be fatal. Something must be done by the Convention, though it should be by a bare majority."

Mr. Gerry" observed, that Massachusetts was opposed to an adjournment, because they saw no new ground of compromise. But as it seemed to be the opinion of so many States, that a trial should be made, the State would now concur in the adjournment."

Mr. Rutledge" could see no need of an adjournment, because he could see no chance of a compromise. The little States were fixed. They had repeatedly and solemnly declared themselves to be so. All that the large States, then, had to do, was to decide whether they would yield or not. For his part, he conceived that, although we could not do what we thought best in itself, we ought to do something. Had we not better keep the government up a little longer, hoping that another Convention will supply our omissions, than abandon everything to hazard? Our constituents will be very little satisfied with us if we take the latter course."

An adjournment until next morning was agreed to, and the published report of the proceedings contains the following note made by Mr. Madison :

On the morning following, before the hour of the Convention, a number of the members from the larger States, by common agreement, met for the purpose of consulting on the proper steps to be taken in consequence of the vote in favor of an equal representation in the second branch, and the apparent inflexibility of the smaller States on that point. Several members from the latter States also attended. The time was wasted in vague conversation on the subject, without any specific proposition or agreement. It appeared, indeed, that the opinions of the members who disliked the equality of votes, differed much as to the importance of that point, and as to the policy of risking a failure of any general act of the Convention by inflexibly opposing it. Several of themsupposing that no good government could or would be built on that foundation; and that, as a division of the Convention into two opinions was unavoidable, it would be better that the side comprising the principal States, and a majority of the people of America, should propose a scheme of government to the States, than that a scheme should be proposed on the other side-would have concurred in a firm opposition to the smaller States, and in a separate recommendation, if eventually necessary. Others seemed inclined to yield to the smaller States, and to concur in such an act, however imperfect and exceptionable, as might be agreed on by the Convention as a body, though decided by a bare majority of the States and by a minority of the people of the United States. It is probable that the result of this consultation satisfied the smaller States, that they had nothing to apprehend from a union of the larger in any plan whatever against the equality of votes in the second branch. Ibid., 319.

When the subject was afterwards resumed, another discussion followed, of which the following is an abstract:

Mr. King wished to know what influence the vote just passed was meant to have on the succeeding part of the report, concerning the admission of slaves into the rule of representation. He could not reconcile his mind to the article, if it was to prevent objections to the latter part. The admission of slaves was a most grating circumstance to his mind, and he believed would be so to a great part of the people of America. He had not made a strenuous opposition to it heretofore, because he had hoped that this

concession would have produced a readiness, which had not been manifested to strengthen the General Government, and to mark a full confidence in it. The report under consideration had, by the tenor of it, put an end to all these hopes.

Mr. Sherman regarded the slave trade as iniquitous; but the point of representation having been settled, after much difficulty and deliberation, he did not think himself bound to make opposition; especially as the present article, as amended, did not preclude any arrangement whatever on that point, in another place of the report.

