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The Terraces, who are citizens, have no right safeguarded by the 14th Amendment to lease their land to aliens lawfully forbidden to take or have such lease. [222] The state act is not repugnant to the equal protection clause, and does not contravene the 14th Amendment.

3. The state act, in our opinion, is not in conflict with the treaty between the United States and Japan. The preamble declares it to be "a treaty of commerce and navigation," and indicates that it was entered into for the purpose of es

prohibited from so owning agricultural, its borders are matters of highest imlands. Two classes of aliens inevitably portance, and affect the safety and power result from the Naturalization Laws, of the state itself. those who may and those who may not become citizens. The rule established by Congress on this subject, in and of itself, furnishes a reasonable basis for classification in a state law withholding from aliens the privilege of land ownership as defined in the act. We agree with the court below (274 Fed. 841, 849) that: "It is obvious that one who is not a citizen and cannot become one lacks an interest in, and the power to effectually work for the welfare of, the state, and, so lacking, the state may rightfully deny him the right to own and lease real estate within its boundaries. If one in-tablishing the rules to govern commercial capable of citizenship may lease or own real estate, it is within the [221] realm of possibility that every foot of land within the state might pass to the ownership or possession of noncitizens." And we think it is clearly within the power of the state to include nondeclarant eligible aliens and ineligible aliens in the same prohibited class. Reasons supporting discrimination against aliens who may, but who will not, naturalize, are obvious.

Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 37, 38, 60 L. ed. 131, 133, 134, L.R.A.1916D, 545, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 7, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 283, does not support the appellants' contention. In that case, the court held to be repugnant to the 14th Amendment an act of the legislature of Arizona making it a criminal offense for an employer of more than five workers at any one time, regardless of kind or class of work, or sex of workers, to employ less than 80 per cent qualified electors or native-born citizens of the United States. In the opinion it was pointed out that the legislation there in question did not relate to the devolution of real property, but that the discrimination was imposed upon the conduct of ordinary private enterprise covering the entire field of industry, with the exception of enterprises that were relatively very small. It was said that the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the community is a part of the freedom which it was the purpose of the 14th Amendment to

secure.

In the case before us, the thing forbidden is very different. It is not an opportunity to earn a living in common occupations of the community, but it is the privilege of owning or controlling agricultural land within the state. The quality and allegiance of those who own, occupy, and use the farm lands within

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intercourse between the countries.

The only provision that relates to owning or leasing land is in the first paragraph of article 1, which is as follows:

ware

"The citizens or subjects of each of the high contracting parties shall have liberty to enter, travel and reside in the territories of the other to carry on trade, wholesale and retail, to own or lease and occupy houses, manufactories, houses and shops, to employ agents of their choice, to lease land for residential and commercial purposes, and generally to do anything incident to or necessary for trade upon the same terms as native citizens or subjects, submitting themselves to the laws and regulations there established."

For the purpose of bringing Nakatsuka within the protection of the treaty, the amended complaint alleges that, in addition to being a capable farmer, he is engaged in the business of trading, wholesale and retail, in farm products, and shipping the same in intrastate, interstate, and foreign commerce, and, instead of purchasing such farm products, he has produced, and desires to continue to produce, his own farm products, for the purpose of selling them in such wholesale and retail trade; and if he is prevented from leasing land for the purpose of producing farm products for such trade, he will be prevented from engaging in trade and the incidents to trade, as he is authorized to do under the

