Opinion of the Court. The findings of the master are prima facie correct. Only such matters of law and of fact as are brought before the court by exceptions are to be considered, and the burden of sustaining the exception is on the objecting party. In the case before us we are inclined, after a careful examination of the testimony, to concur with the master's report. It is altogether a matter of the weight of evidence. 1. It is denied that the money was received of the wife by the husband, and if received, that it was a loan. The testimony leaves no doubt that there was received from the estates of the wife's deceased father and brother, at different times, the aggregate sum of $5,700. The wife swears positively that she loaned these sums to her husband, who repeatedly promised to pay her; that at one time, more than a year before the bankruptcy, they had sharp words or ill-feeling about it, and he told her he had nothing but the farm and would convey that to her, and that the conveyances finally made were in pursuance of his repeated promise to do so. All this is wholly uncontradicted. 2. Much testimony is taken to prove that the price was so inadequate as to show fraud, though no such charge is made in the bill. The fair result of all the testimony on this point is that the land was worth about $8,000, the sum recited in the conveyance; and if interest be computed on the $5,700 from the periods at which the various sums were received, it will amount to the full value of the land, if not more, at the time the deeds were made. 3. There is no reason to disbelieve Mrs. Medsker when she swears positively that she did not know nor suspect her husband's insolvency until bankrupt proceedings were commenced. Her statement is confirmed by the allegation, undisputed, that between the time of the conveyance and the petition in bankruptcy $4,000 of their debts were paid, and the bill alleges that their debts were only $5,000 in excess of their assets. 4. The master, who was present and heard Mrs. Medsker testify, and could see her manner, and is therefore better able to determine the weight due to her testimony, says he has no Opinion of the Court. doubt she was a creditor, and was in ignorance of Medsker's insolvency. Dean v. Pearson, 102 Mass. 101. 5. The conveyance first to McCole, who paid nothing, but took the title in trust for Mrs. Medsker, and from him to her, was to satisfy the common-law inability to make a direct conveyance from husband to wife, and is no evidence of fraud. In the case of the Atlantic National Bank v. Tavener, 130 Mass. 407, that court says: "The question whether a loan by the wife to the husband, of money which is her separate property, upon his promise to repay it, creates an equity in her favor, which a court of equity will enforce, has not been decided in this commonwealth. But it has generally, if not uniformly, been decided in the affirmative in other courts," for which numerous cases are cited. It is added: "That the jury in this case having found that the money delivered by the wife to the husband was by way of loan, and not of gift, and that his subsequent conveyance of land through a third person to her in repayment of that loan, was not made with the purpose of hindering, delaying, or defrauding creditors, that conveyance, to satisfy his equitable obligation to his wife, was not a voluntary conveyance, and was valid against his creditors. Bullard v. Briggs, 7 Pick. 533; Forbush v. Willard, 16 Pick. 42; Stetson v. O'Sullivan, 8 Allen, 321; French v. Motley, 63 Maine, 326; Grabill v. Moyer, 45 Penn. St. 530; Babcock v. Eckler, 24 New York, 623; Steadman v. Wilbur, 7 R. I. 581.” Such is precisely the case here, as reported by the master, and, as we think, supported by the evidence; and The decree of the circuit court is reversed, and the case remanded, with directions to dismiss the bill. Opinion of the Court. STUCKY, Assignee of MELTER in Bankruptcy v. MASONIC SAVINGS BANK and Another. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY. Decided March 5th, 1883. Bankruptcy-Fraudulent Preference. A creditor, dealing with a debtor whom he may suspect to be in failing circumstances, but of which he has no sufficient evidence, may receive payment or take security without necessarily violating the bankrupt law. When such creditor is unwilling to trust a debtor further, or feels anxious about his claim, the obtaining additional security, or the receiving payment of the debt is not prohibited, if the belief which the act requires is wanting. Grant v. National Bank, 97 U. S. 80, approved and followed. Mr. David W. Armstrong and Mr. L. N. Dembitz, for the appellants. Mr. J. P. Helm and Mr. W. O. Dodd, for the appellees. MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court. This suit originated in a bill in equity brought in the district court by Stucky, as assignee of Melter, a bankrupt, against the bank and against Jacob Krieger, Sr., for the purpose of