accordance with this sentiment the new President and Cabinet, with the hearty concurrence of General Grant, repudiated the agreement for the following reasons:

1. It was an exercise of authority not vested in General Sherman, and, on its face, shows that both he and Johnston knew that General Sherman had no authority to enter into any such arrange

ments. 2.

It was a practical acknowledgment of the Rebel Government. 3. It undertook to re-establish Rebel State Governments that had been overthrown at the sacrifice of many thousand loyal lives and immense treasure, and placed arms and munitions of war in the hands of Rebels at their respective capitals, which might be used so soon as the armies of the United States were disbanded, and used to conquer and subdue loyal states.

4. By the restoration of Rebel authority in their respective states, they would be enabled to re-establish slavery.

5. It might furnish a ground of responsibility on the part of the Federal Government to pay the Rebel debt, and certainly subjects loyal citizens of Rebel States to debts contracted by Rebels in the name of the State.

6. It puts in dispute the existence of loyal State Governments, and the new State of West Virginia, which had been recognized by every Department of the United States Government.

7. It practically abolished confiscation laws, and relieved the Rebels of every degree, who had slaughtered our people, from all pains and penalties for their crimes.

8. It gave terms that had been deliberately, repeatedly and solemnly, rejected by President Lincoln, and better terms than the Rebels had ever asked in their most prosperous condition.

9. It formed no basis of true and lasting peace, but relieved Rebels from the presence of our victorious armies, and left them in a condition to renew their efforts to overthrow the United States Government and subdue the loyal states, whenever their strength was recruited and any opportunity should offer.

General Grant was sent immediately to Raleigh to announce the rejection of the Sherman-Johnston arrangement and to direct the immediate and general resumption of hostilities. Subordinate generals were ordered to be ready to resume hostilities at noon on the 26th. But Johnston, finding himself now in firm hands, surrendered on the same terms as Lee did to Grant, the terms being as follows: "Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate; one copy to be given to an officer designated by each of the Commanding Generals; the officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against the Government of the United States until properly

exchanged; and each company or regimental commander to sign a like parole for the men of their commands; the arms, artillery, and public property to be packed and stacked, and turned over to United States officers. This will not embrace the side arms of officers, nor their private horses or baggage. This done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to his home, not to be disturbed by United States authority so long as they observe their paroles, and the laws in force where they may reside."

There were, after this, a few battles and skirmishes in the remote Southwest, but these were unimportant. As a general thing the small bands of Rebels, still in the field, mustered themselves out, grabbed what property they could lay hands on, and started for home. The surrender of Lee made the collapse of the Confederacy inevitable. The surrender of Johnston made it complete.

It remained to disband the Union armies. There were in the field according to the muster rolls on the 1st of March, 965,591 men, of whom 602,593 were present for duty, and 132,538 on detached service. These men had been accustomed, in the Army, to short periods of fierce action, alternating with long periods of comparative idleness. They had lost the habit of steady, quiet, labor, and many people were apprehensive that the "turning loose" of so many of them at once, would be destructive of good order, good morals and good government. These apprehensions proved groundless. The Union armies were made up, almost entirely, of patriotic citizens, and not of bummers, dead beats or scalawags. The Western armies were mustered out as fast as the condition of the districts in which they were located would warrant. The Eastern armies were, as far as practicable, concentrated at Washington for the Grand Review, which has become historic as the most inspiring parade of volunteer citizen soldiery ever seen, and then they, too, were sent to their homes. There was neither disturbance, nor rioting, nor any increase of offenses against person or property. The vast host faded away into the farms, the workshops and the offices of the country, without a sign of disorder, creating for itself only two reminders of its former existence, the Grand Army of the Republic for the living, Memorial Day for the dead.

XV.

ANDREW JOHNSON AND HIS POLICY.

Forebodings of the Northerners in Regard to Johnson-His Campaign Speeches Made An Unfavorable Impression--His Threats Toward the South-Talk About Making Treason Odious— Sudden Change of Attitude--Proclamation of Amnesty and Pardon-Poor Selections of Provisional Governors for the Southern States-Mischievous Results of the President's Plan-Southern States Re-enact Slavery in Another Form-They Accept the Thirteenth Amendment and Then Proceed to Nullify It-Discriminations Against Colored People in the Punishment of Offenses-The President's Message-Committee on Reconstruction-Interesting Debates on the Southern QuestionPassage of the First Reconstruction Act and Proceedings Under It-The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.

