ested in the matter of armaments and yet hold. ing sway over so many millions of subjects that its voice and suggestions would have carried with them serious weight."

On the subject of arbitration, too, the writer declares the conference a failure:

"Thus once more one of the most effective means of furthering the cause of peace was set at naught, simply because the vicar of Christ, the natural arbiter in the disputes of nations, was ignored. And yet the student of history cannot but reflect that the result must have been far otherwise had this legitimate title and prerogative of the Pope been recognized. History teems with instances where the successor of Peter has saved the world from devastation by the sword, and from the shedding of torrents of blood, and from the multiple horrors and curses that long and bloody wars bring in their wake. Even in modern times, from the day when Pope Alexander VI., by drawing the famous demarcation line between their possessions in South America, prevented Spain and Portugal from flying at each other's throats and pouring out their immense resources of blocd and treasure in a needless war, the only result of which must have been a legacy of hatred for the offspring of either nation, down to our own day, when Leo XIII. effected a dispassionate and bloodless set. tlement of the dispute between Germany and Spain over the Caroline Islands, and finally even to the present moment of writing, when the same pontiff has under his consideration the pacific arrangement of the frontier trouble between the republics of Haiti and San Domingo, the holy father has proved that between nations in their angry moments none other than he can come and adjudicate in a perfectly frank, disinterested, and satisfactory manner.

WHAT THE PEACE CONFERENCE HAS DONE.

THE

HERE is an excellent article in the Edinburgh Review on the conference and arbitration. The work done at The Hague falls short, the writer admits, of the Czar's design, but, he maintains, "the conference will stand out as one of the memorable events of the century. It is folly to belittle the gathering at The Hague. Its shortcomings are obvious. But it is a unique event, about the ultimate effects of which one may not dogmatize, and as to which the most hopeful may prove the wisest."

ARBITRATION IN EVOLUTION.

The writer, after remarking on the dramatic character of everything connected with the Czar's rescript, passes to consider its principal, if unex

pected, outcome in the adoption of a permanent international court of arbitration. He says:

"Arbitration is not a panacea for the evils which the Czar deplored; it is a remedy, limited and uncertain in its operation."

The writer thinks these limitations are too much emphasized at present. Arbitration is no novelty; it has been frequently resorted to, and though optional and without sanction has been usually respected. He says:

"In six interesting volumes, enriched with maps, plans, and copies of all important documents, Prof. Bassett Moore has compiled an elaborate history of the arbitrations in which the United States have been concerned. Every reader must be struck by the number and variety of the controversies settled without resorting to arms, the growing habit in modern times to refer to arbitration as a matter of course disputes which diplomacy used to allow to drag on interminably, and, not least, the readiness of nations to carry out awards adverse to them.

ITS AWARDS COMPLIED WITH.

"No sanction secures the enforcement of awards between nations; no court says, 'Obey them or be punished.' Nations which have been worsted in an arbitration may refuse to submit to the award. But the instances in which this has been done are singularly few. . . . In the lists prepared by M. Bellaire, M. Donnot, and Dr. Darley the only clear case of refusal to abide by an award is to be found in the dispute between this country and the United States in regard to the northeast boundary. The Americans declined to accept the award of the King of Holland, and the dispute remained open until it was settled under the Ashburton treaty."

THE IDEA STIFFENING INTO STOUTER REALITY.

Justice is not done to the labors of the conference, the writer contends, until they are seen to form only another step in advance in a long process of development. In the beginning of the century disputes between states were referred to a hastily improvised tribunal, with few rules of procedure or none. The umpire was at first chosen by lot; then for many years the practice was to refer to a sovereign. Of late preference is given to jurists or judges of supreme courts. "The day of the amateur is over; the specialist

is in demand.

Rules of procedure were introduced beforehand in the treaty of Washington in 1871. Within the last ten years permanent treaties of arbitration between two or more powers have been drawn up. The next step of a permanent court has been taken at The Hague :

"Sir Julian Pauncefote and the American representatives at the conference were the first practical statesmen to put forward such a scheme. England and the United States have had far more experience of arbitration than any other countries, and the measure of success achieved by the con ference in this field is due largely to them."

The reluctance of Germany is attributed to dread of anything that would rob her of her chief advantage in war-rapidity of mobilization and a swift first blow.

"And yet it looks as if an international court of some sort which Lord Salisbury in 1887 declared there was no hope of seeing formed—will be established at no distant date; it is probable that, if not a permanent tribunal, a permanent bureau will be constituted with a roster of names from which a tribunal may be formed. can only be a court with very small powers."

A HINT TO YOUNG LAWYERS.

