lent the weight of a title won at the burning of Copenhagen. Mr. Henry Goulburn, an under secretary of state for the colonies, contributed the enthusiasm, the prejudices, and the limitations of a bureaucrat in subordinate office. The third member of the commission, William Adams, was learned in the law, but not impressive otherwise.

Without one man of real talent in their number, the British commissioners with all the tactical advantage of position were far from sure of victory against the most brilliant leadership America could boast. Adams was hardly more than started on his great career. Gallatin for eight years had been the clearest brain in the United States Government. Clay had all the fire and genius that epitomized the West.

Indeed, as Henry Adams, grandson of one of the negotiators, has observed, the Americans had an embarrassment of riches. Great talents and powerful personalities fostered independence of judgment and the clash of diverging tempers. Adams, the nominal chairman, was lacking in qualities of tact. His influence was weakened by his unpopularity in Massachusetts, and the general odium attaching to the unpatriotic conduct of New England, of whose interests he was now chief guardian. Albert Gallatin, most eminent of the commissioners, their senior in age and in the confidence of Madison, was technically subordinate. Extraordinary self-effacement would be needed if Gallatin were to play the rôle of mediator between such contrasting spirits as Adams and Henry Clay. For Clay himself, unfailing in his zeal for Western interests, was slow to comprehend New England's.

The animus between Clay and Adams is constantly apparent in the latter's Memoirs, which constitute a vivid source for details of the negotiation. The retired and studious habits of its author are frequently contrasted with the rollicking good fellowship of his associate and competitor. Adams, for example, usually arose at five to read or write by candle-light, and it was not unusual for him to hear the guests departing from Clay's little parties. The Memoirs

8 See characterizations by Henry Adams, Op. Cit. IX, 13-14.

are everywhere good reading. But perhaps a paragraph from the entry for November 29, 1814, epitomizes as well as any other the sharp divergence of the sectional interests of East and West, as represented by their brilliant sons.

Discussion had been rather heated. Adams says that "Mr. Gallatin brought us all to unison again by a joke. He said he perceived that Mr. Adams cared nothing at all about the navigation of the Mississippi and thought of nothing but the fisheries. Mr. Clay cared nothing at all about the fisheries, and thought of nothing but the Missis-. sippi. The East was perfectly willing to sacrifice the West, and the West was equally ready to sacrifice the East. Now, he was a Western man, and would give the navigation of the river for the fisheries. Mr. Russell was an Eastern man, and was ready to do the same.

"I then told Mr. Clay that I would make a coalition with him of the East and the West. If the British would not give us the fisheries, I would join him in refusing to grant them the navigation of the river.

"He said the consequence of our making the offer would be that we should lose both." The selection quoted anticipates the narrative somewhat, but it pertinently illustrates the difficulties under which the Americans negotiated."

The initiative at Ghent was taken by the British. On August 8th, Goulburn marshaled four demands covering impressment and allegiance, Indians and their boundary, the boundary of Canada, and the landing and drying of fish under British jurisdiction. The Americans demanded time. Then Castlereagh on August 14, 1814, dispatched a fresh statement of conditions. Discussion was renewed on the 19th. Next day an official note was presented the American commissioners to which on the 25th of August they so emphatically replied that a majority of them believed with Adams that negotiation was already at an end. Henry Clay alone of the American delegation was not misled. The western game of poker stood him in good stead. To his experienced reading, the masklike face of his antagonist

See the Memoirs of John Quincy Adams (Philadelphia, 1874-1877), III, 70 ff., for significant entries.

concealed a bluff. He was prepared for overtures of quite a different tone. In this surmise he proved correct, for though a bit delayed, overtures did come in October when Castlereagh and his colleagues had estimated the net results of military operations in America.

Before this necessary information was obtainable, Lord Liverpool, Lord Bathurst and Lord Castlereagh as well, saw cause for dissatisfaction with their emissaries. Goulburn particularly displayed an annoying predilection for ultimata which could not be enforced. His willingness at every disappointment to suspend negotiations reflected more nearly the opinion of the London Times than that of responsible ministers.10

On September 19th, the British presented a note bristling with reproaches over Madison's occupation of West Florida and his attempts on Canada. An adequate reply was difficult. Gallatin had opposed the Florida policy consistently. Bayard had attacked it in the Senate. Clay was deeply compromised on Canada. Only Adams cared to make a hot retort. On this point he overruled his colleagues, but they in turn restrained his pious sentiments on the blessings conferred by Western settlers on the poor benighted Indians. The reply was drafted by September 26th and on October 8th the British somewhat modified their original commitment on the Indians by demanding their return to the status ante bellum.

