been adopted as a motto by the tonic sol-fa party: "Even if you have but little voice, learn to sing from the page without the help of an instrument; it will sharpen your hearing."

To make the community" musical" in fact, not merely in affection · this should be the aim of musical instruction; and for several other reasons than those already given tonic sol-fa lends itself with superior advantage to the mission. A few more appropriate words from Schumann as to desirable aims: "It is not enough to know your piece with your fingers; be able to hum it over without the pianoforte. Quicken your fancy so as to be able to keep in mind not only the melody of a composition, but also the harmony belonging to it." "You must make yourself able to understand music from the printed page."

The advantages which accrue to the individual from the study of choral music are transmitted to the community. The musical taste of a city or town may be accurately estimated from the extent and character of its choral activity. There are said to be over three hundred cities and towns in Germany containing each a choir and an orchestra capable of performing classical music. There are not twenty in the United States.

On these premises a deduction of the value of a system of instruction which addresses itself with peculiar energy and potency to choirsinging can easily be made.

There are features in tonic sol-fa which seem to mark it as the agent called to free our musical cultivation from certain dangers which lurk in the dominant instrumental tendency. Good instruments are not a universal possession, and bad instruments work mischief to popular hearing and taste. Instrumental music, moreover, seems to be entering a degenerate stage from which vocal music has

been rescued within the last half century,― that is, since the operatic scepter passed out of the hands of Italy. Brilliancy of technique is now the property of nearly every public performer, and instrumental music is being threatened by that decadence which all art history proves is the constant companion of "virtuosity." This is one danger from the evil influence of which the encouragement of singing societies can save us. Against another the tonic sol-fa teachers, acting in the spirit of Schumann's wise injunction, have interposed a splendid bulwark. They prohibit the use of the pianoforte in teaching. Thereby they prevent learning from degenerating into imitation, which, in its ultimate effects, discourages excursiveness of thought and activity of the imagination. Better still, they stimulate the pupil to exercise the faculties which are most actively called into play in the correct interpretation of music. Beautiful tone-production is the most essential and most individual process in music-making. This process pianoforte-playing reduces to a minimum. So far as pitch is concerned (a thing of primary care in vocal music), the pianoforte-player is relieved of all responsibility by the mechanism of his instrument. The tones answer to the touch of his fingers; he does not need to exercise his intelligence or his ear in the matter. The tonic sol-fa pupil, on the contrary, is compelled to cultivate acuteness of hearing and to study with great painstaking the emission of each tone. In the hands of the pupil who plays it, or imitates it in the study of tones and intervals, a pianoforte which is out of tune is an evil of frightful magnitude which holds the pupil in its grasp and either stunts or deforms his faculties. Over the instrument of the tonic sol-faist there stands a monitor who can both detect faults and remedy them.

H. E. Krehbiel.

To field, to market, to mill he goes,
Nor sees his comrade gleaming
Where he flies along the purple hills,

Nor the flame from his bridle streaming;
Sees not his track, nor the sparks of fire
So terribly flashing from it,

As they flashed from the track of Alborak When he bravely carried Mahomet.

Henry Ames Blood.

64,340 71,000

Or in round numbers... The difference of over 13,000 is accounted for by losses in battle, desertion, and increase in absent sick. The incomplete return of Medical Director Foard shows killed and wounded May 7th to 20th, inclusive, 3384. The return of June 10th shows 1551 killed and died since May 20th, indicating fully 6000 wounded. The same return shows 569 deserters. The 1542 prisoners captured from Hood and Hardee, shown by increase of absent without leave in their corps, account for the remainder without examining the returns of Polk's corps and the cavalry.

General Johnston's army reached its maximum strength on the New Hope Church line, where he must have had 75,000 for battle when the armies faced each other May 27th. General Sherman's army † there numbered, of all arms, for duty, 93,600 men, and several brigades of this force were employed in guarding trains and watching roads in all directions, for Sherman's army had no rear. Odds of less than 5 to 4 against him is "the great inequality of force" which General Johnston complains compelled him "to employ dismounted cavalry" in holding this line.

In a footnote to his article General Johnston says: "I have two reports of the strength of the army besides that of April 30th, already given: 1. Of July 1st, 39.746 infantry, 3855 artillery, and 10,484 cavalry; total, 54,085. 2. Of July 10th, 36,901 infantry, 3755 artillery, and 10,270 cavalry; total, 50,926."

