5. SLAVE CONTRACTS.-The clause in the State Constitution that "all contracts for the sale or purchase of slaves are null and void, and no court in this State shall take cognizance of any suit founded on such contracts," etc., is in violation of the Federal Constitution. Pillow v.

6.

7.

8.

9.

Brown & Childress, Exrs. 240.

BILL OF RIGHTS.-The provisions of the bill of rights, contained in the Constitution of this State, differ from those of most, if not all the other States. It was the intention of the framers of the present Constitution to place a limitation on the legislative branch of the government, and to inhibit it from enacting any law imposing penalties on persons who had once been acquitted by a jury for the same offense; but this does not deprive the prisoner of his common law rights. Lee v. The State, 260.

SCHEDULE TO CONSTITUTION-Construction of.—That clause of the schedule to the Constitution (sec. 10), requiring all officers to qualify "within fifteen days after they shall have been duly notified of their election or appointment," is mandatory, and, for the purpose designed, has all the force and effect of a provision of the Constitution, and is to be construed by the same rules. State v. Johnson, 281.

SAME.-The command, and the use of the word "shall," in the schedule, denotes command, that the officer shall qualify within fifteen days after having been duly notified of his election, and is nothing more nor less than a grant to qualify within that time. Ib.

CONSTRUCTION OF CONSTITUTION.-Where the Constitution designates, in express and explicit terms, the precise time when a fundamental act shall be done, and is utterly silent as to the performance at any other time, it cannot be done at any other time. Ib.

10. COMPETENCY OF ADMINISTRATORS TO TESTIFY, ETC.-It was not the design of Art. VII, sec. 22, of the State Constitution, to exclude, absolutely, the testimony of the parties, therein mentioned, respecting all matters in controversy between them; but only in respect to those transactions that were strictly personal, and where, in the nature of the case, the privilege of testifying could not be reciprocal and of mutual advantage. Giles, admr. v. Wright, 476.

11. RETROSPECTIVE ACTS-when void.-Legislative acts, retrospective in their character, are not void unless they conflict with some constitutional provision or interfere in some respect with vested rights. Smith & Bro. v. Van Gilder, admr., 527.

12. POWER OF THE PEOPLE, ETC.-The people of a State have a right to alter or reform the government in the manner provided by the organic law, so long as they do not ignore or deny allegiance to the national government, or invade the provisions of the Constitution of the United States. Penn et al. v. Tollison, 545.

13. CONSTITUTION OF 1836-Not destroyed by Convention of 1861.—While there was no act of violation, nor was there any thing revolutionary in the assembling of the convention which met at Little Rock, on the 4th of March, 1861, in pursuance of the act of January 15, 1861, yet the attempt by that body, by the passage of the ordinance of secession, to repeal the "act of acceptance" of the compact; to absolve the citizens of the State from their allegiance to the United States; the adoption of the Constitution of the "Confederate States;" the appropriation of the public domain and other property, and the adoption of a new Constitution, did not destroy the State government of 1836; and all such action on the part of the Convention was null and void, for the want of power. Ib. 14. POWER OF CONVENTION OF 1861.-The people, in their sovereign capacity, did not authorize the Convention to establish a new government; it was assembled for no such purpose; the act assembling it conferred no such power, and they were not authorized to make a new Constitution. Ib.

15. SAME.-The Convention might have had power to adjourn from day to day, but the President had no power to convene it at will, and, as a Convention, it was functus officio when it adjourned on the 10th of March, and all its acts, subsequent to that time, were absolutely null and void, and without authority or sanction on the part of the people. Ib. 16. SAME.-The people are as much bound to their allegiance by the Constitution of the United States as their servants, and the moment the Convention attempted to abjure its allegiance, it became revolutionary, and all its subsequent acts nullities, even with the sanction of the people. Ib.

17. SAME. The Convention was not in the exercise of rightful inherent powers, and the government formed or attempted to be formed, was not a de facto government. Ib.

18. SERVICE BY CONFEDERATE COURT.-This court does not regard a service made in 1861, by a Confederate court, as valid, and a decree rendered thereon is a nullity. Ib.