But it

The suggestion that the members of this court should be drawn from the judges of the various national supreme courts is questioned by the writer. Supreme courts cannot readily part with their most distinguished members without detriment to the national business. Then again, English judges are rarely trained or inclined for international judicature; they seem empirical in their methods to the more philosophically minded French or German judge. Professors of international law, like M. de Maartens, would have more weight than, say, members of the Russian judicature.

THE LAW OF NATIONS EVOLVING.

International law is in a very nebulous and rudimentary stage; but signs are discernible of the growth of a working system of jurisprudence between nations, and nothing will do more

gathering of the nomads of philanthropy-men who move rapidly across Europe and collect wherever good works are being done; some of them vain, futile, obtrusive; some with their hearts full of ineffectual fire of enthusiasm ; others as wise as they are good. In the air of The Hague was a little of the glow of earnestness which accompanies a religious congress rather than a meeting of sober, skeptical diplomats. And some of the heat communicated itself to the representatives, who were eager to do business, and to do it quickly.

THE PROGRESS OF PEACE.

"Despite all obstacles, slowly but surely the forces working for peace are strengthening and throwing out new shoots. Where conscription exists the impatience at the burden which it imposes is more marked than it was. We note in those countries the growth of a popular literature of which war against war is the motto. The success of Baroness von Suttner's Die Waffen Nieder; the vast literature relative to arbitration; the fascination exercised by Verestchagin's pictures of war as it is, stripped of pomp and circumstance, tinsel and dazzling accessories, are signs of the times. Preparations for war are redoubled; and yet there is a reluctance to make use of them such as there never was before. In any case the conference has helped to educate the nations as to the uses of arbitration. England and America have been in this respect the teachers of the world. The object of the Czar's rescript has not been attained; but it has been advanced, and measures hitherto discussed only by theorists have become part and parcel of practical politics."

THE DUM-DUM BULLET.

court, however limited its functions at first may be. The civitas gentium which is to embrace all nations of the earth is a long way off, but some chapters of its laws dealing with minor matters are already written. In regard to copyright, postal matters, telegraphs, the usages of war, have been formed administrative unions' of various states which contain the promise of still more important international organizations."

A RELIGIOUS GLOW AT THE CONFERENCE.

The spirit of the conference thus impresses the writer:

"In many respects, notwithstanding the contrast between the magnitude of the programme and the meagerness of the performance, it has been a memorable meeting. There has been a

historical sketch in the current Quarterly Review. The writer treats of its development, manufacture, ammunition. He touches on the genesis of the bullet which discussions at The Hague have made famous :

The shape of the bullet is a matter of greater difficulty than might be imagined. In the first place the bullet is slightly bigger than the bore of the rifle; and this, with the severity of the spiral, necessitates a jacket or outer covering of hard metal; otherwise the softer material would be blown through the barrel without taking the grooving would strip, as it is technically called -and indeed would be partly softened by the heat from the explosive and from friction. Originally the jacket was thickest at the point, and so strong that, while penetration was enormous, stopping power was wanting; in other words,

one bullet might easily go through half a dozen men, yet, unless it happened to hit a vital spot or a bone, they need not be disabled, and might therefore continue to fight. This was amply illustrated in the Chitral campaign, during which our soldiers began to lose confidence in their weapon; while the enemy, quick to recog nize the different effect of volleys, were inclined to attack British infantry armed with the LeeMetford rather than native infantry armed with the Martini-Henry.

The Indian military authorities at once set about designing a bullet which, while maintaining range, should have the required stopping power. The result was the dum-dum bullet so named after the place near Calcutta where it is made of which much has been heard. The difference in appearance between it and the original pattern is comparatively slight. The shape is exactly the same, but the jacket is differently

THE FAMOUS DUM-DUM BULLET.

arranged; instead of having its greatest strength at the point, it is weakest there-indeed, at the apex a small part of the core is uncovered, but does not project. It was tried in India, and was said to give better results at 1,000 yards than the bullet then in use."

IS THE DUM-DUM INHUMANE?

On its alleged inhumanity the reviewer says: "Our primary requirement in a bullet is that it shall have sufficient stopping power, whether used against man or beast. The enemy, whether civilized or savage, must be stopped in his charge; more than this is not required, but less will not suffice. There must be no question of our right to efficient armament, and this should never be forgotten by our representative at any meeting where modifications of bullets or other parts of our arms may be proposed. It happens that with the development of the rifle, in order to secure efficiency at long range, the velocity of the bullet has become so great that very severe wounds at short range will sometimes be inflicted; nor is it possible to avoid this. All that need be said is that expert testimony from observation in the field tends to prove that the wounds from the dum-dum or the newest pattern of our rifle bullet are, if anything, less severe than those from the Martini-Henry, and very much less severe than those from the Snider."

