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THE PRE-NOMINATION CAMPAIGN

him impossible as a Republican standardbearer? Granted that he has not been free from the failings common alike to politicians and statesmen, does he nevertheless possess the indispensable qualification of availability?

As to availability, there are some pretty important things to be remembered. In the first place, Mr. Roosevelt is a protectionist. Just what part the tariff is to play in the approaching campaign cannot, of course, be accurately forecast at this time. Issues have a curious way of cropping out and of receding, no matter how the platform is constructed. If the Republicans have learned nothing from recent experience of tariff-making and are to "stand pat" on the old-line protective theories and methods, they will invite defeat, whoever is their candidate. On the other hand, the tariff has formed too large an element in Republican policy in the past to be lightly disposed of now; and while the partisan criticism of Democratic "tariff tinkering" need not be taken too seriously, there are many influential Republicans who have become convinced that tariff bargaining, under conditions of reciprocity, is likely to be in the future more important for the United States than mere tariff protection. Whatever the point of view, however, Mr. Roosevelt's record as President shows no disposition on his part to oppose Republican ideas on this important question. He is, and always has been, a protectionist, and he stood upon a protection platform as a Progressive candidate in 1912.

In the second place, Mr. Roosevelt stands for administrative honesty and efficiency. He began his public career in the field of National politics as a civil service reformer, and he has not deserted the cause or allowed his interest in it to wane. The efficiency of the executive departments at Washington and of the administrative service throughout the country was never more marked than in the years of his Presidency. He was the sworn enemy of incompetency as well as of graft.

Abuses were remedied, complaints were listened to, desirable reforms were instituted. The Republican party has long boasted of its superior efficiency and of its success in giving to the country a businesslike administration. The nomination of Mr. Roosevelt at a moment when great tasks of social, industrial, and commercial readjustment are beginning to loom would be an assurance that the boast, if he were elected, would be made good.

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Mr. Roosevelt stands for preparedness. This is not the place to discuss the particular kind or degree of preparedness that is needed, or the merits or defects of the various measures to which the attention of President Wilson and a Democratic Congress are at last directed. It is enough to recall the humiliating fact that after more than twenty months of warning from the European struggle, after more than four months of Congressional debate, and with Mexico as an illustration at the door, we are still unprepared. Never have we been in graver danger; for, literally, we know not what a day may bring forth. Mr. Roosevelt has been unceasing in his demand for preparedness and in his criticism of the mistaken policy which, up to date, has left us well-nigh helpless; and while his criticisms have been severe and his tone often harsh, it may well be doubted whether that which he has said or written is harsher or more severe than that which most Republicans, together with many of other parties, have thought. It was in his Presidency, too, that the American navy reached its highest point of efficiency, and the army, although occupied mainly with the routine of peace, its greatest effectiveness in personnel, spirit, and practical strength. The Republican party, by nature a party of preparedness for the same reasons that have made it a party of administrative efficiency, has only defeat awaiting it if it asks for less than Mr. Roosevelt has all along demanded, or if it nominates a candidate who is less clear and positive on that subject than he is known to be.

Once more, Mr. Roosevelt stands for a strong foreign policy and for the respect due to the American name. Perhaps it is idle to speculate as to what this or that man might or could have done had he been, during the past twenty months, in President Wilson's place; nevertheless, such speculation is very much of a habit in this country, and is often one of the straws which show the direction of the political breeze. There is a widely held opinion that had Mr. Roosevelt occupied the Presidential chair he would at least have insured for the United States a respect abroad which is now, to our chagrin, conspicuously lacking. He might not have been able to prevent the violation of Belgian neutrality or the wholesale infraction of international law, but he might at least have made a protest that would have saved American honor. On any reasonable theory of probability, there is

more likelihood that a leopard would change its spots than that Mr. Roosevelt, had he been President, would have confined his diplomatic activities chiefly to letter-writing, or submitted tamely to interference with American commerce by either belligerent, or allowed foreign agitators to hatch their plots on American soil, or played fast and loose with anarchy in Mexico until forcible intervention could no longer be put off, or frittered away more than a year and a half, in the face of a world war, without doing anything worth mentioning to strengthen the Nation's defenses. Have the Republicans any leader whose course, under such circumstances as now attend us, could so confidently be predicted, or to whom the party support in such a time of crisis could be given with greater enthusiasm and satisfaction?

On four cardinal points, then-protection, administrative efficiency, preparedness, and foreign policy-Mr. Roosevelt is in accord with the best traditions and the prevailing sentiment of the Republican party. On each of these points, moreover, he has already a clear record as President or as a citizen. Are there other more weighty reasons for rejecting him as a candidate?