The return of July 1st shows "present for duty" all arms, officers and men, 64,578, instead of 54,085. (As in case of the return of April 30th, General Johnston gives only the "effective total.") The loss since June 10th is accounted for by 1114 dead, 711 deserters, 1042 increase in absent without leave (prisoners), and 3693 in increase of absent sick and wounded.

None of the returns of this army, either under Johnston or Hood, make any account of the Georgia militia, a division of which under General G. W. Smith

For strength of Jackson's cavalry division, see General S. D. Lee's return May 10th, and the return of General Johnston's army June 10th, 1864.

For strength of General French's division, see his return of "effectives when joined."

42,571

13.318

-4,143

5,000

65,032

General Johnston asserts that the only affair worth mentioning, on his left at Resaca, was near the night of May 14th, when " 40 or 50 skirmishers in front of our extreme left were driven from the slight elevation they occupied, but no attempt was made to retake it." In his official report, made in October, 1864, he says that at 9 o'clock at night of May 14th he "learned that Lieutenant-General Polk's troops had lost a position commanding our bridges." Comment upon the generalship that would leave a position commanding the line of retreat of an army in charge of 40 or 50 skirmishers within gun-shot of a powerful enemy is unnecessary, for it was not done. The position was held by a line of men. It was carried on the evening of May 14th by a gallant charge of two brigades of the Fifteenth Corps of the Union army. Reënforced by another brigade, they held it against the repeated and desperate efforts of Polk's men to retake it. The battle lasted far into the night. General John A. Logan, in his official report of it, says that when at 10 o'clock at night "the last body of the enemy retired broken and disheartened from the field, . . . it was evident to the meanest comprehension among the rebels that the men who double-quicked across to their hills that afternoon had come to stay." General Logan also says that by the capture of this position "the railroad bridge and the town were held entirely at our mercy.”

The Fifteenth Corps lost 628 killed and wounded at Resaca. The troops in its front, Loring's and Cantey's divisions and Vaughan's brigade, according to their incomplete official reports lost 698. Much the greater part of this loss must have been on the evening of May 14th, for there was no other line-of-battle engagement on this part of the field.

General Johnston characterizes the battle of May 28th at Dallas as "a very small affair," in which the Confederates lost about 300 men and the Union troops "must have lost more than ten times as many." This was an assault made upon troops of the Fifteenth Corps by two brigades of Bate's Confederate division and Armstrong's brigade of Jackson's cavalry dismounted, supported by Smith's brigade of Bate's division and Ferguson's and Ross's brigades of Jackson's cavalry. Lewis's Kentucky brigade attacked the front of Osterhaus's division without success. Bullock's Florida brigade charged along the Marietta road and was driven back, with heavy loss, by the fire of the 53d Ohio regiment. Armstrong assailed the position held by Walcutt's brigade across the Villa Rica road and met a bloody reFor strength of Quarles's brigade, see Johnston's narrative,

pulse. General Bate officially reported the loss in his division as 450. General Walcutt in his official report says that" 244 dead and wounded rebels were found in my front," and many were doubtless removed. The Confederate loss in this "very small affair" was, therefore, over 700. The loss of the Fifteenth Corps was 379, or about one-half the Confederate loss, instead of "more than ten times as many."

General Johnston assumes that General Sherman used his entire army in the assault on Kenesaw Mountain, when, in fact, he employed less than 15,000 men. The remainder of the army was not engaged, except in the continuous battle of the skirmish lines. The assaulting column of the Army of the Cumberland, directed against Hardee's corps, was composed of 5 brigades about 9000 strong. The formation was such that each brigade presented a front of but two companies. The leading regiments lost very heavily; those in the rear suffered few casualties. General Thomas reported the entire loss as 1580. The attack of the Army of the Tennessee was made upon the Confederate intrenchments held by French's division and a part of Walker's, by three brigades of the Fifteenth Corps, numbering 5500 men. Their formation was in two lines; their total loss 603, three-fourths of this falling on the regiments in the first line.

General Johnston expresses the belief that Northern soldiers could not be repulsed with casualties so small as reported at Kenesaw. In this he, unwittingly perhaps, compliments Sherman's army at the expense of his own. On the 22d of June, five days before the battle of Kenesaw, he tells us that the divisions of Stevenson and Hindman were repulsed, in an assault on the Union line, with a loss of one thousand men. These divisions, June 10th, numbered over 11,000 for duty. Their loss, therefore, was but 9 per cent., while that of the troops of the Army of the Cumberland engaged at Kenesaw was 17 per cent.; of the Army of the Tennessee, 11 per cent. In both cases the loss sustained was sufficient to demonstrate the futility of further effort. In neither case was it a fair test of the staying qualities of the troops who on many fields had shown their willingness to shed any amount of blood necessary when there was reasonable hope of success.

