terness of spirit the Treaty of Versailles. The loss of fleets and armies, the sacrifice of territory and population, the imposition of indemnities transcending anything in previous experience, were all manifestations of a "hard peace." So it seemed to Wilson, and he deprecated it. He relied upon the League of Nations for gradual amelioration of the sentiment of Europe. But "hard" as the peace assuredly was, Count Bernsdorf, who was Germany's ambassador at Washington till the outbreak of the war, and who followed Wilson's actions then and afterward, has had the courage to assure his countrymen that they are mistaken in their estimate of Wilson. He reminds the Germans that Wilson alone of the Big Four at the Conference did not lose sight of German interests, and that without Wilson the terms imposed would have been vastly more severe.

WHAT HAPPENED TO THE TREATY

Wilson, successful in obtaining at least the shell of what he cherished most, returned to the United States to persuade the Senate into ratifying a treaty inextricably intertwined, as he had promised in advance it would be, with a league of nations covenant. On arrival in the United States he made a considerable but an unsuccessful endeavor to conciliate the Senate. And then to inform the public he did on a grand scale what Taft attempted in his Chicago speech of 1911 relating to Canadian reciprocity. He made a tour of the United States to set before the people what was really contemplated by the League. At Paris, in April, while negotiations were at their height, his health had broken down. In the opinion of physicians he jeopardized his life by undertaking the speaking tour he planned. But his work was only partly done. Undaunted he set forth to finish it. The public welcome accorded Wilson on his arrival home, and later at points en route, contrasted strongly with the feelings of the politicians. His journey seemed like a triumphal progress, and the President hoped it would react upon the Senate. But in the midst of his great efforts, apoplexy cut him down. He was hurried to the White House and the League had lost

its chief proponent. In the months that Wilson lay an invalid the constitutional question arose as to whether his illness did not actually disqualify him from the office which he held. He himself did not so interpret it. From his sickroom he kept in touch with things as well as might be, but it worried him that Secretary Lansing, who had shown but little sympathy with his policies, should now be in unrestrained control at the State Department. And he seized upon a flimsy and undignified excuse that Lansing had presided over certain meetings of the cabinet as warrant to dismiss him. The reason lay far deeper, and was, indeed, quite adequate. The pretext was regretted by the President's most staunch adherents, who saw in it the querulousness of an invalid.

The departing Secretary was succeeded by Mr. Bainbridge Colby, who retained the President's good will until the end and then became his partner in a law firm. But the real work of the Department had been already done, and by a master hand. It remained for Congress and the country to pass upon it. And in the weary months that Wilson lay an invalid, his cherished vision of a regenerated world was exposed to the not too tender mercies of opponents in the Senate.

The contest was triangular. The President desired acceptance of the treaty and the League without qualifying reservations. He felt that the League was weak enough already. To reduce it further would condemn it to impotence. In view of the concessions he had made at Paris, it was natural that he should wish to halt the process of emasculation. At the same time, in their own manner and degree the Senators were as formidable as Clemenceau. Concessions were inevitable. Made freely and with promptness, they might have saved the treaty.

Having now examined at some length the position of the President on an issue which ranks with the adoption of the Constitution as one of the supreme decisions of the American people, it is fair to give a more extended notice of the position of the Senate toward the great debate. There is no denying that the personality of the President was a factor

here as well as at Versailles. He antagonized where conciliation would have been the wiser policy. He was known to hold all but a very few of the Senators in personal contempt. The sentiment was abundantly reciprocated. Republicans in the Senate still were chafing at the President's appeal of October 25, 1918, for a Democratic majority. Politics, they said, had been adjourned; the President was violating a flag of truce. Their efforts to balk him were proportioned to their wrath. The election resulted in a loss of three Democratic seats, and the establishment of a Republican majority of one-that one being the Senator from Michigan, Truman H. Newberry, who gained his seat by unabashed corruption. The new Congress would not take its seat at once, but its election revealed the waning of the President's authority.