THE

THE FRANCO-GERMAN FLIRTATION. HE exchange of friendly greetings by the Kaiser and President Loubet supplies the occasion for " Ignotus" in the National Review to discuss the rapprochement between Germany and France." He quotes a saying of Cavour's, uttered fifty years ago, that a united Germany would arise to disturb the European equilibrium, and that the new state would aim at becoming a naval power to combat and rival England upon the seas. He next quotes Count Yorck von Wartenburg, who says there are only four great powers in the world-the United States, England, Russia, and "central Europe under the hegemony of Germany."

THE KAISER'S ANTI-ENGLISH POLICY.

He finds the reason of the Kaiser's hostile policy toward the United States in his desire to assume the position of the champion of Europe against the transmarine powers. The writer pursues his proof of the Kaiser's anti-English policy:

"It is notorious that at the time of the Jameson raid he sounded France and Russia as to a joint note directed against this country. He re ceived such a rebuff from the former that beyond question this fact weighed with Lord Salisbury at the recent Fashoda negotiations, making the British premier far more tender of French susceptibilities and far more generous than he might otherwise have been."

After Fashoda the German press has been vitriolic toward England. Attempts have been made to break up the close friendship between the British and the Russian royal families and to embroil the United States and England.

FRENCH AND GERMAN COOPERATION. Since Fashoda France and Germany have worked together. They have combined for a joint railroad advance through Asia Minor to Bagdad, thus vetoing the old British Euphrates Valley project. They have helped to sterilize the disarmament proposals of the Czar at The Hague and to throw odium on England for the "dum-dum" bullet. And a German has been appointed to the directorate of the Suez Canal Company. The writer suggests a personal reason for the Kaiser's courtship of France: "He wants passionately to prance along the boulevards of Paris, acclaimed by the Paris mob. He wants to figure at the exhibition."

WHAT GERMANY IS AFTER. The writer enters as ascertained facts: 1. The traditional policy of Germany is to conciliate France and detach her alike from England and Russia.

WHAT FRANCE THINKS ABOUT IT.

France is finding that she cannot afford two hatreds, and that she would rather give up hatred of Germany than hatred of England. M. Ernest Daudet says: It is no longer Germany who is the enemy, but England." Major Marchand's position is that henceforward France would forget Alsace-Lorraine and remember Egypt. In fine:

"This, then, is the situation of France. She despairs of regaining Alsace-Lorraine; she is eager to extend and aggrandize her expensive colonial empire; she is not too trustful of her Russian ally, whose peace proposals were a terrible shock to her susceptibilities, the more especially as they singled out her pet submarines for condemnation; and, having in the Fashoda affair deliberately thrown down the glove in the full expectation that England would, as so often before, yield to bullying at the last minute, she is furious with herself and with us that the challenge was accepted. If the German army were only a little weaker she might hesitate."

BETROTHAL GIFTS.

The paper closes with a revival of an old

scare:

It is perfectly clear, however, that if Germany is to secure the good-will of France she must compensate her in Europe for AlsaceLorraine. . . On the French frontier is Belgium-with its annex the Congo Free State; and on the German frontier Holland-with the very desirable annexes of Curaçao and the Dutch East Indies. Belgium has always shown strong French and republican leanings; Holland is close akin to Germany. Considerations of race

and geography can thus fitly be invoked. Germany in the nature of things ought to possess Rotterdam; France ought to own Antwerp. No power could intervene, for England is far from possessing the military strength required to enforce her will against such a combination, and indemnities might be discovered to satisfy Russia. . . . It is certain the first result of a FrancoGerman alliance, or even of an understanding, would be great danger to Holland and Belgium."

THE UNITED STATES AS ONE OF THE THRE WORLD POWERS.

"ULTIM

LTIMATE World Politics" is the subIMA ject of a brief but suggestive paper by Mr. Samuel E. Moffett in the August Forum.

Mr. Moffett finds the main significance of present world movements to lie in the fact that for the first time in history the international relations of the whole earth seem about to be settled definitely.

Estimating the area of land surface on the globe as approximately 50,000,000 square miles, Mr. Moffett shows that the British empire, including Egypt and the Soudan, now covers about 12,000,000 square miles, or nearly one-fourth of the total area, while of the remainder Russia controls nearly one-fourth, and China, which is about to be divided among England, Russia, France, and Germany, holds a sixth of the rest. More than half of what is left belongs to the United States, France, Brazil, Turkey, and the Argentine Republic. The Turkish possessions must soon pass into the hands of stronger powers. Summarizing the situation, Mr. Moffett says:

"Five-eighths of all the land on the globe already belong to Great Britain, Russia, the United States, France, and Brazil; and, with the impending redistributions in China and Africa, this will be increased to at least three-fourths. The French colonial empire will be held by permission of England, the dominant sea power; and Brazil, like each of the other South American republics, will owe the preservation of its independence to the protection of the United States. Thus the vast bulk of the earth's surface will be controlled by England, the United States, and Russia."