E. C. Dawes,

Late Major 53d Ohio Regiment.

CINCINNATI, September 8th, 1887. A Rejoinder to General Robertson by Colonel Mosby. IN THE CENTURY for August, General Beverly H. Robertson defends himself against the charge of having disobeyed orders in the Gettysburg campaign, and imputes to me the absurdity of trying to prove that Stuart knew nothing about it, and also with defending him against "an imaginary attack." With equal propriety it might be said that General Robertson has defended himself against "an imaginary attack." I never intimated that Stuart was ignorant of his default. Stuart fought at Gettysburg and knew that Robertson did not. The latter affects to be unaware of the fact that two of General Lee's staff have published accounts of Gettysburg, in which they attribute the loss of the battle to the want of cavalry to make the preliminary reconnoissances; and that in the memoir of his chief by Stuart's adjutant, the blame of it is put upon himself

(General Robertson). The accusation against which I defended Stuart was, that by going into Pennsylvania around Hooker's rear with a portion of the cavalry he had taken away the eyes of the army, so that General Lee, like a blind man, had stumbled into the fight. I think I have shown that the fault was not in Stuart's plan, but in the execution of the part assigned to a subordinate. If Booth plays "Othello" with a bad support, the performance as a whole will be a failure, no matter what may be the merit of the chief actor. The complaint against Robertson is, that having been placed with a large force of cavalry in observation, with orders to follow on the right of the army next to the enemy, he gave General Lee no information of their movements, but followed on the left, and never reached the battle-field. He says that he was ordered “to cross the ́Potomac where Lee crossed,” and follow on the right of the army. No such instructions were given him, as they would have involved a physical impossibility, as Lee crossed with Longstreet on the left at Williamsport. So did General Robertson. His instructions were: "After the enemy has moved beyond your reach, leave sufficient pickets in the mountains, and withdraw to the west side of the Shenandoah, and place a strong and reliable picket to watch the enemy at Harper's Ferry, cross the Potomac and follow the army, keeping on its right and rear." In his letter to Stuart of June 23d, General Lee had directed that, if the cavalry passed through the Shenandoah Valley, it must cross on our right at Shepherdstown (where A. P. Hill crossed) and move towards Frederick City. Stuart's instructions to Robertson indicated the same general direction for him to go, and, if they had been obeyed, would have put the cavalry in its proper position, between our infantry and the enemy. The Northern army moved into Pennsylvania east of the Blue Ridge or South Mountain, while Robertson's command moved on a parallel line, about twenty miles to the west of it. This is the only example in war of the cavalry of an invading army marching in rear of the infantry. He says that, as he was ordered to avoid pikes, he was compelled to go by Martinsburg. But that could not have been the reason for selecting this route, as he actually traveled along pikes nearly all the way; whereas, if he had gone by Shepherdstown, he might have avoided them altogether. The suggestion to keep off turnpikes, to save his horses' shoes, did not require him to change the direction prescribed for him on the right of the army. He says he hurried on from Virginia to join the army, and by forced marches reached Chambersburg on the evening of July 2d, and Cashtown on the next morning which was the last day of the battle. If he had kept on to Gettysburg, he might have reached there in time to witness the last scene of the great tragedy. He had marched from Berryville to Chambersburg in three days-which is exactly the time that it took Longstreet's infantry to march the same distance. But then Longstreet did not pretend to be in a hurry. If keeping behind the left wing is the same thing as being on the right flank of the army, then there can be no doubt that General Robertson obeyed orders. At Cashtown, he says that he heard that Pleasonton was moving to capture our trains, so he turned off and went to meet him. Pleasonton was then fighting Stuart at Gettysburg. General Robertson made no report of his operations in this campaign, but General Jones, who was

