retioactive effect of statute exempting married woman's separate property from liability for her debts; Knighton v. Burns, 10 Or. 552, holding void, as to pre-existing debts, act making scrip legal tender Cited approvingly, but without particular application of the rule in Boardman v. De Forest, 5 Conn. 12; Norton v. Cook, 9 Conn. 318, 23 Am. Dec. 344.

66

Distinguished in Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 315, 6 L. 641, and Wilson v. Mathews, 32 Ala. 342, as to debts contracted subsequent to enactment of law; Hundley v. Chaney, 65 Cal. 363, 4 Pac. 238, holding that amendatory act may discharge debts contracted prior to its passage if it does not impair rights of creditors under original act. Criticised in dissenting opinion, Aycock v. Martin, 37 Ga. 179, majority holding 'stay law" void as affecting prior contracts. Distinguished in Blair v. Williams, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 44, holding stay law valid as to subsequent contracts; Mather v. Bush, 16 Johns. 247, 253, 8 Am. Dec. 315, 320, and Smith v. Parsons, 1 Ohio, 237, 13 Am. Dec. 609, sustaining validity of law discharging subsequent debts; Pugh v. Bussel, 2 Blackf. 398, holding that law may provide for discharge from imprisonment on debt contracted previous to its passage.

4 Wheat. 213–225, 4 L. 553, BARR v. GRATZ.

New trial.- Refusal to grant, affords no ground for writ of error, p. 220.

Cited and principle applied in Wright v. Hollingsworth, 1 Pet. 169, 7 L. 98, refusing to review decision of circuit court allowing filing of new count in ejectment; in Zacharie v. Franklin, 12 Pet. 163, 9 L. 1040, and Brown v. Clarke, 4 How. 15, 11 L. 855, denying writs upon that ground; Jones v. Van Zandt, 5 How. 224, 12 L. 126, holding that sufficiency of grounds for new trial cannot be subject of certificate of division; Pomeroy v. Bank, 1 Wall. 598, 17 L. 640, affirming entry of judgment after motion for new trial denied; in Insurance Co. v. Barton, 13 Wall. 604, 20 L. 709, a similar case; Railway Co. v. Twombly, 100 U. S. 81, 25 L. 550, affirming decision of lower court refusing to set aside verdict; Poole v. Nixon, 9 Pet. Appx. 770, 9 L. 306, 19 Fed. Cas. 995, ruling similarly as to refusal of lower court to open decree for revision upon new matter alleged; State v. Hunt, 4 La. Ann. 439, State Supreme Court refusing to review decision of lower court denying new trial in criminal case; State v. Brette, 6 La. Ann. 660, and State v. Muldoon, 9 La. Ann. 25, ruling similarly as to refusal to continue criminal cause; McCourry v. Doremus, 10 N. J. L. 249, as to refusal to grant continuance of civil cause; Coleman v. Bell, 4 N. Mex. 47, 12 Pac. 658, 3 N. Mex. 497, as to refusal to grant new trial in action of ejectment; Law v. Merrills, 6 Wend. 278, in action on note; Smith v. United States, 1 Wash. Tr. 274, refusing to review decision of District Court denying new trial in criminal cause; Territory v. Doty, 1 Pinn. 404, holding writ not to

He to order granting new trial on ground that verdict is against law. Cited approvingly in Sparrow v. Strong, 3 Wall. 105, 18 L. 50, where writ granted upon other grounds.

Distinguished in Gilliland v. Rappleyea, 15 N. J. L. 143, allowing writ of error where court, having set aside verdict on motion of plaintiff, gives judgment for defendant; Welch v. County Court, 29 W. Va. 68, 1 S. E. 340, holding refusal to grant writ of certiorari reviewabie by higher court on writ of error.

Evidence. A decree in chancery under which title to land has been made is admissible in evidence, as one of the links in the chain of title, although inter alios, p. 220.

Cited and principle applied in Applegate v. Mining Co., 117 U. S. 261, 263, 29 L. 893, 894, 6 S. Ct. 744, 745, holding that where attent deed forms part of papers in suit, record is admissible in later suit to show antiquity of deed; Pacific Bank v. Hannah, 90 Fed. 79, but holding judgment in partition suit not conclusive of title of parties not joined; Snider v. Greathouse, 16 Ark. 79, 63 Am. Dec. 59, holding judgment against heirs of deceased surety admissible as evidence of amount paid, in action against administrator; Wells v. Francis, 7 Colo. 418, 4 Pac. 52, affirming order admitting decree awarding vendor's lien as evidence in action upon title bond; Hardwick v. Hook, 8 Ga. 359, holding decree in chancery determining ownership of slaves admissible in evidence to show right of receiver of such owner to maintain assumpsit for their hire; Whitman v. Henebery, 73 Ill. 116, holding decree of partition admissible in collateral action of ejectment; Gage v. Goudy, 141 Ill. 220, 30 N. E. 321, holding decree of partition admissible as evidence of title in action to set aside tax deed; Head v. McDonald, 7 T. B. Mon. 207, holding judgment in suit on note against indorser admissible in action against prior indorser to prove manner of satisfaction; Key v. Dent, 14 Md. 98, holding decision of court confirming report of auditor, admissible in evidence to show amount due on an account; Parr v. State, 71 Md. 234, 17 Atl. 1021, holding decree of court declaring release of guardian by ward, void, admissible to show fact in action against sureties on bond; Newman v. Insurance Co., 20 Minn. 427, affirming order admitting decree reforming mortgage to show right to insurance money in action on policy; dissenting opinion, McCormick v. Fitzmorris, 39 Mo. 38, majority holding sheriff's deed to be presumptive evidence of judgment on which founded, and plaintiff in action of ejectment need not produce judgment and execution; Cheshire Bank v. Robinson, 2 N. H. 128, holding that decree of court confirming referee's report may be pleaded in action for damages so settled by referee; Greenleaf v. Railroad Co., 132 N. Y. 414, 30 N. E. 762, where decree of partition held admissible to show title in action of ejectment; Railroad Equipment Co. v. Blair, 145 N. Y. 611, 39 N. E. 964, holding decree affirming

