Stinehouse. The State. STINEHOUSE V. THE STATE. CRIMINAL LAW.-Indictment.-Seduction.—An indictment for seduction, charg- From the Clinton Circuit Court. R. P. Davidson, F. C. Davidson, and W. H. Thompson, for appellant. 7. C. Denny, Attorney General, for the State. OSBORN, J.-The appellant was indicted for seduction. He moved the court to quash the indictment, which motion was overruled. He then pleaded not guilty, and the case was tried by a jury, who returned a verdict of guilty, and fixing the punishment, and, over a motion for a new trial, judgment was pronounced against him on the verdict. Proper exceptions were taken to the several rulings of the court. The errors assigned bring before us the correctness of these rulings. It is claimed that the indictment should have been quashed because it alleged that the seduction was "by means of a promise of marriage," instead of using the words of the statute, "under a promise," etc. We do not think there is any substantial difference in the meaning of the two expressions. The motion to quash was correctly overruled. On the trial, the girl alleged to have been seduced testified to the seduction under promise of marriage. Her father and mother were then sworn as witnesses, and, among other things, testified that the appellant boarded with them a short VOL. XLVII.-2 47 17 157 239 Stinehouse v. The State. time, and that he "kept company" with the girl, and that they walked and rode out together a few times. The appellant offered to prove by their cross-examination, that while he was boarding with them, and at the time when he was keeping company with the girl, as they had testified in chief, other men were boarding there, who also kept company with her in like manner, which the court refused, and the evidence was excluded on the ground that it was not crossexamination. The facts offered to be proved were connected with the matters stated in the direct examination of the witnesses. While a party cannot introduce his own case to the jury by a cross-examination of the witnesses of his adversary, he may cross-examine a witness as to facts and circumstances connected with the matters stated in his direct examination. I Greenl. Ev., sec. 445; Hartness v. Boyd, 5 Wend. 563. The facts stated by the witnesses in their direct examination were introduced to corroborate the testimony of the girl and as tending to show that a promise of marriage had been made by the appellant. The object of the cross-examination was to overthrow or weaken the effect of the evidence. For that purpose it was proper, and the court erred in refusing to allow it. We cannot tell how much weight it would have had with the jury, but we can see that it might have had some, and as we understand the evidence, after a pretty careful examination of it, very little would have satisfied the jury that the appellant was entitled to an acquittal. Indeed, we are very strongly inclined to think that the verdict. is not sustained by the evidence. But as the judgment must be reversed for the reasons already stated, it will be unnecessary to extend this opinion by a review of the evidence. The judgment of the said Clinton Circuit Court is reversed. The cause is remanded, with instructions to that court to grant a new trial, and for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion; and the clerk is directed to certify to the warden of the state prison north to return the prisoner to the jail of Clinton county. The Excelsior Draining Co. v. Brown. THE EXCELSIOR DRAINING COMPANY V. BRowN. PRACTICE-Joint Demurrer.—A joint demurrer to several paragraphs of an answer should be overruled, if any one of the paragraphs is good. PLEADING.-Denial of Existence of Corporation.-To an action, brought in what purports to be the name of a ditching corporation, to collect an assessment of benefits, an answer properly verified, that at and before the commencement of the suit there was no such corporation, is a good answer in bar. COSTS.--Where a demurrer is erroneously sustained to a complaint, and the cause is reversed on account of such error, and finally disposed of by a judgment for the defendant, the costs made before the demurrer was sustained should be taxed to the plaintiff. From the Cass Circuit Court. H. C. Thornton, for appellant. PETTIT, J.