ion, which, even in high quarters, he found unexpectedly favorable to England.1

Facing what amounted to a test case in international law, Washington sought the advice not only of his cabinet, but of John Jay, who was now chief justice. Unanimously they favored American neutrality. The movement of troops must not be welcomed, though it might be better to tolerate it than to incur by a refusal the flouting of our national authority. But in the event that Great Britain should send such an expedition, it was agreed that our government must take particular pains to assure Spain of our inability to prevent it.

Thus neutrality which has since come to be a first principle of American diplomacy was the united recommendation of Washington's advisers respecting the first case which came before them. To neither possible combatant must we afford advantage. Official neutrality, however, did not preclude individual preferences. And Jefferson, of all those consulted, saw most clearly the menace in British aggrandizement at New Orleans and beyond. He expressed a decided preference for a weak neighbor like Spain to a mighty neighbor like Great Britain, and in his opposition to the latter's designs on South America he foreshadowed once again the cardinal principle of the Monroe Doctrine. From Spain, herself, meanwhile, he hoped to extract free navigation of the Mississippi as the price of our neutrality. If the American demands had reached Spain at the right moment, there is some reason to suppose that they would have been granted.

In determining upon and adhering to a policy of neutrality Washington was insuring to his country ultimate title to the Mississippi Valley. As long as Britain held the posts along the Great Lakes and intrigued with the Indians north of the Ohio, and as long as Spain made use of the Floridas in urging the Creeks, Choctaws, Chickasaws and Seminoles

1 For America's relations to the Nootka Sound incident, see William Ray Manning's "The Nootka Sound Controversy," in Am. Hist. Assn. Ann. Rept. for 1904, especially 410-423.

2. The Works of Thomas Jefferson, Federal Edition, VI, 90-95.

to raids upon American settlements, the men of the frontiers, wedged between these hostile influences and uncertain of the extent of eastern aid, were driven, all save the most cautious, into a certain dependence upon their northern or their southern neighbor. Tempting as it might appear to the American authorities to seek in England an ally against Spain, or in Spain an ally against England, the result must inevitably have been the surrender of the Western country as the price of the alliance. Whereas neutrality by committing us to neither side permitted a waiting game that ultimately assured the maximum advantage.

True wisdom for the United States recommended a policy of delay until the rapid settlement of the frontier should insure its own defense. Till then it would be imprudent to press matters with either England or Spain to their final issue. At the same time this Fabian attitude in the national councils goes far to justify what otherwise seems the near approach to treason on the part not only of the notorious General James Wilkinson, but also of men whom all Americans regard as patriots, characters like George Rogers Clark, and the Tennessee pioneers, Robertson and Sevier. Honorable men on both sides of the Alleghenies felt that the West was a new nation. In this belief, natural in a generation preceding the railroad or even the canal, the leaders of this new people felt justified in guiding its destiny in terms of its own interest rather than of a sentimental attachment to a bygone day.

Erection of the national government diminished the likelihood of separation. But its possibility remained, and the new government had cause for thankfulness that the Nootka Sound episode terminated peaceably, for war, with its excuse for a British march from Detroit to New Orleans and with the possible consequence of a permanent British occupation, would have menaced American control of all the region thus traversed. But calamitous as war

3 For a reference to Clark's state of mind at this period see Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Origin of Genêt's Projected Attack on Louisiana and the Floridas" in Am. Hist. Rev., III, page 656.

would certainly have proved, the peace and entente which superseded it involved scarcely less anxiety.

The original issue between Spain and England concerned an interpretation of colonial rights. Spain upheld the ancient right of discovery alone as granting title to a region; England contended for the more modern interpretation that only settlements can validate a claim. Vancouver and the Northwest were thus within the scope of British policy. So long as Spain felt she could rely upon the Family Compact, the inter-Bourbon treaty of 1761, she was willing to stake the event on war. But in 1791 the will of the elder Bourbon was no longer law, the first French constitution having already gone into effect, and the National Assembly having named a committee to reexamine all the treaties to which France was a party, with a view to formulating a national rather than a dynastic policy. Under the circumstances, Montmorin, the minister of Louis, was obliged to inform Florida Blanca that the King could not uphold Spain in a war against Great Britain.*

NEUTRALITY

The termination of the Family Compact by absolving Spain from the French connection threw her, as soon as the Nootka troubles could be decently buried, into an entente with England. And the shock inflicted by the later stages of the French Revolution upon the monarchical susceptibilities of both countries tended to confirm their new alignment, the effects of which were soon manifested in the Western country in what appeared to be a joint policy of harassing the Americans. It could not be denied, however, that the previous courtship of the United States by each of the opponents had contributed to our international prestige.

