War Department, nor by the bad navigation of any tug belonging to it. 579.14, Sept. 29, 1919.

Owners of requisitioned chartered vessels now being redelivered demand that port-hole openings be closed by a new plate instead of by a spigoted patch. In the "time" and 'bare-boat" requisition charter, the United States has agreed only "to restore the vessel * in the same or as good order and

66

condition as when delivered." In Portuguese American Bank v. Welles, 242 U. S. 7, 11, it is said that "a covenanter is not held beyond his undertaking, and he may make that as narrow as he likes." The United States is not to be held beyond the legal intention of its undertaking, and its obligation must be tested by the rules of law applicable to a private individual. No allowance can be made to an owner based upon the vague notion that the vessel is not as good or will not sell for as much simply because she has been in collision, or had a hole caused thereby patched. This rule applies equally to the obligation of a covenanter to restore the vessel in as good order and condition as when received. (The Heligoland, 79 Fed. 123; the J. T. Easton, 24 Fed. 95; the Baltimore, 8 Wall. 377; the Loch Trool, 150 Fed. 429.) This rule has never been departed from in applying the rule in the Admiralty of restitutio in integrum. In the present case the United States has fulfilled the obligation of its undertaking by closing by a proper spigoted patch the holes in the plates of the requisitioned chartered vessels which it constructed for port holes. 570, Oct. 22, 1919.

RISK ASSUMED BY OWNER

2196. A tug was under charter to the Government. The charter required the owner to keep the tug "tight, staunch, strong, and well and sufficiently manned, victualed, and appareled, and furnished in every respect fit for transportation service, at the cost and charge of her owner." The tug collided with another vessel and was damaged. A board of officers has found that the collision was the fault of the tug and was due to a defective steering gear. The finding of the board is approved. The owner must bear the cost of the repairs. 569.14, Feb. 1, 1919.

The barge Grandma, under charter to the Government, was taken in tow by an Army tug, through whose negligence she was thereafter damaged in a gale. The Grandma charter provided that "The owner assumes the marine and all other risks, including risks usually covered by protection and indemnity insurance." This wording is unusual and expresses a clear intent that the owner shall assume the risks of an insurer, not only those marine risks which become effective without the intervention of the charterer's negligence as a proximate cause, but all marine risks, negligent as well as nonnegligent, which would include the damages herein considered, although caused by the negligence of the Army tug. 569.14, June 5, 1919.

The barge Tanney Bros. was chartered to the Shipping Control Committee and allocated to the War Department. The charter was informal, made by proposal and acceptance, and contained the following clause: "It is also understood that any marine or other risks are to be borne by you, but if the boat leaves the insured limits of New York Harbor, you will be notified in order that you may place additional insurance." The owner makes claim for damages amounting to $328.25 incurred while the barge was being taken through the draw opening of Washington Avenue Bridge out of Wallabout Canal, Brooklyn, N. Y. The evidence shows no negligence by the operators of the bridge, but discloses that the collision resulted from the negligent handling of lines by the

master of the barge. The case is governed by Dittmar v. Frederick Starr Contracting Co., 249 Fed. 437, in which it is said: "The charter was a demise, but the master, as we have often held, represented the owner in such particulars as making the lines fast." The United States is not liable for the damage to the barge. 569.14, June 23, 1919.

The barge Crystal was under charter to the War Department providing that, "In view of the above compensation, it is also understood that any marine or other risks are to be borne by you, but if the barges leave the insurance limits of New York Harbor you will be notified in order that you may place additional insurance." On October 20, 1918, the weather foggy and a strong breeze blowing, she was taken in tow by the tug William Dalzell, also under charter to the War Department. Two other Army barges were later taken in tow. The Dalzell went aground and her tow also took bottom. The Crystal and the two other barges were freed by a launch and taken in tow by the tug J. E. McAllister at the request of the master of the Dalzell. Proceeding, the Crystal collided with two scows lying at dock, causing $956 damages to the Crystal and entailing towage and detention of $225. The finding of the board that the McAllister, and not the Government, is liable for the damages to the Crystal is correct. The charter clause quoted places upon the owner of the Crystal not only those marine risks which become effective without the intervention of the charterer's negligence as a proximate cause, but all risks commonly covered by insurance, irrespective of whether such risks produce loss without intervening negligence or only because of intervening negligence. It is recommended that the claim presented by the owner of the barge Crystal for $1,211, for damages and detention, be disallowed, as the War Department is not liable. 569.14, July 30, 1919. The Peter Stolz was chartered to the War Department under a charter providing that "The owner assumes the marine and all other risks, including risks usually covered by protection and indemnity insurance," and that the owner should provide a captain. Damage is alleged to have occurred by collision caused by a War Department tug in the absence of the captain of the Peter Stolz. That the damage was thus occasioned is not established, but, under the charter, these damages must fall on the owner. In addition, had the captain been aboard the accident might have been avoided. Claim should be disallowed. 569.14, Aug. 9, 1919.

