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MEMORANDA ON THE CIVIL WAR.

The Opening of the Atlanta Campaign. IN the August CENTURY General Joseph E. Johnston-clarum et venerabile nomen - - writes:

Cantey with his division arrived at Resaca that evening (7th) and was charged with the defense of the place. During the day our cavalry was driven from the ground west of Rocky-face through the gap. Grigsby's brigade was placed near Dug Gap,- the remainder in front of our right. About o'clock P. M. of the 8th, Geary's division of Hooker's corps attacked two regiinents of Reynolds's Arkansas brigade guarding Dug Gap. They were soon joined by Grigsby's brigade on foot. The increased sound of musketry indicated so sharp a conflict that Lieutenant-General Hardee was requested to send Granbury's Texan brigade to the help of our people, and to take command there himself. These accessions soon de

cided the contest, and the enemy was driven down the

hill. . . .

Information had been received of the arrival of the Army of the Tennessee in Snake Creek Gap, on the 8th. At night on the 9th General Cantey reported that he had been engaged with those troops until dark. LieutenantGeneral Hood was dispatched to Resaca with three divisions immediately.

It so happened that the brigade of Kentucky cavalry was present at Dug Gap and Snake Creek Gap, and that the regiment I commanded the 9th Kentucky Cavalry - was in front at both places; and it may not be improper to put on record an account of those affairs, and thereby correct the unintentional mistakes in the meager statements given above.

The winter having ended and all possible preparations having been made, the operations known as the Dalton-Atlanta campaign opened on May 5, 1864, by the advance of General Thomas on Tunnel Hill, and on May 7 the withdrawal of our forces within Mill Creek Gap marked the beginning of the long retreat. Including the corps of General Polk, then under orders to join him, General Johnston had under his command, available for strategic purposes, between 65,000 and 70,000 men of all arms. It was a superb army of veterans, with implicit confidence in its general, and capable of great achievements. Deficient to a certain extent in supplies, it had enough for any possible movement its commander could order. Being a Confederate army, it necessarily was inferior to the army before it in numbers, equipment, and supplies. This was generally the case. It was necessarily so. With five millions to over twenty millions; with no market, no ships, no factories, no credit; against a people commanding the sea, rich in all resources, and with all the world to buy from,—it was the fate of the Southern armies to confront larger, better equipped, and admirably supplied armies. Unless we could by activity, audacity, aggressiveness, and skill overcome these advantages it was a mere matter of time as to the certain result. It was therefore the first requisite of a Confederate general that he should be willing to meet his antagonist on these unequal terms, and on such terms make fight. He must of necessity take great risks and assume grave responsibilities. While these differences between the two armies that confronted each other in the mountains of North Georgia existed, they were no greater than always existed, and for which every Con

federate general must be presumed to have prepared. I repeat, it was a superb army. While it had met defeat, and knew what retreat meant, it had fought battles which were, and are, among the bloodiest in all the annals of war; and it felt that under Johnston it could parallel Chickamauga and renew the glories of

Shiloh.

It lay behind an impassable ridge, through which, on its left flank, were only two accessible gaps,- Dug Gap, less than four miles south-west from Dalton, on the main road from Dalton to Lafayette, and perhaps six miles from Mill Creek Gap, and Snake Creek Gap, some eighteen miles south from Mill Creek Gap. With these gaps fortified, the left flank and rear of that army were absolutely safe; for while the Rocky-face and Chattooga ridges protected our flank, through these gaps we had access to attack the flank of the enemy if he attempted to make a march so far to the left and rear as to threaten our communication south of the Oostenaula or Coosa. These gaps were capable of easy and impregnable fortification. Dug Gap was a mere road cut out of the mountain-side, and really needed no breastworks, for the natural palisades and contour of the mountain rendered easy its defense by resolute men. Snake Creek Gap was a gorge apparently cut through the mountains by the creek which ran through it. It was a narrow defile between Milk Mountain and Horn Mountain, which are merely a prolongation of the Chattooga Mountains, and capable of impregnable defense.

These gaps were well known to both armies. Through them ran public roads, and soldiers of both armies had marched through both. Late in February Dug Gap had been seized by an Indiana regiment and held until Cleburne retook it. As early as February General Thomas, knowing that at that time Snake Creek Gap was unguarded, proposed a campaign, the plan being to attract General Johnston's attention by a demonstration on Buzzard Roost, and to throw the main body of the army through Snake Creek Gap, and cut his communications between Dalton and the Oostenaula.

