CHAPTER XXXIII.

BASIS OF REPRESENTATION.

MANY other provisions might be referred to; but enough have already been noticed to show the complex structure of the United States Government, as compared with a simple and pure democracy. It may, however, not be out of place yet to refer to the compromise in regard to the representation of the States in the Senate, and the basis of representation in the House of Representatives, now so frequently found fault with, and complained of, but without which the Constitution could have never been formed, nor the Union established. It was the vexed question, which caused more anxious deliberation and discussion, and was attended with more embarrassment, than any other subject; and a brief view of the deliberations of the Convention in relation to it will explain the reasons for the compromise finally agreed upon, as well as the danger now to be apprehended from any attempt to disturb it.

The second resolution of the series proposed by Mr. Randolph was in these words: "That the rights of suffrage in the National Legislature ought to be proportioned to the quotas of contribution, or to the number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may seem best in different cases." This Col. Hamilton moved to amend, by making it read: "That the rights of suffrage in the National Legislature ought to be proportioned to the number of free inhabitants." Mr. Madison then moved, "that the equality of suffrage, established by the Articles of Confederation, ought not to prevail in the National Legislature, and that an equal ratio of representation ought to be substituted," which was seconded by Gouverneur Morris, "and being generally relished, would have been agreed to," but for the interposition of Mr. Read of Delaware, as will appear from the following extract from the proceedings:

"Mr. Read moved that the whole clause relating to the point of representation be postponed; reminding the committee that the deputies from Delaware were restrained by their commission from assenting to any change of the rule of suffrage; and in case such a change should be fixed on, it might become their duty to retire from the Convention. Mr. Gouverneur Morris observed, that the valuable assistance of those members could not be lost without real concern; and that so early a proof of discord in the Convention, as the secession of a State, would add much to the regret; that the change proposed was, however, so fundamental an article in a National Government, that it could not be dispensed with. Mr. Madison observed, that, whatever reason might have existed for the equality of suffrage when the Union was a federal one among sovereign States, it must cease when a National Government should be put into the place. In

the former case, the acts of Congress depended so much for their efficacy on the cooperation of the States, that these had a weight, both within and without Congress, nearly in proportion to their extent and importance. In the latter case, as the acts of the General Government would take effect without the intervention of the State LegisJatures, a vote from a small State would have the same efficacy and importance as a vote from a large one, and there was the same reason for different numbers of representatives from different States, as from counties of different extents within particular States. He suggested, as an expedient for at once taking the sense of the members on this point, and saving the Delaware deputies from embarrassment, that the question should be taken in committee, and the clause on report to the House, be postponed without a question there. This, however, did not appear to satisfy Mr. Read. By several it was observed, that no just construction of the act of Delaware could require or justify a secession of her deputies, even if the resolution were to be carried through the House as well as the committee. It was finally agreed, however, that the clause should be postponed, it being understood that, in the event, the proposed change of representation would certainly be agreed to, no objection or difficulty being started from any other quarter than from Delaware. 5 Elliott's Deb., 135.

When the subject was resumed, Judge Brearly and Mr. Patterson, both from New Jersey, led off in speeches against the provision, and declared their uncompromising and irreconcilable hostility to it.

Judge Brearly said he "was sorry that any question on this point was brought into view. It had been much agitated in Congress at the time of forming the Confedera tion, and was then rightly settled, by allowing to each sovereign State an equal vote. Otherwise, the smaller States must have been destroyed instead of being saved. The substitution of a ratio, he admitted, carried fairness on the face of it: but, on a deeper examination, was unfair and unjust. Judging of the disparity of the States by the quota of Congress, Virginia would have sixteen votes, and Georgia but one. A like proportion to the others will make the whole number ninety. There will be three large States, and ten small ones. The large States, by which he meant Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, will carry every thing before them." "When the proposition for destroying the equality of votes came forward, he was astonished, he was alarmed. Is it fair, then, it will be asked, that Georgia should have an equal vote with Virginia? what remedy, then? One only; that a map of the United States be spread out, that all the existing boundaries be erased, and that a new partition of the whole be made into thirteen equal parts."

He would not say it was

Mr. Patterson followed him in a similar strain, and concluded thus: “New Jersey will never confederate on the plan before the committee. She would be swallowed up. He had rather submit to a monarch, to a despot, than to such a fate. He would not only oppose the plan here, but, on his return home, do every thing in his power to defeat it there."

