The People v. Cassity. deemed real estate. And yet, the difference between such a case and the present one, is simply one of degree. In each case the superstructure is affixed to an interest acquired for that purpose in the land, and designed to be permanently used with it. Either, without the other, would be useless; but both combined together constitute an entire and valuable property. In ordinary cases, when the superstructure is added to the land, the annexation renders what previously was personal, afterward real estate, and liable to be assessed as such. This point was fully discussed and definitely decided in the case of the People v. Fredricks and others (48 Barb., 173, 180, 181); and in Mohawk and Hud. R. R. Co. v. Clute (4 Paige, 384, 395). And no reason can exist for denying the same result to the act of attachment in the present instance. Though the estate in the relator may be less, it was still sufficient to form an interest in the land, and for that reason to change the character of the property affixed to it, for the purpose of being advantageously used and enjoyed with it. The statute defining the term "land," for the purposes of taxation, does not require that the fee, or any other particular estate, shall be owned in it, in order to render it taxable as land. For that purpose the term is required to be construed as including not only the land itself, but all buildings and other articles erected upon or affixed to the same, &c. And that is broad and comprehensive enough to include the relator's superstructure, for it was composed of articles affixed to the land itself, not for a temporary purpose, but for permanent use and profit. This definition was declared to be a general one, and to include the terms "real estate" and "real property," whenever they occur in the chapter relating to the subject of taxation. (1 R. S., 5th ed., 905, § 3.) The next section of the same title providing that corporations shall not be taxed upon their capital as personal estate, for that portion of it that may have been invested in real estate, indicates that it was not intended that any particular estate should be required to constitute the term land. (1 R. S., 5th ed., 906, The People v. Cassity. 4.) For the purpose of excluding that portion of the capital from taxation as personal property, all that was required was that it should be invested in real estate. And so much of the relator's capital as was paid for the right to construct and maintain its railroad upon the streets and highways in question, and for the superstructure afterward made upon them, was invested in real estate within the terms used by this section. It could not, therefore, be lawfully taxed as personal estate under the description given by this section of that species of property. And if not taxable as real estate or land, under the preceding section, it would escape taxation altogether. A similar interest was held to be taxable as land under this statute in the case of the People v. Beardsley (52 Barb., 105). In that case, the relator had secured the privilege of constructing a railway over the Allegany reservation of Indian lands. And by the contract conferring it, there was a special restriction imposed upon the relator by which it was provided that it should not vest the fee of the land, as it clearly could not while it was a portion of the reservation, in the railroad company, nor the right to occupy the same for any purposes other than what might be necessary for the construction, occupancy and maintenance of the railroad. (Id., 107.) This certainly was no greater interest than the relator in the present case acquired. And it was held, as to that interest in that case, that it could be properly taxed as real estate. Since then, that decision has been affirmed by the Court of Appeals solely upon the ground that the interest secured by the contract, and the superstructure made upon the land was legally taxable as real estate under the terms of the statute. The case of the People v. The Board of Assessors of Brooklyn (39 N. Y., 81), contains nothing in conflict with this conclusion. For the main pipes which were then held not to be taxable as land, were neither erected upon nor affixed to the land. And for that reason they were held to be exempt from taxation as real estate. (Id., 87.) The assessment complained of as erroneous in the present Miner v. Judson. case was legal and proper within the statute referred to, and the proceedings of the respondents should therefore be affirmed. MARVIN and E. DARWIN SMITH, JJ., concurring. HERMAN D. M. MINER, Receiver, &c., Respondent, v. CHARLES K. JUDSON, Appellant. (GENERAL TERM, EIGHTH DISTRICT, APRIL 18, 1870.) The charter of a mutual insurance company provided, that upon alienation of property insured, the policy should be void and surrendered for cancellation, and the assured entitled upon the surrender and payment of his proportion of the losses incurred prior thereto, to his premium note, but that the alienee might have the policy, if assigned to him, ratified for his benefit, on giving security for the sum remaining unpaid upon such note, and thereupon should be entitled to the privileges, and subject to all the liabilities of the party originally owning the policy; the defendant who held a policy for which he had given his premium note to be paid in sums and at times, as required under the charter and by-laws of the company, by the directors, conveyed the insured property, and with the company's assent assigned the policy to his grantee, and it was then by like assent reassigned to the defendant as collateral security for a debt due him from the grantee, who had also given a note in like terms with that of the defendant to the company; the company also retained the defendant's rote and the latter paid assessments upon it for losses, happening after the assignments of the policy. In an action by a receiver of the company against the defendant on his note.