into this state with a bona fide intention of
settling therein, and bringing slaves with them.
The 4th section enacts, that "nothing in this
act contained shall be construed or taken to
affect the right of any person or persons travel-
ing or sojourning with any slave or slaves with-
in this state, such slave or slaves not being sold
or otherwise disposed of in this state, but car-
ried by the owner out of the state, or attempted
to be carried."

This act appears to the court not to compre-
hend the case now under consideration. The

[Local Law.]

NEGRO JOHN DAVIS et al. v. WOOD.

Evidence by hearsay and general reputation is
admissible only as to pedigree, but not to estab-
lish the freedom of the petitioner's ancestor, and
thence to deduce his or her own.
Verdicts are evidence between parties and privies
only; and a record proving the ancestor's freedom
to have been established in a suit against another
party by whom the petitioner was sold to the pres-
ent defendant, is inadmissible evidence to prove
the petitioner's freedom.

If on this point the first section of the act
could be thought doubtful, the fourth section
5*] seems to remove *that doubt. It declares
that "nothing in the act contained shall be
construed or taken to affect the right of any
person traveling or sojourning with any slave
or slaves within this state, such slave or slaves
not being sold or otherwise disposed of in this
state, but carried by the owner out of this
state, or attempted to be carried."

This section sufficiently explains the residence
contemplated by the legislature in the first sec-
tion. The term "sojourning" means something
more than "traveling," and applies to a tem-
porary, as contradistinguished from a perma-
nent residence. The court is also of opinion,
that the act contemplates and punishes an im-
portation or bringing into the state by the mas-
ter or owner of the slave. This construction,
in addition to its plain justice, is supported by

the words of the first section. That section de-
clares, that "a person brought into this state as
a slave contrary to this act, if a slave before
shall, thereupon, cease to be the property of
the person or persons so importing or bringing
such slave within this state, and shall be free."
It is apparent that the legislature had in view
the case of a slave brought by the owner, since
it is the property of the person importing the
slave which is forfeited.

Upon the best consideration we have been
able to give this statute, the court is unani-
mously of opinion that the petitioner acquired
no right to freedom by having been brought
into the county of Washington by Mrs. Rankin
for one year's service, she having been in the
course of the year carried back to Virginia by

her master.

6*]. *The Circuit Court appears to have con-
sidered the case as coming within the proviso of
the 2d section. If in this opinion that court
were even to be thought mistaken, the error
does not injure the petitioner, and is, there
fore, no cause for reversal. The court is
unanimously of opinion that the judgment
ought to be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.

ion of the court below: 1st. That they had of-
fered to prove, by competent witnesses, that
they (the witnesses) had heard old persons, now
dead, declare, that a certain Mary Davis, now
dead, was a white woman, born in England,
and such was the general report in the neigh-
borhood where she lived; and also offered the
same kind of testimony to prove that Susan
*Davis, mother of the petitioners, was line- [*7
ally descended, in the female line, from the said
Mary; and it was admitted that said Susan
was, at the time of petitioning, free, and acting,
in all respects, as a free woman; which evi-
dence, by hearsay and general reputation, the
court refused to admit, except so far as it was
applicable to the fact of the petitioner's pedi-
gree. 2d. That they having proved that the pe-
titioners are the children of Susan Davis and
that she is the same person named in a certain
record in a cause wherein Susan Davis and her
daughter Ary were petitioners against Caleb
Swan, and recovered their freedom, the plain-
tiffs offered to read said record in evidence to
the jury, as prima facie testimony that they
are descendents in the female line from a free
woman, who was born free, and are of free con-
dition, connected with the fact that the defend-
ant in this cause sold said Susan to Swann, the de-
fendant in said record, which the court refused
to suffer the petitioners to read to the jury as
evidence in this cause.

Lee, for the plaintiffs in error, and petition-
ers, referred to the opinion of the court (Duvall,
J., dissenting) in the case of Mima Queen and
Child v. Hepburn, February Term, 1813, as to
the admissibility of hearsay evidence in a
similar case, remarking that unless the court
was disposed to review its decision, it must be
taken for law, and he could not deny its au-
thority.

Duvall, J. The petitioners in that case were
descended from a yellow woman, a native of
South *America. In this case they are de- [*8
scended from a white woman.

Lee cited the opinion of the Virginia Court of
Appeals, in the case of Pegram v. Isabel,' as to
the admissibility of the record, in which a rec-
ord was admitted.

Key, contra, contended, that both grounds
were irrevocably closed against the other party.
The first certainly; and the second equally so;
as the evidence could not be admissible as
prima facie testimony merely, but if admitted
must be conclusive. The decisions in the state
courts of Virginia are against the evidence of
conclusive in favor of a child. The case of Peg-
the parent's or other ancestor's freedom being

1.-2 Hen. & Munf. Rep. 193.

ram v. Isabel is no authority here, for it was formerly considered and repudiated by this court in the decision alluded to.