Aside from opposition on purely personal grounds and the fact that he is persona non grata to thick-and-thin pacificists, the objection most often voiced is that Mr. Roosevelt is "unsafe." President Wilson, it is admitted, has shown himself of unstable mind, but, so far as Europe is concerned, the United States is nevertheless still at peace. Had Mr. Roosevelt been President-so runs the argument-we should long ago have been at war with one or more of the European belligerents, as well as with Mexico; and peace, even at the risk of dishonor, particularly when peace yields such immense financial returns, is better than war with its horrors. If we must go to war, let it be because we are attacked, and not because the President is eager to have a hand in whatever is going on.

It would be interesting to know upon what circumstances in Mr. Roosevelt's career as President this imputation of inherent belligerency in international concerns is based. Were Secretary Hay or Secretary Root, two of the ablest statesmen who have ever held Cabinet office, hard put to it to restrain the warlike propensities of their chief? With all his zeal for a better army and navy, was he ever militaristic? Was his foreign policy one of brag and bluster, or was he constantly

intermeddling in other nations' affairs? When he brought to a close the Russo-Japanese War, was it by threat of armed intervention, or by virtue of a moral force which he alone among the rulers of great nations had the courage and ability to use? Did he not give his support, and very real support too, to the youthful cause of international conciliation? And did he not receive the Nobel peace prize? Did the American people in the years of Mr. Roosevelt's Presidency live in fear lest the Nation should become involved in war? And does any American who takes counsel of his information and his judgment, rather than of prejudice and partisan clamor, really cherish such apprehension about him now? Rather is it not the fact that in the period from 1901 to 1909, one of the most momentous epochs that the United States has ever known, we not only lived at peace, with none to molest us or make us afraid, but that American lives and American interests abroad were respected and safeguarded and the dignity of the Nation upheld without war or parade of force; and that these things were so under a President who, because he was a soldier and knew what war meant, was indefinitely safer than one who relies upon "watchful waiting" or is "too proud to fight"?

The other chief objection seems to be that Mr. Roosevelt is not any longer a Republican but a Progressive, and that his nomination by the Republicans would be not so much a return on his part to his old allegiance as a surrender of the Republicans, body and soul, to the Progressives. It may be taken for granted that Mr. Roosevelt would not accept a Republican nomination save upon his own terms, and that he would insist upon dictating the platform and the conduct of the campaign; whence it is inferred that the outcome, if successful, would be a Progressive rather than a Republican victory. And since many old-line Republicans regard the Progressives as much nearer akin to Democrats or Socialists than to Republicans, the suggestion of Mr. Roosevelt as a candidate would have to be rejected by the party managers even though a considerable number of Republicans preferred him against the field.

The force of this argument depends mainly upon two considerations: first, whether the Progressives, whatever they once were, are now to be regarded as an independent party, marked off by fundamental differences alike from Republicans, Democrats, and Socialists;

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and, second, whether the Republicans, after four years in which to think it over, are now ready to concede some of the more important principles for which the Progressives contended. On neither of these points, of course, is it possible to speak with certainty. How far the Progressives have kept up their party organization since 1912 in anything but name is difficult to say. There is much reason for thinking, however, that not only has the organization not been kept up, but that in some States it has largely lapsed, and that a considerable amount of reconstruction will be necessary to fit it for the arduous work of a Presidential campaign. An enthusiastic convention in this or that State does not necessarily mean an effective party organization in the country as a whole. A decline in the permanent effectiveness of party organization, however, is likely to mean a weaken ing hold of party principles, an admission that the policies for which the party now stands do not seem so vivid or imperative as they appeared to be when the party was formed. To the extent to which the Wilson Administration has stolen the Progressive thunder and a good deal of it has certainly been appropriated, at least in terms-the strength of the Progressives has been weakened; and it is entirely possible that a considerable percentage of the Progressive vote of 1912 might be given to President Wilson in 1916 unless a candidate satisfactory to the Progressives is nominated by the Republicans.

