law exempting period of war from the statute of limitations invalid, in so far as reviving a right of action barred at the time of its passage. See also extended note on this point, 24 Am. Dec. 539, 56 Am. Rep. 364.

Constitutional law.- Courts will not pronounce a law unconstitutional in a doubtful case, p. 625. =623

The College Case comes in for its share of citations upon this point so often affirmed in the early decisions of the Supreme Court: Smith v. Odell, 1 Pinn. 455; Smith v. Mariner, 5 Wis. 580, 68 Am. Dec. 80; United States v. Boyer, 85 Fed. 430; State v. Holden, 14 Utah, 90, 46 Pac. 760; People v. Budd, 117 N. Y. 14, 15 Am. St. Rep. 469, 22 N. E. 674; Noel v. Ewing, 9 Ind. 43, 49; State v. Williams, 7 Rob. (La.) 264; Maxent v. Maxent, 1 La. 453, 454; United States v. Goldman, 3 Woods, 194, F. C. 15,225; Pierce v. Kimball, 9 Me. 60, 23 Am. Dec. 542; Ortman v. Greenman, 4 Mich. 294; Mayor v. State, 15 Md. 389; Murphy and Glover Test Oath Cases, 41 Mo. 382; Territory v. O'Connor, 5 Dak. Ter. 413, 41 N. W. 752; Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 246; Darling v. Berry, 13 Fed. 670, 4 McCrary, 485; Bonaparte v. Camden & A. R. R. Co., 1 Bald. 219, F. C. 1,617; In re Smith, 2 Woods, 463, F. C. 12,996; Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 685, 32 L. 256, 8 S. Ct. 996. It is interesting to note that practically all of these cases uphold the validity of the statute under consideration; and further, that in one or two of them the principle appears to have controlled the decision. Maxent v. Maxent, 1 La. 453, 454; Darling v. Berry, 13 Fed. 670, 4 McCrary, 485. An Alabama case cites to the proposition that an unconstitutional law ought to be declared void by the judiciary. Dale v. Governor, 3 Stew. 397, 419.

Constitutional law. The obligation clause never has been understood to embrace other contracts than those which respect property or some object of value, and confer rights which may be asserted in courts of justice. It does not restrict the right to legislate on the subject of divorce, p. 629. But the State may not annul a marriage without the consent of the parties, per Story, J., p. 696.

It has been argued from Mr. Justice Story's denial of the right to annul a marriage without consent of the parties, that the Federal Constitution in prohibiting laws impairing the obligation of a contract, included the marriage contract within the prohibition; and a few cases favor this view, without actually deciding the point. Lawrence v. Miller, 2 N. Y. 251; Drew's Appeal, 57 N. H. 183; Wright v. Wright's Lessee, 2 Md. 443; Burke v. Barron, 8 Iowa, 136; Callahan v. Callahan, 36 S. C. 466, 15 S. E. 731. And see dissenting opinion, Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 601, 15 L. 782. But a considerably larger number have regarded Dartmouth College v. Woodward, as declaring that the marriage contract is not within the meaning of the prohibition. Townsend v. Griffin, 4 Harr. 444; Hunt v. Hunt, 131 U. S. clxv, 24 L. 1109; Tolen v. Tolen, 2 Blackf. 409, 21 Am.

Dec. 744; Starr v. Pease, 8 Conn. 546; State v. Fry and Others, 4 Mo. 172, 194; Campbell's Case, 2 Bland Ch. 236, 237, 20 Am. Dec. 377, 378; Harding v. Alden, 9 Me. 150, 23 Am. Dec. 555; Cabell v. Cabell, 1 Met. (Ky.) 326; Levins v. Sleator, 2 G. Greene, 608; Noel v. Ewing, 9 Ind. 49, 51; Cronise v. Cronise, 54 Pa. St. 262; Lonas v. State, 3 Heisk. 310; Bowen v. Blount, 48 Ala. 674; Stone v. Gazzin. 46 Ala. 275; Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 210, 31 L. 659, 8 S. Ct. 729; Rose v. Rose, 46 S. W. 530; State v. Tetty, 41 Fed. 757; Ex parte Kinney, 3 Hughes, 13, 18, F. C. 7,825; In re Hobbs, 1 Woods, 540, F. C. 6,550. A few cases call attention to the fact that marriage, under the modern view, is rather to be regarded as a status arising out of contract than as a contractual relation. State v. Tutty, 41 Fed. 757. Several of these citations occur in cases upholding laws prohibiting, and punishing criminally, marriages between blacks and whites. State v. Tutty, 41 Fed. 757; Ex parte Kinney, 3 Hughes, 13, 18, F. C. 7,825; Ex rel. Hobbs, 1 Woods, 540, F. C. 6,550; Lonas v. State, 3 Heisk. 310. It has been urged against the validity of legislative divorces, in several States, that the obligation clause of the Federal Constitution was infringed; but the courts have adhered to the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall stated above, Wright v. Wright's Lessee, 2 Md. 443; Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 210, 31 L. 659, 8 S. Ct. 729; Cronise v. Cronise, 54 Pa. St. 262; Levin v. Sleator, 2 G. Greene, 608; Starr v. Pease and Others, 8 Conn. 546; Tolen v. Tolen, 2 Blackf. 409, 21 Am. Dec. 744; Cabell v. Cabell, 1 Met. (Ky.) 326; Although other grounds have been found in one or two cases for declaring invalid divorces granted by act of legislature. State v. Fry, 4 Mo. 172, 194; Higbee v. Higbee, 4 Utah, 32, 5 Pac. 698.

