campaign, with a reasonable expectation that it would not be resented, and of all our financial men I can recall only Anthony J. Drexel, who actually sympathized with the Republican cause." In New York the merchants contributed liberally to the support of the Fusion ticket, but very little for the Republican. The "commercial classes" of the East learned to think differently of the Republican party, when the Greenback and Free Silver coinage waves swept the country. The last extreme efforts of the Fusionists to carry New York failed. The tide of Republican sentiment that swept over the rest of the State on election day reached Harlem River with so high a crest, that neither Fusion nor the efforts of the commercial classes could overtop it. The elections in 1859 had not been as favorable to the Republicans as those of some previous years, and those of the Spring of 1860 were equally disappointing. In the latter, Connecticut elected its Governor by a greatly reduced majority, and Rhode Island was carried by the Fusionists. The results of the early fall elections were awaited with great anxiety, for they came after the issue had been joined, and the campaign opened. The results exceeded the highest expectations of the Republicans. Vermont, in August, gave a majority of 22,370, this majority being larger than the whole Democratic vote, and Maine, in September, gave the Republican Governor over 18,000 majority, the largest ever given up to that time to any candidate. The song of victory over these results lost nothing of its volume, when in October, in spite of the indifference of the National Committee, Lane carried Indiana by 9,757 majority, and Curtin carried Pennsylvania by 32,164. From that time till the general election in November, the Republican procession was a march of triumph. The final result showed that Douglas had been completely out-maneuvered in the Fusion schemes, for while his popular vote exceeded that of Breckinridge by 526,600, his electoral vote was only 12. The full figures were as follows: On account of the absence of representation from Southern states which were in rebellion, Congress was strongly Republican throughout the next four years. The figures were as follows: Thirty-seventh Congress. Senate Republicans, 31; Democrats, 10; Americans, 7. Thirty-eighth Congress. Senate Republicans, 39; Democrats, 12. Michigan did not quite come up to Austin Blair's promise of 25,000 majority for Lincoln, but he was not SO far out of the way, as the actual plurality was 23,423. The vote stood: Lincoln, 88,480; Douglas, 65,057; Breckinridge, 805; Bell, 405. The Presidential electors were Hezekiah G. Wells, Rufus Hosmer, George W. Lee, Edward Dorsch, Philotus Haydon and Augustus Coburn. The vote for Governor was: Austin Blair, Republican, 87,806; John S. Barry, Democrat, 67,221. The Congressmen elected were again all Republican, being Fernando C. Beaman, Bradley F. Granger, Francis W. Kellogg and Rowland E. Trowbridge. IX. THE INTERREGNUM. A Country Without a Government-Plots for the Disruption of the Union-Plans for Secession Had Long Been in PreparationUtterances in the Secession Conventions-Plotters in the Departments at Washington-Arms Sent From the North to Southern Arsenals-Vessels of the Navy Widely Scattered-Preparations for Seizing Southern Forts-Vacillation of the President over His Message He Finally Concludes That the Government Has No Power to Prevent Secession--The South Carolina "Embassy". Secession of the Southern States and Withdrawal of Members of Congress-Union Meetings in the North-The Crittenden Compromise--The Peace Conference. From the time of Mr. Lincoln's election till the time of his inauguration the country might be said to have been without a government, for some of its most important offices were centers of plots for its dismemberment, while the Executive looked supinely on without moving a hand to stay the work of the plotters. The election of Lincoln was made the pretext for secession but, as a matter of fact, preparations had been going on for that movement for a long time. This was shown by the debates in the first Secession Convention held, that in South Carolina. In the course of those debates R. Barnwell Rhett declared: "The secession of South Carolina is not the event of a day. It is not anything produced by Mr. Lincoln's election nor by the non-execution of the Fugitive Slave Law. It is a matter which has been gathering head for thirty years." Lawrence M. Keitt, who had been in Congress several terms, and who was Brooks' abettor in the assault on Sumner, said: "I have been engaged in this movement ever since I engaged in public life.” Mr. Parker said "This movement is no spasmodic effort; it has been gradually culminating for a long series of years." Mr. Inglis said: "Most of us have had this matter under consideration for the last twenty years." In October, 1856, a Convention of Southern Governors was held at Raleigh, N. C., which was kept secret at the time. Governor Wise, of Virginia, at whose instance