The other question, that of Republican concession to Progressivism, goes nearer to the heart of the matter. As a matter of fact, the Progressive movement of 1912 was not, as a party movement, either Democratic or Socialistic. It was a revolt against the Republican party as then constituted and controlled. It was born of a widespread conviction that the Republican party, notwithstanding its distinguished record and the extraordinary loyalty of its adherents, was at heart a party of "interests" rather than of the people; that it championed property rather than men, employers rather than wageearners, monopoly and big business rather than the consumer, private advantage rather than public welfare. The" fatal incapacity" of the Democrats and the "deliberate betrayal of its trust" by the Republicans were, to be sure, joined in the denunciation of the Progressive platform; but with no Democratic Administration since 1897, and with

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but twelve years of Democratic rule since 1861, it is clear that the Republicans rather than the Democrats were the chief enemy in mind. Of the new conception of "government of the people, by the people, and for the people," for which the Progressives stood, Mr. Roosevelt, for nearly eight years a Republican President, had been the most conspicuous embodiment; but, although his party reluctantly commended his Administration in 1904 and 1908, and reaffirmed its commendation in 1912, it nevertheless cast him out as unworthy, and went down to disastrous defeat in consequence.

It would be idle to deny that the Republican party was guilty of much with which the Progressives charged it. But it is also useless to cry over spilled milk. Public opinion in this country has undergone great changes in the past eight years, and not the least significant of those changes is that which has taken place in the Republican party itself. And the surest proof that the party could give that it has taken to heart the lesson of its defeat, that it does not propose to ignore popular rights because it also protects vested interests, and that it is the supporter of big business only so long as big business does justice and obeys the law, would be to nominate for President in 1916 the man whom it repudiated in 1912, and go into the campaign

So far as the Progressive platform

of 1912 is concerned, there are few of its planks at which a rejuvenated Republicanism need hesitate. The demand for social and industrial reform, the regulation of inter-State corporations, the development of foreign commerce, the reduction of the high cost of living, the conservation of natural resources, the development of waterways, the abolition of corrupt practices in elections, the improvement of agriculture and country life, National control of public health, the strengthening of the powers of the Inter-State Commerce Commission, the protection of American citizens abroad, the regulation of immigration, the enforcement and extension of civil service laws, and Government supervision of investments-what are these but drawings from Republican sketches, specific illustrations of that broad view of Constitutional power for which the Republican party has always stood, and in furtherance of which it has placed in the statute-books a greater volume of constructive legislation than all other American parties put together?

To-day, on the eve of another Presidential

campaign, the American people are asking for leadership. They are weary of delay and makeshift and strong words not backed by deeds. They want a leader who knows his own mind and who is not afraid to act as well as to speak. They do not want to go to war with any nation, but they do want a preparedness which will make it unlikely that any other nation will go to war with us. And they want many other things in addition to preparedness. The deep dissatisfaction of the people with the Wilson Administration is the Republican opportunity. Mr. Roosevelt is admittedly a great leader. Whether one likes him or not, he is unquestionably the most vivid and interesting personality in the modern world. He is not an untried

man; he has "done the job." He needs no introduction either to the United States or to any other country; his name is familiar everywhere. His views on National issues are not a secret yet to be divulged; everybody knows where he stands. He is not the representative of any class or section or interest. He would be the most available Republican candidate, even if the coming election were to be nothing more than a skillful playing of the political game; and every thinking American knows in his heart that the coming election is very much more than a skillful playing of the game. The question for the Republican party is not whether it can afford to accept Mr. Roosevelt, but whether it can afford to get on without him.

MEXICO-FROM THE INSIDE LOOKING OUT

I

BY GREGORY MASON

SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT OF THE OUTLOOK

T is a safe rule that the intensity of a man's convictions on Mexico varies inversely as the square of the distance between his home and the border.

But what about the American whose home is over the border? Alas! his opinion counts for little in the determination of the Nation's Mexican policy, for he cannot vote. But I have found that, whereas the Mexican views of Americans on the outside looking in are as various as the hues in a Guadalajara blanket, the views of the men on the inside looking out are fairly monochromatic, and that one color is usually dark, and often black.

I was surprised by the unanimity which I found on my recent trip to Mexico in the feelings of the Americans who are on the inside looking out. Their feelings in sum and substance were virtually this:

"By no means do we think it necessary or even altogether desirable that the United States should annex Mexico. But it is altogether desirable and necessary that order should be restored in Mexico. We patiently stood the inconveniences of the Madero revolution, for that was the expression in good faith of the popular demand for a more democratic government in Mexico. Our attitude was nearly as serene during the first stages of the Carranza revolution, for,

although some Americans here thought that President Wilson ought to have recognized Huerta, it soon became apparent that Huerta could not control the country, and what all of us want above everything else is a government strong enough to guarantee the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of business. But Carranza has failed to provide such a government, Villa has failed, Zapata has failed, all the Mexicans that have tried it since Diaz have failed, and even Diaz was not so successful a policeman as many of you in the United States believe.