Neither of these gaps was fortified, and on May 5, when the campaign opened, Dug Gap was guarded by a small command of Arkansas troops under Colonel Williamson, numbering perhaps 250, and Snake Creek Gap was left wholly unprotected. At Resaca, where the railroad crosses the Oostenaula, Cantey's brigade was held on the evening of the 7th of May, on its route from Rome to Dalton.

General Sherman had in hand for attack nearly 100,000 men and 254 guns, divided into three armies,the Army of the Cumberland, commanded by General Thomas, numbering 60,773; the Army of the Tennessee, General McPherson, 24,465; the Army of the Ohio, General Schofield, 13,559. It was a superb army, admirably equipped, abundantly supplied, excellently led. It was veteran, and had known victory. It had pushed its antagonist out of Kentucky with the surrender of Donelson; had captured Tennessee; captured

Vicksburg; repossessed the Mississippi River; driven its foe over Missionary Ridge in flight. It knew how to fight, and was willing to fight. On May 7 our cavalry was driven through Mill Creek Gap. On that night, after we had gone into camp, Colonel Grigsby, who commanded the Kentucky cavalry brigade, was ordered to send a regiment to the front of Dug Gap, to guard the approaches to it. In obedience to that order the 9th Kentucky Cavalry passed over Rocky-face Ridge, and near to midnight bivouacked on Mill Creek, about a mile from, and in front of, Dug Gap. Heavy picket lines were thrown out on all the roads leading down the valley. There were several of these roads, and scouts were sent out to ascertain the movements of the enemy. By daylight it was discovered that very large bodies of troops were moving down the valley on all the roads leading to the south. General McPherson had marched from Chattanooga to Rossville, thence west of Chickamauga Mountain to Shipp's Gap and to Villanow, where the road forks, one branch leading down the east foot of Taylor's Ridge, the other leading across towards Rockyface; this road again forks, one leading through Dug Gap, the other down the valley to Snake Creek Gap. Until McPherson reached Villanow it was only a conjecture as to his course, and until the head of his column turned towards Snake Creek Gap his destination was uncertain. His march was concealed by Hooker's corps of the Army of the Cumberland, which corps, forming Thomas's right, marching from Ringgold via Nickajack Gap and Trickum, hid the flank movement of McPherson. The plan was for Hooker to seize Dug Gap and push forward sufficiently to protect the flank of McPherson, and strike the flank of Johnston if he turned on McPherson; while McPherson, marching through Snake Creek Gap to Resaca, should not only destroy but hold the only railroad tributary to Johnston. The possession of Dug Gap by Hooker not only rendered Dalton untenable, but made a retreat from Dalton by the line of the railroad extremely hazardous, and it completely protected McPherson from attack on his left flank. With Hooker descending from Rocky-face on our left flank and rear, McPherson holding Resaca, Thomas, with the corps of Howard and Palmer, pushing to Dalton, and Schofield to his left, our army would have been in perilous posture.

The march of Hooker and McPherson was discovered early on the morning of May 8 by the scouts of the 9th Kentucky Cavalry, and timely information given that at least an attack on Dug Gap was certain, and that the columns on the march were very heavy, and their movements guarded by forces too large to be either resisted or developed by the detachments sent out by the 9th Kentucky. On this information the remainder of Grigsby's brigade was ordered to Dug Gap, and reached there none too soon. All possible delay to the march of Hooker's corps was made, but about 2 P. M. Geary's division of that corps drove the 9th Kentucky across the creek and slowly up the mountain-side, until the regiment fell back in its proper position in the gap, where it found the brigade drawn in mere skirmish line along the edge of the mountainside. As one-fourth of cavalry soldiers hold the horses, I presume that we had about 800 of our brigade in the fight and 250 Arkansas troops; and this handful of men held that gap until nightfall, repelling every

assault. After nightfall Granbury's Texas brigade relieved us, but the assault was over. Hooker had failed in his part of the mission. That flank of our army was safe.

The importance of holding that gap was so manifest that Generals Hardee and Cleburne, with their staffs, galloped to the scene to encourage us by their presence and to aid Colonel Grigsby by their suggestions; and though the fight was made under their eye, that command needed no encouragement, and its officers and men knew that they were holding one of the doors to Dalton.