The followers of Wilson, nevertheless, constituted a majority in the Congress which assembled on the heels of the election. But their leadership was faulty. So far as the Democratic Party was concerned, it reflected a one-man guidance. In the absence of the President, who sailed for Paris on December 4, 1918, Senators Lewis, of Illinois, and Hitchcock, of Nebraska, were less accomplished parliamentarians than their chief opponents, Lodge, and Knox, and Borah. Moreover, the President had not formulated his own plans with sufficient precision. His followers were therefore somewhat in the dark, a circumstance from which the opposition derived an obvious advantage. This much, at least, was clear. The President proposed to incorporate within the peace treaty as an integral component, a league of nations covenant. The opposition early stated its objections. Senator Lodge, for example, asserted on December 21, 1918, that "The attempt to attach provisions for an effective League of Nations to the treaty of peace now making with Germany would be to launch the nations who have been fighting Germany on a sea of boundless discussion."

News from Paris clarified the issue. To the extent that this became more clear, discussion assumed a greater relevance. Senator Walsh, of Montana, now acquired an intellectual leadership within the Democratic ranks. Senator

Porter J. McCumber, Republican, of North Dakota, exhibited a noticeable spirit of broad-mindedness. The triumvirate of opposition leaders maintained their previous tactics. The Senate learned the details of the League of Nations Covenant on February 15th. On the 26th, the Foreign Relations Committee in confidential session heard from the President's own lips his version of the much-debated Article X. It was Wilson's own contribution to the Covenant. It undertook to guarantee the territorial boundaries of the nations as existing at the moment of the Covenant's adoption. This meant, of course, to insure in perpetuity the predominance of the British Empire. To Irish-Americans no less than German-Americans such a proposition was preposterous. The Senate opposition seized upon it greedily. As the Congress drew to its conclusion on March 4, 1919, thirty-seven Republicans, some of them senators elect and not yet seated, joined in the famous "Round-robin" wherein the President was warned that "the constitution of the League of Nations in the form now proposed to the Peace Conference should not be accepted by the United States." Here was a number more than adequate for defeating any treaty the President might propose. Their action was not official, but it was spread upon the record. The President might well take heed.

Next day, March 5th, the President left once more for Paris, resolved despite round-robins to interweave the covenant so completely with the peace that it could not be unscrambled. Out of deference to senatorial opinion, however, he resolved to include if possible within the covenant an international recognition of the Monroe Doctrine, something never previously attained; the separation of American domestic issues from consideration by the League of Nations; more clearcut recognition of the privilege of withdrawing from the League; and recognition of the right of the American Congress to decisions on such vital questions as those of war and peace.

In the interval prior to May 19th when the new Congress first assembled, public sentiment was crystallizing throughout the United States. World coöperation found its sponsors

among internationally minded Republicans like Taft, Wickersham, and McCumber. Isolation advocates kept quoting Washington, Jefferson, Monroe, and other early Fathers. The split was not on party lines, nor need the President abandon hope of having his own way. Subject to certain reservations his plan might carry.

The "Round-robin" of the expiring Congress bore fruit on June 10th in a resolution offered by Senator Knox to separate the covenant and the treaty. Senator Lodge supported such a move by introducing on June 23rd letters from Elihu Root opposing the League of Nations, particularly Article X, and advocating the Permanent Court of Arbitration already in existence at The Hague. But the Knox resolution failed to carry. So far the League was victor.

From July 19th, when the Treaty text was received, until September 15th, the Senate was occupied with committee hearings on the subject. A conscientious endeavor was undoubtedly put forth to ascertain the trend of American opinion. In the absence of detailed memoranda from the President, the Committee obtained perforce much of its information piece-meal. And, as Dr. Henry Barrett Learned, whose account the present writer is following, very judicially epitomizes it, "In the process of reading the evidence, one reaches the view that the document could be reasonably opposed, irrespective of partisanship, partly on the ground of its peculiar method of manufacture as well as on the ground of its menace to some of America's most cherished traditions. On the other hand, it was necessarily produced under extraordinary circumstances such as should be taken carefully into account. And it appeared to be workable and in many ways the result of wisdom and statesmanship of no ordinary kind."

Senatorial opinion was meanwhile influenced by the opinion of Mr. Charles Evans Hughes that the right of withdrawal from the League must be more clearly stated; that domestic issues must be more sharply separated from the purview of the League; that the United States must be its own interpreter as to the application of the Monroe Doctrine; and that Article X, "an illusory engagement," must