to say, for the first few years of its life it must be selfish in order to gain strength. The tree draws to itself from all directions, from the forces of earth, sky, and sunshine; but the time comes when it has to show its fruits. And just so with a nation. This is exactly what has happened with Spain, Portugal, France, and Great Britain. Each nation, in turn, had to bear the white man's burden. It has come to America; and what we have done already in Cuba, and what we have proposed to do and are undertaking to do in the Philippines, is to bear this fruit that other peoples as well as ourselves may enjoy it; and I am perfectly sure that if America is to make her contribution to civilization by carrying her ideas and ideals to people that want them she cannot depend upon other nations to do it for her, but must do it herself under the Stars and Stripes. T THE PRE-NOMINATION CAMPAIGN STAFF CORRESPONDENCE BY FREDERICK M. DAVENPORT HE course of the present National Administration in the conduct of international affairs has been almost continuously under fire since Mr. Wilson became President. In line with the plan of presenting the point of view of both political friends and opponents in at least a straightforward and sympathetic manner, I have sought to learn as nearly as possible at first hand the inner thought of the Administration at Washington upon the international relations which have now so long vexed the country. The questions are questions which I propounded, after counseling with others as to their form in order that they might offer a courteous and sympathetic approach to the proper answers from the Administration view-point. The answers are not mine. They are the answers of those to whom the questions were directly put. Although I have no authority to say that any officer of the Administration is responsible for the language used, yet the readers of The Outlook may be assured that the answers are obtained from intimate and entirely trustworthy sources, and represent with exactness the point of view of the Wilson Administration. When the natural reluctance of high officials to speak freely upon international matters is taken into account, I cannot refrain from expressing my appreciation of the cordiality and frankness with which these inquiries were specifically met. Is or was there any obligation resting upon the United States relative to the maintenance of the inviolability of Belgium? None. What was the nature of the obligation assumed by the United States under Articles I and II of the Fifth Convention adopted by the Second Hague Conference regarding the "Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Case of War on Land," which provides that he territory of neutral Powers is inviolable," and that " belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral Power"? There is a distinction between neutralized states and neutral states. Belgium was a neutralized state, a status imposed upon it by conventional agreement between certain European Powers that were interested either in the maintenance of Belgium as a political entity or in keeping Belgium from being a base of military or any other kind of assistance to neighboring states. Neutralization is a condition of permanent neutrality in peace and war, and only the Powers guaranteeing neutralization have any legal right to complain of any violation of the treaty. The United States had no part in the neutralization of Belgium. It was an affair of European politics. war. Neutrality has to do with the attitude of states at the outbreak of an international The Hague Conventions contemplate the rights and duties of states which remain neutral during war. Belgium at the beginning of the war elected to be a neutral state, and under the Fifth Convention the territory of neutral Powers is inviolable. But the Germans violated no Hague Convention by invading Belgium. For what was regarded as good reason, namely, the refusal of Bel 1916 THE PRE-NOMINATION CAMPAIGN gium to allow a free passage for troops, Germany declared war before invading the territory of the neutral. She may therefore have violated the neutralization agreement, to which the United States was never a party, but not the Hague Convention with respect to neutrality, to which the United States was a party. A belligerent under the rules of international law may attack a neutral after stating its own casus belli. Third parties like the United States can offer to mediate only over matters at variance, and this the President did in general terms in the interest of European peace on the 4th and 5th of August, 1914. Furthermore, the delegates to The Hague from the United States explicitly absolved this country from entangling itself with European politics or administration. Are the considerations in regard to the maintenance of neutrality paramount to those of humanity and international justice? All a neutral can do is to maintain its own rights and, indirectly, the rights of humanity. At bottom, however, the principles of humanity are at the basis of international law. Are there firm principles of international law to guide the Administration in the attitude which it assumes relative to the questions of submarine warfare and the interference with neutral rights? Rules are less The principles are there. sure, but founded on principles. This is illustrated by the memorandum with respect to armed