The ultimate limits of expansion are definite. ly fixed and very near. The question is not how far the national bubble can be blown in infinite space before it bursts, but what share each nation will secure in the final distribution of the earth's surface, which will be settled certainly within the next fifty years, perhaps within the next twenty-five. Some of the elements of this settlement can be clearly foreseen. There is room for only three world powers-Great Britain, Russia, and the United States. The French colonial empire is an artificial creation that cannot survive the stress of war with a great sea power. So is that of Germany. The most formidable nations of continental Europe, outside of Russia, must sink to the rank of second or third class powers. . . . National power must have a solid basis of population and territorial extent; and, cramped in a few hundred thousand square miles each, the continental states must inevitably be dwarfed by the powers that have had the fore

thought or the good fortune to spread over the globe.

OUR FUTURE POSITION AMONG THE NATIONS.

"And how will it be with us? The regions in Asia and Africa which Great Britain already has under mortgage will bring her empire up to not less than 16,000,000 square miles, or onethird of all the land of the earth. Russia has within easy reach, in Turkey, Persia, central Asia, and China-not to speak of Europeenough territory to raise the total area of her dominions to fully 13,000,000 square miles. What, then, will be our position? Including Hawaii and Porto Rico, we have 3,613,127 square miles. If we annex the whole of the Philippines we shall have 3,727,453. We may expect that, sooner or later, Cuba and the rest of the West Indies will gravitate to us. That will give the United States in all something over 3,800,000 square miles. As our national temper does not permit unprovoked aggressions upon our neighbors, there is no other important field. of expansion open to us, unless Canada and Mexico should voluntarily cast in their lots with ours. If that should happen, we should have a splendidly compact domain of about 7,900,000 square miles, capable of holding its own under all conceivable conditions. But it would still rank only third in territorial extent. The British empire, even after Canada had been transferred to our side of the ledger, would still exceed it by fully 60 per cent.; and so would Russia. As a nursery of white men, however, it would be at least equal to either of them.

"Another alternative is a reunion of the members of the English-speaking race. That would make us sharers in a dominion of 20,000,000 square miles, commanding all seas and embracing half the population of the world. Whatever the rest of mankind might do, the people of such a domain would be secure. So far as international relations were concerned, they would have reached the ultimate stability; the planet would contain no ing outside their borders that could endanger them.

"In default of these resources-if we neither acquire Canada and Mexico nor unite with our English-speaking kinsmen-our position under the coming definite world settlement will be simple.

We shall hold a respectable, and even secure, but modest, position as the third of the three great powers. Our territory will be be

tween a fourth and a third of that of Russia and somewhat less than a fourth of that of the British empire. All we can pick up in the way of stray islands here and there will be so utterly insignificant, in the presence of the carving of continents

that is going on before our eyes, that to dignify it with the name of imperialism is trifling with words. If we have acquired a few hundred square miles in the Ladrones, a few thousand in Hawaii, or even a hundred thousand or so in the Philippines, we are far from becoming imperial, as that term will be understood in the world settlement. We are merely reducing in a microscopic degree the inevitable preponderance against us that will exist when the world is permanently partitioned."

THE PARAMOUNT POWER OF THE PACIFIC.

IN the North American Review for August Mr. John Barrett, who is already well known to our readers, nas an article treating of the United States as The Paramount Power of the Pacific."

Mr. Barrett holds that the United States should contend resolutely for the "open door" in China, which he interprets simply as the maintenance of treaty rights of trade throughout the empire, with all nations on an equal Zooting -not the abolition of tariffs, but the payment of the same duties by all nations, as agreed upon in the original treaties. The "spheres of influ ence" of various European nations will have to be recognized, but such recognition need not and should not nullify the policy of the open door."

OUR TRADE INTERESTS IN THE FAR EAST.

"The far East, particularly China, affords markets which should arouse the interest of all sections of the United States and make the country stand unanimously for a firm policy. The West and East and the North and South are equally concerned in maintaining the freedom of trade and preserving our treaty rights throughout China. Were it merely a sectional issue there might be a grave question as to the advisability of taking a strong position as to the future of the empire. China and other Asiatic countries want all the flour and timber and a goodly portion of other kinds of food and raw products which California, Oregon, Washington, and neighboring Western States can supply ; they want the manufactured cotton and raw cotton of the South in increasing quantities, and the time may come when this Pacific-Asiatic demand will take up the surplus supply of the South's great staple; they want the manufactured cotton, iron, steel, and miscellaneous products of the North and East, together with unlimited quantities of petroleum; they want corresponding manufactured products of the cen tral West, and there is no reason why there should not be developed among the Asiatic millions a demand for the central West's great