-Held, that the defendant was not liable thereon, and the plaintiff could not recover. THE plaintiff brought this action as the receiver of the Jamestown Farmers' Insurance Company, upon a premium note made and delivered by the defendant to that company on the 20th day of August, 1853. The note was made and delivered in consideration of a policy of insurance, issued by the company to the defendant, upon a printing press, type, furniture, stock and materials owned by him, and situ Miner v. Judson. ated in Randolph, in the county of Cattaraugus. By this policy, the company insured the defendant against loss and damage by fire upon such property, to the amount of $750 for the period of five years. The business of the company was exclusively that of mutual insurance, and by the terms of the defendant's note, he promised to pay the company, or its treasurer, for the time being, the sum of $165, in such portions, and at such time or times, as the directors of such company might, agreeably to its charter and by-laws, require. By the evidence given upon the trial, which was had before a referee, it appeared that the defendant sold his property in Randolph to B. F. Morris, and with the consent of the company assigned over the policy to him. The assignment of the policy bore date the 8th day of December, in the year 1853, and the consent of the company to the assignment bore date on the 12th of December, 1853. The company at the same time consented that Morris might assign the policy to the defendant as a collateral security for a demand due to him from Morris, and for that purpose Morris, at the time when the policy was assigned to him, reassigned it as collateral security to the defendant. When the policy was assigned to Morris, he made and delivered his own note to the company for the payment of the premium, in the same amount, and the same form, as the note previously given for that purpose by the defendant. And the company still retained the possession of the defendant's note. This note was assessed by the directors of the company for the payment of losses incurred in 1854 and 1856, and the assessments made were paid by the defendant, and subsequent payments were made upon his note by the defendant, in printing, amounting to the sum of fourteen dollars. All the payments made upon it by the defendant, after the assignments of the policy, amounted to thirty-two dollars and fifteen cents. The losses, for the payment of which the assessment in controversy was made, accrued after the assignments of the policy, and the making and delivery of the new note by Morris. Miner v. Judson. Sections 3 and 13 of the charter of the Jamestown Farmers' Insurance Company, read respectively as follows: "Section 3. All persons who shall insure with the said company, and also their heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns continuing to be insured in said company, as hereinafter provided, shall thereby become and continue members thereof during the period they shall remain insured by said company, and no longer." "Section 13. When any property insured by this company shall be alienated by sale or otherwise, the policy shall thereupon be void and be surrendered to said company to be canceled; and upon such surrender the assured shall be entitled to receive his deposit note upon the payment of his propor tion of the losses and expenses that have occurred prior to such surrender; but the grantee or alienee, having the policy assigned to him, may have the same ratified and confirmed to him for his own use and benefit, on giving proper security, to the satisfaction of the directors, for such portion of the deposit or premium note as shall remain unpaid, and by such ratification and confirmation, the party causing such security to be given, shall be entitled to all the privileges and be subject to all the liabilities, to which the original party to whom the policy was given was entitled and was subjected under this charter." The referee reported in favor of the plaintiff, and from the judgment entered upon the report the defendant appealed. A. H. Judson, for the appellant. Stephen Snow, for the respondent. Present-MARVIN, TALCOTT and DANIELS, JJ. By the Court-DANIELS, J. The sole consideration for the defendant's note to the company was the agreement contained in the policy, to insure his property; and when that was ter minated by a sale of the subject of the insurance it was con |