It

by what is called the ordinary prescrip-, come in and assert whatever claim anytion of ten years (art. 2529), notwith- one may have to the fund in the registry standing the requirement of regular, un- of the court. The purpose of the suit interrupted possession for that result in was to remove Patterson's claim to the art. 2528. It is argued that construc- land. He alone was made a party. tive possession follows the record and does not concern the petitioners, after is enough, and it is supposed that this their failure to establish either possestransaction will defeat the previous reg- sion or title, whether some third person istered possession and title by ordinary has a better title than Patterson, or what prescription, although, by art. 789, that precautions the court shall take before possession does not cease until the rec- giving him the fund that has taken the ord is canceled, by consent, or by a trans- place of the land. fer from the registered possessor, or by a judicial decree. It is supposed also to destroy a title complete by the extraordinary prescription of thirty years, to which "no title whatsoever is necessary" (art. 2531).

The effect attributed to art. 2526 depends in part upon its operation after the Canal Zone was taken over by the United States, as the ten years had not run when the Zone was transferred. It would be extreme to construe the article as meaning something different now from what it would have meant before the transfer. Taking it simply as a law of the United States, we should see no reason for attributing to it the unjust operation contended for. It is not necessary to consider what such a registration might do in the way of interrupting a prescription [402] not yet complete, but we see no sufficient ground for converting it into a disseisin when the previous owners maintain their possession undisturbed under a registered title in favor of which prescription already has run. If we recur to the origin of the law we do not believe that a different view would be taken in Panama. But the considerations that have been urged for following local decisions in places like Porto Rico, having their own peculiar system, do not apply in the same degree to a code that, in its present application, governs a predominantly American population and derives its force from Congress and the President. Panama R. Co. v. Bosse, 249 U. S. 41, 63 L. ed. 466, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 211. The opinion of the circuit court of appeals on the first appeal was not res judicata or conclusive here, as the defendant seems to suppose (Remington v. Central P. R. Co. 198 U. S. 95, 99, 100, 49 L. ed. 959, 963, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 577; Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U. S. 436, 444, 56 L. ed. 1152, 1156, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 739), but we are of opinion that, upon the question before us, it was right. The petitioners attempt to fortify their case by the absence of an order calling upon the rest of the world to

The record is at once defective and unduly prolix, and this and other considerations perhaps might have warranted a dismissal of the appeal. But as both parties desired a decision upon the merits, and as the costs will fall upon the appellants, we have thought it better to indicate our opinion that the reasons for the appeal are untenable and that the decree should be affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

[403] NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
WINDOW GLASS MANUFACTURERS,
National Window Glass Workers, et al.,
Appts.,

V.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 403-413.) Monopoly scheme for reciprocally allotting labor to factories.

No combination in unreasonable re

straint of trade, in violation of the Act of July 2, 1890, is effected by an arrangement between manufacturers and laborers in the hand-blown glass industry by which the

Note. As to what relation a contract or combination must bear to interstate commerc in order to bring it within the see notes to Loewe v. Lawlor, 52 L. ed. scope of the Federal Anti-trust ActU. S. 488, and Pocahontas Coke Co. v. Powhatan Coal & Coke Co. 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 268.

On monopolies generally-see notes to Fowle v. Park, 33 L. ed. U. S. 67; United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Asso. 41 L. ed. U. S. 1008; and United States v. United States Steel Corp. 8 A.L.R. 1140.

On contracts in partial restraint of trade as affected by modern anti-trust acts-see notes to Lanyon v. Garden City Sand Co. 9 L.R.A. (N.Š.) 446, and Baird v. Smith, L.R.A. 1917A, 379.

On trade association activities and the Sherman Act-see note to American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 66 L. ed. U. S. 284.

established wage scale is issued to one set Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, of factories for the first half of the year 245 U. S. 229, 62 L. ed. 260, L.R.A. and to another set for the second half, with 1918C, 497, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 65, Ann. the result that the respective classes, not being able to secure labor, must be idle Cas. 1918B, 461; National Fireproofing one half the time, where, because of the Co. v. Mason Builders' Asso. 26 L.R.A. competition of machine-made glass, only (N.S.) 148, 94 C. C. A. 535, 169 Fed. a small portion of the product is hand made, 259; Hopkins v. United States, 171 U. S. and the hand workers have become reduced 578, 593, 594, 43 L. ed. 290, 296, 297, in number so as to be insufficient to man all 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 40. factories at once, the purpose being to secure employment for all men throughout the year, and give all available labor to the factories, dividing it equally among them.