19. STATE GOVERNMENTS.-A State government not in the United States and in obedience to her Constitution, is not, as a law making power, a part of the United States government, and there is no law, State or National, by which that government, when she conquers her opposers, is bound to recognize as valid the public or political action of any such State while engaged in rebellion against the national Constitution and laws. Thomp son v. Mankin, 586.

20. SAME.-Political departments must recognize.-If the lawful government of the United States, or of a State, through the proper political departments, do not recognize the validity of the acts of such rebel State, the courts of the regular State government have no authority

to hold the public acts and proceedings of a State, so in opposition to
the Constitution and laws of the United States, valid and binding be-
tween individuals. Ib.

21. SAME.—The recognition of the civil government must be decided by the
political department of the government to which the courts belong,
and when so decided, are to be considered res adjudicata.—Ib.

22. CONFEDErate Courts-Service by, not binding.—Service made, during the
rebellion, by a Confederate Court is not binding upon the party to ap-
pear, and any decree or judgment rendered thereon is a nullity. Ib.
23. Judgment BY CONFEDERATE COURT VOID.-A judgment rendered by a
court held in this State, after the passage of the ordinance of seces-
sion, is coram non judice and absolutely void. Timms v. Grace, 598.
See Administration, 1. Construction of Statutes, 6, 9, 10, 11. Pardon and
Amnesty. Registrars. 1. Supreme Court, 1, 2. States, 1.

CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.

1. OF ACT OF CONGRESS.-The Hot Springs and four sections of land, in-
cluding the Springs, were reserved from entry and sale, by the act of
April 20, 1832. Gaines, et al. v. Hale and Rector, 168.

2. SAME.

The effect of the third section of the act of March, 1843, was not
put in to extend the act of 1818, to land on the south side of the Arkan-
sas river, as of its time of passage, but simply as of the time of the pas-
sage of the act of March 1843, and rights vested under it, as against the
government only from and after that date. Ib.

3. SAME.-Cherokee-pre-emption claims.-Cherokee pre-emption claims
could not be located on the four sections of land, including the Hot
Springs as their center, after the passage of the act of April, 1832. Ib.

4. SAME.-New Madrid certificates.-A location of a certificate, under the
New Madrid Acts, is the actual survey of the land and a return of the
plat by the surveyor to the recorder of land titles, and its approval on
the part of the government, and until such survey, return and approval,
the title remains in the government, nor was this changed by the act of
April 29th 1816. Ib.

5. CODE CRIMINAL PRACTICE.-Section 178, Code of Criminal Practice,
does not authorize the court to dismiss a valid indictment, after arraign-
ment, plea and impaneling of the jury, so as to hold the accused for trial
on another indictment for the same offense. Lee v. The State, 260.

6. CONFEDERATE MONEY ACT.-The act, approved March 5th, 1867, known
as the Confederate money act, is unconstitutional. Hastings v. White,
et al., 308.

7. STAMP ACT CONSTRUED.-While Congress has the power to prescribe
evidence, and especially what shall be instruments of evidence in the
Federal courts, it is powerless to prescribe them for State courts, and the

act of Congress of June 30, 1864, known as the "stamp act," is not to be
so construed. Bumpass & Hicks v. Taggart 398.

8. STATUTE SUPERSEDED BY CODE.-Chapter 88, Gould's Digest, is no
longer in force, being superseded by chapter IV, of the Civil Code. Hays,
et al., ex parte, 510.

9. CHAPTER 169, GOULD'S DIGEST-How construed.-Chapter 169, of
Gould's Digest, regulating taverns, groceries and dram shops, is not re-
pealed by section seventeen, of article X, of the Constitution of the
State-nor is it in conflict with section five of article X. Henry, et al.
v. The State, 523.