I hold in my hand the official report of General Geary, by whom that attack was made, and on the whole it is a fair and soldierly report. But he is mistaken in his belief that we had two lines of intrenchments, or that we were ever driven from our first position. Our loss was very small — in killed and wounded not a score. He reports that he made that attack with two brigades of infantry and two batteries, being an aggregate of perhaps 4500 men, or about four to one, besides the batteries. Assault after assault was made from 3 o'clock until after dark, and each assault repulsed with loss. At first, in a mere spirit of exuberant fun, some of the men rolled stones down the mountain-side; but when the effect was noticed they were directed to use these means as part of our defense; great stones were rolled down on the supporting lines on the mountain-sides or at its foot; and as these bowlders would go leaping, crashing, breaking off limbs, crushing down saplings, we fancied we could see the effect of the unexpected missiles. It also proved a valuable resource to us, for our ammunition would have given out, and was about exhausted when the attack ceased.

General Geary reports an aggregate loss of 357 officers and men, of whom some 50 were the adventurous advance, who actually reached the crest, only to be made prisoners. After dark our brigade, being relieved by the Texas brigade of Granbury, was ordered to the foot of the mountain to feed and to obtain ammunition.

While this attack had been going on, McPherson had steadily marched towards Snake Creek Gap, to protect which gap no steps had been taken. Undoubtedly if a cavalry force had been started to Snake Creek Gap at the same moment Grigsby was ordered to Dug Gap, it would have reached there before McPherson, and held it during the night of the 8th, during which time infantry support could have reached there. I do not wish to be understood as offering any criticism on these facts; I am merely stating the facts as I believe them. Why these gaps were left unguarded, why a prompt effort was not made to hold Snake Creek Gap, I neither pretend to know nor venture to guess; nor do I offer any criticism. That they were not guarded, and that this gave Sherman the easy means of causing the evacuation of Dalton and the retreat to Resaca, are undoubtedly true. That we could have held Dalton or made an attack on Sherman if these gaps had been held is a problem over which military men may differ. Whatever may have been the reason or cause, the fact is that the provision made to hold Snake Creek Gap was an order to Grigsby during the night of the 8th to move his brigade to its mouth. The 9th Kentucky had been on duty continuously for over twenty-four hours; the whole brigade for over twelve hours, and

under fire all the afternoon. But with cheerful alacrity the command began its march as soon as it could feed, after being relieved by Granbury,— possibly about 10 o'clock. The night was dark, the road rough and unfamiliar, and it was difficult to find guides. But just at dawn we came in sight of the eastern mouth of the gap, and, contrary to our information, found it in possession of the enemy. Colonel Grigsby had been informed that a company of Georgia troops were on picket on the road to the gap, and at or near its eastern outlet. We had not seen that company, and Colonel Grigsby naturally concluded that the troops we saw a few hundred yards before us were those. The usual confusion of an all-night march and the halt of the head of the column had jammed the different organizations somewhat together in a narrow lane. The advanced vidette reported the troops to be Federals. Colonel Grigsby, still supposing them to be Georgians, ordered a small scout to the front. In these few minutes the enemy, having discovered us and being concealed by the character of the ground and the forest, had formed line of battle, while our column had become more confused by many of the men dismounting to rest. Between us and the foot of the mountain was a fallow cotton-field, on the near edge of which was a row of deserted cabins. The road ran along this field a few hundred yards with a gradual descent until it passed through a fringe of willows and underbrush, beyond which there were other open fields, and then on both sides of these open fields were also thick woods.

Suddenly a long skirmish-line broke from the woods, ran to the fringe of willows, and directly through towards the row of cabins, keeping up a brisk fire as they ran. Behind the skirmish-line was developed a line of infantry. For a moment the fire staggered the head of the column, and the order to fall back and form could not be executed. The 9th Kentucky was in front, and very quickly its front companies were dismounted and a dash made for the cabins. Fortunately our men reached them first and drove the Federal skirmishers back. This gave breathing time, of which immediate and brilliant advantage was taken by Major J. Q. Chenowith, who led a portion of the 1st Kentucky, on horseback, on a détour to the right through the woods until he reached the fringe of willows, when at full run he charged the skirmish-line on the left, and the dismounted men of the 9th Kentucky charged on foot through the open field. The audacity of this sudden and unexpected dash caused the skirmish-line to run at break-neck speed, and the line of infantry to halt and to await reënforcements. This gave ample time to form the brigade for its day's work of retreating fight.

The immediate result of this was a delay to the Federal column of several hours, increased caution on the part of McPherson in his march during the day, and prompt information of his movement to our army headquarters.