In 1792, perhaps, more than at any other period in his administration, Washington was tempted to abandon his independence of action for an alliance. Hamilton favored

Alexander Hamilton's report to Washington on America's diplomatic situation in 1790 is a penetrating analysis of conditions. The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Federal Edition, IV, 313-342.

England, as her intrigues on the Northwest were conducted with what was on the whole a greater regard for decency than were those of Spain on the Southwest. But Washington thought such a remedy worse than the disease. For a moment he looked toward France, to the great delight of Jefferson to whom a French alliance had long seemed a "polar star" of policy. But this deviation from Washington's own compass of neutrality was only temporary.

In fact it was Washington who gave to neutrality much of its importance as a concept of international law. Brief and seemingly matter-of-fact as was the neutrality proclamation of April 22, 1793, it is one of the great State Papers of American history, and a precedent-creating document. Its importance justifies a full quotation.

PROCLAMATION OF NEUTRALITY

April 22, 1793

Whereas, it appears that a state of war exists between Austria, Prussia, Sardinia, Great Britain, and the United Netherlands, of the one part; and France on the other—and the duty and interests of the United States require that they should with sincerity and good faith adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial towards the belligerent powers.

I have therefore thought fit by these presents to declare the disposition of the United States to observe the conduct aforesaid towards those powers respectively; and to exhort and warn the citizens of the United States carefully to avoid all acts and proceedings whatsoever, which may in any manner tend to contravene such disposition.

And I do hereby also make known, that whosoever of the citizens of the United States shall render himself liable to punishment or forfeiture under the law of nations, by committing, aiding, or abetting hostilities against any of the said powers, or by carrying to any of them those articles which are deemed contraband by the modern usage of nations, will not receive the protection of the United States against such punishment or forfeiture; and further, that I have given instructions to those officers, to whom it belongs, to cause prosecutions to be instituted against all persons who shall, within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, violate the laws of nations, with respect to the powers at war, or any of them.

In testimony whereof, I have caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed to these presents, and signed the same with my hand. Done at the City of Philadelphia, the 22d day of April, one thousand seven hundred and ninety three, and of the Independence of the United States of America, the seventeenth.

GEORGE WASHINGTON."

The position which Washington thus assumed aroused much controversy. Alexander Hamilton became its foremost champion before the public; James Madison, its chief opponent. Their letters, which in some sense amounted to a sequel to their contributions to The Federalist, were printed under the pseudonyms of Pacificus and Helvidius respectively. Under the former Hamilton stated the ideals of Realpolitik, to use a German phrase, with a cogency not since surpassed. He writes:

Between individuals, occasion is not unfrequently given for the exercise of gratitude. Instances of conferring benefits from kind and benevolent dispositions or feelings towards the person benefited, without any other interest on the part of the person who renders the service, than the pleasure of doing a good action, occur every day among individuals. But among nations they perhaps never occur. It may be affirmed as a general principle, that the predominant motive of good offices from one nation to another, is the interest or advantage of the nation which performs them.

Indeed the rule of morality in this respect is not precisely the same between nations, as between individuals. The duty of making its own welfare the guide of its actions, is much stronger upon the former, than upon the latter; in proportion to the greater magnitude and importance of national, compared with individual happiness, and to the greater permanency of the effects of national, than of individual conduct. Existing millions, and for the most part future generations, are concerned in the present measures of a government; while the consequences of the private actions of an individual ordinarily terminate with himself, or are circumscribed within a narrow compass:

Whence it follows, that an individual may, on numerous occasions, meritoriously indulge the emotions of generosity and benevolence, not only with an eye to, but even at the expense of, his own interest. But a government can rarely, if at all, be justifiable

Richardson, James D., Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 17891897. I, 156-157.