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owning land within its borders. Un-, for the purpose of escheating to the state less the right 'o own or lease land an undivided one-half interest in land, or is given by the treaty, no question the proceeds thereof, held in trust for of conflict can arise. We think that the the benefit of an alien, a subject of the treaty not only contains no provision giv- British Empire, decided since this appeal ing Japanese the right to own or lease was taken, the supreme court of Washland for agricultural purposes, but, when ington held that the statute in question viewed in the light of the negotiations did not contravene this provision of the leading up to its consummation, the Constitution of that state. The question language shows that the high contract- whether or not a state statute conflicts ing parties respectively intended to with- with the Constitution of the state is hold a treaty grant of that right to the settled by the decision of its highest citizens or subjects of either in the ter- court. Carstairs v. Cochran, 193 U. S. ritories of the other. The right to 10, 16, 48 L. ed. 596, 597, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. "carry on trade," or "to own or lease 318. This court "is without authority to and occupy houses, manufactories, ware- review and revise the construction affixed houses, and shops," or "to lease land for to a state statute as to a state matter by residential and commercial purposes," or the court of last resort of the state." "to do anything incident to or necessary Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Acci. for trade," cannot be said to include the Commission, 255 U. S. 445, 448, 65 L. ed. right to own or lease, or to have any 723, 724, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 373, and cases title to or interest in, land for agri-cited. cultural purposes. The enumeration of rights to own or lease for other specified purposes impliedly negatives the right to own or lease land for these purposes. A careful reading of the treaty suffices, in our opinion, to negative the claim asserted by appellants that it conflicts with the state act.

The decree of the District Court is affirmed.

Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice Brandeis think there is no justiciable question involved, and that the case should have been dismissed on that ground.

But, if the language left the meaning of its provisions doubtful or obscure, the Mr. Justice Sutherland took no part in circumstances of the making of the the consideration or decision of this case. treaty, as set forth in the opinion of the district court (supra, 844, 845), would resolve all doubts against the appellants'

Mizuno, Appts.,

V.

U. S. WEBB, as Attorney General of California, and Thomas L. Woolwine, as District Attorney of Los Angeles County.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 225-233.)

contention. The letter of Secretary of [225] W. I. PORTERFIELD and Y. State Bryan to Viscount Chinda, July 16, 1913, shows that, in accordance with the desire of Japan, the right to own land was not conferred. And it appears that the right to lease land for other than residential and commercial purposes was deliberately withheld by substituting the words of the treaty, "to lease land for residential and commercial purposes" for a more comprehensive clause [224] contained in an earlier draft of the instrument, namely, "to lease land for residential, commercial, industrial, manufacturing, and other lawful purposes."

4. The act complained of is not repugnant to § 33 of article 2 of the state Constitution.

That section provides that "the ownership of lands by aliens is prohibited in this state. . . Appellants assert that the proposed lease of farm land for five years is not."ownership," and is not prohibited by that clause of the state Constitution, and cannot be forbidden by the state legislature. That position is untenable. In State v. O'Connell, 121 Wash. 542, 209 Pac. 865, a suit

Treaties
land.

right of Japanese to lease

1. The treaty between the United States and Japan does not confer upon Japanese subjects the privilege of acquiring or leasing land for agricultural purposes. Constitutional law

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denying right to

classification.

hold land 2. The classification of aliens with respect to the right to hold land within the state into those eligible to citizenship and those not so eligible, giving the former the right to hold land and denying it to the lat

Note. On relation of treaty to state and Federal law-see note to Trott v. State, 4 A.L.R. 1377.

As to the validity of class legislation generally-see notes to State v. Goodwill, 6 L.R.A. 621; and State v. Loomis, 21 L.R.A. 789.

ter, is not so unreasonable as to be invalid,, Pac. 245; Re Case, 20 Idaho, 128, 116 as denying the equal protection of the laws. Pac. 1037; Poon v. Miller, Tex. Civ.

[No. 28.1

Argued April 23 and 24, 1923. Decided November 12, 1923.

App., 234 S. W. 573; Fraser v. McConway & T. Co. 82 Fed. 257; Juniata Limestone Co. v. Fagley, 187 Pa. 193, 42 L.R.A. 442, 67 Am. St. Rep. 579, 40 Atl. 977; State v. Montgomery,

APPEAL by complainants from an or- 94 Me. 192, 80 Am. St. Rep. 386, 47

der of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, denying a motion for temporary injunction to restrain the enforcement of a state law forbidding ineligible aliens to hold land. Affirmed.

See same case below, 279 Fed. 114. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. Louis Marshall argued the cause and filed a brief for appellants:

The California Alien Land Law forbids aliens ineligible to citizenship under the laws of the United States to lease real property in the state, although the right to do so has been conferred on all other aliens. The former are thus deprived of the equal protection of the laws, within the meaning of the 14th

Amendment.

