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be deduced from what is set forth in the title that the subject of the act was intoxicating liquors, the case would be much like those of Bright v. McCullough, 27 Ind. 223, and Shoemaker v. Smith, 37 Ind. 122.

But it is impossible to deduce from the title the general subject of intoxicating liquors. The entire title points to the sale of intoxicating liquors, and nothing else, as the subject of the act. It is clear, therefore, that the intemperate use of such liquors is a matter not expressed in the title. This may be illustrated. Suppose that, under the same title, an act had been passed entirely prohibiting the manufacture of intoxicating liquors within the limits of the State. The subject of the act, as expressed in the title, would be the sale of intoxicating liquors, while the enactment itself would prohibit their manufacture. It would scarcely be claimed, in such case, that the enactment would be within the title. No one would look for such legislation under such a title. There seems to be no material difference in principle between the case supposed and the one before us.

Again, suppose that there was no other provision in the act than that contained in the ninth section. We should then have an enactment making it an offence to be found intoxicated, under a title specifying as the subject thereof the sale of intoxicating liquors. If the section could not thus stand alone, under the title it must fall; for it derives no support. from the other enactments. They cannot bring it within the title of the act.

We have thus far been considering whether the matter of the section is expressed in the title of the act. We are clearly of the opinion that it is not. It remains to inquire whether it is properly connected with the subject expressed. It may here be observed that wherever there is doubt on this subject, the doubt should be thrown in favor of the action of the co-ordinate department of the government, and the law should be sustained. But, on the other hand, when it plainly appears to the judicial mind that the matter of an enactment is neither embraced in, nor properly connected

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with, the subject expressed in the title, it becomes an imperative judicial duty to hold the enactment void.

On the point now under consideration, we have no doubt. Under a title which indicates legislation only on the subject of the sale of intoxicating liquors, is found a provision in relation to their consumption, making it a penal offence to be found in a state of intoxication. It will be observed, that under the enactment no sale of liquors, either in accordance with, or in contravention of, the other provisions of the act, constitutes any ingredient or condition of the offence. The manufacturer or other person, who is found intoxicated upon liquor which has never been made the subject of sale, is guilty of an infraction of the law equally with him who is found intoxicated upon liquor which has been made the subject of sale under the law. In short, under a title professedly on the subject of the sale of intoxicating liquors merely, the legislature have attempted, without reference to any sale, to make simple drunkenness a crime.

Admitting that intoxication is so connected with the sale of intoxicating liquor, that, under a title to provide against evils resulting from any sale of such liquor, drunkenness might be declared to be a crime, it does not follow that the section under consideration is properly connected with the subject expressed in the title of this act. The evil provided against by the section is intoxication generally, without regard to the manner of acquiring the liquor by which it is produced, whilst the title includes only such evils as result from sales. The title does not include or indicate any legislation not connected with the sale or disposition of intoxicating liquor. No enactment, therefore, under the title declaring intoxication to be a crime can be valid, except upon the theory that it results from a sale of such liquor, which must appear in the enactment.

It seems to us, therefore, that the matter of the section is not only not properly connected with the subject expressed in the title, but is entirely foreign to it. There are several cases in our reports that illustrate this branch of the question,

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and sustain the view which we take of it. The following may be referred to, without occupying space for details: The State v. Wilson, 7 Ind. 516; Foley v. The State, 9 Ind. 363; Gillespie v. The State, 9 Ind. 380; Mewherter v. Price, II Ind. 199; The State v. Bowers, 14 Ind. 195; Igoe v. The State, 14 Ind. 239; Spaugh v. Huffer, 14 Ind. 305; Grubbs v. The State, 24 Ind. 295.

