers v. Arden, 2 Cro. Eliz. 668; 7 Bac. Abr. tit. Dem. 4, p. 665; Gould Pl. 447, 448; Taylor v. The Royal Saxon, 1 Wall. Jr. 333. Nothing in the libel or in the facts in the case changes the cause of action from what it States for the District of Maine. This was an action instituted in the court below against the principal and sureties in the official bond of Moses Macdonald, as collector of customs at Portland, for the recovery of $6,281, reported to be due the United States on the adjustment of his accounts, and which he had refused to pay into the Treasury. The Moore v. Allegheny City, 18 Pa. 56. rejoinder of the defendants alleged that Mac- | affords no ground of defense in law to the pres donald received, accounted for, quarterly, year-ent action. ly, and retained this sum, by virtue of his office, for storage of merchandise in bonded warehouses from Jan. 20, 1858, to April 18, 1861, inclusive, not more than $2,000 in any one year. The United States demurred and, issue being joined, the court adjudged the rejoinder good and gave judgment for the defendant. The plaintiffs sued out this writ of error. Mr. Henry Stanbery, Atty. Gen., and Mr. J. Hubley Ashton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the United States: Before the passage of the act of 1841, all moneys received by collectors of customs as storage or expenses, for or on account of merchandise stored in the public stores, or in other than the public stores, belonged, and were of right payable to the United States as part of their public money; and the said collectors had no right or power in law to retain or appropriate the same as perquisites, emoluments or allowances of their office. The intention and effect of the act of 1841 were to constitute the storage received from one class of stores a source of official emolument of collectors; to wit, the public stores for which rent was paid by the collectors, on behalf of the government; and all moneys received as storage for goods stored in warehouses owned by the United States, as well also as all moneys received in payment of expenses incurred on the storing of goods in private stores, are not embraced and were not intended to be embraced, by the 5th section of the act of 1841, and were and are payable into the Treasury. Under the warehousing system established by the acts of August 6th, 1846, and March 28, 1854, and the regulations of the Treasury Department made in pursuance of those acts, "bonded warehouses" are "private stores for which no rent is paid," within the meaning of the act of 1841; and no moneys received by collectors upon, or on account of, the storing of goods in "bonded warehouses," whether denominated expenses, half-storage or otherwise, are claimable by those officers as emoluments of their office under the act of 1841. Even if "bonded warehouses" were designable as "public storehouses," and "half-storage," received on account of the storing of merchandise in such warehouses, were designable as "storage," in the sense of the statute of 1841, such "half-storage" could not be retained by collectors under authority of that act, inasmuch as the same did not accrue from goods stored in the "public warehouses for which rent is paid," or from an excess of storage received above the rent paid by the collectors. The rejoinder of the defendants, in that it does not aver that the storage which the said Macdonald retained by virtue of his office, was storage of goods in the "public storehouses for which rent was paid" by him as collector, and also that the same was from an excess of rent and storage beyond the rent paid by the said Macdonald, is insufficient in law to bar the claim of the United States, under the act of 1841. The illegality of the exaction of the moneys in question as storage (if they were so paid), The provision of § 40 of the act of July 18, 1866 (14 Stat. 188), does not entitle the defendants in error to an affirmance of the judgment. It is an established doctrine of interpretation, that every statute shall be confined, in its operation, to the future. Dwar. Stat. 540, et cas. cit. Where the law is altered by statute, pending an action, the law as it existed when the action was commenced must decide the rights of the parties, unless the legislature, by the language used, shows a clear intent to vary the mutual intent of the parties. Hitchcock v. Way, 6 Ad. & E. 943. The statute of 1866 is, in terms, prospective and applicable only to moneys received after its passage. Mr. William P. Fessenden, for defendants in error: The single question presented by the pleadings is, whether the defendant, Macdonald, is entitled to retain a sum not exceeding $2,000 per annum, as collector, from his receipts for storage, under all the acts upon that subject. This question is sufficiently and properly presented. Treasury Instructions of Feb. 7, 1849 [see opinion of Justice Clifford in this case]; act of 1841, § 5, 5 Stat. 422; Clark v. Peaslee, 1 Clif. 545. This specific question has been decided by this court in relation to all acts passed previous to Sept. 7, 1850. U. S. v. Walker, 22 How. 299, 16 L. ed. 382. Private bonded warehouses are expressly recognized as public stores by "the warehouse act" of 1846 and 1854. Act 1846, §§ 1, 2; act 1854, § 2; Clark v. Peaslee, 1 Clif. 545. Congress has removed all doubt on the true construction of the act of March 13, 1841, and the effect of such acts upon the question of storage, by an act approved July 18, 1866, § 40, entitled "An Act Further to Prevent Smuggling and for Other Purposes." This act must be regarded as declaratory of the existing law, and, being remedial, should be liberally construed as covering all accounts of collectors for storage. U. S. v. Freeman, 3 How. 556. Mr. Justice Clifford delivered the opinion of the court: Principal question presented for decision in this case is whether a collector of the customs is entitled to retain as compensation a sum not exceeding $2,000 per annum from his receipts as storage for the custody and safekeeping of imported merchandise, entered