Mr. Gouverneur Morris moved to insert "free" before the word "inhabitants." Much, he said, would depend on this point. He never would concur in upholding domestic slavery. It was a nefarious institution. It was the curse of heaven on the States where it prevailed. Compare the free regions of the middle States, where a rich and noble cultivation marks the prosperity and happiness of the people, with the misery and poverty which overspread the barren wastes of Virginia, Maryland, and other States having slaves. Travel through the whole continent, and you behold the prospect continually varying with the appearance and disappearance of slavery. The moment you leave the Eastern States, and enter New York, the effects of this institution become visible. Passing through the Jerseys, and entering Pennsylvania, every criterion of superior improvement witnesses the change. Proceed southwardly, and every step you take, through the great regions of slaves, presents a desert, increasing with the increasing proportion of those wretched beings. Upon what principle is it that the slaves shall be computed in the representation? Are they men? Then make them citizens and let them vote. Are they property? Why, then, is no other property included? The houses in this city (Philadelphia) are worth more than all the wretched slaves who cover the rice swamps of South Carolina. The admission of slaves into the representation, when fairly explained, comes to this :-That the inhabitant of Georgia and South Carolina, who goes to the coast of Africa, and, in defiance of the sacred laws of humanity, tears away his fellow-creatures from their dearest connections, and dooms them to the most cruel bondage, shall have more votes, in a government instituted for the protection of the rights of mankind, than the citizen of Pennsylvania or New Jersey, who views, with a laudable horror, so nefarious a practice. He would add, that domestic slavery is the most prominent feature in the aristocratic countenance of the proposed Constitution. The vassalage of the poor has ever been the favorite offspring of aristocracy. And what is the proposed compensation to the northern States, for a sacrifice of every principle of right, of every impulse of humanity? They are to bind themselves to march their militia for the defence of the southern States-for their defence against those very slaves of whom they complain. They must supply vessels and seamen in case of foreign attack. The Legislature will have indefinite power to tax them by excises, and duties on imports, both of which will fall heavier on them than on the southern inhabitants; for the bohea tea used by the northern freemen will pay more tax than the whole consumption of the miserable slave, which consists of nothing more than his physical subsistence and the rag that covers his nakedness. On the other side, the southern States are not to be restrained from importing fresh supplies of wretched Africans, at once to increase the danger of attack and the difficulty of defence; nay, they are to be encouraged to it, by an assurance of having their votes in the National Government increased in proportion; and are, at the same time, to have their exports and their slaves exempt from all contributions for the public service. Let it not be said that direct taxation is to be proportioned to representation. It is idle to suppose that the General Government can stretch its hand directly into the pockets of the people, scattered over so vast a country. They can only do it through the medium

of exports, imports, and excises. For what, then, are all the sacrifices to be made? He would sooner submit himself to a tax for paying for all the negroes in the United States, than saddle posterity with such a Constitution.

Mr. Dayton seconded the motion. He did it, he said, that his sentiments on the subject might appear, whatever might be the fate of the amendment.

Mr. Sherman did not regard the admission of negroes into the ratio of representation as liable to such insuperable objections. It was the freemen of the southern States who were, in fact, to be represented according to the taxes paid by them, and the negroes are only included in the estimate of taxes. This was his idea of the matter. Mr. Pinckney considered the fisheries, and the Western frontier, as more burdensome to the United States than the slaves. He thought this could be demonstrated, if the occasion were a proper one. Mr. Wilson "thought the motion premature. An agreement to the clause would be no bar to the object of it."

And on the question to insert free before inhabitants, only New Jersey voted in the affirmative, and all the other States in the negative. Ibid., 391.

CHAPTER XXXV.

VETO POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE.

In addition to the means of safety already noticed, designed by those who formed the Constitution to fortify the personal virtue and fidelity of the functionary in the execution of his trust, and to guard against evil from his misconduct in it, and to preserve intact, in all its parts, the republican system they aimed to establish, many other features might be enumerated, and many of which are not only wholly inconsistent with the kind of democracy now sought to be established, but expressly designed to guard against it. Their conservative policy is alike visible in the peculiar character of the Federal Constitution, and the State governments whose Constitutions had been previously framed.

Without here referring to the then existing provisions of the State Constitutions, in proof of this assertion, sufficient guards and restrictions are to be found in the United States Constitution to show the principles which influenced the conduct of its framers. Prominent among the provisions of this character is what is now called the veto power given to the Executive.

It is true, the first idea seems to have been to confer this power upon the Executive and the Judiciary; but Mr. Gerry raised a doubt of the propriety of joining the Judiciary in such a power. He thought they would "have a sufficient check against encroachments on their own

department by their exposition of the laws, which involved a power of deciding on their constitutionality ;" and that "it was quite foreign from the nature of their office to make them judges of the policy of public measures." He moved, therefore, "that the National Executive shall have a right to negative any legislative act which shall not be afterwards passed by parts of each branch of the National Legislature."

Mr. King seconded this motion, "observing that the judges ought to be able to expound the law, as it should come before them, free from the bias of having participated in its formation."

