Ala. 311; Neely v. Henry, 63 Ala. 264; Sebatier v. Creditors, 6 Mart. (La.) (N. S.) 590; Johnson v. Fletcher, 54 Miss. 632, 28 Am. Rep. 392; Deering v. Boyle, 8 Kan. 535, 12 Am. Rep. 489; Creighton v. Leeds, 9 Or. 217. See also the dissenting opinions in Hardeman v. Downer, 39 Ga. 462, 463; Doughty v. Sheriff, 27 La. Ann. 360, and Sackett v. Andross, 5 Hill, 359. But such laws are valid as operating upon contracts executed subsequent to their passage. Howard v. Jones, 50 Ala. 69. Likewise the so-called "stay-laws" have been denied a retrospective operation. Aycock v. Martin, 37 Ga. 135, 92 Am. Dec. 64 (and see separate concurring opinion of Harris, J., 37 Ga. 139, 142, 144, 145, 148, 155); Baily v. Gentry, 1 Mo. 170, 171, 13 Am. Dec. 488, 489; State v. Carew, 13 Rich. L. 508, 91 Am. Dec. 247; Barry v. Iseman, 14 Rich. L. 136, 138, 139, 91 Am. Dec. 265, 266, 267; Webster v. Rose, 6 Heisk. 95, 98, 19 Am. Rep. 584, 585; dissenting opinion, Ex parte Pollard, 40 Ala. 101, 102, 103, 105. But such laws providing for stay of execution of judgments on contracts executed after their passage are clearly valid and have been so held in Billmeyer v. Evans, 40 Pa. St. 327; White v. Crawford, 84 Pa. St. 437; Taylor v. Stearns, 18 Gratt. 271, 272. And a law of the same nature, extending the term of replevin on judgments rendered, was held to have only a prospective operation in Blair v. Williams, and Lapsley v. Brashears, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 44, 65, 78, 79, 80. The principle has also been applied in State v. Fry, 4 Mo. 185, 186, denying the validity of a special act granting divorce; Orr v. Lisso, 33 La. Ann. 477, denying the retrospective operation of a State insolvent law; Proprietors v. Laboree, 2 Me. 294, 11 Am. Dec. 94, holding invalid an act abolishing the distinction between recorded and unrecorded deeds; Knighton v. Burns, 10 Or. 551, holding that a statute providing a mode for satisfying judgments, could not be construed so as to admit of scrip as a legal tender in payment of a judgment rendered previously. The rule is approved in the dissenting opinion in McElvain v. Mudd, 44 Ala. 76, but denying its application to laws of the United States, and arguing that no recovery could be had, after the emancipation proclamation, upon a note given for the purchase price of slaves.

Constitutional law. There is a distinction between the obligation of a contract and the remedy. Without impairing the obligation of the contract the remedy may be modified at the discretion of the legislature, p. 200.

This dictum of Chief Justice Marshall, reassérted in Ogden v. Sanders, 12 Wheat. 349, 6 L. 653, has been applied in numerous citing cases. Imprisonment for debt, he said, was not part of the contract, and a law abolishing such imprisonment did not impair the obligation. To this effect also are Van Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 553, 18 L. 409; Woodhull v. Wagner, 1 Bald. 298, 301, F. C. 17,975; Towne v. Smith, 1 Wood. & M. 130, 131, F. C. 14,115; McCormick v. Rusch, 15 Iowa, 136, 83 Am. Dec. 408; In re Penniman, 11 R. I. 338,

341, 343, 344, 350; same case on appeal, 103 U. S. 717, 719, 26 L. 604, 605; Lowden v. Moses, 3 McCord (S. C.), 102; Woodfin v. Hopper, 4 Humph. 21. And a law abolishing imprisonment for debt bars an arrest upon a judgment debt as well, although the judgment be in an action of tort. In re Nichols, 8 R. I. 55; Ex parte Hardy, 68 Ala. 318. The question as to the effect of such a law upon bail bonds existing at the time of its passage has frequently arisen, and the courts have uniformly held that such bonds were thereby discharged. Mason v. Haile, 12 Wheat. 378, 6 L. 663; Beers v. Houghton, 9 Pet. 359, 9 L. 157; Newton v. Tibbatts, 7 Ark. 153; Towsey v. Avery, 11 Ohio, 93; Bronson v. Newberry, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 47, 48. But Washington, J., dissenting in Mason v. Haile, 12 Wheat. 379, 380, 381, 382, 6 L. 663, 664, supra, distinguished the principal case upon this point, and declared that a bail bond was a contract between the surety and the creditor, and a discharge of the debtor from imprisonment could not release the surety without impairing its obligation. Durfee, J., dissenting, in In re Penninan, 11 R. I. 357, approved the general rule in admitting that a law abolishing imprisonment for debt barred an arrest upon a judgment, but insisted that an exception should be made where the judgment debtor had property subject to execution but was fraudulently concealing it.