In casting about for some consolation for President Lincoln's untimely taking off, many of the religious people of the class that always understand in advance, the purposes of the Almighty, discovered in this tragic event a design of vengeance upon the transgressing South. Lincoln's gentle and forgiving nature, they said, was not adapted to dealing with sufficient severity with the erring brethren. Providence had ordained that the heavy hand of Johnson should rest upon them, instead of the soft hand of Lincoln. It did not take many months to convince them of their error, for the new President, though truculent and threatening at first, soon inaugurated a policy, that if carried out, would have put the Secession leaders in the saddle again, reduced the negroes to practical slavery, and have nullified half the effects of the war. As it was, he kept the country in a turmoil during his whole four years' term of office, set back the work of orderly and durable reconstruction and hindered progressive legislation in almost every direction. He was one of the worst mischief-makers in the whole history of American politics.

The election campaign had not progressed far when the Republicans who heard him speak became convinced that the nomination of Johnson was a mistake. Nearly or quite the first set speech he made after his nomination was in the wigwam at Indianapolis, during the State canvass in Indiana. It was nearly two hours long, was rambling and disconnected in form, and was full of eulogistic and conceited allusions to himself and his career. The contrast between that and the eloquent, forcible and convincing arguments which the people of that section had been accustomed to hear from the lips of Governor Morton, was painful. His whole stumping tour through the west gave the impression of a narrow, self-satisfied man, who had done good service to the country when he was obstinate in the right, but who was equally likely to do great harm, if he should ever become obstinate in the wrong. The hope remained that the recog nition of the War Democracy on the ticket would bring to it many votes, and that Johnson, on the Vice Presidential shelf would, at least, do no harm. As it turned out the votes were not needed, Johnson did not remain on the Vice-Presidential shelf, and he did an infinite amount of mischief.

While the new President was distrusted at the North his antecedents, as well as his temper, were such as to peculiarly unfit him for dealing with the influential men in the South. He was not only a "poor white," a class which the Southern aristocracy, who were the real leaders, despised, but he was a leader of that class. He constantly boasted of his humble origin, and he had first climbed into political prominence on the votes of men of similar origin. He had posed as the workingman's friend, the champion of the poor against the rich. He was the champion of white labor in the Tennessee Legislature and in Congress, his arguments tending to antagonize slave labor, although he never announced himself as an AntiSlavery man. He advocated the Homestead policy, which was especially obnoxious to the Southern leaders, as tending to break up the territories and the unsettled portions of the states into small land holdings, with independent settlers, instead of putting it into large plantations with slaves. In his course in Congress he was undoubtedly sincere, and he was certainly courageous. He was a Union man, when to be such incurred the hatred of his own section. At the time of Secession, he was the only Senator from a seceded State that remained loyal to the Union. His firm and courageous discharge

of his duty, as Military Governor of Tennessee, had further intensified the hatred against him in the South.

The Southern leaders might perhaps have co-operated with such a Southern Republican as Henry Winter Davis or Horace Maynard, or Francis P. Blair, in the effort to formulate a reasonable and safe plan of reconstruction, but not with Andrew Johnson. He might, perhaps, when backed by the power of his new position, have overcome this disadvantage, if he had possessed an even temper, tact and good judgment. He possessed neither. He might have avoided most of his numerous mistakes, if he had taken the course that would have suggested itself to any prudent man, called Congress together in extra session, conferred with its leaders, and let that body take the initiative. He was too conceited for that.

There had been nothing in his recent utterances that could lead the Southerners to expect clemency at his hands. He protested to President Lincoln against what he called the too easy terms of surrender accorded by Grant to Lee. Before Mr. Lincoln's remains had left the White House, he announced that his policy was not to be one of mercy. In a speech to a delegation of distinguished citizens of Illinois, on the 18th of April, he announced that Lincoln's policy would be his policy, but afterwards struck out that portion of his speech from the stenographer's notes. It did not agree with the sentiments in other parts of the address, nor with what he, at the time, felt. In another part of his address to these Illinois visitors he said: "When the question of exercising mercy comes before me it will be considered calmly, judicially, remembering that I am the Executive of the Nation. I know men love to have their names spoken in connection with acts of mercy, and how easy it is to yield to that impulse. But we must never forget that what may be mercy to the individual is cruelty to the State."

His first public speech after he became President showed a siugular want of tact. He gave no expression of grief or praise for the dead President, beyond the declaration that he was "almost overwhelmed by the announcement of the sad event which has so recently occurred." But he had much to say about himself, and his career. This was always a ready and tempting topic to him. "Toil, and an honest advocacy of the great principles of Free Government have been my lot," he said. "The duties have been mine, the consequences God's." And this led Senator John P. Hale to remark: "Johnson