Overshadowing these details and making possible eventual success was the fundamental change in instructions determined on June 27th when Madison and his cabinet at last abandoned their position on impressments. If the British could be induced to a similar abandonment of uti possidetis, the way was clear to serious negotiation, for America could never yield her territorial boundaries. Nor, in the light of Prevost's headlong retreat to Canada in the summer of 1814, did there seem much likelihood that she could be compelled to do so.

10 Henry Adams' chapter on the Peace of Ghent is well worth reading. Op. Cit. IX, 24-53.

News of this defeat in Canada arrived in London on October 17th. To the cabinet at home and to Lord Castlereagh at Vienna it caused grave concern. High hopes had failed. Eventual success would require another campaign to be waged 3000 miles from home and to cost no less than £10,000,000. Injuries like these inflicted by an enemy so lightly rated impaired the British status at Vienna, and caused heart searchings to diplomats and economists alike. Certainly in face of facts, the claim of uti possidetis was untenable. On October 24th, the Americans formally rejected the idea.

To shift responsibility for a peace without victory, the Government submitted the entire military and diplomatic situation to the judgment of Wellington, with an offer to transfer him to Canada should he desire to go there. Wisely preferring to enjoy his laurels rather than to risk them, Wellington offered most sensible advice. Canada could be held indefinitely, he thought, with the forces there already. But an offensive campaign offered little prospect of success. Nothing on the military map in his opinion warranted any claim to territory, and negotiations if intended to succeed must take a milder tone.

This opinion of Wellington's reached London on November 13th. On the 18th its effect was evident in a note from Liverpool to Castlereagh intimating that all claim to territory was abandoned. With this the last impediment was removed. Negotiations might proceed.

Having abandoned one by one their ultimata, the British surrendered the initiative, and on the 10th of November the Americans dispatched their project of a treaty. Its preparation brought to a head the difficulties between Clay and Adams. To return to the status ante bellum would open navigation on the Mississippi to Great Britain. Clay totally rejected this. He neither could nor would yield on this point. On the other hand not to return to status ante bellum was to sacrifice New England's rights in British fisheries. Here Adams fought not only for his section but for the family honor, the fishing rights of 1783 being an achievement of his father. Jonathan Russell supported Clay. Gallatin offered mediation. Leaning perhaps toward Clay,

he argued that the fisheries were scarcely to be called a "natural right." At the same time he urged unwearyingly upon Great Britain the necessity for yielding it. On December 19th, Great Britain gave notice of her willingness to defer that issue for future discussion. A similar postponement resolved the Mississippi difficulty. Finally on December 24th the treaty, so hopeless in its preliminary stages, was prepared for signature.'

11

At the council table as on the battle-field, the honors were divided. Great Britain failed to secure American consent to the principles of impressment and blockade. Her navigation of the Mississippi was subject to dispute while as for America, her definition of impressment by no means prevailed, and her rights in the fisheries were thrown in doubt. Hope was abandoned also of any reparations for the enormous losses inflicted on American merchants during the troubled years since the Essex decision rendered the seizure of American ships the most lucrative of British pastimes. Vital issues incapable of settlement in 1814 were deferred for later treatment. But that such settlement would eventually favor America inhered in the facts of the situation.

The treaty thus finally arrived at contained ten provisions of importance. Hostilities were suspended in the opening article, with provision for reciprocal return of land, official papers, and goods taken on land, these to include slaves. Here again, as in 1783, Great Britain never lived up to the provision, but in 1826, on the decision of a neutral arbitrator, paid an indemnity instead. The second and third articles, corollaries really to the first, assured a mutual return of prizes, and of prisoners of war. Article Four set up a commission for determining the ownership of islands in Passamaquoddy Bay. Article Five likewise concerned the boundary from the headwaters of the St. Croix to the St. Lawrence River. The boundary from the

11 No student, however limited the resources of local libraries, need be without access to the "Papers of James A. Bayard 1796-1815," which are among the sources for the Treaty of Ghent. See Am. Hist. Assn. Ann. Rept., 1913, vol. II, 312-369.