Constitutional law. The United States government is one of enumerated powers; it can exercise only the powers granted to it by the Constitution, p. 406.

This elementary principle has been applied in several cases. In the dissenting opinion in In re Neagle, 135 U. S. 87, 34 L. 79, 10 S. Ct. 676, it was argued that where the jurisdiction asserted by a Federal court conflicts with that of a State court, such jurisdiction must be shown to exist by positive law. The majority held, however, that an assault upon a Federal justice was a breach of the peace of the United States, and a marshal who killed a person in repelling such an assault could not be arrested and committed under a State law. So in United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 636, 27 L. 292, 1 S. Ct. 606, the court denied the power of congress to make it a penal offense under Federal laws for two or more persons in any State to "go in disguise upon the highway or the premises of another for the purpose of depriving persons of the equal protection of the laws." And in In re Barry, 42 Fed. 119, 121, F. C. 1,059 (see also 136 U. S. 605, 608, n., 34 L. 506, 507), it was held that a Federal court could not issue habeas corpus to review the decree of a State court in divorce proceedings awarding the custody of a minor child.

Constitutional law. In the exercise of its power to make "all laws which shall be necessary and proper" for carrying into execution its enumerated powers, congress may incorporate a bank, pp. 411, 424.

The foregoing rule has been cited and applied in Magill v. Parsons, 4 Conn. 321, holding that as an act incorporating a national bank is constitutional, congress may provide that such bank may sue in any Federal Circuit Court; Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U. S. 529, 38 L. 810, 14 S. Ct. 892, asserting the power of congress to create a bridge corporation for the purpose of erecting a bridge across navigable waters between two States. In a discussion of the general subject of implied powers two cases have approved the rule Robinson v. Turrentine, 59 Fed. 555; Thayer v. Hedges, 22 Ind. 285. A Maine case has applied the principle in overruling a motion to set aside a verdict against a person arrested for having in his possession counterfeit bills of a national bank, on the ground that the court admitted a copy of the act establishing the bank as proof of incorporation. The Supreme Court held the act of incorporation to be a public act; that its public nature arose from the fact that such a bank was an agency of the Federal government. In re Rogers, 2 Me. 304.

The court, in Commonwealth v. Morrison, 2 A. K. Marsh. 99, although recognizing the authority of the principal case, criticise the rule in arguing against the constitutionality of an act establishing an "office of discount" in a State. The rule that this power

is to be exercised as an incident to the granted powers of congress excludes the idea that congress may create purely private corporations within the limits of the States, and this is recognized in Williams v. Creswell, 51 Miss. 822, where the court held, however, that congress, by reason of its exclusive jurisdiction over the District of Columbia, could incorporate a savings society there and that such society was entitled to establish an agency in the State on the same terms as any foreign corporation.

Constitutional law. In order to carry into execution the powers granted by the Constitution, congress may employ those means, in its judgment, the most advantageous. Where such means are really calculated to effect the object instrusted to congress, the courts cannot inquire into the degree of their necessity, pp. 419, 423. This principle has been invoked in numerous cases to sustain the validity of various acts of congress. Thus Miller, Swayne and Davis, JJ., dissenting in Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 629, 631, 19 L. 528, 529, argued that the power of congress to make treasury notes legal tender could be implied from the power to raise and support an army. (See also 2 Duv. [Ky.] 55.) The majority, however, affirmed the decision of the State court in Griswold v. Hepburn, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 26, where the principal case was distinguished on this point. See 8 Wall. 614, 615, 19 L. 523. But Hepburn v. Griswold was overruled in The Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 532, 537, 538, 539, 542, 568, 20 L. 306, 308, 309, 317, where the authority. to pass such an act was held to be implied from the grant of power to regulate the currency. See, however, the dissenting opinion of Chase, C. J., Id. pp. 570, 573, 575, 612, 626, 631, 642, 20 L. 318, 319, 320, 332, 336, 338, 341. Again in Lick v. Faulkner, 25 Cal. 418, 419, 421, 432, and George v. Concord, 45 N. H. 438, 440, 442, the legal tender acts have been held valid as incident to the power to declare and carry on war; and in Metropolitan Bank v. Van Dyck, 27 N. Y. 409, 410, 413, 416, 438, 449, 450, 469, 470, 476, 497, 505, 521, 525, and Schollenberger v. Brinton, 52 Pa. St. 35, 59, 63, as incident to power to borrow money on the credit of the United States. But see dissenting opinion in Bank v. Van Dyck, 27 N. Y. 537. In Maynard v. Newman, 1 Nev. 278, and Milliken v. Sloat, 1 Nev. 585, they have been uphold as incident to the general powers of congress. Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U. S. 438, 439, 441, 442, 445, 450, 28 L. 211, 212, 213, 215, 4 S. Ct. 125, 126, 127, 128, 131, asserts probably the sound rule and holds that the authority to pass such acts is to be implied from the power to regulate the currency.

