40

undertook his mission, perhaps the most important diplomatic maneuver ever intrusted to an American naval officer. His instructions bade him safeguard the natural rights of shipwrecked seamen. He must obtain a right of entry to Japan for food, supplies, and fuel. He was also to obtain a port of entry for commercial vessels, disclaiming, however, any trade monopoly for the United States, it being the hope of his government that any advantages from the mission might "ultimately be shared by the civilized world."

Care was taken in the instructions given Perry to avoid appearance of offense. "In his intercourse with this people, who are said to be proud and vindictive in their character, he should be courteous and conciliatory, but at the same time firm and decided. He will, therefore, submit with patience and forbearance to acts of discourtesy to which he may be subjected by a people to whose usages it will not do to test by our standard of propriety, but, at the same time, will be careful to do nothing that may compromise, in their eyes, his own dignity or that of his country. He will, on the contrary, do everything to impress them with a just sense of the power and greatness of this country, and to satisfy them that its past forbearance has been the result, not of timidity, but of a desire to be on friendly terms with them." Particularly was he cautioned against unnecessary use of force. The supplementary instructions of February 15, 1853, drawn up by Edward Everett, read: "Make no use of force, except in the last resort for defense, if attacked, and self-preservation." 41

Perry reached the Bay of Yedo on July 8, 1853. The first days were critical, but Perry scored important gains. First, he refused to depart; secondly, he obtained a dignified reception for the letter from President to Emperor; thirdly, he surveyed the harbor; and fourthly, he accomplished a fair and open exchange of presents. In his opinion much head

40 Callahan, James Morton, American Relations in the Pacific and the Far East 1784-1900 (Baltimore, 1901), pp. 78-82, gives a brief account of the negotiation.

41 Dennett, Tyler, Americans in Eastern Asia (New York, 1922), should be consulted for our Far-Eastern policy from its inception. For above quotation see Hill, Leading American Treaties, p. 230.

way was already gained, and as the Emperor's reply must take much preparation, in ten days he departed for Hong Kong promising to return in the spring for further negotiations.

He did return in February and was received with courtesy. Preliminary formalities were begun at Yokohama on March 8, 1854. The presents from President to Emperor were received on the thirteenth. Among the gifts which Perry brought, telegraph instruments, a miniature train, and fire arms aroused the greatest wonder. Negotiations became more promising and included the presentation on the twenty-fourth of return gifts from the Shogun, and, on the twenty-seventh, a great banquet on board the Susquehanna, Perry's flag-ship. On March 30, 1854, a new era began for Japan in a treaty whose importance, scarcely recognized at the time, now passes estimation.

The twelve provisions of the treaty met the points outlined in the Commodore's instructions. Peace, and treaty ports, the rights of shipwrecked sailors, temporary commerce pending a more detailed treaty, most-favored-nation treatment, and the residence of an American consul were all guaranteed, and eighteen months allowed for an exchange of ratifications. Both in itself and in its provision for further negotiation, the treaty contained the germs of a prodigious awakening. After more than two centuries of sleep, Japan was aroused by America to the vision of a modern world.42

If the greater future rested with Japan, of not inferior immediate importance to our diplomacy was Hawaii. Here, too, the Pierce Administration made a contribution. American missionaries had been active in the Islands since 1820. The native rulers approved of Protestantism. After 1839, French influence backed Catholicism and bred trouble between the opposing Christians. Alarmed at French encroachments and those of Great Britain too, the Hawaiian king in 1842 appealed to England, France, and the United States for a guarantee of independence. Matters reached 42 Hill, Charles E., Leading American Treaties, pp. 225-240.

a crisis in 1843 when a British naval officer raised the Union Jack above the islands, and the king entreated Tyler to interpose. This the United States actually did, in a somewhat cautious way, with the result that in November, 1845, both Great Britain and France recognized Hawaiian independence, and renounced any purpose to assume even a protectorate, though neither power completely kept its pledge.

Looking upon the United States as their principal defender, the islanders desired a closer union. In 1849, a treaty of friendship, commerce, navigation and extradition was negotiated. And in 1851, the king and privy council with approval of the parliament declared their country an American protectorate. Webster, who at the time was Secretary of State, did not dream it prudent to accept this offer. But the American fleet in the Pacific received orders to safe-guard Hawaiian independence from the encroachments of other powers.

Pierce's Secretary, Marcy, took a somewhat stronger stand. Disregarding French and British opposition to our growing influence in the islands, he felt that the approaching death of the Hawaiian king would precipitate a crisis from which the United States should not hesitate to profit. On April 4, 1854, he authorized our minister to negotiate for actual possession of the islands. The dying king, still friendly to the United States, resisted Franco-British opposition and was on the point of consummating the negotiation when death called him. On this event hung the issue of the treaty, for the new king, Kamehameha IV, opposed it. He was friendly to a reciprocity agreement which failed to pass our Senate. Beyond that he would not go. Married to an English wife, he gave the preference to her countrymen, and at his death in 1863, Hawaii seemed more likely to become a cotton-growing colony for Great Britain than a United States possession.*3

In the diplomatic exchanges of the administrations treated in the present chapter one encounters routine more than crisis. With England our affairs were more difficult than

43 Callahan, James Morton, Op. Cit. 114-123, is more detailed as to Hawaii than as to Japan.

threatening. Even our cynical pursuit of Cuba fell considerably short of war. The opening of Japan was glorious, but not at once perceived to be so. A diplomacy which had tasted of imperialism was reaching out in many fields. But a lack of unity behind the lines imposed restraints. The general tendencies of diplomacy as here sketched continued to the Civil War. But their details in Buchanan's term de

serve a separate examination.

T

CHAPTER XV

THE IMPENDING CRISIS

HE election of 1856 raised to the Presidency a most experienced diplomat. Thoroughly tested by the

State Department under Polk and the Court of St. James under Pierce, Buchanan brought to his own administration wide knowledge of affairs. For his Secretary of State he selected Lewis Cass, a Democratic war horse whose Presidential hopes were past, and who like his chief possessed unusual experience in diplomacy. The President was elderly, however, and his Secretary really old, so that their combination augured a cautious administration.

The domestic situation forbade aggressive policies. In the mounting heat over Kansas and the fugitive slaves, the North would certainly oppose endeavors to obtain slave territory. Hope of Cuba really vanished with the Ostend Manifesto, though Buchanan was to make at least a gesture toward the cherished object of his Southern friends. Relations with Japan, so happily initiated by Commodore Perry, were followed up successfully. Disturbed conditions on the Mexican border invited intervention, but this was never pressed. William Walker and his filibustering could not be ignored. Relations with Great Britain in the aftermath of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty demanded much attention, as has previously been noted. Among their varied problems, the two old statesmen scored but one real triumph, in the settlement forever of all contentions by Great Britain of the right to search our vessels.

Pierce and his successor each recorded a maritime success. It was a mistake in 1856 for Secretary Marcy to refuse adherence to the Declaration of Paris on the ground that it failed to recognize the principle of "free ships make free goods." The refusal proved embarrassing in the Civil War. But in negotiations with Denmark the Secretary