Held, That where land is described by courses and distances, beginning at a point and running to a road or highway and thence on a line with the same, the measurements being exact, and extending only to the margin of such road or highway, the title to no part of the road passes, and the grantee can claim nothing beyond the boundary line described (5 Cyc., 906 n.; 8 Cent. Dig., Boundaries, sec. 123); that the Government therefore did not own any part of the roadways upon which the national cemeteries abutted, and that the appropriation for the maintenance and improvement of national cemeteries was not available for the construction of the proposed improvements. 80-412.2, May 11, 26, 1914.

A provision similar to that quoted above is found in current appropriation act for support of the War Department.

TRESPASSERS

Secs.

1191. IN GENERAL. 1192. ANIMALS.

IN GENERAL

1191. Commanding officer of arsenal requests that he be advised whether the guards on arsenal reservation would be justified in shooting at trespassers who come on the premises for the purpose of shooting game, which offense is a misdemeanor, in case they refuse to surrender. The law in these cases where the shooting results in the taking of human life is stated as follows:

A homicide committed to prevent a mere trespass or misdemeanor is not justifiable, unless it is accompanied by imminent danger of great bodily harm or felony. (21 Cyc., 800 b.) The weight of authority, holds that in arresting for a misdemeanor

or breach of the peace only as well as in preventing the escape of a person after being arrested therefor, life may not be taken unless the offender by the use of a deadly weapon or otherwise resists to such an extent that the officer can not make the arrest without subjecting himself to the danger of great bodily harm or loss of life, or unless the killing is done in self-defense. (Id. 797 c.)

It is clear that the shooting at these trespassers would not be justified, and in case bodily injury or death should result from the shooting, the guard would be criminally responsible for his act. 680.5, Jan. 3, 1920.

ANIMALS

1192. The commanding general, Camp Pike, Ark., requests an opinion as to his right to impound stray animals found on the camp site, and to bring suit against the owners. The Government has exclusive jurisdiction of that camp (sec. 3481, Kirby's Dig. Ark. Stat.), but even in the absence of direct and specific legislation by Congress, the camp commander possesses as an attribute of command the power to cause to be removed or ejected from the camp all livestock straying thereon. No authority for impounding livestock is found in the Federal Statutes; and resorting to the laws of the State of Arkansas, under the well-settled rule that where there is no Federal statute upon the subject the laws of the State affecting private rights remain in force on a reservation after jurisdiction thereover has been ceded by the State to the United States, it is found that only stock running at large in any fencing district may be impounded. It is assumed that no such fencing district has been formed or estab lished, and while under the common law the owner was required to confine his livestock, or was held liable for damages done by them on the land of others, such doctrine has never been recognized in the State of Arkansas. However, the doctrine discussed would not be controlling in a case where the evidence

established that the owner of stock, after being notified to remove them and to cease and desist from permitting them to go upon the camp site, turned them out at a time and place which made it reasonably certain that they would go on the camp site. Under such circumstances a suit to enjoin the owner would lie. A practicable means of protecting the camp site from livestock entering thereon is for the Government to inclose it with a substantial fence, and then, if a proper occasion therefor arises, invoke the provisions of section 56 of the Federal Criminal Code (35 Stat. 1099), penalizing the person who knowingly permits his cattle to enter an inclosure upon lands of the United States. 680.5, Apr. 20, 1921.

The chairman of the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park Commission inquires whether livestock found trespassing upon the lands comprising the said park may lawfully be removed therefrom. It appears that the park lies partly in one county of Tennessee and partly in two counties of Georgia, and that one of the latter has adopted what is known as the "no fence law," by which cattle may be impounded only in case of trespass upon lawfully fenced property. Such statutes "do not give permission to the owner of cattle to use his neighbor's land as a pasture. They are intended to condone trespasses by straying cattle; they have no application to cases where they are driven upon unfenced land in order that they may feed there." (Light v. United States (1911), 220 U. S. 523, citing cases.) Such cattle may therefore lawfully be removed from the reservation, provided that in so doing reasonable care is taken to avoid unnecessary injury to them. In that county of Georgia where the State fence law is understood to be applicable, the owners of such cattle would only be liable for damages where they intentionally drove or permitted their stock to go upon the unfenced reservation. (Vanderford v. Wagner (N. M. 1918), 174 Pac. 426; 3 C. J. 132.) If owners persist in pasturing their cattle in the park, that fact should be reported to the Department to the end that should the facts warrant it steps may be taken to enjoin them from so doing. 688.5, June 25, 1921.