Constitutional law. Framers of the Constitution did not intend to restrain the States in the regulation of their civil institutions adopted for internal government, p. 629. The State legislatures have power to enlarge, repeal and limit the authorities of public officers in their official capacities, per Story, J., p. 694.

In reliance upon the foregoing principles it has been held that the State may abolish an office at any time, or change the mode of appointment, or shorten the term, and impair no vested right, State v. Dews, Charlt (Ga.) 414, 421; People v. Loeffler, 175 Ill. 609, 51 N. E. 793; Demarest v. Mayor, 74 N. Y. 166; People v. Pickney, 32 N. Y. 395; Alexander v. McKenzie, 2 S. C. 91; Coyle v. McIntire, 7 Houst. 44, 88, 90, 40 Am. St. Rep. 114, 116, 30 Atl. 730, 731; Donohue v. County of Will, 100 Ill. 106. See also 27 Am. Rep. 754; Mayor v. State, 15 Md. 491. So also the legislature may change the custodian of trust funds from one municipal officer to another; and this does not impair the contract of the donors. Smith v. Westcott, 17 R. I. 367, 22 Atl. 281. But see Trustees v. Bradbury, 11 Me. 122, 26 Am. Dec. 516. And it may temporarily direct that no funds be paid out of the State treasury without impairing the obligation of any contract for the salaries of its officers, Swann v. Buck, 40 Miss. 300;

or declare a reduction in salary in the middle of an appointee's term of office; Marden v. Portsmouth, 59 N. H. 20; or deprive him of perquisites such as certain commissions. Iowa City v. Foster, 10 Iowa, 191. A discharged officer has no right to his salary for the remainder of his term of office; Hoboken v. Gear, 27 N. J. L. 278; nor one who has not discharged its duties although elected. Smith v. New York, 37 N. Y. 520. But where under authority of the legislature a State governor has entered into a contract for a stipulated time for the employment of a State geologist, the legislature may not repudiate this agreement. Hall v. Wisconsin, 103 U. S. 10, 26 L. 305, overruling 39 Wis. 84.

The above observations of Chief Justice Marshall have also been referred to in a Mississippi case upholding an act suspending the statute of limitations during the civil war. Hill v. Boyland, 40 Miss. 637. And in a South Dakota case deciding a jurisdictional question. Pyle v. Hand County, 1 S. Dak. 387, 47 N. W. 402. And again in holding that a prohibition against lotteries may apply to a corporation previously authorized to conduct one, Mississippi Society, etc. v. Musgrove, 44 Miss. 834, 7 Am. Rep. 727, as also in upholding test oath acts as applied to attorneys. State v. Garesche, 36 Mo. 260.

Public corporations.- Charters of, are not within the protection of the obligation clause, but the legislature may not take the private property even of such corporations, pp. 629, 694.

The citing cases upon this point are discussed in the general note upon the charter contract doctrine, see supra, pp. 927-931.

Corporations. A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible and existing only in contemplation of law, p. 636.

In applying this definition it has been held that associations formed under the New York general banking law of 1838 were not corporations, properly speaking, for the reason among others, that they were authorized to sue in the name of their executive officer rather than as a distinct entity. Warner v. Beers, 23 Wend. 124, 143, 155; Gifford v. Livingston, 2 Den. 395. So, an individual banker is not to be regarded as a corporation sole. Codd v. Rathbone, 19 N. Y. 40. An organization known as the "Canebrake Agricultural District" has been declared to be a corporation in the nature of a municipal corporation. Dillard v. Webb, 55 Ala. 474. A "partnership association limited" with a board of managers, individual liability for debts, power to sue and be sued, to hold and convey real estate in the corporate name, is a corporation, and a citizen of Pennsylvania, within the meaning of the Federal statute respecting diverse citizenship as a basis of Federal jurisdiction. Andrews Bros. Co. v. Youngstown Coke Co., 86 Fed. 589. It follows from the proposition that a corporation is a mere creature of law, that it cannot act beyond the territory which that law covers, except by comity. Bank