Re Turner, 51 Cal. App. 317, 196 Pac. 807; Blythe v. Hinckley, 127 Cal. 431, 59 Pac. 787; Herrick v. Basletta, 257 U. S. 658, 66 L. ed. 421, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 185; Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275, 23 L. ed. 550; New York v. Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, 107 U. S. 59, 27 L. ed. 383, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 87; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 713, 37 L. ed. 905, 913, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1016; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 368, 30 L. ed. 225, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 39, 60 L. ed. 134, L.R.A.1916D, 545, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 7, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 283; United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 42 L. ed. 890, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 456; Re Kotta, 187 Cal. 27, 200 Pac. 957; Re Terui, 187 Cal. 20, 17 A.L.R. 630, 200 Pac. 954; Re Tetsubumi Yano, 188 Cal. 645, 206 Pac. 995; Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 5 Sawy. 562, Fed. Cas. No. 6,545; Re Tiburcio Parrott, 6 Sawy. 349, 1 Fed. 481; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 25 L. ed. 664; Re Ah Chong, 6 Sawy. 451, 2 Fed. 733; Opinion of Justices, 207 Mass. 601, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 604, 94 N. E. 558; Re Ah Fong, 3 Sawy. 144, Fed. Cas. No. 102; Laundry Ordinance Case, 7 Sawy. 526, 13 Fed. 229; Gandolfo v. Herman, 16 L.R.A. 277, 49 Fed. 181; Re Tie Loy, 26 Fed. 611; Re Sam Kee, 31 Fed. 681; Re Lee Sing, 43 Fed. 359; Ex parte Sing Lee, 96 Cal. 354, 24 L.R.A. 196, 31 Am. St. Rep. 218, 31

Atl. 165, 15 Am. Crim. Rep. 117; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 19 L. ed. 357; Templar v. State Examiners, 131 Mich. 254, 100 Am. St. Rep. 610, 90 N. W. 1058; Vietti v. George K. Mackie Fuel Co. 109 Kan. 179, 197 Pac. 881, 20 N. C. C. A. 647; Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. ed. 394; Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 76, 62 L. ed. 161, L.R.A.1918C, 210, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 16, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1201; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 345, 25 L. ed. 676, 679, 3 Am. Crim. Rep. 547; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, 26 L. ed. 567; Gibed. 1075, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 904; Williams son v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 565, 40 L. 1012, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 583; Carter v. v. Mississippi, 170 U. S. 213, 42 L. ed. Texas, 177 U. S. 442, 44 L. ed. 839, 20 192 U. S. 226, 48 L. ed. 417, 24 Sup. Sup. Ct. Rep. 687; Rogers v. Alabama, Ct. Rep. 257; Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S. 316, 50 L. ed. 497, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 338; McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 235 U. S. 151, 59 L. ed. 169, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 69; Railroad Tax Cases, County v. Southern P. R. Co. 9 Sawy. 8 Sawy. 238, 13 Fed. 722; Santa Clara 165, 18 Fed. 385; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. 666, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 255; Atchison, T. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 41 L. ed. & S. F. R. Co. v. Vosburg, 238 U. S. 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 675; Truax v. Corrigan, 56, 59 L. ed. 1199, L.R.A.1915E, 953, 257 U. S. 312, 66 L. ed. 254, 27 A.L.R. 375, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 124; Missouri v.

Lewis (Bowman v. Lewis) 101 U. S. 22, 25 L. ed. 989; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400, 417, 54 L. ed. 536, 541, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 287, 17 Ann. Cas. 1247; Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. (Cotting v. Godard) 183 U. S. 79, 46 L. ed. 92, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 30; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. 184 U. S. 540, 46 L. ed. 679, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 431; Raymond v. Chicago Consol. Traction Co. 207 U. S. 42, 52 L. ed. 90, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 14; Smith v. Texas, 233 U. S. 630, 58 L. ed. 1129, L.R.A. 1915D, 677, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 681, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 420; Gast Realty & Invest. Co. v. Schneider Granite Co. 240 U. S. 55, 60 L. ed. 523, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 254; F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 64 L. ed. 989, 40 Sup.