sale of property admissible as evidence of title in action to recover same by receiver of vendor; Buckingham v. Hanna, 2 Ohio St. 561, holding decree ordering sale of land admissible as evidence of title in action of ejectment by third party; McCoy v. Reed, 5 Watts, 302, holding that in action against sheriff for official misconduct, it is prima facie a sufficient defense that his act was done under judgment of court; Koogler v. Huffman, 1 McCord (S. C.), 498, holding judgment making title to land conveyed by agent to be conclusive in collateral action as to execution of power of attorney by original owner; Baylor v. Dejarnette, 13 Gratt. 163, holding decree for sale of land admissible as evidence of title in action of ejectment. Cited approvingly in Samuel v. Hall, 9 B. Mon. 376, holding, however, that judgment against assignee is not evidence of facts upon which it was based; Hoffman v. Coster, 2 Whart. 473, holding that while deed is admissible as evidence of title in action of ejectment, it cannot be impeached by privies; Carroll v. Goldschmidt, 80 Fed. 522, admitting patent decree a link in chain of title to patent.

Distinguished in Succession of Lampton, 35 La. Ann. 421, holding ex parte order of court recognizing person as heir, not to be judgment, and so not pleadable as res adjudicata; Connell v. Galligher, 36 Neb. 755, 55 N. W. 231, holding decree remedying defect in acknowledgment of deed not to be operative to impair rights of strangers; Tierney v. Insurance Co., 4 N. D. 573, 574, 62 N. W. 644, 645, holding decree of foreclosure inadmissible in action on insurance policy for purpose of impeaching it; dissenting opinion, Masser v. Strickland, 17 Serg. & R. 360, 17 Am. Dec. 675, majority holding judgment against constable for official misconduct to be conclusive as against sureties; dissenting opinion, Kessler v. McConachy, 1 Rawle, 446, majority holding judgment in favor of tenant in distress proceedings, admissible in suit for rent as evidence on issue, 66 no rent in arrear."

Deed - Evidence.- Deed more than thirty years old is admissible in evidence without proof of execution, p. 221.

Cited and principle applied in Coulson v. Walton, 9 Pet. 72, 9 L. 56, ruling similarly as to bond for conveyance of land; Applegate v. Mining Co., 117 U. S. 261, 263, 29 L. 893, 894, 6 S. Ct. 744, 745, holding that where ancient deed forms part of papers in suit in court of record, the record of such case is admissible in later suit to show antiquity of deed; Walton V. Coulson, 1 McLean, 124, F. C. 17,132 (see 9 Pet. 72, supra); McCleskey v. Leadbetter, 1 Ga. 558, 559, as to bill of sale for slaves; Harlan v. Howard, 79 Ky. 376, holding, however, that credibility of evidence contained in such deed is to be determined by jury; Havens v. Land Co., 47 N. J. Eq. 378, 20 Atl. 501, as to deed of partition; Robinson v. Craig, 1 Hill Law (S. C.), 391, holding that, where ancient deed reciting power of attorney has been

received in evidence without proof, power need not be produced: Caruthers v. Eldridge, 12 Gratt. 685, holding such deed admissible, although possession not held in accordance with it for entire period. And see note, 9 Am. St. Rep. 303, on this point.

Deed - After-acquired title.-When holder of inchoate title conveys land by deed, and afterwards obtains perfect title, his seisin comes at once to his grantee, p. 222.

Cited and principle applied in Johnson v. Parcels, 48 Mo. 555, holding that where land warrant had issued to soldier, but patent was not issued until after his death, patent would relate back to enlistment, and widow be entitled to dower; Garner v. Johnson, Peck (Tenn.), 26, holding that after-acquired title of former grantor inures to benefit of purchaser at execution sale.

Seisin. Of two persons in possession of land at the same time, he who has better title is deemed to have seisin, p. 223.