The wage scale agreement, with its two-period system, if it can be said to relate to commerce at all, is not an un

due or unreasonable restraint.

Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 60, 55 L. ed. 619, 645, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 834, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 502, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 734; United States v. AmerDe- ican Tobacco Co. 221 U. S. 106, 179, 55 L. ed. 663, 693, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 632; Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United

Sup. Ct. Rep. 427; 2 Tiedeman, State & Fed. Control of Persons & Property, p. 939; Re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 106, 50 Am. Rep. 636; Butchers' Union S. H. & L. S. L. Co. v. Crescent City L. S. L. & S. H. Co. 111 U. S. 746, 28 L. ed. 585, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 652; State ex rel. Zillmer v. Kreutzberg, 114 Wis. 530, 58 L.R.A. 751, 91 Am. St. Rep. 934, 90 N. W. 1098; Erdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. 79, 63 | L.R.A. 538, 99 Am. St. Rep. 783, 56 Atl. 327.

The Clayton Act permits the adoption of the wage scale in issue.

Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 14, 8 Am. Rep. 287; United States v. Joint Traffic Asso. 171 U. S. 550, 568, 43 L ed. 259, 287, 19 Sup. Ct. Kep. 25; Martin, Labor Unions, p. 13; Powers v. Journeymen Bricklayers' Union, 130 Tenn. 643, L.R.A.1915E, 1006, 172 S. W. 284.

U. S. 1, 55 L. ed. 619, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 834, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 502, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 734; United States v. American Tobacco Co. 221 U. S. 106, 55 L. ed. 663, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 632: United States v. Terminal R. Asso. 224 U. S. 383, 56 L. ed. 810, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 507; Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U. S. 20, 57 L. ed. 107. 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 9; United States v. Union P. R. Co. 226 U. S. 61, 57 L. ed. 124, 33 Sun. Ct. Rep. 53; United States v. Reading Co. 226 U. S. 324, 57 L. ed. 243, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 90, 183 Fed. 427; Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Asso. v. United States, 234 U. S. 600, 58 L. ed. 1490, L.R.A. 1915A, 788, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 951; Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U. S. 231, 238, 62 L. ed. 683, 687. 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 242, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 1207; United States v. United States Steel Corp. 251 U. S. 417, 64 L. ed. 343, 8 A.L.R. 1121, The wage agreement in question in40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 293; United States v. volves manufacture only, and not interE. C. Knight Co. 156 U. S. 1, 17, 39 L. state commerce, and is, therefore, beed. 325, 331, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 249; An-yond the regulatory power of Congress. derson v. United States, 171 U. S. 604, 615, 616, 43 L. ed. 300, 305, 306, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 50; Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 396, 397, 49 L. ed. 518, 524, 525, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 276; United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co. 259 U. S. 344, 66 L. ed. 975, 27 A.L.R. 762, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 570; National Fireproofing Co. v. Mason Builders' Asso. 26 L.R.A. (N.S.) 155, 94 C. C. A. 535, 169 Fed. 259.

When the chief object of the parties is a legitimate transaction out of which a restraint incident thereto developed, the restraint is considered reasonable, and not illegal.

United States v. E. C. Knight Co. 156 U. S. 1, 39 L. ed. 325, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 249; Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U. S. 418, 48 L. ed. 504, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383; United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co. 259 U. S. 344, 66 L. ed. 975, 27 A.L.R. 762, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 570; Gable v. Vonnegut Machinery Co. 274 Fed. 66; Federal Trade Commission v. Claire Furnace Co. 52 App. D. C. 202, 285 Fed. 936; Re Greene, 52 Fed. 104; Oliver Iron Min. Co. v. Lord, 262 U. S. 172, 67 L. ed. 929, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 526; Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co. 260 U. S. 245, 67 L. ed. 237, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 83; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 20, 32 L. ed. 346, 350, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 232, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 6; Hammer v. Dagen hart, 247 U. S. 251, 62 L. ed. 1101, 3 A.L.R. 649, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 529, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 724; Delaware L. W. R. Co. v. Yurkonis, 238 U. S. 439, 59 L. ed. 1397, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 902; Crescent Cotton Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 257 U. S. 129, 66 L. ed. 166, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 42.

