tract with the carrier.14 Unless, therefore, the presumed intention of the parties be that the passenger should, in the event of his being injured by the breach of the manufacturer's contract, of which he has no knowledge, be without remedy, the only way in which effect can be given to a different intention is by supposing that the carrier is to be responsible to the passenger, and to look for his indemnity to the person whom he selected and whose breach of contract has caused the mischief." And this view of the carrier's liability for the carelessness of the manufacturer is sustained by a number of cases, both English and American.15

Sec. 910. (§ 512a.) Same subject-Same rule applies to bridges. The same rule applies also to the railway carrier's responsibility for the bridges constructed or caused to be constructed by it along its line of road. If a passenger sustains injury by reason of a defective bridge, the railway company can only relieve itself by showing that it exercised the highest practicable degree of care and skill in making the bridge reasonably safe for its intended purpose, and that, to the fullest extent that such care and skill would suggest, the bridge was inspected from time to time for the purpose of discovering and remedying any defects that might have developed in it from the operation of the road or otherwise.16 And if an injury result

14. Longmeid v. Holliday, 6 R. 2 Q. B. 412, L. R. 4 Q. B. 379; Exch. 761.

15. Caldwell v. The Steamboat Co., 56 Barb. 425, 47 N. Y. 282; Hegeman v. The R. R. Corporation, 13 N. Y. 9; McPadden v. The Railroad, 44 N. Y. 478; Bissell v. The Railroad, 25 id. 442; Curtis v. The Railroad, 18 id. 534; Carroll v. The Railroad, 58 id. 126; Grote v. The Railway Co., 2 Exch. 251; Pym v. The Railway, 2 Foster & Finlason, 619; Brazier v. The Polytechnic Institution, 1 id. 507; Pike v. The Polytechnic Institution, id. 712; Readhead v. The Railway, L.

McGuire v. The Golden Gate, 1 McAllister, 104; Gillenwater v. The Railroad, 5 Ind. 340; Meier v. The Railroad, 64 Penn, St. 225; Manser v. The Railway Co., 3 L. T. (N. S.) 585; Pittsburg, etc. R. R. v. Nelson, 51 Ind. 150; Illinois Cent. R. R. v. Phillips, 49 Ill. 234; Pendle ton v. Kinsley, 3 Clifford, 416; Toledo, etc. R'y Co. v. Beggs, $5 Ill. 80.

16. Jackson v. The Railway, 144 La. 982, 38 So. Rep. 701, 70 L. R A. 294.

from a defect which the railway company alleges was latent, and therefore such as a careful inspection would not disclose, it will not be enough for the company to show that it contracted with and obtained the materials from a reputable manufacturer.17 To relieve itself from liability, it must further show that the materials were carefully and skilfully tested in accordance with the usual and approved methods commonly employed in testing materials of that character, and that no defects were discovered.18 "The duty of a railroad company engaged in carrying passengers," said the court in The Railway Company v. Snyder,19 "is not always discharged by purchasing from reputable manufacturers the iron rods or other iron work used in the construction of its bridges. The duty of the company is not discharged by trusting, without inspecting and testing, to the reputation of the manufacturers and the external appearance of such materials. The law requires that before the lives of passengers are trusted to the safety of its bridges, the company shall carefully and skilfully test and inspect the materials it uses in such structures. This duty of inspection does not end when the materials are put in place, but continues during their use, for the company is bound to test them from time to time to ascertain whether they are being impaired by use or exposure to the elements."

Sec. 911. Responsibility for equipping vehicles with unsafe appliances-Duty as to management of appliances. Having provided vehicles which in themselves are as safe for their intended purpose as human skill and foresight can reasonably

17. Grote v. The Railway, 2 P. 486, 1 C. P. Div. 342; Ingalls Exch. 251. v. Bills, 9 Metc. 1; Funk v. Potter, 18. Jackson V. The Railway, 17 Ill. 406; Bremner v. Williams, supra, citing Hutchinson on Carr. 1 Car. & P. 414; Hegeman v. Railroad Co., 13 N. Y. 9; Alden v. Railroad Co., 26 N. Y. 102.

19. 117 Ind. 425, citing (as illustrative of the principle) Manser v. Railway Co., 3 L. T. (N. S.) 585; Texas, etc. R'y Co. v. Suggs, 62 Tex. 323; Stokes v. Railway Co., 2 F. & F. 691; Robinson v. Rail road Co., 9 Fed. Rep. 877; Richardson v. Railway Co., L. R. 10 C.

make them, it is the carrier's duty to exercise the utmost care⚫ and caution in keeping the various appliances with which such vehicles are equipped in a safe and suitable condition; and if by reason of an appliance being unsafe or defective an injury is sustained by the passenger, the carrier will be responsible if by the exercise of such care and caution he ought to have foreseen that such an injury was likely to happen. If, for instance, he allows a seat in one of his vehicles to become so defective that it falls,20 or if he fails to exercise a due degree of care in keeping the fastening on a vehicle window in a safe condition, and the window, which has been raised, suddenly closes,21 or if he permits a door of such unusual construction as to be more than ordinarily dangerous to remain in use upon a vehicle,22 or if he makes use of a particular pattern of platform upon which there is attached a coupling pin which projects beyond the platform in such a manner that it is likely to catch the attire of female passengers,23 or if he neglects to use a due de

Co.,

22. Sturdivant v. Railway (Tex. Civ. App.) 27 S. W. Rep. 170.

But a railroad company is not negligent in failing to furnish doors for its passenger cars which are provided with glass so that passengers in leaving the cars may be able to see through them and thereby be warned against danger from the doors being suddenly pushed open by incoming passengers. It is enough that such doors are of the kind in common use. Graeff v. The Railroad, 161 Penn. St. 230, 28 Atl. Rep. 1107, 41 Am. St. Rep. 885, 23 L. R. A. 606.

nell, 160 Ill. 636, 43 N. E. Rep. 704, affirming s. c. 59 Ill. App. 463.