having two mortgages made by the bankrupt declared void, and the real estate covered by them sold free of the lien of those mortgages. The ground of this relief is the allegation that the mortgages were made by Melter when insolvent, and were preferences in contemplation of bankruptcy, void by the bankrupt law, and that, by virtue of the bankrupt proceedings commenced within two months after they were made, they are void. The case was decided in favor of the assignee in the district court, but on appeal the circuit court reversed this decree and dismissed the bill. It is shown that both mortgages were taken to secure renewal notes for pre-existing debts, one note and mortgage being made to the bank directly, and the other to Mr. Krieger, who was president of the bank, the note being indorsed by him to the bank. They were for $6,000 each. Opinion of the Court. The whole matter turns upon the question whether Krieger, who acted almost alone for the bank, had reasonable ground to believe that Melter was insolvent at the time the mortgages were made. The district judge, who decided that he had such reasonable ground, does not seem to have given due weight to the principles of the case of Grant v. The National Bank, decided by this court, and reported in 97 U. S. 80, a case which was fully considered, and which has since been followed by us as a leading one on the subject. That case establishes the doctrine that a creditor dealing with a debtor whom he may suspect to be in failing circumstances, but of which he has no sufficient evidence, may receive payment or security without violating the bankrupt law. He may be unwilling to trust him further; he may feel anxious about his claim and have a strong desire to secure it, yet such belief as the act requires may be wanting. Obtaining additional security or receiving payment of a debt under such circumstances is not prohibited by law. In the case before us the testimony of Krieger himself, as the one who best knows the strength of the suspicion, if any, on which he acted, and what evidence was before him, must chiefly control. We have examined his deposition very carefully. We think it bears the impress of candor, and it negatives the idea that he had reasonable ground to believe Melter insolvent, or that he actually did believe it. The evidence, outside of this, as to the various estimates of the value of Melter's property and the amount of his debts, while it shows that Melter was probably insolvent, does not show that this was known to Melter himself or to Kreiger, or that the latter had reasonable grounds to believe him so. It would serve no useful purpose to give in this opinion a full examination of all the evidence. It is sufficient to say that in looking it all over we concur with the circuit judge, and his decree dismissing the bill is Affirmed. Satement of Facts. NEW HAMPSHIRE v. LOUISIANA and Others. NEW YORK v. LOUISIANA and Others. ORIGINAL. Decided March 5th, 1883. Constitutional Law-International Law-Jurisdiction-Sovereign State. 1. The history of article XI. of the amendment to the Constitution which provides that the judicial power of the federal courts shall not extend to suits against a State by a citizen of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign State, and the causes which led to its adoption, reviewed. 2. Unless the State prosecuted consents, that amendment prohibits the court from entertaining jurisdiction of a cause in which one State seeks relief against another State on behalf of its citizens, in a matter in which the State prosecuting has no interest of its own. One State cannot create a controversy with another State, within the meaning of that term as used in the judicial clauses of the Constitution, by assuming the prosecution of debts owing by the other State to its citizens. 3. The relation of one of the United States to its citizens is not that of an independent sovereign State to its citizens. A sovereign State seeking redress of another sovereign State on behalf of its citizens can resort to war on refusal, which a State cannot do. 4. The qualifications of the duty of a sovereign State to assume the collection of the debts of its citizens from another sovereign State considered and stated. The case on which the opinion is given is thus stated by the court. On the 18th of July, 1879, the general court of New Hampshire passed an act, of which the following is a copy: "AN ACT to protect the rights of citizens of this state, holding claims against other States. "Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General Court convened. SECTION 1. Whenever any citizen of the State shall be the owner of any claim against any of the United States of America, arising upon a written obligation to pay money issued by such State, which obligation shall be past due and unpaid, such citizen holding such claim may assign the same to the State of New Hampshire, and deposit the assignment thereof, duly exe |