Several cases apply the principle in sustaining the validity of certain acts, as implied from the general power of congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce: Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 472, 473, 38 L. 1055, 1056, 14 S. Ct. 1131, 1132, affirming the constitutionality of the interstate

commerce act; In re Debs, 158 U. S. 578, 39 L. 1100, 15 S. Ct. 904, holding that congress may provide penalty for obstructing interstate commerce; The City of Salem, 13 Sawy. 612, 37 Fed. 850, upholding an act prescribing the limit of capacity of passenger steamers; Benner v. Dredging Co., 134 N. Y. 163, 30 Am. St. Rep. 654, 31 N. E. 330, denying right of a person injured by operations of a company employed by congress to dredge a navigable river to set up want of authority in such company in an action for damages. See also the dissenting opinion of Harlan, J., in United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 33, 39, 40, 39 L. 336, 338, 339, 15 S. Ct. 261, 264. The principal case is distinguished in United States v. Boyer, 85 Fed. 429, 430, where it was held that packing-houses engaged in slaughtering cattle for interstate shipment were not instruments of interstate commerce, and that congress could not provide for the inspection of cattle about to be slaughtered. As aiding the execution of the revenue laws the courts have held that congress may provide for the punishment of persons for interfering, by threats or otherwise, with the right to inform a United States marshal of a violation of such laws, In re Quarles, 158 U. S. 537, 39 L. 1082, 15 S. Ct. 961; to provide that persons chargeable with revenue tax shall submit disputed cases to a supervisor of revenue, In re Meador, 1 Abb. (U. S.) 334, F. C. 9,375; to make it a penal offense to destroy papers relating to merchandise which is liable to duty, In re Platt, 7 Bened. 272, F. C. 11,212, and to apply the provisions of the civil service act to the revenue service, Butler v. White, 83 Fed. 581, 582. So also as an incident to its power to levy and carry on war, congress had power to suspend the operation of statute of limitations during the existence of the rebellion, Stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wall. 507, 20 L. 179; to pass the "nonintercourse acts," Hamilton v. Dillin, 21 Wall. 93, 22 L. 532; to enact pension laws and provide penalty for frauds committed in the execution thereof, United States v. Fairchilds, 1 Abb. (U. S.) 77, F. C. 15,067; United States v. Marks, 2 Abb. (U. S.) 535, F. C. 15,721; to provide for compulsory enlistment, Antrim's Case, 1 Fed. Cas. 1063; Ex parte Coupland, 26 Tex. 417; to confiscate enemies' property and provide toat it should be a sufficient bar to an action for the recovery of such property, to prove that the plaintiff was a "rebel" within the meaning of the act of congress, Norris v. Doniphan, 4 Met. (Ky.) 409, 429; to provide for the removal to the Federal courts of suits instituted in State courts for acts done under authority of the president during the rebellion, Tod v. Court of Common Pleas, 15 Ohio St. 387; and to authorize the president to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in cases contemplated by the Constitution, McCall v. McDowell, 1 Abb. (U. S.) 229, 230, 231, Deady, 254, F. C. 8,673. In aid of a national bankrupt law, congress may provide for the punishment of persons guilty of fraud in the disposition of a debtor's goods, United States v. Pusey, 6 Bank. Reg. 288, 27 Fed. Cas.

632; and provide for compositions with creditors, In re Reiman, 7 Bened. 466, F. C. 11,673, 11 Bank Reg. 33. On the same principle congress may, under a national bankruptcy law, provide that District Courts may transfer franchises of insolvent railroad companies, Sweatt v. Railroad Co., 3 Cliff. 352, F. C. 13,684.