Cited and principle applied in McClung v. Ross, 5 Wheat. 124, 5 L. 50, holding that mere silent possession, unaccompanied by any act amounting to ouster, will not disseize owner; O. & G. Smelting, etc., Co. v. Tabor, 13 Colo. 53, 16 Am. St. Rep. 194, 21 Pac. 929, holding that deed to land carries right to immediate possession of land described, and parol evidence is inadmissible to show agreement that possession should not pass until price paid; Towle v. Ayer, 8 N. H. 59, holding that in order to give party right to elect to consider himself disseized, alleged disseizor's acts must be such as law considers adverse to true owner; Culver v. Rhodes, 87 N. Y. 354, to the effect that possession to be adverse must be open and notorious and under claim of right; Peeler v. Norris, 4 Yerg. 344, holding possession under grant, during pendency of caveat by party in possession, is not such possession as will form bar under statute of limitations; Fancher v. De Montegre, 1 Head, 42, holding that possession of father cannot be adverse to children in whom legal title is vested. Cited approvingly, but without particular application in Kirk v. Smith, 9 Wheat. 288, 6 L. 92; Northrop v. Marquam, 16 Or. 191, 18 Pac. 459; Horton v. Crawford, 10 Tex. 388.

Adverse possession.—Actual entry upon part, under color of title, gives constructive possession to whole tract to which title extends, p. 223.

Cited and principle applied in Bradstreet v. Huntington, 5 Pet. 440, 8 L. 184, as to possession under deed executed by one of several tenants in common; Peyton v. Stith, 5 Pet. 493, 8 L. 203, giving similar effect to deed, although grantor did not claim under title and only occupied part of whole tract granted; Sicard v. Davis, 6 Pet. 140, 8 L. 348, as to possession under junior patent, there being no occupancy under senior patent; Ellicott v. Pearl, 10 Pet. 443, 9 L. 488, holding that entry under deed gives possession to all unoccu

pied land described; Clymer v. Dawkins, 3 How. 690, 11 L. 786, as to entry by tenant in common under deed of partition; Deputron v. Young, 134 U. S. 255, 33 L. 930, 10 S. Ct. 545, holding tax deed, although void on its face, to be sufficient color of title to support adverse possession to land described; Barclay v. Plant, 50 Ala. 521, holding that where husband has deeded land to wife, his seisin is referred to her title, and the land is not subject to execution for his debts; Hicks v. Coleman, 25 Cal. 133, 85 Am. Dec. 112, holding right thus acquired to be good as against party subsequently entering into possession of another part under mere color of title; Unger v. Mooney, 63 Cal. 593, 49 Am. Rep. 105, ruling similarly as to entry under deed from one tenant in common, others not being in actual possession; Kendrick v. Latham, 25 Fla. 837, 6 So. 875, as to entry under sheriff's deed; Wiggins v. Halley, 11 Ind. 7, as to entry under tax deed; Cottle v. Sydnor, 10 Mo. 770, as to entry under junior title, holding further that rule applies although occupant ignorant of extent of grant; Whitehead v. Foley, 28 Tex. 283, 289, as to entry under government survey; Taylor v. Burnsides, 1 Gratt. 199, as to entry under junior patent. Cited approvingly, but without particular application of the rule, in Norris v. Haggin, 12 Sawy. 58, 28 Fed. 283; Owen v. Morton, 24 Cal. 377; Stewart v. Stewart, 83 Wis. 371, 35 Am. St. Rep. 71, 53 N. W. 688.

Distinguished in Kile v. Tubbs, 23 Cal. 437, holding rule inapplicable where person having no color of title beyond his possession makes conveyance in excess of it; Bellis v. Bellis, 122 Mass. 417, where adverse possession held part of land covered by deed, under lease from legal owner.

Adverse possession.- Where adverse possession is not under color of title, disseisin is limited to bounds of actual occupancy, p. 224. Cited and principle applied in Clarke's Lessee v. Courtney, 5 Pet. 355, 8 L. 153, where junior patent not describing land by metes and bounds held to extend only to land actually occupied; Trapnall v. Burton, 24 Ark. 393, holding further that such occupancy may be. indicated by fencing; Wilkins v. Pensacola Coal Co., 36 Fla. 59, 18 So. 26, holding disclaimer of tenant ousts landlord to extent only of land held under lease; Goewey v. Urig, 18 Ill. 241, holding that two years' possession of part without title cannot be added to subsequent possession under color of title, so as to bar legal title to whole; Bonne v. Powers, 3 Mart. (La.) (N. S.), 461, holding deed not signed by vendor insufficient as basis for claim to whole of tract described; Cresap v. Hutson, 9 Gill, 277, holding that such adverse possession must be indicated by an inclosure; Hoye v. Swan, 5 Md. 253, holding that exclusive possession without such inclosure will not bar legal owner, although latter never had actual possession; McDonald v. Schneider, 27 Mo. 411, holding further that burden is upon such adverse occupant to show extent of holding; St. Louis v. Gormau, 29 Mo. 603, 77 Am. Dec. 591, where adverse claim was to part of