"It has been apparent to us for many months now that this country can be made a fit living-place for civilized people only by the co-operation of some outside power with the best elements among the natives. The United States is the natural power to do this. We hoped that this was going to be done when our forces got a foothold at Vera Cruz. But they soon scuttled out, and we endured the more than ever contemptuous taunts of the class of Mexicans whose favorite sport is gringo-baiting.

"Now our soldiers have entered Mexico again, this time, by the President's avowal, for the sole purpose of getting Villa. The American uniform looks as good to us as a sail to men marooned on a desert island.

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MEXICO-FROM THE INSIDE LOOKING OUT

But the dispersing' of Villa-whatever that ambiguous phrase may mean-will not be enough. Even if Villa were caught, the situation would be very precarious for Americans who remained here after the army had left. If the army leaves without breaking up all of the lawless bands that make life so uncertain and painfully dramatic here, every one of us will give up the outposts of civilization we have struggled so long to hold, and go back to the United States."

That is the warning which comes from our colonists in Mexico, which ought to be heard now when the newspapers are filled with reports that the expedition will be recalled from Mexico without getting Villa.

To withdraw the expedition now means to withdraw every American from Mexico.

Try to put yourself in the position of the man on the inside looking out. It is strange

what a difference the point of view makes. From the comparative safety of the lobby of an El Paso hotel it is easy to join the chorus of glory-shouters who assure each other that "one American can lick ten greasers." But But when you are riding your horse alone past a cuartel, with its lounging guard of boy soldiers, you salute them with the utmost respect, even though many of them are under sixteen, most of them stunted and weak, and all of them dirty, disheveled, and unmartial in appearance.

The first request of Bishop A. B. Call, of the Mormon colony of Colonia Dublan, to the American soldiers that came to camp near his town was:

"Don't laugh at the Carranza soldiers, fellows. Some of them, who are only barefoot boys little higher than their rifles, may seem ridiculous to you well-trained, wellequipped veterans of Philippine campaigns; but don't laugh at them. For, if you do, they'll take it out on us when you have passed south."

The Mormons of Colonia Dublan have fared rather better than the average Americans in Mexico. One reason is that this colony, like the other Mormon villages established in Chihuahua about twenty years ago, has been sufficient unto itself and has steadfastly avoided meddling in Mexican politics. Thus what the Mormons have suffered most other Americans in Mexico have suffered to a greater degree.

This town was named by the Mormons for a Mexican patriot. That was the first stroke of diplomacy scored by these shrewd

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Americans. Dublan should be accented on the second syllable, but the indomitable Irishmen in our army have dubbed the town "Colony of Dublin," as they have nicknamed the near-by Mexican village of Casas Grandes "Casey's Grandest."

Two of its features force Dublan on the retina of the passer by. In the first place, it is remarkably well preserved. Only every tenth house has been war-ruined, instead of every other house, as in most of the surrounding towns. But the first thing you notice about the village is the architecture. After passing, one after another, typical towns of ramshackle, crumbling adobe structure, suddenly on a high plain you see the pointed towers, baroque gables, and multiform windows of multicolored glass characteristic of the atrocious gingerbread style of architecture that visited many parts of the United States like a plague in the latter part of the nineteenth century. The walls of most of the buildings are of those small, red, clean-cut bricks which gave Boston ivy its first foothold; but the gables, roofs, and superstructure in general are shingled over the gingerbread patterns once so popular in Boston's suburbs.

An orderly, well-laid-out town it is, intimating the orderly, well-laid-out minds of its solid, plodding citizens. Man has bifurcated the Rio Casas Grandes above the town, and one arm of the river is flung caressingly about the upper limits of the village, protecting it from the scorching sun and smarting sand of the hungry desert. From this arm long fingers poke through the town, giving each of the several far-stretching longitudinal streets of Dublan two irrigation ditches as gutters, whereby double rows of stately cottonwoods have been nourished into a blossoming and aromatic maturity.

For,

In this garden town the Mormons lived in comparative peace until five years ago, raising with untroubled minds their abundant crops of grain, live stock, and children. although they will assure the visitor to the contrary, polygamy is still practiced enthusiastically. In the single large building of white adobe among the village of red bricks, where flocks of tow-headed children learned their A B C's on week-days, Bishop A. B. Call " Alphabet Call" he is called-expounded the religion of his people's choice to them on warm, clear-skied Sundays.

Up to five years ago at the fairs in El Paso and other American cities near the border there were no apples, peaches, and pears so

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