Certain cases have held that where a debtor was released from imprisonment in the State where the debt was contracted, he was not liable to an arrest in another State, in an action upon the same contract. Fisher v. Stayton, 3 Harr. 278; Pugh v. Bissel, 2 Blackf. 398. And in Wood v. Funk, 7 Ohio (pt. 1), 197, it was held that a debtor discharged under a State law was not liable to arrest under process of a Federal court sitting in that State. Where, however, the contract in question was to be performed in another State, the courts have applied a contrary rule. Woodhull v. Wagner, 1 Bald. 298, 301, F. C. 17,975; Whittemore v. Adams, 2 Cow. 632.

A few cases hold that laws exempting property from execution operate only upon the remedy given for the enforcement of contracts, and hence may exempt property which was subject to execution when a contract was made. Hardeman v. Downer, 39 Ga. 427, 428, 431; Lessley v. Phipps, 49 Miss. 799; In re Kennedy, 2 S. C. 221; Rockwell v. Hubbell, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 203, 45 Am. Dec. 250; Stephenson v. Osborn, 41 Miss. 129, 90 Am. Dec. 364. See also dissenting opinion, Danks v. Quackenbush, 1 N. Y. 132, 134. An extended note in 45 Am. Dec. 251, in which the authorities are collected and discussed, draws a distinction between exemptions of real property and exemptions of personal property, and denies that the former may operate retroactively. As to exemptions of personal property where the effect upon existing contracts is not so important, the conclusion is that the legislature may exempt a reasonable amount from execution, the question as to what is a reasonable amount being for the courts to determine.

"Stay laws" as affecting remedy.- Laws providing for a stay of execution have been upheld, although purporting to operate upon judgments rendered upon contracts executed prior to their passage. The authorities go upon the ground that the same remedy exists as before the passage of the stay law, its enforcement being merely postponed. Beeson v. Beeson, 1 Harr. 470; Farnsworth v. Vance, 2 Cold. 118; Ex parte Pollard, 40 Ala. 88; Wardlaw v. Buzzard, 15 Rich. L. 160, 94 Am. Dec. 149. See also the dissenting opinions in Aycock v. Martin, 37 Ga. 174, 177, 179 (printed also as note, 92 Am. Dec. 66, 67); Jacobs v. Smallwood, 63 N. C. 124; State v. Carew, 13 Rich. L. 537, 91 Am. Dec. 247. Of the same nature are laws abolishing courts, and providing for the assumption of jurisdiction by other courts, thus delaying the rendition of judgments. Such a law was held valid in Newkirk v. Chapron, 17 Ill. 348. So also in Tilton v. Swift, 40 Iowa, 80, a statute empowering a court to postpone the receipt of verdicts and entry of judgments, was held valid as to actions pending. Following this principle, laws providing for the continuance of actions against persons in the military service of the United States, have been upheld. McCormick v. Rusch, 15 Iowa, 131, 133, 83 Am. Dec. 404, 405; Edmonson v. Ferguson, 11 Mo. 345. Likewise laws suspending statutes of limitations or extending the time provided in such statutes. Wardlaw v. Buzzard, 15 Rich. L. 160, 94 Am. Dec. 149; Bishop v. Wilds, 1 Harr. 102. The Louisiana courts, following this rule, have upheld the " respite laws" of that State, which, going upon the assumption that embarrassed debtors could eventually pay their debts, gave them an additional time to pay after the debts were due. Rasch v. Creditors, 3 Rob. (La.) 409; Anderson v. Creditors, 33 La. Ann. 1161.

Redemption laws as affecting remedy. There is some State authority for holding that laws allowing mortgagors a limited time in which to redeem property before final sale under foreclosure, affect only the remedy and apply to mortgages executed previously. Bugbee v. Howard, 32 Ala. 716; Beverly v. Barnitz, 55 Kan. 468, 469. 42 Pac. 726; State v. Gilliam, 18 Mont. 99, 100, 44 Pac. 395, 396. But in Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311, 11 L. 143, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of a mortgage with power of sale. denied the right to extend the period of redemption by subsequent law, on the ground that the obligation and not the remedy merely would be impaired. McLean, J., dissenting, relied upon the principal case. 1 How. 328, 11 L. 149. See also the dissenting opinion in Scobey v. Gibson, 17 Ind. 578, where the majority held that an act providing for the redemption of property sold on execution, was inoperative as to sales under judgments rendered upon contracts executed previous to its passage.

Laws regulating procedure and practice in the courts are also valid if they operate only upon the remedy. The following cases cite the principal case to this effect; Cutts v. Hardee, 38 Ga. 355,

set aside discharge granted by a Federal court, although such discharge was impeachable in the Federal courts, for reasons set forth In the act itself. To the same effect also are Van Nostrand v. Carr, 30 Md. 131; Miller v. Mackenzie, 43 Md. 411, 20 Am. Rep. 113, and Hudson v. Bigham, 12 Heisk. 67, holding that State courts are bound to respect a composition of creditors sanctioned by act of congress. The principle has also been applied in denying the right of a creditor to proceed against a debtor in a State court while bankruptcy proceedings are pending in a Federal court. Deford v. Hewlett, 49 Md. 62.