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of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 587, 10 L. 307; Land Grant Ry. Co. v. Coffey Co., 6 Kan. 253. This principle of recognition on grounds of comity will not prevail, however, where the corporation by the enabling act is prohibited from carrying on business in the place of its domicile. Land Grant Ry. Co. v. Coffey Co., 6 Kan. 253. More miscellaneously, the definition has been cited in holding that a breach of trust by corporate directors is a violation of duty to the corporation and not its members, and to be prosecuted therefor by the corporation, Charlestown Ins. Co. v. Sebring, 5 Rich. Eq. 346; in holding void a provision that the different branches of a State bank might severally sue, State v. Ashley, 1 Ark. 543; in holding that a tax upon the deposits in a bank was a tax upon the bank as an existing entity, rendering it immaterial that the deposits consisted in large part of nontaxable government bonds, Coite v. Society for Savings, 32 Conn. 173, 185; in holding a municipality bound by a consent decree sanctioned by its officers, Union Bank v. Board of Commissioners, 90 Fed. 12; in holding that a corporation created with power of "perpetual succession " was not controlled by the general enactment limiting the term of corporate existence to ten years, since immortality is by the definition a legitimate attribute of corporate bodies, State v. Stormont, 24 Kan. 690; but see State v. Payne, 129 Mo. 478, 31 S. W. 799; in holding that an exemption from taxation contained in a statute merely entitled an act to incorporate" the Memphis, etc., R. R. Co., did not violate the familiar prohibition against embodying in a statute matters not set forth in the title, Goldsmith v. Rome R. R. Co., 62 Ga. 481; in sustaining a statute authorizing condemnation proceedings on behalf of a railroad on the ground that the use was public, Swan v. Williams, 2 Mich. 433; in holding that in its dealings with the Pacific Railroads, the government, although dealing with corporate bodies, yet dealt with reference to the security of the individual stockholders and intended to take advantage of no local statute creating a personai liability in the case of one of them, United States v. Stanford, 70 Fed. 358, 44 U. S. App. 68; in holding that a corporate officer might, as notary, take an acknowledgment of a mortgage to the corporation, Horbach v. Tyrrell, 48 Neb. 526, 67 N. W. 490; and in deciding that those owning all the corporate stock might not sue individually, but must proceed in the corporate name, Cutshaw v. Fargo, 8 Ind. App. 694, 34 N. E. 377; and in Louisville R. R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 558, 11 L. 378, holding a corporation a person for jurisdictional purposes. Cited more generally as to the nature of a corporation in Bergen, etc., Co. v. Cole, 26 N. J. L. 365; Hope v. Valley City Co., 25 W. Va. 797; Medical, etc., Soc. v. Weatherby, 75 Ala. 253; Thomas v. Dakin, 22 Wend. 100; Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 47 Fed. 19, 51 Fed. 324, 10 U. S. App. 98; State v. Payne, 129 Mo. 478, 31 S. W. 799; Planters' Bank v. Sharpe, 6 How. 331, 332, 337, 12 L. 460, 462.

Corporations. A corporation possesses only those powers which its charter confers either expressly or as incidental to its very existence, p. 636.

A number of citing cases apply the definition to questions as to the extent of the powers of a municipal corporation. The principal case is cited to this point in holding that a city council authorized "to grant licenses " might not fix the license fee at such an amount as to be practically prohibitory in its operation, Ex parte Burnett, 30 Ala. 465; in holding that a city authorized to establish ferries might employ an attorney to safeguard its rights respecting such property, Waterbury v. Laredo, 60 Tex. 521; a municipality may borrow money for municipal purposes, Bank of Chillicothe v. Chillicothe, 7 Ohio (pt. 2), 36, 30 Am. Dec. 187; but not to guarantee bonds for a navigable canal under a charter authorizing only construction of canals for sewerage purposes, Louisiana Bank v. Orleans, 3 La. Ann. 309. And in Louisiana it has been held that the police jury of a parish has no authority to raise funds by the issue of notes and bonds. Breaux v. Iberville, 23 La. Ann. 236. A city council may levy a tax for the construction of a canal for the supply of water under general authority to pass laws " necessary for the security, welfare and convenience of the city." Frederick v. Augusta, 5 Ga. 567. So also the leading case is cited to this point in holding a street commissioner of a municipality authorized to employ laborers, and the city to be liable for their services, Beers v. Dalles City, 16 Or. 337, 18 Pac. 837; in holding valid a State statute authorizing a county municipality to purchase railroad bonds, Ex parte Selma, etc., R. R. Co., 45 Ala. 725, 6 Am. Rep. 725; in holding that in the absence of special statute there is no general duty imposed upon a county to keep in repair bridges which it has erected, Covington v. Kinney, 45 Ala. 182; and in holding that commissioners authorized to make necessary contracts for building, furnishing or repairing bridges, have no right to destroy them. Commissioners of Gallea Co. v. Holcomb, 7 Ohio (pt. 1), 233. The definition is also applied in determining whether a parish was eleemosynary in its nature. Hale v. Everett, 53 N. H. 248.

Quite as numerous are the applications of the proposition to questions arising under railroad charters. In so applying the principle it has been held that such a corporation may not mortgage its franchises under an authority to mortgage the "road income and other property," Pallan v. Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co., 4 Biss. 41, F. C. 11,461; nor buy other roads under an authority to operate a railroad, Deaderick v. Wilson, 8 Baxt. 133; nor buy and sell land under a charter permitting the acquisition of lands for right of way, depots, etc., Pacific R. R. Co. v. Seely, 45 Mo. 220, 100 Am. Dec. 375; nor may a plank road company guarantee the debts of its construction company, Madison, etc., Co. v. Watertown, etc., Co., 7 Wis. 80; a railroad has no implied power to exempt itself by contract from