The force under McPherson was so large that our small brigade of cavalry could not force it to develop its line. All that was possible was to cause the march to be as slow as that of a skirmish-line. This was done. It was late in the afternoon when McPherson drove us into the works before Resaca, which were defended only by Cantey's brigade and ours.

It was a gloomy prospect. We knew that McPherson had a force of from 15,000 to 20,000, and that there was no possibility of our receiving any reënforcements that afternoon and night. One serious attack by McPherson and Resaca must have been captured.

Fortunately McPherson knew that Hooker had failed in his attempt to seize Dug Gap, and consequently the road from Dalton was free to any Confederate column moving on him. The intrenchments at Resaca were formidable, and when McPherson felt the lines, the response was resolute and spirited. As Hardee came as reënforcements at Dug Gap, so here Hood joined us. He and part of his staff came to share our fate. Calmly we waited for the inevitable assault. We did not doubt that it would be made. McPherson was young, ambitious, and able. In our ranks he was accounted the equal, perhaps the superior, of Sherman. Here was an opportunity that Sherman might well say "does not occur twice in a single life"; and not for a moment did we doubt that such a soldier, with such an army, would seize such an opportunity.

I recall the scene, as a group stood on a knoll and watched the skirmishers advance. As the puffs of smoke arose in the distance, as the sharp-shooters paid compliments to this group, General Hood rode up, and after a few moments' gaze turned the head of his horse and rode a few feet, and by motion called Colonel Grigsby to him; in another moment Grigsby called me, and General Hood said in a cheery yet grave tone," We must hold until night."

Just at dusk the enemy began to fall back, and to our surprise the retrograde movement ended near to where we had commenced our fight in the morning. Wm. C. P. Breckinridge.

LEXINGTON, KY., August 27, 1987.

Kershaw's Brigade at Fredericksburg. GENERAL RANSOM's letter, in THE CENTURY for December, 1887, in regard to his services at Fredericksburg, contains an error in relation to the operations of my brigade. In the morning of that day, my troops were stationed at the foot of Lee's Hill. After the assaults on General Cobb's position had commenced, I was directed to send two of my regiments to reenforce Cobb, and did so. Before they had reached him, tidings arrived of the fall of General Cobb, and I was immediately ordered to take the rest of my brigade to the position held by his forces, and assume command of the troops of McLaws's division there. I preceded my troops, and as soon as possible arrived at the Stevens House at the foot of Marye's Hill. As my brigade arrived they were placed — two regiments, 3d and 7th South Carolina, at Marye's house, on the hill, and the rest of them in the sunken road, with the left resting about the Stevens House. The last regiment that arrived was the 15th South Carolina (Colonel De Saussure's). He sheltered his command behind the cemetery on the hill until his proper position was made known, when he moved deliberately and in perfect order down the road to the Stevens House, and proceeded to the right of my line. Instead of having two regiments engaged at that point, as General Ransom supposes, I had five regiments and a battalion (my entire brigade), each of which suffered more or less severely. During these operations I received no

orders or directions from any officer but my division commander, General McLaws. I requested not to be relieved that night, and remained in that position until the evacuation of Fredericksburg by the Union forces. These facts were officially reported at the time, and were then too well known to be the subject of mistake. J. B. Kershaw.

CAMDEN, S. C., Dec. 6, 1887.

The Last Victim of the War.

TO THE traveler on the old Walnut Hills road, Cincinnati, at noon, May 11, 1865, an unwonted spectacle presented itself. To the south of the road along the ravine near by stood, in solemn silence, a regiment of soldiers facing the road, the companies at each wing at right angles, forming a hollow square. Within this, near the left, stood a squad of soldiers, arms at the shoulder, bearing upon the breast of a youth kneeling erect beside his coffin and facing them at eight paces, with hands unbound and tremorless at his side, and eyes bandaged with a white handkerchief. At the word of command the guns were fired and the youth fell dead. Thus perished Thomas Martin, the last victim of the great civil war. The war was over, Lee had surren dered, Richmond had been taken, Johnston had yielded, Davis had been captured. Federal and Confederate, the blue and the gray, were fraternizing everywhere save in that lonely ravine, within the corporate limits of Cincinnati, where was being transacted the most revolting deed of war — the deliberate killing by overwhelming power of an unresisting human being.

Few of the citizens of Cincinnati were aware of the tragedy at the time; and how few now, as they read this narrative, will recall it. We are living in a time of reminiscences, and the history of this poor Confederate soldier may have its lesson.