-The appellant brought this suit against the appellee, to recover an assessment of benefits on lands by the construction of the ditch. This case has been here before, 38 Ind. 384, to which we refer for a full statement of the cause as it then stood. The court below had sustained a demurrer to the complaint. This court held that ruling erroneous, and reversed the judgment. When the case went back for further proceedings, the defendant answered in seven paragraphs; to the first, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh, the plaintiff demurred jointly for want of sufficient facts. Subsequently the defendant withdrew the sixth and seventh paragraphs of the answer, and the demurrer was overruled to the first, third, fourth, and fifth paragraphs, excepted to, and this ruling is assigned for error. The demurrer being a joint one to the first, third, fourth, and fifth paragraphs of the answer, if any one of the paragraphs was good, the demurrer was properly overruled, and we need not inquire as to the sufficiency of the other paragraphs of the answer. The first paragraph of the answer was in these words: "For answer to plaintiff's complaint, the defendant says that at and before the time of the institution of this suit, The Excelsior Draining Co. v. Brown. there was no such corporation as the Excelsior Draining Company organized under the laws of the State of Indiana." This was properly sworn to and verified by the oath of the defendant, and was a clear and full answer of nul tiel corporation, and was a bar to the action, if true. It follows that there was no error in overruling the demurrer to the answer. The counsel for the appellant, in his brief, confines his argument to the supposed insufficiency of the third paragraph of the answer, which may be termed a special answer of nul tiel corporation. We need not consider the sufficiency of this paragraph, for the reasons above given. The plaintiff refusing to reply to the paragraphs of the answer to which the demurrer had been overruled, a judgment was rendered for the defendant for costs since the reversal of the judgment by the Supreme Court, and for the plaintiff for all costs against the defendant up to the time of sustaining the demurrer to the complaint. The judgment for costs against the defendant was properly excepted to, and is assigned as a cross error. The judgment for costs against the defendant up to the sustaining of the demurrer to the complaint was error. The defendant was liable for the costs in the court below, on the reversal of the case here, back to the commission of the error for which the cause was reversed, and not for costs made before that time. The judgment against the appellant is affirmed, and the judgment against the appellee, for costs accrued before the sustaining of the demurrer to the complaint, is reversed, with instructions to order the costs made before the sustaining of the demurrer to the complaint to be taxed to the appellant; all of which is done at the costs of the appellant. Hayes v. Fitch, Adm'r HAYES V. FITCH, ADMINISTRATOR. BILL OF EXCHANGE.-Waiver of Demand and Notice.-Where the indorsers of a bill, by writing on the back of the bill, waived demand of payment and notice and protest without any qualification or limitation, the indorsers could not show a parol agreement between the indorsers and holder, made at the same time the waiver was signed, that the waiver should only extend for a certain time. SAME.-Extension of Time by Holder and Acceptor.-Burthen of Proof.Where an accommodation indorser of a bill answers that the holder and acceptor, by an agreement, for a valuable consideration, extended the time of payment of the bill without the consent or knowledge of the indorser, and a reply in denial is filed, if the defendant prove the extension of time by the agreement of the holder and acceptor, the burthen of proof then shifts upon the plaintiff to show that the defendant had knowledge of and consented to said extension. From the Ohio Common Pleas. W. S. Holman, F. Adkinson, O. B. Liddell, and F. Schwartz, for appellant. J. D. Haynes and F. K. Thompson, for appellee. WORDEN, C. J.-This was an action by the appellee against Hayes, the appellant, Levin B. Lewis, and the Lawrenceburgh Woolen Manufacturing Company, upon the following bill of exchange and the indorsements thereon, the plaintiff's testator having been at the time of his death the indorsee and holder thereof, viz. : "LAWRENCEBURGH, IND., February 22d, 1869. "The drawers and indorsers dispense with notice of nonacceptance and non-payment of this bill and protest to be evidence of presentment. "One year after date pay to the order of myself at the First National Bank, Lawrenceburgh, forty-five hundred dollars, value received, without relief from valuation or appraisement laws, and charge to account of-yours, "L. B. LEWIS, President. "To Lawrenceburgh Woolen Manufacturing Company." Endorsed on the face, "E. D. MOORE, Treasurer." Endorsed on the back as follows, to wit "L. B. LEWIS, Pres't. "E. G. HAYES. |