In Poulin v. The Railroad, 34 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 296, the accident was occasioned by the hoop skirt worn by the plaintiff catching upon a projecting nail upon the platform of the car, which caused her to be dragged some distance upon the street and injured. The court at the trial had told the jury that "if hoop-skirts are worn by such passengers as the railroad were in the habit of carrying, it was bound to provide for the safety of passengers with that kind of garment on;" and this instruction was approved by the appellate court and the company was made liable for the injury.

The case of Delamatyr v. The Railroad Company, 24 Wis. 578, was also that of injury to the

23. Illinois, etc. R. Co. v. O'Con- passenger by the catching of her

24

gree of care in keeping the berths in his vehicles properly secured in place, and an upper berth falls upon a lower one, or if he permits a halyard used in hoisting a heavy lantern on his vessel to become defective, and the halyard breaks causing the lantern to fall,25 or if he constructs ladders on the ends of his freight cars instead of on the outside without providing bumpers or other agencies to keep the cars from coming so close together as to imperil the lives of persons lawfully using such ladders, 26 or if he starts on a journey with an engine which is known to be out of repair,27 and an injury results to a passenger, he will be liable.

So it is the duty of the carrier to exercise a high degree of care and foresight in so managing the appliances with which his vehicles are equipped that injury to passengers may be avoided. Thus, if he leaves the iron flanges on a car platform

dress upon the steps of the car as she attempted to alight from it; and the company was held liable upon the ground that it had provided no means for enabling passengers dressed in female attire to descend from its cars without the risk of such accidents.

In Kelly v. Railway Co., 39 Hun, 486, the passenger's dress caught on an unguarded hook and the carrier was held liable; but this was reversed in the court of appeals. 109 N. Y. 44.

It will be noticed that most of the cases against railway companies for injuries sustained in alighting from their cars in consequence of insufficient facilities provided for that purpose have been brought on behalf of female passengers, who, as said in Robson v. The Railway Co., L. R. 10 Q. B. 271, from their mode of dress and habits of life are but ill suited to grapple with the difficulties of such situations.

24. Horn v. New Jersey Steamboat Co., 48 N. Y. Supp. 348, 23 App. Div. 302.

25. The Wasco, 53 Fed. 546.

Where a carrier by steamboat uses a defective appliance for the purpose of bringing his boat to the dock, and the appliance gives way and injures a passenger, he will be liable. Miller v. Steamship Co., 118 N. Y. 199.

26. Railroad Co. v. Blumenthal, 57 Ill. App. 538; s. c. 160 Ill. 49, 43 N. E. Rep. 809.

27. Railway Co. v. Heath, 22 Ind. App. 47, 53 N. E. Rep. 198.

standing in an upright position while passengers are in the act of leaving the car,28 or if he neglects to keep the openings in the deck of his vessel near which passengers are in the habit of passing securely closed or else properly guarded 29 and a passenger is thereby injured, he will be responsible for the injury thus caused.

Sec. 912. Responsibility for injuries caused by escaping sparks or cinders. If the carrier employ steam as a motive power, it is his duty to equip his engines or locomotives with spark-arresters, or other efficient appliances, for the purpose of protecting his passengers from injuries by escaping sparks or cinders. He is not, however, required to provide appliances which will prevent absolutely the escape of sparks or cinders, or even appliances of the best type known to be in existence if their use would not be practicable. But he is required to provide appliances for the purpose which are of the best approved type in general use by other persons engaged in a similar occupation.30 And having provided such appliances, it is his duty to exercise a high degree of care in keeping them in suitable repair and efficient for their intended purpose, and for any negligence in discharging such duty whereby a passenger sustains an injury, he will be liable.31

28. Railroad Co. v. Gates, 162 Co. v. Flood, Ill. 98, 44 N. E. Rep. 1118, affirming 61 Ill. App. 211.

29. Memphis, etc. Packet Co. v. Buckner, 22 Ky. Law Rep. 401, 57 S. W. Rep. 482; The City of Kingston, 77 Fed. Rep. 655.

30. Texas, etc. R. Co. v. Jumper, 24 Tex. Civ. App. 671, 60 S. W. Rep. 797; St. Louis, etc. R'y Co. v. Parks, 7 Tex. Ct. Rep. 178; s. c. 8 Tex. Ct. Rep. 452, 73 S. W. Rep. 439; Railway Co. v. Parks, 97 Tex. 131, 76 S. W. Rep. 740, reversing s. c. (Tex. Civ. App.) 69 S. W. Rep. 125; Missouri, etc. R'y Co. v. Mitchell, (Tex. Civ. App.) 79 S. W. Rep. 94; Missouri, etc. R'y

Tex. Civ. App.

79 S. W. Rep. 1106; Railway Co. v. Young, 90 Fed. 709, 33 C. C. A. 251. Where a passenger's eye was injured by a spark from a locomotive and it appeared that the locomotive was in good repair and equipped with the best known appliance for preventing the escape of sparks, that the engineer was both competent and skilful and that the engine was properly and skilfully managed and operated at the time of the injury, it was held that the passenger was without remedy. Railway Co. v. Orton, 67 Kan. 848, 73 Pac. Rep. 63.

31. See cases cited in preceding