Carolina also proposed a constitutional amendment which was treated in the same manner as those referred to. It was proposed to confer upon Congress immediately, the power of forbidding importation of slaves into the United States. The Federal Constitution in Section 9, Article I, expressly provided that such importation "shall not be prohibited by Congress prior to 1808.”

Ohio believed in adhering to the articles as originally adopted; while the resolution of non-concurrence expressly approved the morals of the North Carolina proposition, it dissented from its adoption on the ground of inexpediency. The General Assembly said: "Notwithstanding that this inhuman practice is impolitic in the extreme, and altogether repugnant to the principles on which our government is founded, yet it was the mutual agreement between the States forming the federal compact, that Congress should not possess the power of preventing any of the States then existing from carrying on a trade of this kind for a given period." On all these propositions the Legislature of Ohio acted wisely and in a spirit of fair play and candor with its sister States. It was evident that dearer to her than party, was the perpetuity of the Union which, even at that date, was still an experiment. Ohio was willing to make sacrifices, to forego securing in the National Constitution what she believed to be right rather than to endanger its existence by constant changes.

The first grave trial of the state government came in 1807. This was a serious conflict between the Legislature and the Judiciary, involving the question

of the power of the former, and the jurisdiction and independence of the latter. It attracted the attention of the whole State and was a matter of serious concern to thoughtful minds. Should the courts be allowed to determine whether an act of the Legislature was contrary to the Constitution? If this power rested in the courts did it not make them, as a branch of the state government, superior to, and not co-ordinate with the Legislature? The facts of this controversy and the results form one of the most striking events of the first decade of the State.

In 1805 the act defining the duties of justices of the peace was passed. The question of its constitutionality was before several courts of the State. The court of common pleas, for the third circuit, of which Calvin Pease was president judge, and Judges Huntington and Tod, constituting a majority of the Supreme Court of the State, in different cases, decided, that so much of the law, contained in the fifth section of that act, as gave to justices jurisdiction in cases exceeding twenty dollars, and so much contained in the twentyninth section, as prevented plaintiffs from recovering costs in actions commenced by original writ from the courts of common pleas, for amounts between twenty and fifty dollars, was unconstitutional, and therefore void. The principal grounds of these decisions were the seventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which ordains, that "in suits at common law, when the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,'

and the eighth section of the eighth article of the State Constitution, which declares that "the right of trial by jury shall be inviolate."

These opinions were received with much opposition by the people of the State. It will be remembered that the Jeffersonian idea of vesting the power of the people in the Legislature was the central idea of the Constitution. Here was a new doctrine that was taking away from the popular branch of the government much of its power. Consequently at the session of 1807-8, a resolution for the impeachment of the obnoxious judges was introduced into the House of Representatives, but was not, at that time acted on. Before the next session Judge Huntington was elected Governor of the State and resigned his seat on the bench. The impeachment, however, was not dropped. Soon after the next Legislature convened, a committee was appointed to inquire into the official conduct of Messrs. Huntington, Tod, and Pease, with leave to exhibit articles of impeachment, or to report otherwise. This committee reported articles against Judges Tod and Pease; but not against Governor Huntington. The charges against Judge Pease were three: First, that on an appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace for a sum exceeding twenty dollars, he had as president judge, reversed that judgment, on the ground that the justice had no constitutional jurisdiction of that case. Second, that in an action for a sum between twenty and fifty dollars, commenced by original writ from the court of common pleas, he had allowed the plaintiff his costs of suit, upon his recovering judgment, contrary to the twenty-ninth

section of the justice act, and the fifth section of the act organizing judicial courts. Third, that, sitting as president judge, he had decided, on various occasions, that the court had full power to set aside, suspend, and declare null and void any act of the State Legislature, and that he had suspended, set aside, and declared null and void the fifth section of the act defining the duties of justices. The article against Judge Tod, contained but a single charge; the same, in substance, as the first charge against Judge Pease.

Both the judges were summoned to appear before the Senate, sitting as a High Court of Impeachment. Judge Tod was first tried. In his answer to the charge exhibited against him, he admitted that, in his judicial capacity, he had decided that the fifth section of the act, giving to justices of the peace jurisdiction in cases exceeding twenty dollars, was unconstitutional and void; declared that he still remained of the same opinion; asserted his right and duty to determine cases brought before him as a judge, according to the convictions of his judgment; and vindicated the purity of his motives, and the uprightness of his judicial conduct. The investigation continued for several days, but finally resulted in the acquittal of the respondent.

Judge Pease was next put upon trial. His answer was substantially the same as that of Judge Tod. The result was, that on the first charge he was unanimously acquitted. On the second charge he was acquitted; the vote being for conviction fifteen, for acquittal nine, and the Constitution requiring a concurrence of two-thirds for conviction. The third