bursements as per items in the cash-book here, $381.23. Balance on hand is $185.12.

The detailed report is as follows:

RECEIPTS.

Cash on hand February 16, 1903 ...

$170 35

Dues received from February 16, 1903, to February 15, 1904...

396 00

$566 36

C. I. Haring, Secretary, expenses of banquet etc., as per acct..

249 75

On motion the report was accepted and placed on file.

The President: Next in order are the reports of the standing committees. Is the Committee on Amendment of the Law ready to report?

The chairman of the committee then presented the report of the committee, as follows:

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON AMENDMENT OF THE LAW.

Your committee on Amendment of the Law respectfully reports:

Being so authorized by the Association it gave general notice during the legislative session of 1903 through the newspapers, that it would present any bills, which might be sent to its chairman by lawyers, relating to evidence, practice and procedure. A few such bills

were placed in its charge, the more important of which were a bill regulating admission to the bar, a bill regulating proceedings for the disbarment of attorneys, and a bill amending the law of change of venue for the prejudice of the judge, attempting to cure certain abuses which had grown up under that practice.

The bill regulating admission to the bar provides that students must have three instead of two years preparation before they can be examined for admission, abolishing the practice of admitting graduates of foreign law schools, and that rules shall be made in regard to the general qualifications of applicants. It was drawn by Mr. A. A. Jackson, a member of the board for the examination of applicants for admission to the bar. The act relating to disbarment proceedings provides a definite and simple method of making it easy to get out of the profession. It was drawn by Mr. Nash, also a member of the same examining board.

Both of these measures were passed. It is interesting to note that the first disbarment proceeding instituted since their adoption was begun under the former practice, which is continued in force by the recent act.

The amendment in relation to three years' preparatory study for admission to the bar was first recommended by the Committee on Legal Education of this Association in 1886 (Vol. 2 p. 18). The Association has been urging this amendment ever since, and its efforts have finally been rewarded with success.

While the bill relating to admission to the bar was before the judiciary committees, the question was raised whether the admission of graduates of the University Law School should not be abolished and all applicants compelled to take the bar examination.

This is the law of Iowa, Illinois and some other states and is reported to work well. The judiciary committee did not feel justified in favoring so great a change without full consideration.

In regard to the act relating to change of venue for local prejudice, although it was conceded by the committees on judiciary that gross abuses exist under the present law, yet they could not agree upon any amendment. Most of the circuit judges favored such changes in the law as would prevent the filing of an affidavit of prejudice merely for delay, but no feasible plan of amendment was found, and the bill was unfavorably reported.

At the last meeting we had the pleasure of listening to the very interesting and instructive paper of Judge Clementson, on Non-unanimous Verdicts, printed on pages 107-126 of our last report. Judge Clementson proposed the introductiou in the legislature of a joint resolution amending the constitution so that the legislature may provide for a majority verdict in civil cases. (5 Proceedings, 39.) After considerable discussion by Judge Parish, Mr. Neal Brown and Mr. J. G. Flanders, the latter moved that the matter be referred to your Committee on Amendment of the Law to report at this meeting. This motion was supported by Judge Clementson and was adopted.

At the annual meeting of the Association in 1899, Mr. Edward P. Vilas read a paper on the unanimous verdict, tentatively recommending the following:

"That the constitution be so amended as to provide or give to the legislature power to enact a provision in substance as follows: That the court or officer before whom a trial jury in any civil action or special proceeding is had, instead of discharging the jury

when they disagree, may, and if either party request it, shall inquire how many of the jurors are agreed, and if all but two are agreed he shall require the verdict to be signed by those who agree to it, take the verdict and record it. He shall then request the dissenting jurors to state the grounds of their dissent, which statements, if the jurors consent to make them, shall be entered on the record with the verdict of the majority; and thereupon the jury shall be discharged. If no ground sufficient to sustain a verdict the other way has been stated by either of the dissenting jurors and recorded, or if either of them refuse to make such statement, the verdict of the majority shall, upon motion of either party, stand as the verdict in the cause, provided the presiding judge or officer shall also certify in writing that no sufficient ground to sustain a verdict the other way has been stated by the dissenting jurors and that he approves the verdict of the majority. If the presiding judge or officer fails to make such certificate during the term, the verdict shall be deemed invalid and the proceeding stand as though a mistrial had taken place; otherwise, the verdict shall stand as the verdict in the cause, the proceedings thereon shall be the same as if the verdict. had been unanimous. The certificate of the judge approving the verdict should be given no greater weight than a refusal by the same court to set aside the verdict."

He was followed by Mr. L. J. Nash in a thorough discussion of the question. He cites a large number of high authorities condemning the features of unanimity, but strongly urges against any change in the system. These papers may be found in Vol. II, of our reports, pp. 370-408.

Judge Clementson calls attention to the judicial legislation by which the rule of charging the jury has been radically changed since the adoption of the constitution. At that time and down to the year 1884, the trial court might advise the jury as to the weight, value and materiality of the evidence, so long as he left them the right to find for themselves. This is the rale now prevailing in the federal courts. It was changed by the decision in Lampe v. Kennedy, 60 Wis., 110, holding that it was error to instruct the jury as to the relative weight of the testimony or credibility of the witnesses. Judge Clementson deplores this as a change for the worse.

The points cited in favor of a majority verdict, and against making any changes as contained in the papers and discussion referred to, may be summarized as follows:

In favor of majority verdict in civil cases:

Better character of verdicts, in case of great conflict of evidence, and doing away with compromise verdicts.

Fewer disagreements.

If a small minority, after deliberation, cannot bring majority to their view, the conclusion of nine or ten should be received. The legislature might provide that every verdict rendered within six hours must be unanimous, and after that by nine or ten agreeing.

A small minority of stubborn but perhaps unintelligent jurors, possibly moved by prejudice, bribery, a pretty face; pathetic appearance, should not have the power to go against the preponderance of the evidence. It is easier to corrupt one than three or four. The unanimity rule is generally condemned by writers on jurisprudence, never existed on the conti