for warehousing, under the acts of Congress upon that subject, and stored in bonded warehouses. Firstnamed defendant was the collector of customs for the district of Portland and Falmouth, and the other defendants were his sureties. He was appointed collector prior to the 20th day of January, 1858, and between that day and the 18th day of April, 1861, he received as stor age for the custody and safe keeping of imported merchandise subject to duty and stored in bonded warehouses, the sum of $6,281, as | that time were certain fees or emoluments, com appears by the pleadings. Due returns were made by the collector, but he refused to pay over the moneys so received, and the plaintiffs sued him and his sureties, declaring on his of ficial bond. Defendants craved oyer of the bond, and pleaded performance. Replication of the plaintiffs alleged that the statement of the collector's accounts, as adjusted and settled at the Treasury Department, showed that he had received that amount of the moneys of the plaintiffs, and that he had neglected and refused to pay the same into the Treasury. Rejoinder of the defendants alleged that the sum specified in the replication of the plaintiffs accrued and was received, accounted for quarter yearly, and retained by the collector in virtue of his office for storage of merchandise in bonded 650*] *warehouses, from the 20th day of January, 1858, to the 16th day of April, 1861, inclusive, but not more than $2,000 in any one year, as he lawfully might do. Plaintiffs demurred, and the defendants joined in demurrer. Parties were heard, and the circuit court overruled the demurrer and rendered judgment for the defendants, and the plaintiffs sued out this writ of error. I. 1. All controversy as to the material facts of the case, so far as they are set forth and well pleaded in the rejoinder of the defendants, is closed. Applying that well-known rule to the case, it follows that the demurrer admits that the whole amount retained by the collector, as alleged in the replication, accrued and was received by that officer in virtue of his office as storage of imported merchandise in bonded warehouses, and that he never received from that source during the period embraced in this controversy more than $2,000 in any one year. Views of the defendants are that the collector had a right, under the 5th section of the act of the 3d of March, 1841, as construed by this court, to retain to his own use all sums received from storage, not exceeding $2,000 in any one year, as compensation for his services. 5 Stat. at L. 432. By the 5th section of that act collectors are directed to render a quarter yearly account, in addition to the account previously required by law, and to include in it all sums collected for fines, penalties, and forfeitures, or from seizures of merchandise, or on account of suits for frauds against the revenue, or for rent and storage in the public storehouses, for which a rent is paid beyond the rents paid by the collector. 2. Construction of that section, as given by this court, was that collectors must include all sums received for rent and storage in the public stores beyond the rents which they paid, in their quarterly accounts, and if it appeared from such accounting that the aggregate sum so received in any one year exceeded $2,000, they must pay the excess into the Treasury, as 651*] part and parcel of the public *money. Such excess, under that law as construed, belongs to the Treasury, but if the sums received from that source in any one year did not exceed $2,000, the court held that collectors might retain the whole amount to their own use, as additional compensation for their services. 8. v. Walker, 22 How. 299, 16 L. ed. 382. missions and allowances, to which was added a prescribed sum, called salary, which was much less than the compensation to which such officers were at all times entitled. They were also entitled to certain proportions of fines, penalties and forfeitures, but were never before obliged to embrace such receipts in their quarterly accounts. Statement of the court in that case was, and it was undoubtedly correct, that the bill, as originally reported, not only required that the sums so received should be included in the quarterly accounts of collectors; but if the aggregate from all those sources; including fines, penalties, and forfeitures, exceeded $2,000 in any one year, collectors were, required to pay the excess into the Treasury. Radical amendments, however, were made in the bill during its passage, essentially changing its character in that respect. Fines, penalties, and forfeitures, as it passed into a law, are not required to be included in the aggregate of the accounts from which to deduct the $2,000, in order to ascertain the excess to be paid into the Treasury; and, inasmuch as fees and emoluments were previously required to be included in the quarterly accounts of collectors as the principal source of their compensation, under such previous laws, the court held, and well held, that there was nothing left for that part of the section which directed the payment of the excess into the Treasury to operate upon, except the sums received from rent and storage. Conclusion of the court, therefore, was, and it was a unanimous conclusion, that collectors might, if the office earned so much, retain to their own use, as an addition to the compensation allowed to them by previous laws, the [*652 sum of $2,000 per annum for rent and storage, but that all excess beyond that sum must be paid into the Treasury as public money. II. 1. None of these principles are controverted by the plaintiffs, nor do they contend that the 5th section of that act has been repealed. Storehouses used for the storing of imported merchandise were such at that date, as were owned by the United States, and such as were leased by the collectors under the direction of the Treasury Department. Imported merchandise might, in certain cases, be stored for a limited time without the payment of duties, unless sooner withdrawn for consumption. Where the entry of merchandise was incomplete, the 52d section of the act of the 28th of February, 1799 (1 Stat. at L. 665) required that the importation should be conveyed to some warehouse or storehouse to be designated by the collector, there to remain, with due and reasonable care, at the expense and risk of the owner or consignee, under the care of some proper officer, until the invoice was exhibited and the value was ascertained by appraisement. 