LOSS OR DAMAGE OF CARGO

2197. The obligation of the owners of a ship is that she must be in fact seaworthy at the commencement of the voyage, and it is immaterial that the owners believed her to be seaworthy or have used every reasonable effort to make her so. If she was unseaworthy at the inception of the voyage, the owners are liable for the value of cargo lost (Benner Line v. Pendleton, 210 Fed. 67, affirmed 217 Fed. 497, affirmed 246 U. S. 353). 579.1, Sept. 30, 1918.

RETURN TO OWNERS

2198. The United States Shipping Board chartered certain Japanese steamers. The charter contained a time limitation and a provision that at the expiration thereof the owners might elect to have the vessels delivered at an Atlantic, Gulf, or Pacific port. The vessels were allocated to the War Department by the Shipping Board with the assumption of the obligations of the charter. The owners elected to have the vessels delivered at a Pacific port. The War De partment is bound to return the vessels to the port designated by the owner and to bear the expense thereof. 569.7, Jan. 1' 1919.

Secs.

2199. DESERTERS.

2200. SHIPPING ARTICLES.

SEAMEN

DESERTERS

2199. A letter from the British Embassy to the Secretary of War indicates that desertions from British merchant vessels in American ports are so frequent as to make it practically impossible to maintain the present volume of traffic which is vital to the successful prosecution of the war. The United States has no legal authority to apprehend, detain, or return to their ships seamen so deserting. In the absence of a treaty, the surrender of deserting seamen can not be granted by the authorities of the United States. (Moore on Extradition, sec. 408; 6 Op. Atty. Gen. 148; 6 id. 239; Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U. S. 424, 431.) The treaty between the United States and Great Britain, ratified June 3, 1892, providing for the arrest and return of deserting British seamen, was made effective by the provisions of R. S. 5280, but this statute has been repealed and the treaty abrogated by sections 16 and 17 of the act of March 4, 1915 (38 Stat. 1164, 1184). The United States can not permit the introduction of British officers and troops into its territory or jurisdiction for the purposes under consideration. (Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U. S. 424, 435.) 251, Nov. 1,

1918.

Certain vessels were chartered by the Shipping Board and allocated to the Army under the "bare-boat" form of charter. While they were being used for transports by the Army, some of the seamen deserted. The disposition of the wages of such deserting seamen is governed by R. S. 4604. Under the charter the Army became the owner of these vessels pro hac vice, and is subject to the section mentioned. 248.4, Jan. 10, 1919.

SHIPPING ARTICLES

2200. The crew of a steamship flying the Chinese flag allocated to the War Department are serving under shipping articles that provide that the vessel shall be "armed" before leaving an Atlantic port for Europe. Held, That sending the vessel from an Atlantic port to Europe in convoy will be a compliance with the provisions of the shipping articles. 545.02, Apr. 25, 1918.

r

2201-2202. AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS.

2203. BEGINNING AND END OF WORLD WAR.

2204-2205. CHARACTER OF SERVICE.

2206-2208. COOPERATION OF OTHER SERVICES WITH ARMY.

2209. GENEVA CONVENTION.

2210. INTERCOURSE DURING ARMISTICE.

2211-2220. PRISONERS OF WAR AND INTERNED PERSONS. 2221-2222. REGULATIONS.

2223-2239. SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT.

Secs.

AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS

2201. ACTIVITIES AUTHORIZED.

2202. STATUS.

ACTIVITIES AUTHORIZED

2201. Under the act of January 5, 1905 (33 Stat. 599), which created the American National Red Cross in pursuance of the obligations of the Geneva Conventions of 1864 and 1906, that organization may, in time of war, extend aid to members of the military forces of the United States other than the sick and wounded, and may extend "welfare" aid, as distinguished from “medical" aid, to both sick and well. The requirement of the act of April 24, 1912 (37 Stat. 90), as to acceptance by the President applies to medical aid only. All medical aid must be rendered under direction of Medical Department. Welfare work is subject to military control only to the extent (1) that all activities in areas subject to military jurisdiction must conform to the orders of those in authority; (2) that the President, as commander in chief of the Army and President of the American National Red Cross, may enforce cooperation between them; and (3) that the act of January 5, 1905, supra, requires the activity of acting as a "medium of communication to be exercised in accord with the military authorities. 080, Oct. 19, 1925.

STATUS

2202. The American Red Cross and the Y. M. C. A. are both purely civilian organizations, and neither one of them is a part of the Army or Navy. Consequently persons in the employ of the Y. M. C. A. and those in the employ of the American Red Cross are not persons in the military service of the United States, so as to be entitled to the benefits of either the War Risk Insurance Act (40 Stat. 398) or of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act (40 Stat. 440). 014.4, June 21, 1918.