1193. INSURANCE.

1194. REGISTRATION.

1195. RIGHT TO OPEN.

1196-1203. USE OF PENALTY ENVELOPES.

INSURANCE

1193. Section 8 of the act of August 24, 1912 (37 Stat. 558), establishing the parcel-post system, provides among other things that—

The Postmaster General shall make provision by regulation for the indemnification of shippers, for shipment injured or lost, by insurance or otherwise, and, when desired, for the collection on delivery of the postage and price of the articles shipped, fixing such charges as may be necessary to pay the cost of such additional services.

Regulations have accordingly been issued by the Post Office Department, providing for giving receipts for insured packages transmitted through the parcel-post system and fixing charges therefor which are to be paid in parcelpost stamps attached to the packages. Said regulations make provision for indemnification in case of loss, but no additional facilities or safeguards are provided for the transportation of insured packages, and they are treated other wise as ordinary mail matter. Receipts, however, are exacted on delivery.

Held, That as it is not the policy of the Government to insure its property, and as the sending of packages through the parcel-post system and insuring them according to the regulations prescribed, would amount simply to such insurance without obtaining any additional security against loss than a money indemnity, the use of appropriations of the War Department for the purpose of so insuring such packages containing Government property would not be authorized. 94-070, Apr. 23, 1913.

An officer of the Medical Department requested that he be furnished a supply of postage stamps for parcel post insurance purposes, stating that the stamps were required for insuring packages sent by mail containing articles of considerable value.

Held, That in the absence of a specific appropriation therefor, the stamps could not legally be furnished, the Comptroller of the Treasury having repeatedly ruled against the propriety of Government officers incurring expenses for the insurance of Government property, both upon the ground that the appropriations sought to be charged with the expenses were not available, and because it was against the policy of the Government to insure its property. 5-244, Apr. 5, 1915.

REGISTRATION

1194. In view of the ruling (supra) that there was no authority for furnishing stamps for parcel-post insurance, the question was presented whether the registration of mail matter should be regarded as insurance and the issuing of stamps therefor governed by the said ruling.

72746-32-38

Held, That the registration of mail matter is not for the purpose of providing ordinary indemnity insurance such as is contemplated in the case of insurance of parcel-post packages, which are carried and treated as ordinary mail, but that the primary object of registration is to avail of the special or superior service designed to secure the safe delivery of the mail matter itself, the use of which service is well established in all branches of the Government, and that therefore postage might properly be furnished for the registration of mail matter when necessary in the Army service. 5-240, Aug. 12, 1915.

RIGHT TO OPEN

1195. Mail addressed to a soldier in desertion and received at a local post office or by his company commander is subject to the laws and postal regulations and can not be lawfully opened and examined with a view of discovering the whereabouts of the deserter. It is a criminal offense for a postmaster or any person other than the addressee of a letter to open the same without the consent of such addressee. (Sections 194, 195, Criminal Code, 35 Stat. 1125.) Hence, such letters can not be opened except in the manner provided by law. 251, Mar. 15, 1918.

A number of garrison prisoners, serving minor sentences, complained that their mail has been opened without their consent by officers of the Army. The officers have no authority to open such mail. It is unlawful for any person other than an employee of the dead letter office, duly authorized thereto, or other person upon a search warrant authorized by law, to open any letter not addressed to himself. (Section 1, Title XII, Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, 40 Stat. 217, 230.) 311.13, Apr. 4, 1919.

1196. BY ARMY PERSONNEL.

1197. BY CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES.

1198. BY CONTRACTORS.

1199. BY GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENTALITIES.

1200. BY NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE OFFICERS.

1201. BY STATE OFFICIALS.

BY ARMY PERSONNEL

1196. In forwarding applications for family allowances and for insurance, officers may use penalty envelopes; but these may not be registered without payment of the registration fee. 311.17, Dec. 21, 1917.

Within the meaning of paragraph 834, A. R., 1913 (par. 3, AR 310-10), relating to the use of penalty envelopes for the transmission of mail matter free of postage, correspondence about supplies purchased for the use of an Army hospital is public business. Penalty envelopes can not be used for transmitting checks in payment of subsistence purchased by an officer on his own account from either private concerns or the quartermaster. 311.151, Jan. 4, 1919.