Ct. Rep. 560; Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Road Improv. Dist. 256 U. S. 658, 65 L. ed. 1151, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 604; State v. Julow, 129 Mo. 163, 29 L.R.A. 257, 50 Am. St. Rep. 443, 31 S. W. 781; Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U. S. 32, 50 L. ed. 647, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 387, 5 Ann. Cas. 692.

The act is likewise unconstitutional because it deprives Porterfield, who is a citizen of the United States, of the right to enter into contracts for the leasing of his realty, and because it deprives Mizuno of his liberty and property by debarring him from entering into a contract for the purpose of earning a livelihood in a lawful occupation. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 40, 60 L. ed. 134, L.R.A.1916D, 545, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 7, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 283; Butchers' Union S. H. & L. S. L. Co. v. Crescent City L. S. L. & S. H. Co. 111 U. S. 746. 28 L. ed. 585, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 652; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 589, 590, 41 L. ed. 832, 835, 836, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427; Smith v. Texas, 233 U. S. 630, 58 L. ed. 1129, L.R.A.1915D, 677, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 681, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 420; Cop- | page v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 59 L. ed. 441, L.R.A.1915C, 960, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 240.

p. 372; 2 Kent, Com. 14th ed. 53-64; Kerr, Real Prop. 215; Tiffany, Real Prop. 2350; 1 Stimson, Am. Stat. Law, 6013; 1 Stephens, Com. 330; Sedgw. Trial of Title, 226; Washb. Real Prop. 131; Fairfax v. Hunter, 7 Cranch, 603, 3 L. ed. 453; Orr v. Hodgson, 4 Wheat. 453, 4 L. ed. 613; Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483, 25 L. ed. 628; United States v. Repentigny, 5 Wall. 211, 18 L. ed. 627; Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 258, 33 L. ed. 642, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 295; Donaldson v. State, 182 Ind. 615, 101 N. E. 485; Jones v. Jones, 234 U. S. 615, 58 L. ed. 1500, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 937; State ex rel. Tanner v. Stacheli, 112 Wash. 344, 192 Pac. 991; Frick v. Webb, 281 Fed. 407; Re Akado, 188 Cal. 739, 207 Pac. 245; Re Colbert, 44 Mont. 259, 119 Pac. 791.

The California Alien Land Law does not violate the United States-Japan treaty of commerce and navigation of February 21, 1911.

Terrace v. Thompson, 274 Fed. 845; Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U. S. 433, 65 L. ed. 344, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 158.

Plaintiff Mizuno is not carrying on trade, wholesale and retail, or leasing land for commercial purposes, within the scope of the treaty of commerce and navigation with Japan.

Terrace v. Thompson, supra; Kidd v. Mr. U. S. Webb, Attorney General of Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 32 L. ed. 346, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 232, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. California, argued the cause, and, with 6; United States v. E. C. Knight Co. 156 Messrs. Frank English, Thomas Lee Woolwine, and Tracy C. Becker, filed a 249; Joyce v. Auten, 179 U. S. 591, 594, U. S. 1, 39 L. ed. 325, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. brief for appellees:

The Alien Land Law of California

does not violate the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Perley v. North Carolina, 249 U. S. 510, 514, 63 L. ed. 735, 737, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357; Moody v. Hagen, 36 N. D. 471, L.R.A.1918F, 947, 162 N. W. 704, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 933; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 66 L. ed. 254, 27 A.L.R. 375, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 124; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 369, 30 L. ed. 220, 226, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064; Missouri v. Lewis (Bowman v. Lewis) 101 U. S. 22, 31, 25 L. ed. 989, 992; Terrace v. Thompson, 274 Fed. 849; Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 259, 272, 4 L. ed. 234, 237; Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483, 484, 25 L. ed. 628, 629; De Vaughn v. Hutchinson, 165 U. S. 566, 570, 41 L. ed. 827, 829, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 461; Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U. S. 186, 44 L. ed. 1028, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 873; Blythe v. Hinckley, 180 U. S. 333, 45 L. ed. 557, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 390; 1 Co. Litt. Hargrave & Butler, 19th ed. chap. 1, § 2a; 1 Bl. Com.