Arthur v. Oakes, 25 L.R.A. 414, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 744. 11 C. C. A. 209, 24 U. S. App. 239, 63 Fed. 310, 9 Am. Crim. Rep. 169; National Fireproofing Co. v. Mason Builders' Asso. supra; National Protective Asso. v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 324, 58 L.R.A. 135, 88 Am. St. Rep. 648, 63 N. E. 369; Grassi Contracting Co. v. Bennett, 174 App. Div. 244, 160 N. Y. Supp. 284; Wunch v. Shankland, 59 App. Div. 482, 69 N. Y. Supp. 349, appeal dismissed in 170 N. Y. 573, 62 N. E. 1102; Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 6 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1067, 116 Am. St. Rep. 272, 78 N. E. 753, 7 Ann. Cas. The plan restrains interstate com638; Clemmitt v. Watson, 14 Ind. App. ' merce. 38, 42 N. E. 367; Jetton-Dekle Lumber Co. v. Mather, 53 Fla. 969, 43 So. 590; Longshore Printing Co. v. Howell, 26 Or. 527, 28 L.R.A. 464, 46 Am. St. Rep. 640, 38 Pac. 547; Bowen v. Matheson, 14 Allen, 499; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 586, 41 L. ed. 832, 835, 17

Solicitor General Beck argued the cause, and, with Special Assistant to the Attorney General Robert P. Reeder, filed a brief for appellee:

American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 377, 66 L. ed. 284, 21 A.L.R. 1093, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 114; United States v. Reading Co. 226 U. S. 324, 353, 367, 57 L. ed. 243, 252, 257, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 90; Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373, 380, 57 L. ed.

1232, 1236, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 780; Charles' tion of § 1, which forbids combinations A. Ramsay Co. v. Associated Bill Post- in restraint of trade among the states. ers, 260 U. S. 501, 511, 67 L. ed. 368, The defendants are all the manufacturers 370, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 167; United States of handblown window glass, with certain v. American Linseed Oil Co. 262 U. S. of their officers, and the National Window 371, 67 L. ed. 1035, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. Glass Workers, a voluntary association, 607; United Mine Workers v. Coronado its officers and members, embracing all Coal Co. 259 U. S. 344, 407-412, 66 L. the labor to be had for this work in the ed. 975, 993-996, 27 A.L.R. 762, 42 Sup. United States. The defendants estabCt. Rep. 570. lished a wage scale to be in effect from September 25, 1922, to January 27, 1923, and from January 29, 1923, to June 11, 1923; and the feature that is the object of the present attack is that this scale would be issued to one set of factories for the first period and to another for the second, but that no factory could get it for both, and without it they could not get labor, and therefore must stop work. After a hearing a final decree was entered enjoining the defendants from carrying out the above or any similar agreements so far as they might limit and prescribe the time during which the defendant manufacturers should operate their factories for handblown window glass. 287 Fed. 228.

The Clayton Act does not exempt the agreements involved in this case from the operation of the anti-trust laws. United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co. 259 U. S. 344, 385, 391, 66 L. ed. 975, 984, 987, 27 A.L.R. 762, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 570; Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U. S. 20, 48, 49, 57 L. ed. 107, 117, 118, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 9; Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. 220 U. S. 373, 408, 409, 55 L. ed. 502, 518. 519, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 376; Boston Store v. American Graphophone Co. 246 U. S. 8, 62 L. ed. 551, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 257, Ann. Cas. 1918C, 447; Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 469, 65 L. ed. 349, 358, 16 A.L.R. 196, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 172.

The intentions of the defendants when thus restraining interstate commerce are immaterial.

Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211, 243, 44 L. ed. 136, 148, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 96; United States v. Patten, 226 U. S. 525, 543, 57 L. ed. 333, 341, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 325, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141; United States v. Reading Co. 226 U. S. 324, 370, 57 L. ed. 243, 259, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 90; Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U. S. 20, 49, 57 L. ed. 107, 117, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 9; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 55 L. ed. 619, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 834, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 502, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 734; United States v. American Tobacco Co. 221 U. S. 106, 181, 55 L. ed. 663, 694, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep.

632.

The agreement shows on its face that it constitutes a restraint of trade, in violation of the Anti-trust Act.

This agreement does not concern sales or distribution; it is directed only to the way in which union labor, the only labor obtainable, it is true, shall be employed in production. If such an agreement can be within the Sherman Act, at least it is not necessarily so. United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co. 259 U. S. 344, 408, 66 L. ed. 975, 994, 27 A.L.R. 762, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 570. To determine its legality requires a consideration [412] of the particular facts. Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U. S. 231, 238, 62 L. ed. 683, 687, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 242, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 1207.