The following discussion then ensued:

Mr. Wilson hoped, if the Confederacy should be dissolved, that a majority—nay, a minority of the States would unite for their safety. He entered elaborately into the defence of a proportional representation, stating, for his first position, that, as all authority was derived from the people, equal numbers of people ought to have an equal

number of representatives, and different numbers of people, different numbers of repre sentatives. This principle had been improperly violated in the Confederation, owing to the urgent circumstances of the times.

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Representatives of different districts ought clearly to hold the same proportion to each other, as their respective constituents hold to each other. If the small States will not confederate on this plan, Pennsylvania, and he presumed some other States, would not confederate on any other. We have been told that each State being sovereign, all are equal. So each man is naturally a sovereign over himself; and all men are therefore naturally equal. Can he retain this equality when he becomes a member of civil government? He cannot. As little can a sovereign State, when it becomes a member of the Federal Government. If New Jersey will not part with her sovereignty, it is vain to talk of government. A new partition of the States is desirable, but evidently and totally impracticable.

Mr. Sherman proposed, that the proportion of suffrage in the first branch should be according to the respective numbers of free inhabitants; and that in the second branch, or Senate, each State should have one vote and no more. He said, as the States would remain possessed of certain individual rights, each State ought to be able to protect itself; otherwise, a few large States will rule the rest. The House of Lords in England, he observed, had certain particular rights under the Constitution, and hence they have an equal vote in the House of Commons, that they may be able to defend their rights.

Mr. Rutledge proposed, that the proportion of suffrage in the first branch should be according to the quotas of contribution. The justice of this rule, he said, could not be contested.

Mr. Butler urged the same idea; adding, that money was power; and that the States ought to have weight in the government in proportion to their wealth.

Mr. King and Mr. Wilson, in order to bring the question to a point, moved, "that the right of suffrage in the first branch of the National Legislature ought not to be according to the rule established in the Articles of Confederation; but according to some equitable ratio of representation." The clause, so far as it related to suffrage in the first branch, was postponed, in order to consider this motion. [In the printed Journal, Mr. Rutledge is named as the seconder of the motion.]

'Mr. Dickinson contended for the actual contributions of the States, as the rule of their representation and suffrage in the first branch; by thus connecting the interests of the States with their duty, the latter would be sure to be performed.

Mr. King remarked, that it was uncertain what mode might be used in levying a national revenue; but that it was probable imposts would be one source of it. If the actual contributions were to be the rule, the non-importing States, as Connecticut and New Jersey, would be in a sad condition indeed. It might so happen that they would have no representation. This situation of particular States had always been one powerful argument in favor of the five per cent. impost.

The question being about to be put, Dr. Franklin said he had thrown his ideas of the matter on a paper; which Mr. Wilson read to the Committee in the words following:

Mr. Chairman: It has given me great pleasure to observe, that till this point-the proportion of representation-came before us, our debates were carried on with great

coolness and temper. If any thing of a contrary kind has on this occasion appeared, I hope it will not be repeated; for we are sent here to consult, not to contend.

"But, sir, in the present mode of voting by States, it is equally in the power of the lesser States to swallow up the greater; and this is mathematically demonstrable. Suppose, for example, that seven smaller States had each three members in the House, and the six larger to have, one with another, six members; and that, upon a question, two members of each small State should be in the affirmative, and one in the negative, they would make, affirmatives, fourteen; negatives, seven; and that all the larger States should be unanimously in the negative, they would make, negatives, thirty-six; in all, affirmatives, fourteen; negatives, forty-three.

“It is, then, apparent, that the fourteen carry the question against the forty-three, and the minority overpowers the majority, contrary to the common practice of assemblies in all countries and ages.