the meeting was called, afterwards said that if Fremont had been elected, he would have marched with 20,000 men to Washington, and taken the Capitol, preventing by force the inauguration of Fremont at that place. But it was in Washington itself, and in the Government service, that the chief plotters were at their work. A number of the Southern Senators were at the Capitol more for the purpose of promoting secession than for the purpose of legislating for the general good of the country. They were aided by three conspirators in the Cabinet: Howell Cobb, of Georgia, Secretary of the Treasury; John B. Floyd, of Virginia, Secretary of War, and Jacob Thompson, of Mississippi, Secretary of the Interior. These three men were doing more toward shaping the policy of the Government than President Buchanan himself, and they commenced their preparations early. On the 30th of December, 1859, the Secretary of War ordered that one hundred and fifteen thousand muskets be removed from the Northern armories and distributed among Southern arsenals, and the order was speedily carried out. Similar removals were afterwards made, the Southerners stealing the arms belonging to the country which they sought to overthrow. On the 29th of October, 1860, General Scott sent to the President and Secretary of War a letter, expressing apprehensions lest the Southern people should seize some of the Federal forts in the Southern states, and advising that they should be immediately garrisoned by way of precaution. According to the subsequent statement of one of Mr. Floyd's eulogists this, if carried out, would have defeated the conspiracy, and prevented the formation of the Southern Confederacy. Accordingly the Secretary "thwarted, objected, resisted, and forbade," and the imbecile President weakly yielded. Another of the conspirators in the public service was Wm. H. Trescott, of South Carolina, Assistant Secretary of State, who acted as a sort of go-between for the conspirators in the South, and the conspirators in the Cabinet. Five days before the election he wrote to R. Barnwell Rhett, on authority of Secretary Howell Cobb, that “upon the election of Lincoln Georgia ought to secede from the Union, and she will do so. But he desires me to impress upon you his conviction that any attempt to precipitate the actual issue upon this administration will be most mischievous, calculated to produce differ ences of opinion and destroy unanimity." Secretary Floyd had also expressed himself opposed to any rash movement, because he thought that Lincoln's administration would fail, and be regarded as impotent for good or evil within four months of his inauguration. From Floyd's standpoint this was certainly a rational point of view, for he was then selling to the Southern states muskets, altered from flint-lock to per cussion by the United States Ordnance Department. Whether he was putting the money thus received into the United States treasury or into his own pocket, or reserving it for the Confederate treasury is not a matter of record. Mr. Floyd also knew that Isaac Toucey, Secretary of the Navy, although he was not counted among the conspirators, was gradually placing the Navy beyond the reach of the incoming administration, in anticipation of secession. From every point of view, Secretary Cobb's advice against precipitate action was good, and great complaint was afterwards made by Confederates against the South Carolina Convention for precipitating the issues as soon as it did. But the South Carolinians were too hot-headed to wait, as were also many of the Southern Senators and Representatives who abandoned their seats in Congress in January following. President Buchanan had an outline of his message prepared soon after election, and showed it to the Cabinet on the 10th of November. Secretary Floyd had told him a day or two before that he thought "disunion inevitable and under the present circumstances, most desirable." Secretary Toucey was non-committal as to the form of the message, but had already given his opinion that "retaliatory measures would prove most availing in bringing Northern fanatics to their senses." Secretary Thompson objected to the proposed message because "he misses entirely the true States Rights doctrine on the subject of secession." Amid these and other conflicting opinions the President was not able to make up his own mind, and asked the Attorney General, Jeremiah S. Black, for advice. Mr. Black was not among the conspirators. He hated New England, and disliked the North generally. He loved the South, but did not believe in secession. At the same time he did not think the Government had power to prevent such a movement. He was, in fact, the author of the contradictory doctrines that while a State has no right to secede, the Government has no power to prevent secession. On the 20th of November, in reply to the inquiries of the President, he gave the official opinion that "Congress had no right to carry on war against any State, either to prevent a threatened |