merchantmen issued on April 26 under direction of the President. The international principle with respect to armed merchantmen is clear. The principle is that the merchantman, even though armed, is armed for defense and is of peaceful character. But the rule or standard of evidence is not necessarily the same for the neutral and the belligerent. The neutral must be more strict in practice with respect to the evidence of hostile purpose because it may unwittingly violate neutrality in its own ports. The belligerent on the high seas must be cautious in the opposite direction and guard against the wanton destruction of humanity and property. What redress will the Government consider as holding Germany to a strict accountability for the destruction of American lives? That depends on what the proper amends are in each case. Of course there will be an indemnity, which will be an admission of liability. 143 How far will the Government go to protect Americans from jeopardy on the high seas? This is the physical side, and it is up to the President as to the length to which he will go in the use of the naval arm particularly, and also the military arm. Will American citizens employed on any freighter flying a belligerent flag be protected against unlawful attack to the same extent as American passengers traveling on liners? There are two points of view with respect to that: (a) By taking employment on such a vessel American citizens acquire a belligerent character to an extent. (b) On the other hand, men who are following their customary vocations have to seek employment where they can get it. They are, therefore, perhaps, entitled to even more protection than passengers. The Administration has not yet reached a conclusion. If it be an entirely unwarranted attack, it might very justly be complained of. It would not appear that we would have any right to make any great distinction between freighters and liners. In the case of a freighter there is a little more justification in sinking it, but probably the protection of life is just as vital. To what extent is the Government justified in taking action to vindicate the National honor? Any action that it sees fit. We should be careful, however, about putting National interest above National right. The foundation of the Republic is upon National right. The emphasis upon National interest is a part of the utilitarian tendency of the whole age, of which another manifestation is the exaltation of efficiency. In how far should a self-respecting Government modify its stand in regard to the defense of its rights in the presence of a threatened recourse to force on the part of a foreign gov ernment? Yes. The American Government has gone into that carefully in a memorandum just made public. If the American Government considers that international law permits the armament of merchant vessels, why should the Secretary of State, in his note of January 18, have said: I should add that my Government is impressed with the reasonableness of the argument that a merchant vessel carrying armament of any sort, in view of the character of the submarine warfare and the defensive weakness of underseas craft, should be held to be an auxiliary cruiser, and so treated by a neutral as well as by a belligerent Government, and is seriously considering instructing its officials accordingly? The international principle has not changed. A merchantman still has the right to arm for defense. But the burden of proof has changed since the invention and use of the defensively weak underseas craft. The old defensive armament on a merchantman can now be used offensively with disastrous results to the submarine. And a supposedly defensively armed merchantman may easily be a commerce raider in disguise. The old principle requires that the neutral should exercise every care to prevent its own ports from being used by belligerent war-vessels. Since armed merchantmen may now easily become war craft, the neutral must be far more strict in determining what war craft are, in order to prevent itself from becoming liable. The neutral must assume in practice that the presence of armament is against a vessel being of peaceful character, but must listen to the evidence. So far as the neutral is concerned, the burden of proof is on the merchantman. The belligerent on the high seas, on the other hand, must be careful about the application of the new rule, in order to prevent wanton destruction of human life and property, and must have positive evidence that the merchantman is in reality armed for aggression. What answer should be made to those who assert that the United States has not insisted upon its rights of neutral commerce as against British interference? Is there any justification for the view that the United States should regard the illegal destruction of American lives on a different plane from the disregard of its rights of commerce? Certainly. The difference lies in this. The right of life is an inherent right. The right of property is a legal right. Legal right can always be compensated for by a monetary consideration. The right of life never can be. Are there precedents for such forbearance as the Government has shown in the submarine negotiations with Germany? No precedents; but it may be assumed that there are reasons that never will be made public. Of course there is one reason that is obvious to everybody. The submarine is