Command Failure in War: Psychology and LeadershipIndiana University Press, 2004 M05 12 - 304 páginas Why do military commanders, most of them usually quite capable, fail at crucial moments of their careers? Robert Pois and Philip Langer -- one a historian, the other an educational psychologist -- study seven cases of military command failures, from Frederick the Great at Kunersdorf to Hitler's invasion of Russia. While the authors recognize the value of psychological theorizing, they do not believe that one method can cover all the individuals, battles, or campaigns under examination. Instead, they judiciously take a number of psycho-historical approaches in hope of shedding light on the behaviors of commanders during war. The other battles and commanders studied here are Napoleon in Russia, George B. McClellan's Peninsular Campaign, Robert E. Lee and Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg, John Bell Hood at the Battle of Franklin, Douglas Haig and the British command during World War I, "Bomber" Harris and the Strategic Bombing of Germany, and Stalingrad. |
Contenido
1 | |
1 Frederick the Great at Kunersdorf August 12 1759 | 5 |
2 Napoleon in Russia 1812 | 25 |
The Wounded Ego | 49 |
The Failure of Success | 73 |
The Wrong Enemy | 99 |
The British Military in World War I | 122 |
7 Winston Churchill Arthur Harris andBritish Strategic Bombing | 156 |
A Ghastly Collaboration betweenHitler and His Generals | 173 |
Conclusion | 215 |
Notes | 231 |
267 | |
277 | |
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
Command Failure in War: Psychology and Leadership Philip Langer,Robert Pois Vista previa limitada - 2004 |
Command Failure in War: Psychology and Leadership Robert A. Pois,Philip Langer Sin vista previa disponible - 2004 |