Lee and Law replied, and cited 2 Washington's Rep. 64, and Swift's Law of Evidence, 13.

Marshall, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court, and stated that, as to the first exception, the court had revised its opinion in the case of Mima Queen and Child v. Hepburn, and confirmed it. As to the second exception, the record was not between the same parties. The rule is, that verdicts are evidence between par9] ties and privies. The court does *not feel inclined to enlarge the exceptions to this general rule, and, therefore, the judgment of the court below is affirmed.

PPEAL from the Circuit Court for the Rhode Island District. The Brig Samuel sailed from St. Bartholomews, an island belonging to His Majesty the King of Sweden, in the month of November, 1811, with a cargo consisting of rum, molasses, and some other articles, and arrived in Newport, Rhode Island, on the 8th of the following December, where the vessel and cargo were seized and libeled in the District Court as being forfeited to the United States, under the act of Congress prohibiting the importation 10*] *of articles the growth, produce or manufacture of Great Britain or France, their colonies or dependencies. The vessel and cargo were claimed by John Pierce and George Beach, both citizens of the United States. The District Court condemned both vessel and cargo. The Circuit Court condemned the vessel and the rum, but restored the residue of the cargo. From the sentence of the Circuit Court both the libelants and the claimants appealed to this

court.

Daggett, for the claimants, made three points:

1st. The proceedings ought to have been at common law, and not in the admiralty. 2d. The information is insufficient.

suit, by action of debt, indictment, or information." The cases under the authority of which this proceeding was brought are The Vengeance,' The Sally' and The Betsey and Charlotte." But the act under which the Vengeance was prosecuted was the same with the collection law of the 2d of March, 1799, section 89, which prescribed a proceeding in the admiralty; the Sally was prosecuted under the slave-trade act of the 23d of March, 1794, which indicates no particular proceeding; *whilst [*11 The Betsey and Charlotte was prosecuted under the act of non-intercourse with St. Domingo, of the 28th of February, 1806, wherein no method of recovering the penalties was specified. Supposing this to be a civil cause of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and that the District Court has jurisdiction of it as such, the proceedings may still be by information, as in the exchequer. Where a statute prescribes a particular remedy, or particular remedies, no other can be pursued.* 2. The statute is penal, and requires strictly accurate proceedings. The libel alleges, generally, that the cargo was laden on board in some foreign port. The cargo was stated to have belonged, in the alternative or disjunctive, to Pierce and Beach, or to one Stillman, or some other citizen, or consigned to one of said parties; and it was alleged that the offense was committed with "the knowledge of the owner, or of the master." 3. The testimony of Oldham, a witness in the cause, was taken irregularly, and not used in the court below. The vessel and cargo were condemned upon the testimony of tasters only, against all the oral and documentary evidence. This tes timony is novel; professional men and artists are credible witnesses in their own peculiar science or art; but this is matter of speculative opinion only not of known art or certain science. The witnesses can never be made responsible for perjury. Their evidence is contradicted.

1.

The Attorney-General, for the libelants. The *cargo could not have been the [*12 produce of St. Bartholomews, a sterile and unproductive island, used as St. Eustatius was during the war of the American revolution. It is more likely it was transshipped from a British than a Spanish colony; and, therefore, the claim is clouded with improbability. The case of The Odin may be invoked from the law of prize to show how little the fairest documentary evidence is to be regarded in comparison with the evidentia rei. Strip off this veil, and the onus is thrown upon the claimants, from which they cannot relieve themselves but by the strongest positive testimony. As to the evidence of the tasters, all our knowledge is derived through the senses. It is not unerring, but weighty; and the revenue laws rely upon it in collecting the duties on wines. The spirit and equity of the judiciary act of the 24th of September, 1789. were pursued in taking the deposition of Oldham; he was a seaman serving in the flotilla of gun-boats at Newport, and

1. The act of the 1st of March, 1809, on which this libel is founded, directs, that the penalties and forfeitures "shall be sued for, prosecuted and recovered, with the costs of

1.-3 Dall. 297.
2.-2 Cranch, 406.
3.-4 Cranch, 443.

4.-2 Burr. 803, Rex v. Robinson.
5.-1 Gallison, 85, The Bolina.
6.-1 Rob. 217.

ACTS OF CONGRESS, CITED, CON.

3 Wheat. 41, 86 et seq. 93

66

2 Wheat. 425 | April 25th, 1808.

3 Wheat. 233, 311 Jan. 9th, 1809.

Mch. 1st

June 28th,

April 25th, 1810.

Feb. 18th, 1811.

June 26th, 1812.

June

July 6th,

July 24th, 1813.

Aug. 2d,

Mch. 3d, 1817..

April 20th, 1818.

4 Wheat. 201

3 Wheat. 518

1 Wheat. 473

4 Wheat. 242, 245

2 Wheat. 138 et seq.

4 Wheat. 78

4 Wheat. 246

3 Wheat. 533, 526

2 Wheat. 152

2 Wheat. 152

66

66