a new weapon of warfare. The Germans maintain that the British are attempting to starve their population. People at war never look at any question entirely sanely, and it is better to exhaust every possible diplomatic channel before we resort to the threat of breaking off relations. What has been accomplished during the year's negotiations with Germany over the sinking of the Lusitania? We had practically reached an agreement until the renewal of submarine activity which has, so far, prevented a complete settlement. We were dealing with two features--past and future conduct. We thought future conduct was entirely settled by the assurance given us, and the whole debate was over past conduct. We had practically reached a satisfactory settlement when the indiscriminate warfare was renewed and overturned everything. How far can an American citizen support what he believes to be the justice of the cause of one of the belligerents without ceasing to be a loyal citizen or causing undue embarrassment to the American Government? He must do nothing that would in any way contribute to the violation of our neutrality. What he says is largely a matter of taste. But the deed is material. For example, using this country as a basis for belligerent operations. Why did the American Government not take any action to prevent the massacre of the Armenians? We did all we could. We made protests. We got Germany to protest. We did not have the physical power to do anything further. What we did had to be entirely through moral and personal influence. We did a good 1916 THE PRE-NOMINATION CAMPAIGN deal to relieve the situation, but not sufficient. Of course there is a measure of excuse, not for the massacre, but for the policy of the Turkish Government, which was to remove the Armenians from the immediate seat of war. Other countries would have done the same thing, but in an entirely different way. Does the American Government expect to secure the protection of American lives and property in Mexico? If we were to undertake fully to protect life and property, we should have to go in and take the country. The whole question of intervention is involved. The majority do not want intervention by this country if it can be avoided. All of Mexico has resented our being in their country every minute since we have recently gone in. We must respect the inherent right of men to pick their own form of government. So far as property is concerned, those who go among non-civilized . peoples for profit expect more than a fair return on their money, and expect to be compensated for their loss, to an extent, in that way. What relative importance attaches to the maintenance of order and the protection of life in Mexico as compared with the right of the Mexicans to continue in revolution or anarchy ? The right of revolution no one can deny. We might use moral influence for the maintenance of order and the protection of life, but we would hardly be warranted in threatening the Mexicans. Within what geographic limits and to what extent shall the United States assist weaker and more disturbed countries to meet their i ternational obligations, as has been done in the cases of San Domingo, Haiti, and Nicaragua? That is a question of our own National safety. It is important in the countries mentioned that there should be peace and stability of government in order that they may not become a prey to foreign interests. This applies particularly to the small countries around and about the Panama Canal. In working out a feasible policy of Pan Americanism for the common defense of the interests of all the republics on this hemisphere, how far is the American Government willing to shoulder the burdens of armament and administration without assuming a preponderating influence in determining the action to be taken! Of course we are bound to maintain PanAmericanism mostly by our own force. That 145 is apparent. There are difficulties in the matter of equality of representation. A PanAmerican policy is best worked out by treaty, by which the countries bind themselves to certain things. And there may be, so far as we are concerned, of course, at any time an appeal to the Monroe Doctrine when our National safety is involved. The Monroe Doctrine is entirely National, for our own protection. If the Unitel Sates should withdraw from the Philippines, whit assurance would there be: (a) For the protection of the civilized popula tion against the uncivilized inhabitants of the islands? (b) That the weaker and less civilized perples would not be exploited by the predatory interests from among the more developed inhab itants of the islands ! (c) For the protection of the lives and property of Americans and ether foreigners for whom we are responsible? (d) That the Philippines would not become another apple of discord, for the possession of which the nations would contend in the Far East? (a) The civilized populations in the Philippine Islands are thoroughly competent to look after themselves so far as the attacks from the non-civilized are concerned, both by their intelligence, arms, and numbers. (b) There could be no assurance that exploitation might not happen. We can only say that since the natives who now constitute the lawmaking body have been practically authorized to legislate they have treated the people very well indeed. At least, under cur observation and guidance they have shown