Nearly a year before this execution, its victim, a native of Kentucky, had been captured in that State and brought to Cincinnati as a prisoner; there he had been brought before a court-martial upon the charge of being a guerrilla, and had been convicted and sentenced to be shot. He was a mere boy, quite illiterate, unable to read or write: he claimed that he was a regular Confederate soldier, and evidently the distinction between such a soldier and a guerrilla was beyond his knowledge.

At the time this sentence was rendered, no one expected it would be carried into execution. No member of the court, and certainly the military commandant of the city, General August Willich, did not. The sentence had been rendered for its deterrent effect upon the guerrillas in Kentucky. So little did General Willich think the sentence would be executed that he gave the boy his liberty, the freedom of the city, using him as a sort of orderly; and in his intercourse with him he became attached to him. Time passed; and the day when General Hooker would leave the department, of which he had had command since General Sherman's action retired him from the front, was approaching.

In an evil moment for the victim, General Hooker, in the first days of May, 1865, asked an aide to read over the papers on file in the department, so that he might dispose of them. In so doing, the papers relating to this boy were found. The general had forgotten the case. He inquired whether sentence had been executed. Learning that it had not, he sent for General

Willich, his subordinate, and asked for the facts. General Willich stated them as above given. Next day, he received an order from General Hooker directing him to shoot the boy on the 5th of May, then only a few days off. General Willich was dumfounded. To shoot the boy who had been his attendant for nearly a year, and whom he had respected for his faithful conduct, was too much for the stern old soldier of many years and many wars. With tears in his eyes he rushed to Judge Stallo, now our minister at Rome, and besought his interference. Judge Stallo, in turn, came to me and solicited my aid.

Meanwhile General Hooker had left the city to attend the funeral of Mr. Lincoln at Springfield. Therefore I could not reach him. At my request, Mr. Gaither, then Superintendent of Adams Express Company, sent a telegram to Major Eckert to be laid before Mr. Stanton, requesting his intervention. But no order came, and preparations were made for the execution.

The boy was dressed for death. The priest, Father Garesché, brother to General Rosecrans's chief of staff,who fell at Stone's River,-attended him. The mournful procession took its way to the ravine, yet General Willich moved slowly, hoping the order for suspension would be received. He left a mounted orderly to wait until the last moment for a telegram from Stanton. Anxiously, imploringly, he looked back for his messenger. At length, to his great joy, in the distance he saw him coming at full speed, holding in his outstretched hand a paper. It was this telegram:

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C., May 5, 1865. MAJOR-GENERAL JOSEPH HOOKER: Suspend the execution of Thomas Martin, to be executed in Cincinnati this day, until further orders.

By order of the President.

E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

Great was the rejoicing. The soldiers who were to shoot the boy now congratulated him on his escape, and all returned to the city. Alas, how short-lived was this joy!

It had been my purpose to advise General Hooker, on his return, of what I had done; but my first knowledge of this was from an aide of his, who delivered a note from the general requesting my presence at his headquarters.

The moment I saw Hooker, I discovered that he was under great excitement, which he was striving to suppress, and in this effort he fairly succeeded. He did not look me full in the face, but sat sideways, looking obliquely, ever and anon casting upon me furtive glances. In slow and measured tones, he said:

"Judge Dickson, I was very angry at you on my return and had ordered your arrest; but reconsidered it, and am now more composed."

"Why, you surprise me, General! What is the matter?"

"Why, sir, on my return to the city I found my administration of this department had been interfered with; that Martin, whom I had ordered shot, had not been shot; that Mr. Stanton had suspended my order. I immediately telegraphed him, demanding why he interfered. He replied that it was in response to the Gaither telegram — your work. I demanded of him to send me a copy of this telegram, which he did. Oh, yes, sir! I have got it. I know all you did."

"Well, General, was it not all right?"

"No, sir; it was not right. No, sir. Why, sir, when I was in command of the Army of the Potomac, Lincoln would not let me kill a man. Lee killed men every day, and Lee's army was under discipline; and now, sir, Lincoln is dead, and I will kill this man. Yes, sir, I will. The order is given to shoot him to-morrow, and he will be shot; and don't you interfere."

"Did Stanton order you to shoot him?" I inquired. "No, sir. He left the matter in my hands, and I demanded that he be shot-and shot he will be."

"Well, General," I again interposed, "this boy was only a guerrilla. The war is over. He belonged to Colonel Jesse's command. The papers of this morning tell us that the Government has given Jesse the same terms given Lee; that he is now in Louisville, where he has been feasted and fraternized with by Union officers. Will it not be shocking to shoot here one of his deluded followers?"