Constitutional law.- Power of States to enact insolvent laws is subject to the prohibition against laws impairing the obligation of contracts. Such a law, acting upon contracts entered into before its passage, is a law impairing the obligation of contracts, and void, pp. 196, 197.

The principal case is the leading authority upon this point, and the rule thus laid down has been uniformly applied in those cases wherein the constitutionality of such retrospective laws has been questioned. Farmers', etc., Bank v. Smith, 6 Wheat. 134, 5 L. 225; Bank of United States v. Frederickson, 2 Fed. Cas. 745; Smith v. Mead, 3 Conn. 256, 8 Am. Dec. 184; Boardman v. De Forest, 5 Conn. 12; Schwartz v. Drink water, 70 Me. 410; Roosevelt v. Cebra, 17 Johns. 108; Salters v. Tobias, 3 Paige Ch. 344; Elton v. O'Connor, 6 N. Dak. 6, 68 N. W. 85. On this principle also, it was held in In re Wendell, 19 Johns. 153, that an amendment to an insolvent act was ineffectual to discharge a debtor from liability on a contract entered into previously, the effect of such amendment having been to reduce the number of creditors who could grant a release. The ruling of the principal case was approved in Wyman v. Mitchell, 1 Cow. 320, but the decision went upon other grounds. In Van Hook v. Whitlock, 3 Paige, 414, the question was as to the validity of the discharge of a corporation, and the court held that notwithstanding the discharge, the liability of the individual stockholders still continued as to debts contracted prior to the act. The same case, coming before the court later, however, approved the ruling of the previous case, but held that, although the act in question was unconstitutional, the creditors, having accepted dividends under an assignment, were estopped from calling upon the stockholders for payment of the residue of their debts not received under the assignment. 26 Wend. 53; 37 Am. Dec. 248. In Sacia v. De Graff, 1 Cow. 358, it was held that a discharge would not prevent the statute of limitations from running against an action of assumpsit upon a contract made before the act, even though the money did not fall due under the contract until after the passage of the act. And in Conway v. Seamons, 55 Vt. 11, 45 Am. Rep. 581, the court, citing the principal case, denied the operation of an insolvent law upon a

previously contracted debt, even where such debt was merged in a judgment rendered after the passage of the act. In In re Klein, 14 Fed. Cas. 723, the court went so far as to hold that the restriction applied to congress as well as the States, but the decision was reversed in the Circuit Court. In re Klein, printed as note, 1 How. 279, 11 L. 131, 14 Fed. Cas. 717.

But while insolvent laws may not thus retroact upon previously contracted debts, it is equally well settled that State laws providing for the discharge of subsequent contracts are valid. The question was the subject of much argument in Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 215, 6 L. 606, and the majority held that such laws, if prospective only in their operation, were valid. 12 Wheat. 257, 262, 263, 264, 272, 273, 284, 296, 304, 312, 314, 315, 317, 6 L. 621, 622, 623, 626, 630, 634, 637, 640, 641, 642. See also the dissenting opinion of Marshall, C. J., 12 Wheat. 333, 6 L. 647. The question had previously been before the courts in New York, and on the same reasoning the validity of such laws upheld. Mather v. Bush, 16 Johns. 247, 253, 8 Am. Dec. 314, 320; Hicks v. Hotchkiss, 7 Johns. Ch. 304, 309, 311, 313, 11 Am. Dec. 476, 480, 481, 483. To the same effect also is Smith v. Parsons, 1 Ohio, 237, 242, 13 Am. Dec. 609, 615. In Hundley v. Chaney, 65 Cal. 363, 4 Pac. 238, the court went still further, and held that a discharge under a State act of 1880, operated to bar an action on a judgment rendered in 1876. The act of 1880, having been merely amendatory of an act passed in 1851, and more stringent and burdensome upon the insolvent than the latter act, was held not to be open to objection by the creditor on the ground that it was retrospective in operation.

Bankruptcy.- State insolvent laws can have no extra-territorial operation, p. 207.

This rule, which was directly applied in the principal case, has been reasserted in numerous subsequent decisions. Following Sturges v. Crowninshield upon the point that a discharge under a State law cannot operate to bar an action by a foreign creditor, the following cases are to be noticed: McMillan v. McNeill, 4 Wheat. 212, 4 L. 553, applying the principle and holding that a discharge under English laws, could not bar an action by a creditor residing in this country; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 255, 262, 357, 6 L. 620, 622, 656, the decision in this case finally going upon the ground that the law in question was inoperative, as to a nonresident creditor; Suydam v. Broadnax, 14 Pet. 75, 10 L. 361, holding that the insolvency of an estate determined under a State law could not abate a suit commenced in the United States courts by a citizen of another State against the executors of such insolvent estate; Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 228, 17 L. 532, affirming the decision, in Hale v. Baldwin, 1 Cliff. 514, F. C. 5,913, and holding that a discharge in Massachusetts was not a bar to an action by a