LIX.

1862.

CHAP. consciousness returned, the fight was over and all was silent. He anxiously asked, "Have I saved the frigate "? "Aye, aye, and whipped the Merrimac," was the answer. "Then I care not what becomes of me," said he. Captain Worden's eyes never recovered from the injury they received from the iron-dust at the concussion of that shot.

Movement of the Army of the Potomac.-Evacuation of Manassas.Yorktown, Siege of.-Battle of Williamsburg.-Sanitary Commission. The Retreat.-Excitement in Richmond.-Conscription Law.-Jackson in Shenandoah Valley.-The Chickahominy.-Battle of Fair Oaks -Lee in Command.-Battle of Gaines' Mill or Cold Harbor.-Change of Base.-Battle of Malvern Hill.-Harrison's Landing.-Cedar Mountain.-Second Battle of Bull Run.Lee Invades Maryland.-Harper's Ferry Captured.-Battle of Antietam.-Lee Retreats.-McClellan's Slowness; His Removal.Burnside in Command.-Battle of Fredericksburg.

LX.

1862.

PREPARATIONS on a large scale were made to move the CHAP. Army of the Potomac to its destination on the Peninsula. There were employed 113 steamers, 185 schooners, and 85 barges with tugboats. These were to pass down the bay and up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and thence to "reach the vicinity of Richmond before they (the rebels) could concentrate all their troops there from Manassas." The latter had railroad communication and could place their troops in defense of Richmond long before the Union army could make its way across a country more or less woody, with four rivers to pass, proverbial for their marshy banks. which in the spring were always overflowed by freshets. This plan of advance, as the President suggested, was to leave a way open on the right flank of the army by which a force accustomed to move with the rapidity of the enemy, or, as we have seen, the Union armies in the West, could come

LX.

1862.

CHAP. in overwhelming numbers and attack Washington before it would be possible to recall the Potomac army from its posi tion. For this reason President Lincoln retained McDowell's division for some time that the Capital might be secure. As the insurgents had their spies, male and female, in Washington, every fact worth knowing was communicated to them, and the city when known to be in a position of defense was secure from attack. In a note to McClellan the President gives his reason for retaining McDowell. This reason will always be satisfactory to the people. He says After you left I ascertained that less than 20,000 unorganized men, without a single field battery, were all you designed to be left for the defense of Washington and Manassas Junction, and part of this even was to go to General Hooker's old position."

19.

66

The Confederate General T. J. Jackson-afterward Mar. known as "Stonewall"-made a dash at Winchester, where General Shields was in command, but after a day's skir mishing and fighting retired in the night up the valley, destroying all the bridges on the route. The Baltimore and Ohio Railway, through the exertions of the chivalrous General Lander, was once more put in order that supplies could be brought to Washington. General Lander had been wounded in a previous battle, but would not retire, though urged by his physician, and in consequence his great exertions led to his death.

Mar.

10.

The enemy had been for some time leisurely evacuating Manassas and transporting their war material by railway to Richmond without interference from the Union army. Twenty hours after the fact was known along the front "it was made apparent at headquarters that the enemy was evacuating Centreville and Manassas as well as on the Upper Potomac." Yet orders were not issued for a pursuit until the enemy had been gone thirty-six hours. The Union army, after four days' marching, returned and had gained some experience on the march and bivouac." So said the General-in-Chief.

66

MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY-MANASSAS ABANDONED.

875

LX.

1862.

"General Joe Johnston had 44,000 men at Centreville CHAP. and Manassas, and Jackson had 6,000 in the Shenandoah Valley. Johnston finally fell back behind the Rapidan, deemed a more defensive position than the Rappahannock, of which it is a branch."

991

18.

Two divisions-General Heintzelman commander-left Alexandria on transports for Fortress Monroe. Several days after McDowell's division was ready to move, and as it Mar. has been said the President retained it to make Washington safe; but on June 6th, when McClellan might need them, a large portion of the corps (Franklin and McCall's divisions) was dispatched to him, who says in a note to the President, "I shall be in perfect readiness to move forward to take Richmond the moment McCall reaches here and the ground will admit the passage of artillery."

June

8.

4.

10

4.

The plan adopted by McClellan to reach Richmond was by the peninsula formed by the York and James Rivers; the latter not used lest the Merrimac should interfere, though she was closely blockaded by the Monitor and other war vessels. For one entire month the Union army was Apr. engaged in making the most elaborate redoubts and parallels, and placing in order siege guns, while the enemy could May leave at any moment, as their rear was open and unobstructed. The Confederate government never intended to make a stand at Yorktown, and General Magruder had only about 11,000 men to defend a line "embracing a front from Yorktown to Milberry Point, thirteen and a half miles." But when the comparatively immense force of McClellan appeared, and after a delay of ten days or more began to dig trenches and not attack, General Joe Johnston availed himself of the delay to join Magruder with 53,000 men,* and he only remained to make a show of defense until Richmond could be thoroughly fortified. Had the Union army at once advanced with its much superior numbers, Magruder would have fallen back toward Richmond.

CHAP. LX. 1862.

Magruder, surprised that he was not attacked, says: In a few days the object of McClellan's delay was apparent. In every direction in front of our lines, through intervening woods and along the open fields, earthworks began to appear." McClellan made requisitions upon the War Department for siege guns, stating that the enemy had within his entrenchments not less than 100,000 men, probably more," and that "here is to be fought the great battle that is to decide the existing contest," yet the way was open for the Confederates to retire to Richmond whenever they chose. He also complained of his want of men. Mr. Lincolu wrote in reply: "Your dispatches, complaining that you are not properly sustained, while they do not offend me, pain me very much. He reminds the Generalin-Chief that he has with him 85,000 effective men, and en route enough to make 108,000, remarking: "By delay the enemy will relatively gain upon you; that is, he will gain faster by fortifications and reinforcements than you can by reinforcements alone." After further suggestions and expressions of kindness, he closed by saying-" But you must act." Time passed on, the enemy making a bold front to deceive the Union commander, and when he was ready to May open with his siege guns, it was discovered one morning that the enemy were gone; their rear guard, even, was far on its way to ward Richmond. The Federal gunboats passed up York river convoying transports, carrying Franklin's division to West Point, twenty-five miles above Yorktown, where it arrived the next day. This capture of Yorktown was hailed as an important victory by the people, and excited hopes of the speedy crushing of the rebellion.

4.

The Confederates, meantime, retired as best they could on account of the muddy roads, made so by a pouring rain, which continued for thirty-six hours, and halted to retard the pursuit at Williamsburg, twelve miles above Yorktown, at which place earth work defenses had been thrown up some time before, mostly by the labor of slaves. About noon the same day the Union cavalry overtook the