Col. Hamilton was against the latter part of the amendment, and in favor of giving the Executive "an absolute negative on the laws." He thought "there was no danger of such power being too much exercised," and said "that the king of Great Britain had not exerted his negative since the revolution."

Dr. Franklin thought "this was a mischievous sort of check. If the Executive was to have a council, such a power would be less objectionable. It was true, the king of Great Britain had not, as was said, exerted his negative since the revolution; but that matter was easily explained. The bribes and emoluments now given to the members of Parliament rendered it unnecessary, every thing being done according to the will of the ministers. He was afraid, if a negative should be given as proposed, that more power and money would be demanded, till at last enough would be got to influence and bribe the Legislature into a complete subjection to the will of the Executive."

Mr. Sherman was "against enabling any one man to stop the will of the whole. No one man could be found so far above all the rest in wisdom. He thought we ought to avail ourselves of his wisdom in revising the laws, but not permit him to overrule the decided and cool opinions of the Legislature."

Mr. Madison supposed that, if a proper proportion of each branch should be required to overrule the objections of the Executive, it would answer the same purpose as an absolute negative. It would rarely, if ever, happen that the Executive, constituted as ours is proposed to be, would have firmness enough to resist the Legislature, unless backed by a certain number of the body itself. The king of Great Britain, with all his splendid attributes, would not be able to withstand the unanimous and eager wishes of both Houses of Parliament."

Mr. Butler "had been in favor of a single Executive magistrate; but could he have entertained an idea that a complete negative on the laws was to be given him, he certainly should have acted very differently." "Gentlemen seemed to think that we had nothing to apprehend from an abuse of the executive power. But might not a Cataline or a Cromwell arise in this country as well as in others ?"

Mr. Bedford ". was opposed to every check on the Legislature, even the council of revision first proposed. He thought it would be sufficient to mark out in the Constitution the boundaries to the legislative authority, which would give all the requisite security to the rights of the other departments. The representatives of the people were the best judges of what was for their interest, and ought to be under no external control whatever. The two branches would produce a sufficient control within the Legislature itself."

Col. Mason said,- "The probable abuses of a negative had been well explained by Dr. Franklin, as proved by experience, the best of tests. Will not the same door be opened here? The Executive may refuse its assent to necessary measures, till new appointments shall be referred to him; and, having by degrees engrossed all these into his own hands, the American Executive, like the British, will, by bribery and influence, save himself the trouble and odium of exerting his negative afterwards." "Notwithstanding the oppression and injustice experienced among us from democracy, the genius of the people is in favor of it, and the genius of the people must be consulted." 5 Elliott's Debates, 153.

The Convention having, by a unanimous vote of the States, rejected the proposition to give the Executive an absolute negative, Mr. Butler moved, and Dr. Franklin seconded it, to give the Executive power to suspend legislative acts for a limited period, whereupon Mr. Gerry remarked that this power "might do all the mischief dreaded from the negative," and it was likewise unanimously rejected, after which Mr. Gerry's proposition was amended so as to enable two-thirds of both houses of Congress to overrule the President's veto, and then passed as amended, Connecticut and Maryland only voting against it. Ibid., 155.

Towards the close of the Convention, Mr. Williamson "moved to reconsider the clause requiring three-fourths of each house to overrule the negative of the President, in order to strike out three-fourths and insert two-thirds. He had, he remarked, himself proposed three-fourths instead of two-thirds; but he had since been convinced that the latter proportion was the best. The former puts too much in the power of the President." Mr. Sherman "was of the same opinion." Mr. Hamilton "added his testimony to the fact, that two-thirds in New York had been ineffectual, either where a popular object, or a legislative faction, operated; of which he mentioned some instances." Mr. Gerry said, “It is necessary to consider the danger on the other side also. Two-thirds will be a considerable, perhaps a proper security. Three-fourths puts too much in the power of a few men." Mr. Williamson "was less afraid of too few than of too many laws." Col. Mason" had always considered this as one of the most exceptionable parts of the system." Mr. Gouverneur Morris "dwelt on the danger to the public interest, from the