2. Goods damaged during the voyage were also required to be deposited in some warehouse or storehouse to be designated by the collector, in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as where the entry of the goods was incomplete, to be kept until the extent of the damage could be ascertained in the same U. way. 1 Stat. at L. § 52, p. 665. 3. Persons importing teas also might pay or 3. Sources of their compensation prior to secure the duties before a permit was granted for landing the same, on the same terms as pre- | ed from the importers at such offices greatly 653*] *4. Wines and distilled spirit might III. 1. Such was the state of affairs in this behalf when Congress passed the act of the 3d of March, 1841 (5 Stat. at L. 432), to which reference has already been made. Express provision of that act was that no collector shall, on any pretense whatsoever, hereafter receive, hold or retain for himself, in the aggregate, more than $6,000 per year, including all commissions for duties and all fees for storage, or fees or emoluments, or any other commissions or salaries which are allowed and limited by law. Collectors were required by the 2d section of the act of the 2d of March, 1799, called the compensation act, to keep accurate accounts of all fees and official emoluments by them received, and to transmit the same to the Comptroller of the Treasury; but they were allowed to retain to their own use the whole amount of the emoluments derived from those sources. 1 Stat. at L. 708. Custody and control were the same, whether 2. Maximum rate of compensation was first merchandise was deposited in the public or prescribed by the act of the 30th of April, 1802, other storehouse; and, whether in the one or and the provision was, that whenever the anthe other, the expenses of safe keeping were to nual emoluments of any collector, after deductbe paid by the importer, owner, or consignee. ing the expenditures incident to the office, shall Importer and the proper revenue officer might*amount to more than $5,000, he snall [*655 agree upon a store as a place of deposit other account for the surplus, and pay the same into than those few warehouses then owned by the the Treasury. 2 Stat. at L. 172. United States; but when the locks of the inspector and of the importer were affixed to the doors of the same, as required by law, and the merchandise as imported was deposited therein, under the control of the collector, it became a public storehouse for the purpose of securing the importation until the duties should be paid or secured, and the same should be withdrawn by authority of law. 5. Provision was also made in the 6th section of the act of the 14th of July, 1832, that imported wool and the manufactures of wool might, at the option of the importer, be placed in the public stores, under bond, at the risk of the importer, subject to the payment of the customary storage and charges, and to the payment of interest at the rate of six per cent per annum while so stored. 4 Stat. at L. 595. Effect of that law was to diminish the compensation of collectors, as it made large additions to the free list, and to increase the demand for storehouses for public use, as it authorized the warehousing of a large class of importations never before entitled to those privileges. 654*] *Resort was had by Congress to additional compensation acts, passed annually for the period of eight years, to remedy the first difficulty, and the section was overcome without legislation, by storing the merchandise, as imported, at the expense and risk of the importer, in storehouses designated by the collector, or in such as were agreed upon between the importer and the revenue officer, or in stores owned by private persons, and leased for that purpose by the collector for limited periods. Commerce and trade revived, and the practice of leasing such storehouses at certain ports became general, and "customary storage" collect Districts for the collection of the customs were, by the act of the 7th of May, 1822, divided into two classes, usually denominated the enumerated and the nonenumerated ports, and the maximum rate of compensation to collectors was diminished. Emoluments of collectors for the seven enumerated ports might reach, under the provisions of that act, the sum of $4,000, but could not exceed that amount under any circumstances. Annual compensation allowed to the collectors of the nonenumerated ports, of which Portland was one, might amount to $3,000; and the provision in respect to both classes was, that the excess, after deducting the expenses incident to the office, should be paid into the Treasury as public money. 3 Stat. at L. 693. He 3. The contest in Walker's Case, 22 How. 299, 16 L. ed. 382, was whether or not he was entitled, as the collector of a nonenumerated port, to an annual compensation of $6,000. claimed that he was, because, as he insisted, the maximum rate of compensation to the collectors of those ports, as prescribed by the act of the 7th of May, 1822, was repealed and, consequently, that he was entitled to $4,000 under the 9th section of that act, and $2,000 from the receipts of his office for storage, as allowed by the 5th section of the act under consideration. But this court held that the maximum rate prescribed in the prior law allowed to the collectors of the nonenumerated ports was not repealed, but was in full force as to all the emoluments of collectors prescribed or recognized in that act. Unanimous conclusion of the court, therefore, was that collectors of the nonenumerated ports might receive, as the annual compensation for |