under him, says that at Cashtown an order came from General Lee requiring a cavalry force to be sent to Fairfield, and that in the absence of General Robertson he determined to move in that direction at once, and that near there he encountered and routed the 6th United States Regulars. There was only one regiment of Federal cavalry there, which thus neutralized two Confederate brigades with two batteries of artillery. If all of our cavalry had been at the front, Meade could not have spared even this one regiment to send after Lee's trains; it would have been all he could do to take care of his own. In the skirmish at Fairfield on July 3d was the first time Robertson's command had seen the enemy since it disappeared from his front at Middleburg, Va., early on the morning of June 26th. Keeping eight days out of sight of the enemy was not exactly the way to carry out Stuart's order to watch and harass him. It was his leadership preceding the battle that I criticised. In modern war the most important service of cavalry is rendered before a battle begins. General Robertson says that it was at Martinsburg, and not at Ashby's Gap in the Blue Ridge, "as Colonel Mosby insinuates," that he received orders from Gen. eral Lee to join the army. In December, 1877, a letter of his was published in the Philadelphia "Times," in which he justified his delay in Virginia, on the ground that his instructions required him "to await further orders," and stated that on June 29th, at Ashby's Gap, he received orders from General Lee to join the army, and started forthwith. He fortified this statement by certificates of two members of his staff. The instructions which I recently found among the Confederate archives direct him to hold the mountain 66 gaps as long as the enemy remains in your [his] front in force." He staid there three days after they had gone into

Pennsylvania, and now makes no explanation of the de lay, but raises an immaterial issue about the skirmish at Fairfield, which simply proves that on the day of battle he was in the rear with the wagon trains. General Robertson says that he gave satisfaction to General Lee. Now, that General Lee was dissatisfied with some one is shown by his report in which he complains that "the movement of the army preceding the battle of Gettysburg had been much embarrassed by the absence of the cavalry." I have elsewhere shown that this censure can only apply to the commander of the cavalry who was left with him to observe the enemy. As soon as the army returned to Virginia, General Robertson, at his own request, was relieved of command. No argument in favor of acquittal can be drawn from the leniency that was shown in this case. There was but little of the stern Agamemnon in the character of General Lee.

Ransom's Division at Fredericksburg.

IN the August, 1886, number of THE CENTURY General James Longstreet published what he "saw of the battle of Fredericksburg, Va., December 13th, 1862." The omissions in that article were so glaring and did such injustice, that I wrote to him and requested him to correct what would produce false impressions. His answer was unsatisfactory, but promised that, "I [Longstreet] expect in the near future to make accounts of all battles and put them in shape, in a form not limited by words, but with full details, when there will be opportunity to elaborate upon all points of interest." General Lee, in his report of the battle of Fredericksburg, December 13th, 1862, writes as follows:

Longstreet's corps constituted our left, with Anderson's division resting upon the river, and those of McLaws, Pickett, and Hood extending to the right in the order named. Ransom's division supported the batteries brigade of McLaws's division and the 24th North on Marye's and Willis's hills, at the foot of which Cobb's Carolina of Ransom's brigade were stationed, protected by a stone wall. The immediate care of this point was committed to General Ransom."

The italics in this paper are all mine. The positions are stated by General Lee exactly as the troops were posted. Lee's report continues, farther on:

"About II A. M., having massed his [the enemy's] troops under cover of the houses of Fredericksburg, he moved forward in strong columns, to seize Marye's and Willis's hills. General Ransom advanced Cooke's brigade to the top of the hill, and placed his own, with the exception of the 24th North Carolina, a short distance in rear.

"In the third assault "[his report continues] "the brave and lamented Brigadier-General Thomas R. R. Cobb fell at the head of his gallant troops, and almost at the same moment Brigadier-General Cooke was borne from the field severely wounded. Fearing that Longstreet had directed General Kershaw to take two Cobb's brigade might exhaust its ammunition, General regiments to its support. Arriving after the fall of Cobb, he assumed command, his troops taking position on the crest and at the foot of the hill, to which point General Ransom also advanced three other regiments.'

General Kershaw took command of Cobb's brigade, which I had had supplied with ammunition from my wagons, and I repeated the supply during the day. General Longstreet in his official report says:

"General Ransom on Marye's Hill was charged with the immediate care of the point attacked, with orders to send forward additional reënforcements, if it should become necessary, and to use Featherston's brigade of Anderson's division, if he should require it." And continuing, "I directed Major-General Pickett to send me two of his brigades: one, Kemper's, was sent to General Ransom to be placed in some secure position to be ready in case it should be wanted." And again, "I would also mention, as particularly distinguished in the engagement of the 13th, Brigadier-Generals Ransom, Kershaw, and Cooke (severely wounded)."

General McLaws was not upon the part of the field in the vicinity of Marye's and Willis's hills during the