themselves to be fair to the backward peoples. The chief danger is not that the natu ral resources and the backward inhabitants might be exploited, but that everything would be let alone. (c) Any government established by the Filipinos would have a disposition to protect foreigners. If any class of foreigners complained, it would be likely to mean the subjection of the government to foreign tutelage. The foreign investor would have to look to our Government. But even here the situation in the Philippines is fortunate. The Spaniards did not exploit the islands. Neither have we exploited them. And a Philippine government, once established, would become the possessor of forests and public domains worth many times the value of the property under private ownership. A Philippine government, if at all thrifty, could easily take care of the public indebtedness, which is very small. The only danger that might arise would be from extreme incompetence from within. (d) A matter of doubt. There is a good deal of difference of opinion within the Democratic party and among the Wilson supporters. The very fact that the Philippines are the richest tropical country anywhere, the most capable of development, makes a natural temptation to any country wishing to go into tropical colonization. The country is not overpopulated and would develop rapidly. It is near the Chinese coast, and could get a thrifty population without much trouble. The Filipinos have always been a sheltered people. The Spanish Government treated them very well, was semi-religious in its character, and protected them from the temptations of the world. They have never been called upon to protect themselves. They have never been called upon to do most of the serious things connected with government. We have given them much more experience than they ever had, but we have maintained a sufficient number of Americans in power to direct everything. We could not have extended participation in the government much faster than we have without things breaking down. This is the conservative Administration view. The radicals favor the Clarke amendment, practically withdrawing our leadership and responsibility within a short time. What action, if any, is the American Gov ernment taking to help preserve the integrity of China? We are doing nothing except preserving all our rights. As to the integrity of China, there is much doubt if it is being particularly threatened. Is the American Government willing that Japan should apply a Monroe Doctrine of her own to the Far East? The Monroe Doctrine is a National policy of defense. The Monroe Doctrine says that other countries shall not expand their holdings in the Western Hemisphere. Under the terms of a real Monroe Doctrine Japan could not expand her holdings in the Orient. There is some question whether the United States would be willing to have Japan apply "a Monroe Doctrine of her own." What diplomatic policy can the United States adopt which will accord a perfect equality of treatment to the subjects of Japan and yet maintain its sovereign right to choose those whom it will accept into the body of its citizens and those whom it will permit to sojourn or take up a permanent residence in this country? The "gentlemen's agreement " which now governs these matters between Japan and the United States is working well, and there is no complaint. And it is a good adage of diplomacy to let the sleeping dogs lie. Furthermore, so far as citizenship is concerned, we admit by our naturalization laws only whites and those of African descent. Under our laws no Japanese could be naturalized. Those born in this country, however, become citizens without regard to color. In how far is it necessary for a democratic government to keep its diplomacy secret? Without secrecy we never could hold confidential negotiations at all. If we should disclose many things affecting the course of diplomacy we should destroy the usefulness of our officers abroad and all possibility of completing the negotiations. How is it possible to reconcile a large measure of secrecy in the conduct of foreign affairs with the necessary education of public opinion and the securing of the support of the people for the policies of the Government? The only way to educate public opinion is to proclaim a general policy and allow it to be discussed among the people. This is almost the first time that foreign affairs have really become so prominent that the people of the United States have become thoroughly exercised over them. There is a great deal which can be disclosed and which it is important to disclose and to have discussed in order to develop a sound public opinion. Is the proposal of a league to enforce peace compatible with the traditional policy of the United States to avoid entangling alliances? An Administration beset by a problem of the first magnitude of keeping the peace without any league, has not the time just now to think much about leagues hereafter to enforce peace. What is the verdict of the future likely to be upon the whole course of the Wilson foreign policy? As to the foreign policy in general, there is reason to believe that in the cool judgment of history the President's conduct will meet with the approval of all. The country is now divided into camps and cannot see things dispassionately, and it is therefore impossible to get an unbiased opinion. It is the chief |