A variety of cases have applied the syllabus principle in sustaining laws passed in aid of other granted powers; In re Jackson, 14 Blatchf. 250, F. C. 7,124, holding that as incident to the power to establish post-offices and post-roads, congress may prohibit the mailing of letters or circulars concerning lotteries; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 721, 9 L. 1259, sustaining the validity of an act providing that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to controversies between two or more States; United States v. Gratiot, 14 Pet. 537, 10 L. 578, holding that the power to " dispose of" public lands includes the power to lease for the purpose of mining; Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 373, 23 L. 451, asserting the power of congress to condemn land within the limits of a State for the purpose of erecting Federal buildings; likewise in Cherokee Nation v. Railway Co., 33 Fed. 911, asserting power to condemn land on an Indian reservation to provide a right of way for a railroad; Springer v. United States, 102 U. S. 593, 25 L. 256, holding that the United States in order to enforce payment of an income tax may distrain the real and personal property of the debtor; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 713, 37 L. 913, 13 S. Ct. 1022, holding the Chinese registration law valid; Schenck v. Peay, 21 Fed. Cas. 682, holding that if a tax levied by congress is constitutional, provision may be made for absolute forfeiture of property in case of nonpayment; Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 283, 36 L. 435, 12 S. Ct. 622, upholding an act providing for punishment of persons conspiring to injure prisoners in the custody of a United States marshal; United States v. Gettysburg, etc., Ry. Co., 160 U. S. 681, 40 L. 581, 16 S. Ct. 429, denying jurisdiction of Supreme Court to determine limit to amount of land congress may condemn for the purpose of laying out a national park; Bloomer v. Stolley, 5 McLean, 161, F. C. 1,559, asserting the power of congress to grant an extension of a patent right; Minturn v. Brower, 24 Cal. 663, holding that congress could require that persons who had held land under another government, should, upon the acquisition of the territory by the United States under treaty, submit their titles to a court provided to determine their validity. See also the dissenting opinion of McLean, J., in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 542, 15 L. 757. A Virginia case, testing the validity of an act of congress by the rule laid down in the principal case, held that an act authorizing the sale of land en masse for nonpayment of taxes was not an "appropriate" means for collecting such taxes, if the amount due could be realized by a sale of part. Martin v. Snowden, 18 Gratt. 146. Following the principal case also, several cases have applied,

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the rule in holding that congress is the exclusive judge as to what is appropriate" legislation to enforce the provisions of the thir teenth and fourteenth amendments. The constitutionality of the "civil rights" act was thus sustained in United States v. Rhodes, 1 Abb. (U. S.) 48, 50, 51, 56, F. C. 16, 151, and People v. Washington, 36 Cal. 669, where State statutes prohibiting negroes and mongolians from testifying against white persons were held to be void. The Supreme Court, however, uniformly held such legislation void. The power to enact such laws, they declared, is not to be implied from the language of the amendments. The prohibitions contained therein operated directly on the States, and if State statutes were repugnant they were ipso facto void. See, however, the dissenting opinions in these cases: United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 253, 23 L. 577; Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S. 701, 30 L. 776, 7 S. Ct. 667; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 51, 27 L. 853, 3 S. Ct. 50. The Civil Rights Cases denied the power of congress to prohibit individuals from discriminating against negroes in refusing them admittance to inns and public conveyances in certain cases.

The remaining cases under this head show an extension of the principle: Slaughter House Cases, 10 Wall. 64, 21 L. 405, holding that where a legislature is clothed with power to pass laws to protect the safety and health of the citizens, it may create a monopoly for the purpose of slaughtering cattle and confine its operations to a particular place; Tilley v. Commissioners, 4 Woods, 444, 5 Fed. 656, denying jurisdiction of courts to determine the question as to what is a reasonable regulation of freights and tariffs, where the legislature has power to so regulate; Nicol v. Ames, 89 Fed. 149, asserting power of congress to choose means for collecting revenue tax; Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Attorney-General, 5 Fed. Cas. 597, holding that a provision in the charter of a railroad company that. the company should be subject to such regulations as might be enacted by the legislature, gave the legislature a right to provide a schedule of rates; State v. Gleason, 12 Fla. 260, holding that a grant of power in a State Constitution to issue writs of quo warranto, included the power to institute proceedings by information in the nature of quo warranto; Hancock v. Yaden, 121 Ind. 373, 16 Am. St. Rep. 401, 23 N. E. 255, and Martin v. Martin, 20 N. J. Eq. 428, 430, 434, holding that States in the exercise of their power to regu late contracts may prescribe that contracts shall be satisfied in gold or silver coin; Arbenz v. Railroad Co., 33 W. Va. 7, 10 S. E. 16, holding that a grant of power to a city to grant a franchise to a railroad company implies a grant of power to allow the company to establish its own grade, provided the use of streets is not unnecessarily impaired; Union Bank v. Jacobs, 6 Humph. 522, holding that a corporation created to construct a road has power to borrow money to accomplish that object; Ellerman v. Chicago, etc., Stockyards Co., 49 N. J. Eq. 242, 23 Atl. 295, denying right of individual stock