The case that comes nearest to the support of the section under consideration is that of The State v. Adamson, 14 Ind. 296, where it was held, that under the title, "an act to regulate and license the sale of spirituous," etc., "liquors," etc., a provision punishing the giving away, etc., was properly connected with the subject expressed in the title. There it was made an offence to sell, barter, or give away any intoxicating liquor to a minor. Although the word "sale" only was mentioned in the title, it was held, that giving away was properly connected with the subject expressed. The court say: "When we consider the object for which such a law was passed, viz., to prevent abuses that might flow from the unrestrained disposal of liquors in these respects, it would seem that the giving away, under circumstances which might produce the same evil results as the selling, would be a matter properly regulated in connection with the selling. Indeed, it may be regarded as a necessary incident to a statute regulating the sale, to secure its efficient operation. It is a necessary precautionary provision to prevent evasion of the prohibition to sell."

It would seem from the observation of the court, that the object of the law was "to prevent the abuses which might flow from the unrestrained disposal of liquors," that the word “sale,” as used in the title, might have been regarded as used in a sense broad enough to cover a disposal of liquor by way of barter or gift.

But, however this may be, under the title to that act, it was legitimate to frame a law to punish selling to minors. The giving of liquor to minors, it was thought, had a proper connection with the subject of selling. Both the sale and

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the gift involve the idea of a disposal of the liquor. They both involve the idea of furnishing it to the minor, and vesting the title in him. In the one case, there is a consideration for the transfer; in the other, none. But the substance of the thing, the evil to be avoided, is the same in both cases, viz., the furnishing of intoxicating liquors to minors.

While that case goes, perhaps, to the verge of tenable ground, it falls quite short of meeting the case under consideration. Here the offence defined and punished by the ninth section of the act has no connection whatever, as before observed, with the subject expressed in the title, but is wholly foreign to it. The section is, therefore, unconstitutional and void.

The judgment below is affirmed.

BUSKIRK, J., and DOWNEY, C. J.-Being unable to concur in the opinion of the majority of the court in the present case, and the case being one which involves not only a construction of the constitution, but a question of great importance to the public, we deem it to be our imperative duty to state, at length, the ground and reasons for our dissent.

We proceed to the consideration of the question, whether the ninth section of the act under examination is void by reason of being in conflict with the nineteenth section of article 4 of our state constitution. The section of the constitution which is supposed to have been violated is set out in the opinion of the majority of the court, but only a part of the ninth section is set out. The entire section is as follows:

"Sec. 9. It shall be unlawful for any person to get intoxicated. A person found in a state of intoxication shall upon conviction thereof, be fined in the sum of five dollars. Any person convicted of intoxication shall be required upon the trial to designate the person or persons from whom the liquor, in whole or in part, was obtained. In default of so designating such person, he or she shall in addition to the fine above mentioned, and as a part of his or her punishment for the

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offence, be imprisoned in the county jail not less than one day nor more than ten days, at the discretion of the court."

A correct understanding of the objects sought to be accomplished, and the mischiefs intended to be remedied, by the section of the constitution in question, may aid us in arriving at the true construction of such section. This court, in Grubbs v. The State. 24 Ind. 295, has very clearly declared what mischiefs were intended to be remedied by the framers of the constitution. The court say: "We have recently had occasion, in three cases (Reams v. The State, 23 Ind. III, Robinson v. Skipworth, 23 Ind. 311, and Hingle v. The State, 24 Ind. 35), to consider the scope and application of section 19, article 4, of the constitution. Thinking that the time had come when some rule ought to be declared which might be capable of somewhat general application in the interpretation of the clause in question, we took pains, in the two cases last mentioned, to declare what we deemed to be the mischiefs of our legislation which it was intended to prevent. One of them was stated to be the enactment of laws under false and delusive titles, whereby measures had procured the support of legislators, who were thus deceived as to the character of the laws; and another was deemed to be the conjunction, in one act, of two or more subjects having no legal connection, for the purpose of procuring the passage of laws which might not, alone, command legislative sanction, upon the strength of popular measures embraced in the same act. To prevent these tricks in legislation, the constitution absolutely, and in all cases, forbids the passage of any law, unless the subject of it be expressed in its title, and, in like manner, inhibits the embodying in the same act of two or more subjects, having no legal connection with each other."

It is a settled rule, that in interpreting a clause in the constitution the court should look to the nature and objects of the particular powers, duties, and rights in question, with all the lights and aids of contemporary history, and give to the words of each provision just such operation and force,