10. WHAT ACTS CONTINUED IN FORCE BY CONSTITUTION.-All laws continued
in force, by virtue of section sixteen, of article XV, of the Constitution,
are as valid as though re-enacted by the General Assembly. Ib.
11. POWER TO LICENSE-License not a tax, etc.-The Legislature may pass
any law not inhibited by the Constitution, and a law requiring an amount
or sum of money to be paid for a license to sell spirituous liquors, is not a
tax in the sense used in section five, of article X, of the Constitution. Ib.
12. SECTION 116, CIVIL CODE CONSTRUED.-The several pleas or defenses
that may be set up in an answer, under paragraphs three and four, sec-
tion 116, Code of Practice, stand each upon its own merits, and a demurrer
may be sustained as to some and overruled as to others. Pugh v. Har-
vison, 162.

See Attachments, 1, 5; Amendments, 2; Administration, 2; Appeals, 5;
Commissioner of Deeds, 1; Constitutional Law, 3, 4, 11; Counties, 4;
Dower, 1, 2; Indian Lands, 1, 2; Indictments, 2; Judges, 1; Mandamus,
4; Pardon and Amnesty, 6; Probate Court, 1, 3; Public Lands, 1, 3; Prac-
tice, 31, 33; Registrars, 1; Statute of Limitations, 1, 2, 3; Verdicts, 1.

CONTINUANCES.

1. WITHIN THE DISCRETION OF COURT.-Continuances in criminal, as well
as in civil cases, as a general proposition, are within the sound discre-
tion of the court, and its refusal to grant a continuance is never ground
for a new trial, unless it clearly appears to have been an abuse of such
discretion, and manifestly operates as a denial of justice. Thompson v.
The State, 323.

CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS.

1. WHAT REQUIRED OF CONTRACTING PARTIES.-The law requires contract-
ing parties to be vigilant and to exercise due caution, and if the means of
information are alike accessible to both, so that with ordinary prudence
and diligence the parties might respectively rely upon their own judg
ments, they must be presumed to have done so. Wilson v. Strayhorn, 28.

2.

CONTEMPORANEOUS STIPULATIONS-Construction of.-Where a transaction is evidenced by two papers, the connection between which is established by their contents, without any necessity of referring to other matter to connect them together, they will be taken as one entire agreement. Pillow v. Brown and Childress, 240.

3. WHEN LAW RELIEVES FROM PENALTY.-Where a person agrees to do an act, which is neither malum in se nor malum prohibitum, at the time of entering into the agreement, and is prevented from doing the act, by the law, it excuses him from all penalties that would otherwise arise from his omission.

Ib.

4. WHEN VOID FROM THREATS OR DURESS.-To render a contract void, because of threats or menaces, it is necessary that the threats and circumstances should be of a character to excite the reasonable apprehensions of a man or person of ordinary courage, and the promise, contract or statement, should be made under the influence of such threats or menace. Bosley v. Shanner, 280.

5. RECISION OF.-.--Contracts, ordinarily, can only be rescinded by mutual consent of the parties and cannot, in general, be rescinded in toto by one. Gatlin & Gibson v. Wilcox, 309.

6.

SAME.-The infringement or partial failure of performance by one party to a contract, for which there may be a compensation in damages, does not authorize a recision or put an end to a contract. Ib.

7. FRAUDULENT CONTRACTS BINDING ON PARTIES THERETO.-All executed contracts tainted with fraud, are binding upon the immediate parties. Noble, et al. v. Noble, 317.

8. WHEN VOID AS TO GENERAL CREDITORS.-A secret, voluntary conveyance made by an embarrassed creditor to another creditor in preference, is fraudulent and void as to general creditors, to that extent, but is binding on the parties thereto, and a court of equity will not relieve either party to such conveyance. 1b.

9. LEX-LOCI.-While the law of the place of the contract interprets and construes it-the law of the place where it is put in suit, determines all questions as to the manner in which the same may be enforced. Laird v. Hodges, 356.

10. WHEN IMPLIED.-Where a party accepts the beneficial results of another's services, the law implies a previous request and a subsequent promise. Ford v. Ward, 300.

See Confederate money, 1, 3, 4, 5; Constitutional Law, 2, 5; Illegal Cinsideration, 1; Partnerships, 3; Sales, 2; Usury, 2.

CONVEYANCES.

Sec Deeds; Fraudulent Conveyances; Lien, 2.