"The greater States, sir, are naturally as unwilling to have their property left in the disposition of the smaller, as the smaller are to have theirs in the disposition of the greater. An honorable gentlemen has, to avoid this difficulty, hinted a proposition of equalizing the States. It appears to me an equitable one, and I should, for my own part, not be against such a measure, if it might be found practicable. Formerly, indeed, when almost every province had a different constitution,-some with greater, others with fewer privileges,—it was of importance to the borderers, when their boundaries were contested, whether by running the division lines, they were placed on one side or the other. At present, when such differences are done away, it is less material. The interests of a State are made up of the interests of its individual members. If they are not injured, the State is not injured. Small States are more easily well and happily governed than large ones. If, therefore, in such an equal division, it should be found necessary to diminish Pennsylvania, I should not be averse to the giving a part of it to New Jersey, and another to Delaware. But as there would probably be considerable difficulty in adjusting such a division, and, however equally made at first, it would be continually varying by the augmentation of inhabitants in some States, and their fixed proportion in others, and thence frequently occasion new divisions; I beg leave to propose, for the consideration of the committee, another mode, which appears to me to be as equitable, more easily carried into practice, and more permanent in its nature. "Let the weakest State say what proportion of money or force it is able and willing to furnish for the general purposes of the Union;

"Let all the others oblige themselves to furnish each an equal proportion;

"The whole of these joint supplies to be absolutely in the disposition of Congress; "The Congress, in this case, to be composed of an equal number of delegates from each State;

"After their decisions to be by the majority of individual voting;

"If these joint and equal supplies should, on particular occasions, not be sufficient, let Congress make requisitions on the richer and more powerful States for further aids, to be voluntarily afforded, leaving to each State the right of considering the necessity and utility of the aid desired, and of giving more or less, as it should be found proper. "This mode is not new-it was formerly practiced with success by the British government with respect to Ireland and the colonies. We sometimes gave even more than they expected, or thought just to accept ; and, in the last war, carried on while we were united, they gave us back in five years a million sterling. We should probably have continued such voluntary contributions, whenever the occasions appeared to require

them, for the common good of the empire. It was not till they chose to force us, and to deprive us of the merit and pleasure of voluntary contributions, that we refused and resisted. These contributions, however, were to be disposed of at the pleasure of a government in which we had no representative. I am, therefore, persuaded, that they will not be refused to one in which the representation shall be equal.

“My learned colleague (Mr. Wilson) has already mentioned, that the present method of voting by States was submitted to originally by Congress under a conviction of its impropriety, inequality, and injustice. This appears in the words of the resolution. It is of the sixth of September, 1774. The words are,—

“Resolved, That, in determining questions in this Congress, each colony or province shall have one vote; the Congress not being possessed of, or at present able to procure, materials for ascertaining the importance of each colony.””

On the question for agreeing to Mr. King's and Mr. Wilson's motion, it passed in the affirmative.

Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia-aye, 7; New York, New Jersey, Delaware-no, 3; Maryland, divided. 5 Elliott's Debates 179.

When the subject was subsequently resumed, Luther Martin spoke at great length, contending that the General Government ought to be formed for the States, and not for individuals. Messrs. Lansing and Dayton moved to strike out the word not, so that the article should read "that the right of suffrage in the first branch ought to be according to the rule established by the Confederation," when a very long and able discussion ensued, from which the following is extracted:

Mr. Williamson thought that, if any political truth could be grounded on mathematical demonstration, it was, that, if the States were equally sovereign now, and parted with equal proportions of sovereignty, they would remain equally sovereign. He could not comprehend how the smaller States would be injured in that case, and wished some gentlemen would vouchsafe a solution of it. He observed that the small States, if they had a plurality of votes, would have an interest in throwing the burdens off their own shoulders on those of the large ones. He begged that the expected addition of new States from the westward might be taken in view. They would be small States; they would be poor States; they would be unable to pay in proportion to their numbers, their distance from market rendering the produce of their labor less valuable; they would consequently be tempted to combine for the purpose of laying burdens on commerce and consumption, which would fall with greater weight on the old States.

Mr. Madison said, he was much disposed to concur in any expedient, not inconsistent with fundamental principles, that could remove the difficulty concerning the rule of representation. But he could neither be convinced that the rule contended for was just, nor that it was necessary for the safety of the small States against the large ones. That it was just, had been conceded by Mr. Brearly and Mr. Patterson themselves. The expedient proposed by them was a new partition of the territory of the United States. The fallacy of the reasoning drawn from the equality of sovereign States, in the formation of compacts, lay in confounding mere treaties, in which were specified certain duties to which the parties were to be bound, and certain rules by which their subjects were to be reciprocally governed in their intercourse, with a compact by which an authority was created paramount to the parties, and making laws for the government of them.

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