should not be confined in the Federal penitentiary, but should be confined in the United States Military Prison at Fort Leavenworth, Kans. 30-200, July 23, 1914.

Accused stole a pocketbook containing money, a check, and a money order, aggregating more than $50 in value. He was charged in separate specifications with stealing (a) money, (b) check, and (c) money order. Held, That, as in no one of the specifications is the amount alleged to have been stolen more than $50, as required by section 287, Federal Penal Code (35 Stat. 1144), confinement in the penitentiary is not authorized. C. M. 121178 (1918).

On a trial for larceny, the value of certain articles stolen was proved to be about $25. It was proved that certain other described articles were stolen, but there was no proof of their value. It was shown that all the property was in use or usable. The common experience, of which the court and this office may take judicial notice, will suffice to convince that an array of articles such as were stolen, in condition to be used, possesses a value more than sufficient to make the amount required to constitute a penitentiary offense. C. M. 124636 (1919).

FOR SODOMY

1613. Held, That confinement in a penitentiary is not authorized under A. W. 42 for an attempt to commit sodomy. C. M. 147074 (1921).

FOR SOLICITING

1614. Penitentiary confinement is not authorized for the offense of soliciting and procuring others to have illicit carnal intercourse with a woman. C. M. 145190 (1921).

DESIGNATION, CLASS, AND GRADE

1615. A soldier was honorably discharged and thereafter tried by general court-martial for embezzlement, in violation of A. W. 94, and was sentenced to confinement at hard labor for six months in the United States Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, Kans. The commandant of the barracks expressed doubt as to whether the prisoner should serve his sentence as a general or as a garrison prisoner and requested advice in the premises. As the prisoner was a civilian at the time of his trial no sentence to dishonorable discharge was or could have been adjudged against him, and therefore after approval of the sentence to confinement he did not become a general prisoner as defined by A. R. 928 (par. 5a, AR 600-375) and in the note to M. C. M. 74j. Neither is he, strictly speaking, a garrison prisoner, as designated in A. R. 928. But since he is not bearing the stigma of a sentence to dishonorable discharge his status approaches more nearly to that of a garrison prisoner than to that of a general prisoner, and he should not serve his sentence as a general prisoner. 253, Apr. 29, 1920; Sept. 3, 1920.

DISCIPLINE

1616. An officer of the guard who permits and encourages unlawful striking and beating of prisoners in the guardhouse, is not relieved from responsibility by the fact that he committed and authorized such acts under direction of his superior officers, since his orders to enforce prison discipline by beating prisoners were clearly in violation of the laws and usages of military service. (Winthrop, Mil. Law and Precedents, reprint, pp. 296, 297.) C. M. 118423 (1918).

PREVENTION OF ESCAPE

1617. If a sentinel guarding prisoners shoots at an escaping prisoner and brings him down, a thorough investigation should be made and, where circumstances warrant it, the sentinel charged with the most serious offense, if any, of which he may have been guilty. If investigation shows no offense or dereliction of duty on the part of the sentinel, he should not be brought to trial. 259.4. Aug. 2, 1918.

RESTORATION TO DUTY

1618. General prisoners serving sentences for desertion in time of war, whether in a disciplinary barracks or in a penitentiary, may be restored to duty by the Secretary of War. Such men should not be restored to duty as a class, but each case should be decided on its own facts. 319.12, Jan. 2, 1918.

REWARD OR EXPENSES FOR APPREHENSION

1619. An enlisted man sentenced to confinement by a general court-martial was paroled. The parole was subsequently revoked. Held, That he thereupon became an escaped prisoner, and that under the provisions of paragraph 121, Army Regulations (AR 35-2620), the city detective who apprehended him and delivered him to proper military authority was entitled to be paid $50 reward. 251, June 17, 1918.

TRANSPORTATION

1620. A discharged general prisoner applied to a railway company for a refund of the unused portion of a ticket given in exchange for a transportation request issued to him on his discharge, in accordance with the act of March 2, 1913 (37 Stat. 715). Transportation was furnished from New York to Chicago, Ill., but he had used the ticket only as far as Buffalo, N. Y. Held, That the Government could claim no right to refund in respect of the unused portion of the ticket furnished the prisoner, and that the matter was one for arrangement between the railroad company and the holder of the unused portion of the ticket. 94-322, Mar. 10, 1914.

Similarly, held with respect to the redemption of the unused portion of a ticket obtained on a transportation request issued to a rejected applicant for enlistment for his return to the station where he was accepted for enlistment. 94-330, June 1, 1914; June 17, 1914.

Provision for transportation to their homes of prisoners on discharge is found in current appropriation act for support of the War Department.

Question whether dishonorably discharged military prisoners en route to places of confinement or from one place of confinement to another prior to the completion of their terms of confinement are "troops of the United States" within meaning of statutes providing for the payment for transportation of troops on land-grant railroads.

There can be no doubt that to be " troops of the United States" within the meaning of the statutes in question (act of Mar. 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 453; act of June 5, 1920, 41 Stat. 948, 960), persons must be soldiers-must be members of the armed forces of the United States. * * ** It is, of course, clear that persons who have been dishonorably discharged from the military service, as in the cases under consideration, have ceased to be soldiers in every sense of the term. They are not amenable to military service except as are all other civilians, and are not actually members of the armed forces of the United

States. Whatever disciplinary control over them the War Department may have, or whatever obligations toward them the Government may bear, arise wholly by virtue of the fact that they are prisoners, not because they are soldiers. The fact that the United States is bound to pay for the care and necessary transportation of such persons does not alter their status, and can not be said to make them soldiers or troops" within the purview of the land-grant acts.

66

The fact that the persons under consideration are "military" prisoners— that is, were formerly members of the Army and were sentenced to confinement by military courts-does not affect their status within the meaning of the statutes, their status as soldiers having completely terminated by their dishonorable discharges, and the statutes and regulations charging the Military Establishment with their temporary care not operating to renew their former status as soldiers, or to change their present status from that of discharged soldiers. 253, June 19, 1922.

1621-1634. MILITARY ACADEMY.

1635-1638. CITIZENS' MILITARY TRAINING CAMPS. 1639-1656. RESERVE OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS AND EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS.

1657-1658. RIFLE PRACTICE.

1659. TEXTBOOKS AND MANUALS.

1621. The general rule regarding age limits for admission to the Military Academy is laid down in R. S. 1318. R. S. 1325 makes exceptions of cadets recommended for readmission after discharge for deficiency in conduct or studies. Discharge for physical disability, not being within such exception, is covered by the general provisions of R. S. 1318. 351.11, Sept. 12, 1924.

EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS

1622. The Academic Board of the United States Military Academy, under the provisions of R. S. 1319, as amended by act of March 2, 1901 (31 Stat. 911), and section 57, Regulations for the United States Military Academy, 1920, has the discretionary authority to accept or reject certificates from accredited institutions relating to the educational qualifications for candidates for admission to the Military Academy. This authority is limited to acceptance or rejection based on the existence or nonexistence of educational or mental qualifications which are evidenced by the certificates themselves. But such