45 L. ed. 332, 334, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 227, S. 238, 245, 46 L. ed. 171, 175, 22 Sun. Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio, 183 U. Ct. Rep. 120; Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio, 183 U. S. 245, 46 L. ed. 175, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 120.

ion of the court: Mr. Justice Butler delivered the opin

the above-named attorney general and Appellants brought this suit to enjoin district attorney from enforcing the California Alien Land Law, submitted by the initiative and approved by the electors, November 2, 1920.

Appellants are residents of California. Porterfield is a citizen of the United States and of California. Mizuno was born in Japan, of Japanese parents, and is a subject of the Emperor of Japan. Porterfield is the owner of a farm in Los Angeles county, containing 80 acres of land, which is particularly adapted to raising vegetables, and which, for some years, has been devoted to that and other agricultural purposes. The com

Appellants contend that the law denies to ineligible aliens equal protection of the laws secured by the 14th Amendment, because it forbids them to lease land in the state, although the right to do so is conferred upon all other aliens. They also contend that the act is unconstitutional because it deprives Porterfield of the right to enter into contracts for the leasing of his realty, and [233] deprives Mizuno of his liberty and property by debarring him from entering into a contract for the purpose of earning a livelihood in a lawful occupation.

plaint alleges that Mizuno is a capable at L. 1504-1509) does not confer upon farmer and a desirable person to become Japanese subjects the privilege of aca tenant of the land, and that Porter- quiring or leasing land for agricultural field desires to lease the land to him for purposes. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. a term of five years, and that he desires S. 197, ante, 255, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 15. to accept the lease, and that the lease would be made but for the act complained of. And it is alleged that the appellees, as attorney general and district attorney, have threatened to enforce the act against the appellants if they enter into such lease, and will forfeit, or attempt to forfeit, the leasehold interest to the state, and will prosecute the appellants criminally for violation of the act. It is further alleged that the act is so drastic and the penalties attached to a violation of it are so great that neither of the appellants may make the lease even for the purpose of testing the constitutionality of the act, and that, unless the court shall determine its validity in this suit, appellants will be compelled to submit to it, whether valid or invalid, and thereby will be deprived of [232] their property without due process of law, and denied equal protection of the laws.

Appellants made a motion for a temporary injunction to restrain appellees, during the pendency of the suit, from bringing or permitting to be brought any proceeding for the purpose of enforcing the act against the appellants. This was heard by three judges, as provided in § 266 of the Judicial Code. The motion was denied.

The act provides in §§ 1 and 2 as follows:

Section 1. All aliens eligible to citizenship under the laws of the United States may acquire, possess, enjoy, transmit, and inherit real property, or any interest therein, in this state, in the same manner and to the same extent as citizens of the United States, except as otherwise provided by the laws of this state.

Section 2. All aliens other than those mentioned in § 1 of this act may acquire, possess, enjoy and transfer real property, or any interest therein, in this state, in the manner and to the extent, and for the purpose prescribed by any treaty now existing between the government of the United States and the nation or country of which such alien is a citizen or subject, and not otherwise.

Other sections provide penalties by escheat and imprisonment for violation of $2.

The treaty between the United States

This case is similar to Terrace v. Thompson, supra. In that case the grounds upon which the Washington Alien Land Law was attacked included those on which the California act is assailed in this case. There the prohibited class was made up of aliens who had not in good faith declared intention to become citizens. The class necessarily includes all ineligible aliens, and, in addition thereto, all eligible aliens who had failed so to declare. In the case now before us the prohibited class includes ineligible aliens only. In the matter of classification, the states have wide discretion. Each has its own problems, depending on circumstances existing there. It is not always practical or desirable that legislation shall be the same in different states. We cannot say that the failure of the California legislature to extend the prohibited class so as to include eligible aliens who have failed to declare their intention to become citizens of the United States was arbitrary or unreasonable. See Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373, 383, 384, 59 L. ed. 628, 631, 632, L.R.A.1915F, 829, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 342, and cases cited.

Our decision in Terrace v. Thompson, supra, controls the decision of all questions raised here.

The order of the District Court is affirmed.

Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice Brandeis think there is no justiciable question involved, and that the case should have been dismissed on that ground.

Mr. Justice Sutherland took no part in and Japan (February 21, 1911, 37 Stat. the consideration or decision of this case.

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