The

It

The dominant fact in this case is that, in the last quarter of a century, machines have been brought into use that dispense with the employment of the highly trained blowers and the trained gatherers needed for the handmade glass, and in that and other ways have enabled the factories using machines to produce window glass at half the cost of the handmade. price for the two kinds is the same. has followed, of course, that the companies using machines fix the price, that they make much the greater part of the glass in the market, and probably, as was testified for the defendants, that the handmakers are able to keep on only by This is a proceeding brought by the the sufferance of the others and by workUnited States under the Act of July 2, ing longer hours. The defendants say, 1890, chap. 647, § 4, 26 Stat. at L. 209, and it is altogether likely, that the condiComp. Stat. § 8823, 9 Fed. Stat. Anno. tions thus brought about and the nature 2d ed. p. 701, to prevent an alleged viola- of the work have driven many laborers

Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211, 244, 245, 44 L. ed. 136, 148, 149, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 96.

Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:

Appts.,

V.

FIDELITY TRUST COMPANY et al.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 413-417.)

jurisdiction

interference

with judgment of state court.

away and made it impossible to get new | DORA E. ROOKER and William V. Rooker, ones. For the work is very trying, requires considerable training, and is always liable to a reduction of wages if the machine industry lowers the price. The only chance for the handworkers has been when and where they could get cheap Courts fuel, and therefore their tendency has been to follow the discoveries of natural gas. The defendants contend with a good deal of force that it is absurd to speak of their arrangements as possibly having any effect upon commerce among the states, when manufacturers of this kind obviously are not able to do more than struggle to survive a little longer before they disappear, as human effort always disappears when it is not needed to direct the force that can be got more cheaply from water or coal.

1. The district court of the United States has no jurisdiction to annul a judgment of a state court on the ground that it is in conflict with the Federal Constitution in giving effect to a state statute which is alleged to be in conflict with such Constitution in denying due process and equal protection of law and in impairing the effect of a prior decision in the cause which had become the law in the case, where the questions were before the state court for decision.

[For other cases, see Courts, VI. f, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.]

Courts effect of expiration of time to correct errors.

ment of the state court because of such

errors.

trustee of cause involving

But that is not all of the defendants' case. There are not twenty-five hundred men at present in the industry. The gov- 2. After the time for correcting errors ernment says that this is the fault of the in the decision of constitutional questions union; the defendants, with much great- by a state court has expired, no action will er probability, that it is the inevitable lie to a Federal court to annul the judgcoming to pass. But wherever the fault, if [413] there is any, that is the fact with which the defendants had to deal. There were not men enough to enable the factories to run continuously during the working season, leaving out the two or three summer months in which the heat makes it impossible to go on. To work undermanned costs the same in fuel and overhead expenses as to work fully manned, and therefore means a serious loss. On the other hand, the men are less well off with the uncertainties that such a situation brings. The purpose of the arrangement is to secure employment for all the men during the whole of the two seasons, thus to give all the labor available to the factories, and to divide it

equally among them. From the view that

we take we think it unnecessary to explain how the present system sprang from experience during the war when the government restricted production to one half of what it had been and an accident was found to work well, or to do more than advert to the defendant's contention that, with the means available, the production is increased. It is enough that we see no combination in unreasonable restraint of trade in the arrangements made to meet the short supply of

men.

Decree reversed.
Petition dismissed.

362

Judge disqualification
corporate stock
duties of corporation.
3. A judge who is executor and trustee
under a will which devises to him in trust,
for administration and disposal, stock in
a corporation which holds property under
a conventional trust, is not disqualified to
relations of the corporation under the trust.
sit in the cause relating to the duties and
[For other cases, see Judges, III. in Digest

Sup. Ct. 1908.]

[No. 295.]

Submitted on motion to dismiss or affirm November 26, 1923. Decided December 10, 1923.

AP

PPEAL by complainants from a decree of the District Court of the United States for the District of Indiana, dismissing a bill filed to annul a judgment of a state court. Affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. William Velpeau Rooker submitted the cause for appellants:

The Supreme Court, upon writ of ertion if there be present upon the record ror to a state court, will deny jurisdiclocal or state issues which may have controlled the decision, even though there are present, also, Federal ques

tions.

Johnson v. Risk, 137 U. S. 300, 34 L. ed. 683, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 111; Eustis v. 263 U. S.