"It makes no difference," replied the general. "Louisville is not in my department. I am not responsible for what is done there. I will do my duty in my own. I will kill him. Yes, sir, I will; and that to-morrow."

The image of the speaker rises before me with startling distinctness. The manner as well as the words indicated that his mind was oppressed with the thought that Lincoln's humanity had thwarted his career. In some way it seemed to him a relief to sacrifice this boy. Hence his eagerness that the opportunity should not escape him.

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As I gazed upon the man the uppermost thought in my mind was, not the brutality of his act, nor yet pity for the fated youth,- though these thoughts were not absent, but simple amazement that such a man, only a few months before, in a supreme crisis, should have held in the hollow of his hand, as it were, the fate of this mighty nation.

But why revive these harrowing incidents of the war? As well ask, Why tell the story of the war at all? If it is to be told, let us have the whole. Let the young not be misled; the dread reality has something else than the pomp and circumstance, however glorious. Besides, there will be other wars and other generals. Let these remember that an abuse of power will sooner or later rise up in judgment against them.

W. M. Dickson.

Hooker on the Chancellorsville Campaign. [THE subjoined letter has been kindly furnished to us for publication by Lieutenant Worth G. Ross, son of the late Colonel Samuel Ross, to whom it is addressed. It is believed that it has not before been printed. EDITOR.]

LOOKOUT VALLEY, TENN., Feb. 28, 1864. MY DEAR COLONEL: For some reason your letter was a long time in reaching me. When the Eleventh Corps gave way on Saturday, Berry's division and Hays's brigade were dispatched to seize and hold the ground occupied by the left of that corps. Berry double-quicked his men to the point, but was too late. The enemy were already in possession. When this was reported to me I directed my engineers to establish a new line, which was pointed out to them on the map, and at the same time stated to them that we would

probably have to move on it as soon as the enemy opened on us in the morning, as his batteries would sweep the plain in front of the Chancellorsville House, and, besides, enfilade the line held by the Second and Twelfth Corps nearly its entire length. Soon after these instructions were given to the engineers, peremptory orders were sent to General Sedgwick to advance over the plank road from Fredericksburg and attack the enemy in front of the Second and Twelfth Corps at daylight. My single object in holding on to the position as long as I did was to hear Sedgwick's guns, which I momentarily expected, of course. General Warren had been sent to guide him. The orders reached him between 10 and 11 o'clock, [he] had but eight miles to march, a bright moonlight night, with only a small force to oppose. Probably had he marched as directed, not a gun would have been fired. With Lee in my front and Jackson on my flank I was unwilling to attempt to force my way through Lee, especially as the roads through the forests would only enable me to present my columns with narrow fronts, which the enemy could cut down as fast as they were exposed. I knew that I could do this, and I gave the enemy credit for being able to do as much as I could, but no more. Had Sedgwick come up on Lee's rear, the latter would have found himself between two armies, and would doubtless have followed Jackson's flank movement, which I desired, as that would throw the enemy off the short road to Richmond and our troops on it. I do not know that you ever heard that I had one and a half millions of rations afloat in the Potomac to throw up the Pamunkey River in view of this contingency.

I recrossed the Rappahannock, expecting to return at or near Franklin's Crossing, where I had elbow room, and at least an even chance for being victorious, and so stated to the President at the time. No general battle was fought at Chancellorsville, for I was unwilling to give battle with such great odds against me. I rejoice that what was not gained was not lost.

We lost no honors at Chancellorsville. With all of our misfortunes the enemies' loss exceeded our own by one-third. Of this I have abundant evidence in the official returns of the enemies' casualties, as they have from time to time been published. If I did not cross the river again it will appear that it was for reasons over which I had no control. The rains had nothing to do with our returning from Chancellorsville, for it had been determined on in my mind long before the rain commenced falling. I do not like to be quoted as authority on this subject until after the official report is published, and for the flattering terms in which you speak of me not ever. I hope that you and yours are well. My kindest regards to Mrs. Ross and my best wishes for yourself.

Your friend,

JOSEPH HOOKER. COLONEL SAMUEL ROSS, Commanding Brigade, Twelfth Corps.

Erratum.

A TYPOGRAPHICAL error in General Sherman's "Grand Strategy of the Civil War," in the February number, gave General Thomas's loss at Nashville as 305 instead of 3057 (revised compilation).

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